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Structured Summary of the Provided Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

The Court considered a Rule on five persons directing them to show cause why they should not be proceeded against for contempt for allegedly disregarding and disobeying interim orders made by Bose, J., in a Rule Nisi issued on an application under Article 226 of the Constitution. The five persons named as opposite parties were: (1) Sri S.N. Maitra, Collector of 24-Parganas; (2) State of West Bengal, represented by Sri S. Banerjee (Secretary, Department of Land and Land Revenue); (3) Sri S.N. Roy, Relief Officer of Basirhat; (4) Sri Prafulla Chandra Deb Roy, Superintendent, Refugee Camp, Basirhat; and (5) Sri Atul Krishna Gain, Kanungo at Basirhat.

The petitioners (three persons claiming ownership of lands in Gokulpore, 24-Parganas) had earlier moved a petition (on Aug. 20, 1951) seeking writs (mandamus, prohibition and directions) alleging unlawful steps under the West Bengal Land Development and Planning Act, 1948. Bose, J., issued a Rule Nisi with interim orders corresponding to the prayers in the petition; those interim orders were directed against the State and the Collector. The petitioners alleged that despite the interim orders, opposite parties continued interference with their lands, including forcible trespass by opposite parties Nos. 3–5, sinking of a tubewell, and felling of trees.

The matter, initially before a Bench including the Chief Justice, was referred to the regular Criminal Bench for hearing on evidence because disputed questions of fact arose. At the hearing the petitioners' advocate limited the alleged contempts to three acts (sinking a tubewell, cutting down trees, and demarcation), later abandoning some allegations; ultimately the issues to be proved reduced to the sinking of a tubewell in plot No. 779 and the cutting down of certain trees.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the five named opposite parties should be proceeded against for contempt for allegedly disregarding and disobeying the interim orders made by Bose, J., in the Rule Nisi under Article 226.
  2. Whether the State of West Bengal can properly be impleaded in contempt proceedings as "represented by" a named individual (Sri S. Banerjee), and, relatedly, the proper procedure for holding government officers personally liable for contempt when an order is made against the State.
  3. Whether the petitioners proved (a) the specified acts (sinking a tubewell and cutting trees) as occurring after service of the interim orders, (b) the identification and connection of opposite parties Nos. 3, 4 and 5 with those acts, and (c) that opposite parties Nos. 1 and 2 (the Collector and Sri S. Banerjee) had the requisite responsibility and knowledge to be held in contempt.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioners' Arguments

  • The petitioners alleged that after interim orders had been made by Bose, J., opposite parties continued to take steps purporting to acquire petitioners' land under the West Bengal Land Development and Planning Act, 1948, and that opposite parties Nos. 3–5 forcibly trespassed on certain plots, sank a tubewell and felled trees.
  • The petitioners' advocate limited the acts to be proved at the hearing to three items: (i) sinking of a tubewell, (ii) cutting down of trees, and (iii) demarcation of certain lands. (At trial the demarcation allegation was not pursued.)
  • The petitioners contended that Sri S. Banerjee, as Secretary of the Land and Land Revenue Department, was responsible for administration of the Act and therefore should be held liable for any disobedience by the State or its agents.

Opposite Parties' Arguments and Responses

  • Sri S. Banerjee, in affidavit, admitted service of a copy of the original Rule (served on September 4) but stated that his Department had nothing to do with the administration of the West Bengal Land Development and Planning Act, 1948, and denied that the orders of the Court were violated or that the acts complained of were done by the opposite parties as alleged.
  • The Collector (Sri S.N. Maitra) denied that the alleged acts were done or that any violation of the interim orders took place; the Collector's affidavit included a statement about service dates that the Court later criticized for imprecise drafting.
  • At the hearing petitioners' counsel declined to rely on an Advocate's letter alleged to have been shown to opposite parties Nos. 3–5 and led no evidence establishing those persons were aware of the interim orders.

Table of Precedents Cited

No precedents were cited in the provided opinion.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The judgment proceeds in a stepwise analysis focused on identity, procedure, proof of acts, notice and responsibility.

