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  • West Bengal Premises Rent Control (Temporary Provisions) Act, XXXVIII of 1948.2.
  • West Bengal Premises Rent Control (Temporary Provisions) Act, XXXVIII of 1948,
  • West Bengal Premises Rent Control (Temporary Provisions) Act,
  • sec. 5 of the Limitation Act
  • Sub-sec. (1) (b) of this section
  • Indian Companies Act
  • Act in sec. 12 (1) (b)
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Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Judges
Acts
  • West Bengal Premises Rent Control (Temporary Provisions) Act, XXXVIII of 1948.2.
  • West Bengal Premises Rent Control (Temporary Provisions) Act, XXXVIII of 1948,
  • West Bengal Premises Rent Control (Temporary Provisions) Act,
  • sec. 5 of the Limitation Act
  • Sub-sec. (1) (b) of this section
  • Indian Companies Act
  • Act in sec. 12 (1) (b)
Smart Summary

Structured Summary of the Opinion delivered by Harries, C.J.

Factual and Procedural Background

The appeal arises from an order of Banerjee, J., dated 20 December 1948, dismissing an application under the West Bengal Premises Rent Control (Temporary Provisions) Act, XXXVIII of 1948. The respondent (the Plaintiff in the original suit) owned premises known as No. 10, Canning Street, Calcutta. The appellants were the Federation Bank of India, Ltd., tenants of part of those premises at a monthly rent of Rs. 360.

The bank fell into arrears. In early 1946 it applied to the Court under the Indian Companies Act for a moratorium; the application was refused. A notice to quit was served on 31 July 1946; the bank did not vacate. The bank was wound up on 10 September 1946; subsequently a scheme under the Indian Companies Act allowed the bank to pay debts by instalments.

Because the bank was a rent defaulter, the plaintiff obtained leave from the Rent Controller to file a suit for ejectment (leave conditioned on non-payment of arrears from January 1946). The bank appealed that order but the appeal was dismissed. A suit for possession and arrears (Rs. 2,880) was filed on 25 July 1947; the suit was decreed ex parte on 14 August 1947 because the bank did not appear.

The bank applied under Order 9, rule 13 to set aside the ex parte decree; that application was dismissed, and an appeal was unsuccessful despite a stay on deposit of Rs. 8,000. An application under section 5 of the Limitation Act for extension of time to appeal was dismissed on 27 September 1948. Execution was taken out and attempts by the Sheriff to obtain possession were resisted. The bank sought three months to vacate (dismissed), sued to set aside the decree on grounds of fraud (dismissed), and applied for an injunction against execution (dismissed). Various other persons claimed independent occupation. By 1 December 1948, despite the August 1947 decree, the respondent had not obtained possession.

On 1 December 1948 the West Bengal Premises Rent Control (Temporary Provisions) Act, XXXVIII of 1948, came into force. On that day the bank applied to Banerjee, J., under section 18 of that Act seeking rescission or variation of the August 1947 decree (and an injunction against execution). Banerjee, J. dismissed the application with costs. The present appeal challenges that dismissal.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether, under section 18 of the West Bengal Premises Rent Control (Temporary Provisions) Act, XXXVIII of 1948, the court that made a decree for recovery of possession before the Act commenced may rescind or vary that decree if the court is of opinion that the decree "would not have been made" if the Act had been in force at the date the decree was made.
  2. If section 18 is applicable, whether the bank satisfied the statutory preconditions (notably section 12(1)(b) and/or section 12(2)) so as to be entitled to the protection of section 11 (which prevents recovery of possession while the tenant pays rent allowable by the Act and performs tenancy conditions).
  3. Whether section 17(1) (which requires the court at the first hearing to decide whether there is sufficient cause to proceed in certain suits) can be applied retrospectively via section 18 to a suit filed and heard before the Act commenced.
  4. More generally, whether the statutory phrase "commencement of the Act" in sections relied upon can be treated, for the purpose of section 18, other than the actual commencement date stated in the Act (i.e., whether the Act can be assumed to have come into force earlier than its stated commencement date for the purpose of deciding what would have happened when the decree was made).