  1. On impleading the State and an individual officer:
    • The Court held that it is inappropriate and incorrect to implead the State simply as "represented by" a particular officer and then treat that officer as the personification of the State for purposes of committing the State to prison. The State is not to be personified in that manner. When an order or injunction is made against a Government or corporation, enforcement typically proceeds by attachment or committal of an officer in whose charge the subject matter rests, but the correct procedure is to make an application for leave to proceed against that individual and to establish prima facie that the individual had the duty and knowledge to obey the order.
    • Chakravartti, J., observed the petitioners did not follow the correct procedure in impleading Sri S. Banerjee personally but, because Sri S. Banerjee's affidavit showed he understood himself to have been arraigned and no one was misled, the Court waived the irregularity and treated the application as if properly made against him individually.
  2. On what the petitioners actually sought to prove:
    • The petitioners reduced the basis of contempt to three acts, and during hearing reduced that further to two: (i) sinking of a tubewell in plot No. 779 and (ii) cutting down certain trees. Allegations of steps toward acquisition and demarcation were abandoned or unsupported by evidence.
  3. On proof against opposite parties Nos. 3, 4 and 5 (the alleged physical actors):
    • The petitioners, who examined themselves, made no attempt to identify or connect opposite parties Nos. 3–5 with the alleged acts. No evidence was led to show these officers had knowledge of the interim orders. The petitioners declined to rely on an Advocate's letter previously alleged to have been shown to these officers, and expressly did not lead evidence about it.
    • Consequently, even assuming the acts occurred after the interim orders, there was no proof of (a) the identity/connection of these individuals to the acts, and (b) their knowledge of the orders — both necessary elements to establish contempt. The Court therefore found no case against opposite parties Nos. 3–5.
  4. On Sri S. Banerjee (opposite party No. 2):
    • Although Sri S. Banerjee admitted service, he averred his Department was not concerned with administration of the Act in respect of development and settlement work. The Court examined the scheme of the West Bengal Land Development and Planning Act, 1948: the Government issues notifications and lands are acquired; thereafter a "prescribed authority" (the Land Planning Committee) prepares and executes development schemes, and the Relief and Rehabilitation Department (a different department with its own Secretary) was charged with refugee settlement in the lands at issue.
    • The Court concluded the Land and Land Revenue Department (for which Sri S. Banerjee was Secretary) was concerned principally with acquisition; the alleged physical acts (tubewell sinking, felling trees) were acts of development/exercise of ownership indicative of activity by the prescribed authority under the Relief and Rehabilitation Department. Thus, even if the acts occurred, responsibility would not, on the material before the Court, rest with Sri S. Banerjee. The Court emphasized that to hold an individual officer liable for contempt it must be established that he was in charge of the subject-matter and had knowledge of the order.
  5. On the Collector (opposite party No. 1):
    • The Collector denied the acts and breach. The petitioners relied upon Section 11 of the Act to contend the Collector retained connection with the lands; the Court observed Section 11 relates to final disposal by the Collector and does not speak to acquisition-stage duties or to acts in the course of development under the prescribed authority.
    • The Court found it doubtful that the Collector had any connection with acts of development executed by the prescribed authority under the Relief and Rehabilitation Department and concluded the petitioners failed to establish that it was the Collector's duty to ensure that the type of acts complained of did not occur. Further, the evidence did not establish that the acts, if done, occurred after service of the interim orders on the Collector.
    • The Court also criticized the Collector's affidavit wording about the date of service as carelessly drafted, but did not base the decision solely on that point.
  6. On burden of proof and required elements for contempt:
    • The Court (both in Chakravartti, J.'s analysis and in the concurring remarks of the other Judge) emphasized four indispensable requisites for contempt proceedings against individuals: (1) service of the order upon the person alleged to have committed contempt; (2) precise act of contempt; (3) precise responsibility of the contemnor for that act; and (4) that the alleged contempt occurred subsequent to service of the order. Failure to establish any of these requisites requires dismissal of the contempt petition.
    • The petitioners failed to satisfy these requisites on the evidence adduced, and the Court held that, on the materials, no disobedience of the interim orders had been established.
  7. On costs and Court's view of abuse of process:
    • The Court expressed regret at the evasive or insufficient identification of persons accused (opposite parties Nos. 3–5) and criticized the dragging of public officers into criminal proceedings without adequate foundation. The Court noted the practice in England to award costs to respondents if the contempt charge is not established and considered it fair to award costs here because the petitioners made no attempt to establish connections with the accused persons at the hearing.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The Rule nisi for contempt is discharged; the petitioners failed to prove contempt against any of the opposite parties.

Implications and immediate consequences as directed by the Court:

  • The Rule is discharged (no committal or punishment for contempt of the named opposite parties).
  • Costs were ordered against the petitioners: petitioners Nos. 1 and 2 to pay two gold-mohurs each; petitioner No. 3 to pay three gold-mohurs. The amount of costs was to be divided between opposite parties Nos. 2, 3, 4 and 5. No costs were ordered in favour of opposite party No. 1 (the Collector) because his status was not wholly free from doubt and because of defects in his affidavit.
  • Procedural guidance from the opinion:
    • A State should not be impleaded in contempt proceedings as being "represented by" a named officer; contempt proceedings must target individual officers qua individuals when it is they who are alleged to have disobeyed orders.
    • Before proceeding against an officer for contempt where the original order was against the State or a corporation, the petitioner must (at least prima facie) show the officer was responsible for the subject-matter to which the order related and had knowledge of the order.
    • The Court reiterated the four essential elements a petitioner must prove in contempt proceedings (service, the precise act, the contemnor's responsibility, and the timing of the act relative to service). Failure on any one of these elements requires dismissal of the petition.

The Court's decision disposed of the contempt proceedings on the facts and procedural grounds described above. The opinion articulates guidance on proper procedure in contempt proceedings involving the State and public officers, but it does not purport to lay down a novel legal principle beyond the application of the necessary elements and procedures for proving contempt on the facts of this case.

    Tarafatullah Mandal And 2 Ors. v. S.N Maitra, I.C.S, Collector, 24-Parganas, & 4 Ors. Opposite Parties.

    The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

    Chakravartti, J.:— This is a Rule on five persons, requiring them to show cause why they should not be proceeded against for contempt for having disregarded and disobeyed certain interim orders made by Bose, J., while granting a Rule Nisi on an application under Art. 226 of the Constitution of India. Of the five persons, the first is Sri S.N Maitra, Collector of 24-Parganas; the second is the State of West Bengal, represented by Sri S. Banerjee; the third is Sri S.N Roy, Relief. Officer of Basirhat; the fourth is Sri Prafulla Chandra Deb Roy, Superintendent, Refugee Camp, Basirhat; and the fifth is Sri Atul Krishna Gain, Kanungo at Basirhat.

    2. The petitioners are three in number and claim to be owners of certain lands in village Gokulpore in the District of 24-Parganas. It appears that on Aug. 20, 1951, a petition was moved on their behalf and on behalf of certain other persons for various writs against the first opposite party and the State of West Bengal on the allegation that they were taking various steps to deprive the petitioners of their lands in purported and illegal exercise of their supposed powers under the West Bengal Land Development and Planning Act, 1948, which was an ultra vires piece of legislation. A schedule to the petition gave particulars of the lands in respect of which the rights of the petitioners were alleged to have been invaded. The writ, asked for by prayer (a) of the petition, was a writ of mandamus, directing the opposite parties therein to forbear from depriving the petitioners of their property by way of any orders under Act XXI of 1948; that, asked for by prayer (6), was a writ of prohibition, prohibiting the opposite parties from taking any step under the aforesaid Act; and the writ, asked for by prayer (c), was a direction upon the opposite parties to forbear from taking any steps under the Act already mentioned. Bose, J., it appears, did not issue any writ straight away, but instead issued a Rule Nisi and in the meantime he passed interim orders in terms of prayers (a), (b) and (c); those orders were necessarily only against the present Opposite Party No. 1 and the State of West Bengal. It is alleged that in spite of those orders being passed and with knowledge of them, opposite parties Nos. 1 and 2 continued their interference with the lands of the petitioners. Not only did they not desist from proceeding with the proceedings of acquisition, but they also caused actual acts of aggression to be done and opposite parties Nos. 3, 4 and 5 forcibly trespassed into certain plots of land belonging to the petitioners, sank a tubewell in one of them and felled trees in others. It was not stated in the petition when these acts had been done and the petitioners contented themselves with stating that they had been done after the interim orders had been made. The acts complained of constitute, in the submission of the petitioners, contempt of this Court and accordingly they prayed that the opposite parties might be committed to prison for wilfully flouting and disobeying the interim orders made by Bose, J.

    3. Before proceeding further, it is necessary to say a word about the person or party impleaded as opposite party No. 2 in the petition. That party, as I have stated already, is “State of West Bengal, represented by Sri S. Banerjee, Secretary, Department of Land and Land Revenue”. It will thus be seen that the person or party said to be in contempt, so far as this opposite party is concerned, is the State of West Bengal itself. It will also be remembered that the prayer in the petition is that the opposite parties should be committed to prison. In effect, therefore, the petitioners are praying that the State of West Bengal, as represented by Sri S. Banerjee, should be committed to prison.