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

  • The bank (through Mr. D. N. Sinha) argued that section 18 authorized the court to rescind or vary the ex parte decree of 14 August 1947 if the court concluded that that decree "would not have been made" had the Rent Control Act been in force on that date.
  • Relying on section 11 (which prevents making an order for recovery of possession while the tenant pays rent allowable by the Act) together with section 12(1)(b), the bank contended that it had paid all arrears that had accrued before the commencement of the Act within one month after the Act commenced (the Act's commencement being 1 December 1948) and therefore, if the Act had been in force, no decree could have been passed.
  • Alternatively, the bank relied on section 12(2) as conferring entitlement to the protection of section 11 if the Act is assumed to have been in force in August 1947.
  • The bank also urged consideration of section 17(1), contending that if that section had been in force when the suit was first heard, no court would have found sufficient cause to permit the suit to proceed.

Respondent's Arguments

The opinion does not contain a detailed account of the Respondent's legal arguments in this appeal.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Ablev v. Dale (citation as cited in the opinion; referenced via Jervis, C.J.) Principle of statutory construction: where words of a statute are plain and unambiguous, courts must give them their ordinary meaning even if that leads to absurdity or injustice; courts must not depart from literal meaning by adding or subtracting words. The court (adopting Banerjee, J.'s reasoning) applied this principle to refuse to reinterpret section 18 (or other provisions) so as to give retrospective or alternative meanings to "commencement of the Act" or to recast section 18. This supported the conclusion that section 18 could not be applied to set aside the August 1947 decree on the bank's suggested basis.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court began by setting out section 18 of the Rent Control Act, which permits a court to rescind or vary a pre-Act decree for recovery of possession if the court is of opinion that the decree "would not have been made" had the Act been in operation at the date of the decree. The central analytical task was to determine what it means to ask whether a decree "would not have been made" if the Act "had been in force" at the earlier date.

The appellant's core contention required treating the Act as if it had been in force in August 1947 and, crucially, interpreting the phrase "commencement of the Act" in sections 11, 12 and 17 in a way that would allow the bank's post-commencement (December 1948) payments to be treated as if they had been made within the statutory periods applicable had the Act been in force in August 1947.

The Court held that this approach is impossible without distorting the plain language of the Act. If one assumes the Act was in force in August 1947, the "commencement" must, for that hypothetical, be in or before August 1947; but the bank's payments were actually made in December 1948, so the bank could not meet the one-month payment requirement of section 12(1)(b) measured from a hypothetical August commencement. Conversely, to accept the appellant's argument one would have to assume that the Act both was in force in August 1947 and yet had a commencement date of 1 December 1948 — a contradiction that renders the argument unworkable and nonsensical in the Court's view.

The Court explained that section 12(1)(b) requires arrears that accrued before the commencement of the Act to be paid within one month after the date of such commencement, and that the phrase "commencement of the Act" must be given its ordinary meaning (the actual date of commencement prescribed by the statute). Accordingly, the bank's post-commencement payments (made after 1 December 1948) cannot be retrofitted into an assumption that the Act was in force in August 1947.

The Court similarly rejected reliance on section 12(2) and section 17(1). Section 12(2) would not assist if the Act's commencement is taken as December 1, 1948; and if one assumes the Act was in force in August 1947, the bank had not complied with the time-limits required by sub-section (2). As to section 17(1), the Court observed that this provision contemplates a "first hearing" procedure that does not fit the practice on the Original Side of the Court (where there is often no separate "first hearing"), and in any event it cannot sensibly be applied retrospectively to actions heard before the Act commenced.

The Court emphasized the rule of construction (as cited from Ablev v. Dale through Jervis, C.J.) that where statutory words are plain and unambiguous, courts must apply their ordinary meaning even if adherence produces harsh or absurd results. The learned judge below (Banerjee, J.) had relied on this rule and had concluded that he could not hold the 14 August 1947 decree would never have been passed if the Act had been in force then. Harries, C.J. agreed with that conclusion and found that to grant the relief sought by the appellants would require recasting section 18 (and related provisions) in their entirety.

Holding and Implications

Holding: This appeal is dismissed with costs; the order of Banerjee, J., dismissing the bank's application under the West Bengal Premises Rent Control (Temporary Provisions) Act, XXXVIII of 1948, is affirmed.

Implications:

  • The immediate legal consequence is that the appellants (the Federation Bank of India, Ltd.) are denied the relief of rescission or variation of the 14 August 1947 ex parte decree under section 18 of the Rent Control Act.
  • The Court concluded that application of section 18 in the manner urged by the appellants would require impermissible re-interpretation or recasting of the statute (notably as to the meaning of "commencement of the Act"); therefore the appeal fails on statutory interpretation grounds.
  • The opinion does not purport to establish a broader new principle of law beyond applying standard rules of statutory construction; the decision's practical effect is confined to the parties and the statute's proper interpretation in this context.