    4. As the practice of impleading the State as represented by some particular individual is becoming common in contempt proceedings, it seems necessary to point out what the correct procedure is. Nothing can be less accurate or more ridiculous than to ask that a particular State should itself be committed to prison, or that the State should be regarded as personified in some individual officer nominated by the complainant, and should be committed to prison in the person of that officer. The State is not a minor, or a lunatic, or a Hindu deity that it can be represented by anyone in the manner sought to be done in the present petition. Nor is it a body corporate. Even when the Union of India or one of the component States is sought to be made a party, it is to be impleaded in the manner and the name indicated in the Constitution itself. To implead the Union, or one of the States as represented by some particular officer, whether in Civil or Criminal proceedings, is not warranted by any provision of law, and so far as Criminal proceedings are concerned, is particularly inappropriate. As I have already indicated, what the petitioners seem to have in contemplation is that, for the purposes of the present case, Sri S. Banerjee should be treated as the personification of the State of West Bengal and that to commit him to prison would be committing the State. If that be correct, then, in the event of the petition succeeding, this State will stand committed to prison and dwell there in the person of Sri S. Banerjee during the period of our pleasure. Nothing, as I have pointed out, can be more ridiculous than that.

    5. When an order or injunction is made against a Government or a corporate body, it can, in case it is disregarded, be sought to be enforced by attachment or committal of one of the officers. That is well established, the reason being that a State or a corporation cannot, in the very nature of things, act by itself, but must act through agents, such as officers or members. In such cases if an order or injunction is made against the Government, or the corporate body, a breach of such order or injunction can in most cases be punished only if it is possible to proceed against the officer or member in whose charge the subject matter of the order might be and whose duty it was to obey and carry out the order. But if it is sought to enforce an order, made against a corporation, or a Government by the attachment or committal of a member of the corporate body, or an officer of the Government, the correct procedure to follow is to make an application to the Court concerned for leave to proceed against the particular individual who is sought to be arraigned and to make out to the satisfaction of the Court that he was the person on whom the duty lay to see that the order previously made was carried out or not disobeyed and further that he had knowledge of the order. In the present case, for example, an application might have been made for leave to proceed against Sri S. Banerjee personally though the interim orders were against the State, but if the petitioners intended to do so, they would have to make such an application and satisfy the Court, prima facie at least, that after the interim orders had been made, it would be the concern of Sri S. Banerjee, as the Secretary of the Department of Land and Land Revenue, to see that the mandatory portions of the order were carried out and the prohibitory portions not disobeyed and that he had been served with or had come to know of the orders. No such application was made, nor any leave asked for or granted, and the State of West Bengal itself was arraigned as the party in contempt, not simpliciter but as represented by Sri S. Banerjee. I do not say that in fit cases a writ for contempt may not be asked for against a corporation itself, or against a Government. In what form, in such a case, any penal order, if considered necessary, is to be passed and how it is to be enforced are different matters which do not call for decision in this case. In England, there is a specific rule providing for sequestration of the corporate property of the party concerned, where such party is a corporation. I am not aware of any similar rule obtaining in this country, but I do not consider it impossible that in a fit case a fine may be imposed and it may be realised by methods analogous to sequestration which would be a distress warrant directed against the properties of the Government or the corporation. But, as I have said, that matter does not require to be decided in the present case.

    6. There can be no doubt that what the petitioners intended to say by their petition was that such interference with their lands as, according to them, was being committed, must ultimately be attributed to Sri S. Banerjee, inasmuch as the application of the West Bengal Land Development and Planning Act, 1948, was a concern of the Department of Land and Land Revenue, of which Sri S. Banerjee was the Secretary. On that basis, their intention appears to have been to submit that Sri S. Banerjee, being the person responsible for the administration of the Act, was the person who was required to see, on behalf of the State, that the interim orders were not disregarded and that having failed to do so, he had made himself liable in contempt. It appears that the original order, so far as it was made against the State of West Bengal, was served on Sri S. Banerjee; even so, as I have already indicated, the petitioners have not adopted the correct procedure for impleading Sri S. Banerjee as an individual nor have they done so in fact. But since familiarity with the correct procedure in regard to such matters is perhaps not to be expected, as Occasions to have recourse to it are infrequent, we shall waive the irregularity and take the application as properly made against Sri S. Banerjee individually. It appears from the affidavit filed by Sri S. Banerjee that he understood himself to have been arraigned as the person in contempt. Since no one has been misled and a Rule has already been issued on Sri S. Banerjee, we shall overlook the irregularity.

    7. To return now to, the facts, in paragraph 6 of their petition, which is the material paragraph, the complaint made by the petitioners is that the opposite parties are “continuing to take all steps and actions purporting to acquire your petitioners' land” and that three of them trespassed into certain plots of lands, sinking a tubewell and cutting down trees in the manner I have already described. As soon as the case was opened, I asked the learned Advocate for the petitioners what the acts were which he was going to establish and which, in his submission, constituted contempt. He mentioned three acts only, (i) the sinking of a tubewell, (ii) the cutting down of trees, and (iii) the demarcation of certain lands. He did not mention any steps taken towards acquiring the lands of the petitioners. We have, therefore, to confine ourselves to the three acts named by the learned Advocate himself.

    8. I have omitted to mention that this matter came up for hearing originally before a Bench presided over by my Lord the Chief Justice but as it appeared that it involved disputed questions of fact, their Lordships made an order that it should be heard on evidence by the regular Criminal Bench. It was under that direction that the case came up for hearing before us.

    9. I have already stated that in opening his case the learned Advocate for the petitioners abandoned one of the allegations made in the petition, namely, the allegation that certain steps towards acquiring the lands of the petitioners had been taken after the interim orders had been made. The evidence he led dropped another allegation, for not a single question was put to any of the petitioners regarding any demarcation made of any land. In the result, we were left with two allegations only, namely, (i) the sinking of a tubewell in plot No. 779, and (ii) the cutting down of certain trees.

    10. I must now proceed to consider whether these acts have been established as facts and whether, if they have been, the opposite parties have been successfully connected with them, or their responsibility proved. It will be convenient to take up first opposite parties Nos. 3, 4 and 5 who, it is alleged, committed the actual physical acts.

    11. As to the case against those opposite parties, it is enough to say that the petitioners, who examined themselves, did not even make any attempt to prove any case.

    12. [The rest of the paragraph is not material to the report— Reporter.]

    13. This ought to be sufficient to dispose of the case against the opposite parties Nos. 3, 4 and 5, but there is more. In the petition it was alleged that a letter, written by a certain Advocate, was shown to these opposite parties at the time they were about to do the acts complained of and that by that letter they had been made aware of the interim orders passed by Bose, J. At the hearing Mr. Das stated that he did not desire to make use of that letter and would lead no evidence regarding it. Whether, even if an Advocate's letter had been shown and that letter contained a statement that certain interim orders had been passed, it would suffice to affect these opposite parties with notice of the orders, is itself not too clear. Personally, I doubt if it would. But since no use was sought to be made of the letter, the petitioners would have to prove by other evidence that opposite parties Nos. 3, 4 and 5 had been aware of the interim orders at the time they had done the acts complained of, assuming it was they who had done them. No attempt whatsoever was made to prove that they had any knowledge of the orders. It follows that even assuming that the acts complained of were done and they were done after the interim orders had been made, there is no case at all against opposite parties Nos. 3, 4 and 5, first for the reason that their connection with the alleged acts was not proved and secondly for the reason that it has not been shown that they were aware of the orders.

    14. [The rest of the paragraph is not relevant to this report— Reporter.]

    15. I would next take up Sri S. Banerjee. In his affidavit he admits that a copy of the original Rule was served upon him on September 4, but he pleads that he or his Department has got nothing to do with the administration of the West Bengal Land Development and Planning Act, 1948, and that, therefore, he could not, in any view, be held to have been in contempt, even if the alleged acts were clone. He proceeds to state that according to his knowledge derived from the records, the orders of this Court were not violated and the acts complained of were not done by the opposite parties, as alleged.

    16. It appears to me that the first plea taken by Sri S. Banerjee is well-founded and must be accepted. The parties did not appear to realise the importance of ascertaining at what precise stage the proceedings under the West Bengal Land Development and Planning Act were and the bearing which that matter had on the liability of opposite parties Nos. 1 and 2, even if the alleged acts had been done. In those circumstances, we invited the learned Advocates, particularly the learned Advocate for the opposite parties, to inform us more fully what the scheme of the new Act was and what stags the proceedings had reached. It appears from an examination of the Act that in the main it is concerned with providing for the acquisition of lands for some special purposes and it leaves the development of exploitation of lands, so acquired to a body called the “prescribed authority”. Broadly stated, the scheme of the Act is that in the first place the Provincial Government will set up an authority for carrying out the purposes of the Act. The Government will then issue a notification, declaring that certain lands are needed or likely to be needed for a public purpose and then ask the “prescribed authority”, or it may be, some company or local authority, to prepare a development scheme in respect of the notified area. If the scheme, when prepared and submitted, is sanctioned, the Government will proceed to acquire the lands and, having acquired them, will proceed to dispose of them mainly by handing them over to the prescribed authority for the purpose of the execution of the scheme. It may also retain, or let on hire, or lease, or sell any land acquired in pursuance of the Act, but the main purpose is what I have stated. When the lands have been thus acquired and handed over to the prescribed authority, the development scheme will proceed.