Additional particulars present in the opinion: Sinha, J. concurred. The judgment was certified for two counsel. Solicitors were M.K. Roy Choudhury & Co. for the Appellant and B.M. Bagaria for the Respondent.

    Federation Bank Of India Ltd. v. Hanutmal Boid .

    The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

    Harries, C.J:— This is an appeal from an order of Banerjee, J., dated December 20, 1948, dismissing an application under the West Bengal Premises Rent Control (Temporary Provisions) Act, XXXVIII of 1948.

    2. The application was made by the Appellants for an order that the decree in a suit for ejectment and rent made against them at the instance of the Respondent and dated August 14, 1947, and all orders for execution made thereunder should be rescinded or varied on such terms and conditions as the Court might seem fit. There was also a prayer for an injunction restraining the Respondent, his servants or agent from executing the said decree for possession. The facts giving rise to the litigation can be shortly stated as follows. The Plaintiff-Respondent was the owner of premises known as No. 10, Canning Street in the city of Calcutta. The Petitioners, the Federation Bank of India, Ltd., were the tenants under the Plaintiff in respect of part of the premises at a monthly rent of Rs. 360.

    3. The Bank were in arrears with the payment of rent and in the early part of the year 1946 the Bank made an application to this Court under the Indian Companies Act for a moratorium. The application was, however, refused. On July 31, 1946, the Plaintiff-Respondent served a notice to quit upon the bank, but the bank did not vacate the premises after the expiry of the notice.

    4. On September 10, 1946, this Court made an order winding up the bank and the Official Liquidator was appointed liquidator of the company. Subsequently, a scheme was sanctioned under the Indian Companies Act and by that scheme the bank was allowed to pay its debts by certain instalments.

    5. As the bank was a defaulter in the payment of rent an application was made by the Plaintiff-Respondent to the Rent Controller for leave to file a suit for ejectment, as it was necessary under an Ordinance then in force that such leave should be obtained before a suit could be filed. The Rent Controller gave leave to the Plaintiff-Respondent to bring a suit if the arrears from January, 1946, were not paid up in a month's time. The arrears were not paid and the leave became effective. The bank appealed from the order of the Rent Controller, but that appeal was dismissed and on July 25, 1947, a suit for possession and for Rs. 2,880 as arrears of rent and mesne profits at the rate of Rs. 360 a month was filed in this Court.

    6. It will be seen that non-payment of rent was made a ground for eviction. The writ of summons was duly served on the bank, but no appearance was entered. The result was that the suit was decreed ex parte on August 14, 1947.

    7. The bank then made an application under Or. 9, r. 13 to have the ex parte decree set aside. This application was dismissed and an appeal was preferred. The Court of appeal granted a stay on certain conditions, one being that the Petitioner deposited in Court a sum of Rs. 8,000 as a condition for the stay. The sum was deposited in Court by the bank, but eventually the appeal was dismissed and the Respondent took out the money in payment of his dues.

    8. The bank then made an application under sec. 5 of the Limitation Act to the Appellate Court for extension of time for filing an appeal against the ex parte decree. That application was dismissed on September 27, 1948. In the meantime the Plaintiff-Respondent had taken out an execution and obtained an order from this Court for possession. The Sheriff's officer endeavoured to obtain possession but he was resisted. On October 1, 1948, the bank made an application to the Court asking for three months' time to vacate the premises. This application was moved before Majumdar, J., but later was dismissed.

    9. On November 26, 1948, the bank filed a suit for setting aside the decree of August 14, 1948, on the ground of fraud, but eventually this suit also met the same fate and was dismissed. The bank also made an application for an injunction restraining the Plaintiff from executing the decree. That application was ultimately dismissed.

    10. Between November 25 and November 30, 1948, the Sheriff received a number of letters from various persons claiming that they were in occupation of the premises in question under title independently of the bank, that is to say, neither as assignees nor as sub-tenants of the bank. The Sheriff's officer then reported that the premises were locked and the upshot of it all has been that though the Plaintiff obtained a decree on August 14, 1947, nevertheless he was not successful in getting possession up to December 1, 1948.

    11. On December 1, 1948, the Act known as the West Bengal Premises Rent Control (Temporary Provisions) Act, XXXVIII of 1948, came into force and on the day it came into force the bank made the application to Banerjee, J., which has given rise to this appeal. Banerjee, J., eventually came to the conclusion that there were no merits in the application and he accordingly dismissed it with costs. It is from that order that the present appeal has been preferred.