    17. It appears that the Land and Land Revenue Department of the Government, of which Sri S. Banerjee is the Secretary, is concerned with the Act only up to the stage of acquisition. The “prescribed authority” under the Act is the Land Planning Committee and that committee, it appears, has decided, so far as the lands involved in the present case are concerned, to utilize them for the purposes of a scheme for settlement of refugees. This settlement of refugees is the concern of a different department of the Government, namely, the Relief and Rehabilitation Department, which has its own Secretary. The position, therefore, seems to be that so far as the present lands are concerned, the application of the West Bengal Land Development and Planning Act, 1948, has passed the stage of acquisition and reached the stage of development; in other words, has passed from the charge of the Land and Land Revenue Department to the charge of the Relief and Rehabilitation Department. The petition proceeds on the basis that the stage of acquisition is not yet over, because one of the complaints, as I have already stated, is that the first two opposite parties had taken certain further steps towards acquiring the lands even after the interim orders had been made. As I have said already, no attempt was made to prove this allegation. Besides, the actual physical acts complained of themselves suggest that a stage has now been reached which is subsequent to the stage of acquisition. The complaint, it will be remembered, is that a tubewell was sunk and that certain trees were cut down. These are not acts incidental to any proceeding for acquisition of lands, but are acts done in exercise of ownership or a claim of ownership. What incidental acts may be done in the course of the preliminary operations relating to acquisition is indicated in sub-sec. (2) of Sec. 4 of the Act and they are not acts of the kind alleged to have been done on the present occasion. There can thus be no doubt that the lands are now being developed by the prescribed authority under the supervision and control of the Relief and Rehabilitation Department and if any violation of the interim orders took place, the responsibility therefor would not in any event be on Sri S. Banerjee.

    18. It is true that when an injunction is granted against a corporation, which afterwards does or permits an act in breach of the injunction, there is a wilful disobedience of the order and it will be no answer for the corporation to say that the act was done or the omission allowed to occur unintentionally, or through carelessness, or through dereliction of duty on the part of servants of the corporation. The same principle, I imagine, would apply in the case of a Government, or a State, but before an individual officer of the Government can be held to be liable, it must be established that he was the person in charge of the subject-matter to which the injunction or order, alleged to have been disobeyed, related and unless that is established, no case against an individual officer can succeed. In my opinion, the petitioners arraigned Sri S. Banerjee without due enquiry as to what position he was occupying and as to whether he had any longer any responsibility at all in respect of the acts done in execution of the development scheme. It may be that awards in respect of the lands acquired in connection with the scheme still remain to be made and so far as that matter is concerned it may be that neither the Collector nor the Secretary of the Land and Land Revenue Department has yet ceased to have connection with the lands. But the acts, complained of, which are said to have constituted contempt, do not relate to any proceedings connected with the acquisition of the lands. They are acts done in the course of the execution of the development scheme and consequently it is impossible to say that even if the acts were in fact done, the ultimate responsibility was Sri S. Banerjee's.

    19. It remains now to deal with the case against the first opposite party, namely, the Collector of 24-Parganas. He too has filed an affidavit and has simply denied that any of the alleged acts were done, or that any violation of the interim orders had taken place in any other form. In his case again, we are confronted with the question I have dealt with in connection with the case of Sri S. Banerjee. The learned Advocate for the petitioners referred us to Sec. 11 of the West Bengal Land Development and Planning Act, 1948, and contended that the Collector could not be said to have ceased to have any connection with the lands.

    20. [The judgment then stated the argument made on Sec. 11 and the oral evidence and continued as follows:]

    21. As regards Sec. 11, that again speaks of only the final disposal of the land by the Collector to the prescribed authority. It has nothing to do with acquisition, or anything to be done by the Collector in matters between the original owners and the acquiring authority. If, as I have already indicated, the lands are now being developed and exploited by the Land Planning Committee under the direction of the Relief and Rehabilitation Department, it is at least doubtful whether the Collector has any connection at all with the activities relating to the development scheme. I have already pointed out that the acts, complained of, are not acts incidental to acquisition of lands, but are acts which are ordinarily done in exercise of rights of ownership. In any event, this is a proceeding for contempt and if the petitioners expected to succeed, it was for them to establish affirmatively that it was the duty of the Collector under the Act to see that no acts of the nature complained of were done. On the materials before us, we do not find it possible to hold that the Collector qua Collector or otherwise has any concern with acts done by the prescribed authority under the direction of the Relief and Rehabilitation Department.

    22. We would not, however, like to rest our decision as respects the Collector on this technical ground.

    23. [His Lordship discussed the evidence and concluded as follows:]

    24. This, in my opinion, is sufficient for holding that no disobedience of the interim orders has been established, even assuming that the acts complained of were done at some time or other.

    25. It was brought to our notice by the learned Advocate for the petitioners that although the date of the service of notice on the Collector had been given in the petition as the 14th September, it appeared from the return of service that the service had actually taken place on the 11th.

    26. [After discussing the evidence on the point the judgment proceeded as follows:]

    27. Still, as we have not heard the Collector, we shall assume that the notice did not actually find its way into his hands till the 14th. Even then we cannot but regret that the Collector should have stated in an affidavit to be used in this Court that the notice was “served upon me” on the 14th. Surely, officers in the position of a District Magistrate, swearing affidavits personally for the purpose of the same being used in this Court, ought to be extremely careful as to what language they use and what statements of fact they make. The affidavit shows that it was not drafted by any lawyer and the language which the Collector permitted himself to use only justifies the old warning that no man should be a lawyer in his own case.

    28. [His Lordship discussed whether the acts were done before or after the service of interim orders and went on thus:]

    29. I am, therefore, of opinion that even assuming that the Collector would be responsible if the acts alleged were done after the service of the interim orders, it has not been established that they were so done.

    30. In the result, therefore, the case against all the opposite parties fails.

    31. It appears to us that the matter cannot be disposed of by merely discharging the Rule. This Court is and has always been jealous of its authority in public interest and will, I hope, always continue to be so. It will regard persons who bring to its notice cases of violation of its orders as persons who aid the administration of justice. But it cannot tolerate being misled by accusations against wrong parties and cannot allow its time to be wasted by proceedings which ought not to have been initiated at all in respect of the parties against whom they are directed. The petitioners took the responsibility of mentioning opposite parties Nos. 3, 4 and 5 as the persons responsible for the acts complained of by them and actually named them as the persons who had gone upon their lands. At the actual hearing, they made no attempt to connect them with the incidents at all either by identifying them or by describing them sufficiently or in any other way. On the other hand, it appeared that two of the officers had never resided in the Gokulpore School at all and the one that did, was a mere Superintendent of a Refugee Camp, charged with looking after stranded refugees before their rehabilitation and having no concern whatever with any development work. These three officers had to attend this Court and were kept from their public duties for three days and it is, in my opinion, intolerable that any one should drag public officers into criminal proceedings without making the slightest attempt to establish a case against them at the actual hearing or trial. Although contempt of this Court is a matter between the Court and the party in contempt, proceedings in contempt must be allowed to be initiated by a motion made by private parties, because that is one of the ways in which cases of breaches of the Court's orders may come to the Court's notice. But at the same time this liberty or privilege of private parties cannot be allowed to be abused and no person can be allowed to arraign others in a proceeding for contempt without exercising due care and responsibility. It was surprising to us to a degree that during the examination-in-chief of the petitioners, not a single question was put to anyone of, them about the identity of any of the opposite parties Nos. 3, 4 and 5. If the petitioners really knew that those were the persons who had done the acts complained of, as they had stated in their petition and if they had instructed their learned Advocate to that effect, it is impossible for us to understand why during their examination-in-chief no statements were obtained from them that these were the officers who had been seen or known to have done the acts complained of, or caused them to be done. Nor, we think, was there any reason for bringing in Sri S. Banerjee without making any enquiry as to the stage at which the proceeding was.

    32. It appears from the books that it is the practice on the Crown side in the High Court in England to award costs to the respondent in a contempt proceeding if the charge is not established. Where the person charged with contempt is proved to have done the act complained of and the question merely is whether it amounted to contempt or not, it may not always be proper to make an order for costs, even if the decision be in favour of the respondent.

    33. But where, as in the present case, no connection with the persons charged with the acts complained of has been attempted to be established, it is obviously fair and proper that the persons so unreasonably treated should be indemified in costs. We, therefore, propose to make an order for costs in the present Rule.

    34. In the result, the Rule is discharged.

    35. As regards costs, there ought to be, we think, a distinction between petitioner No. 3 and the two remaining petitioners. Petitioner No. 3 affirmed the petition on which the Rule was issued and claimed to have instructed the learned Advocate for the petitioners. The names of the opposite parties must, therefore, have been put down at his instance, or at least that is the assumption we must make, although absence of any examination-in-chief on the point suggests other possibilities as well. We accordingly direct that petitioners Nos. 1 and 2 do pay two gold-mohurs each as costs and petitioner No. 3 do pay as costs three gold-mohurs, the amount of costs to be divided between opposite parties Nos. 2, 3, 4 and 5. As the status of opposite party No. 1 is not wholly free from doubt and as there Occurs in his affidavit the defect I have referred to, we shall make no order for costs in his favour.

    P.B Mukharji, J.:— I agree that this Rule should be discharged with the order for costs just made by my Lord.

    36. A proceeding in contempt is by its nature a proceeding in personam. A contempt proceeding therefore cannot be allowed to acquire the character of a representative proceeding. One of the respondents described in the petition for Rule is in the form: “The State of West Bengal represented by S. Banerjee, Secretary, Department of Land and Land Revenue”. That, I think, is wholly an unjustified procedure and cannot be permitted. The State is not a legal and juristic entity in the same sense as a corporation or a joint stock company nor is it to be treated as a minor or a lunatic or a Hindu Deity in the sense of having to be represented by a guardian.

    37. A State as such cannot be said to commit contempt. In the case of the State the allegation must be against a particular officer or officers of the State. Where, as in this case, an order was obtained against the State in a civil proceeding restraining certain acts of the State, and it is alleged by the complainant or the petitioner that there has been a contempt by breach of that order, the petitioner for contempt will have to take out the Rule for contempt against the particular officer or officers who has or have disobeyed that order. In such a petition for contempt the Rule must be asked against an individual and not against the State. Article 300 of the Constitution of India provides for proceedings by way of suit against the State or the Union of India and cannot be extended to apply to contempt proceedings.

    38. As at present advised I do not however think it is necessary that any leave of the Court is required to proceed against a Government Officer in contempt. It is, I think, enough to state in the petition for Rule as against the particular officer of the State that he has disobeyed an order of the Court in a particular manner. We have no such requirement for leave of Court as is provided in the Rules of the Supreme Court of London in Order 42, Rule 31, which says that any judgment or order against a corporation wilfully disobeyed may by leave of Court or a Judge be enforced by sequestration against the corporate property or by attachment against the Directors or other officers thereof or by sequestration against their property. It is however always essential even in India that an individual or an officer who is not a party to the proceeding resulting in the order alleged to have been disobeyed but who is sought to be proceeded against in contempt, must be served with a copy of the order or judgment to be enforced. It is proper course in my opinion to insert the names of the individuals or the officer in the Rule Nisi and to serve it on him specifying the nature of the contempt with which the individual or officer served is charged.

    39. Before a proceeding for contempt can succeed it is of paramount importance to establish first, the service of the order of the Court said to have been disobeyed upon the person alleged to have committed contempt thereof, secondly, the precise act of contempt, thirdly, the precise responsibility of the contemner in the act of contempt, and fourthly, the date of the alleged contempt being subsequent to the service of the order said to have been disobeyed. These are the four indispensable requisites and failure to establish any one of them must mean dismissal of the petition for contempt.

    40. The petitioners have alleged as against the Collector and the Secretary, Department of Land and Land Revenue, that the acts of contempt mentioned in paragraphs 5 and 6 of the petition were done at the instance of and/or under the direction or orders of these two respondents. That allegation has not been established at all on the evidence produced by the petitioners. Nothing appears in the evidence as to how these two respondents are responsible by any of their order or direction. On this ground alone the Rule should be discharged against them.

    41. Next with reference to the respondents Nos. 3, 4 and 5 it is quite clear from the evidence that not one of them has been identified or proved to have any responsibility whatever in the alleged acts of contempt. On this ground alone the Rule should be discharged as against them.

    42. Having regard to this view that I take, it is not necessary in my opinion, therefore, to decide the legal technicalities of procedure under the West Bengal Land Development and Planning Act, 1948, and the exact point when acquisition ends and planning begins under that Act or at what particular stage these proceedings are at present with respect to the lands in question. I, therefore, do not express any opinion on that point.

    43. The total effect of the evidence shows beyond any doubt that the petitioners have failed completely to prove that the alleged acts of contempt were committed after the service of the order said to have been disobeyed upon respondents Nos. 1 and 2.

    44. A contempt cannot be spelt out by mere inference from doubtful circumstances. The essence of a contempt is that even after the communication of the order of the Court there has been deliberate disregard of such order. There can never be a contempt of an order of Court by a person who was not aware of such order at the time when he is supposed to have acted contrary to what was directed by the order. Knowledge of the order of the Court therefore is a fundamental postulate for contempt. The facts on the evidence have been dealt with at length by my Lord and the dates as shown there for the alleged contempt being the “end of Bhadra” clearly indicate that at best the contempt here can only be a matter of speculation.

    45. I therefore agree that this petition should be denied with the order made by my Lord.

    P.S

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