    12. Mr. D.N Sinha who has appeared on behalf of the Appellant-bank has urged that the Court should set aside or vary the decree which had been passed in August, 1947, against his client, because that decree would never have been passed if the Act, namely, the West Bengal Premises Rent Control (Temporary Provisions) Act, had been in force at the date upon which the decree was made. Counsel has relied upon sec. 18 of that Act which is in these terms:

    “Where any decree or order for the recovery of possession of any premises has been made, before the date of commencement of this Act, but the possession of such premises has not been recovered from the tenant by the execution of such decree or order, the Court by which the decree or order was made may, if it is of opinion that the decree or order would not have been made if this Act had been in operation at the date of the making of the decree or order, rescind or vary the decree or order in such manner as the Court may think fit for the purpose of giving effect to the provisions of this Act.”

    13. It seems to me that the wording of this section is clear. If a Court on application made to it comes to the conclusion that the decree sought to be rescinded would never have been made, if this Act had been in force at the time that decree was made, then the Court can rescind or vary that decree. What the Court has to ask itself is would it have passed the original decree if this Act (Act XXXVIII of 1948) had been in force at the date of the original decree?

    14. Mr. D.N Sinha has urged that if the Act XXXVIII of 1948 had been in force in August of 1947, the decree for eviction of the bank would never have been made. Under the Act (Act XXXVIII of 1948) mere default in payment of rent is not in itself a ground for eviction, Sec, 11 of that Act provides that no order or decree for the recovery of possession of any premises shall be made as long as the tenant pays to the full extent the rent allowable by the Act and performs the conditions of the tenancy. However it is provided that the section shall not apply where the tenant has been guilty of certain conduct.

    15. By sec. 12, it is provided that no tenant shall be entitled to the benefit of sec. 11 in respect of any premises unless he pays rent in a certain manner. Sub-sec. (1) (b) of this section provides:

    “In the case where any rent has accrued due before the commencement of this Act, he also pays within one month after the date of such commencement all arrears of rent allowable by this Act and due by him in respect of such premises to the full extent together with, where the arrears are already the subject-matter of a suit or proceeding before a Court or of any decree or order of Court, interest thereon at the rate of six and a quarter per cent, per annum and such costs as the Court may award.”

    16. According to Mr. Sinha the bank had paid all rent which had accrued due before the commencement of the Act, the date of commencement being December 1, 1948, within one month from that date. Mr. Sinha then argues that if Act XXXVIII of 1948 had been in force in August, 1947, no decree could have been passed because all the rent which had accrued due before the commencement of the Act had been paid as required by sec. 12 (1) (b) and, therefore, the tenant would be entitled to the benefit of sec. 11.

    17. I find it impossible to apply sec. 16 of Act XXXVIII of 1948 to the facts of this case. What the Court has to do is to assume that in August, 1947, Act XXXVIII of 1948 was in force. If it was, then no decree should have been passed against the bank if the bank had paid all rent accrued due before the commencement of the Act within one month after the date of such commencement. Now, if the Court has to assume that the Act was in force in August, 1947, then the date of the commencement of the Act must have been in or before the month of August, 1947. If that be so, then clearly the bank is in no better position because admittedly the rent was not paid until December, 1948. Mr. Sinha, however, has contended that even if we assume that the Act was in force in August, 1947, nevertheless the date of the commencement of the Act must be the date stated in the Act itself, namely, December 1, 1948. But how can an Act which came into force on December 1, 1948, be assumed to be in operation in August, 1947, unless an assumption is made that it came into force before the date stated in the Act. It appears to me that if the Court has to consider what it would have done if sec. 12 (1) (b) was in existence at the time it passed the decree in August, 1947, then it must give some meaning to the phrase “commencement of the Act” other than the date upon which the Act provides it should commence. If it does not the result is nonsense, because how could a Court decide whether a decree should be passed or not when the decision would depend upon an event which would happen long after the decree would have to be passed. It seems to me that if the words “commencement of the Act” in sec. 12 (1) (b) mean December 1, 1948, then sec. 18 cannot be applied to the facts of this case and the bank cannot rely upon sec. 12 (1) (b).

    18. Mr. Sinha then relied upon sub-sec. (2) of sec. 12 and contended that if it was assumed that Act XXXVIII was in force in August, 1947, then the bank would be entitled to the protection of sec. 11 by reason of compliance with the provisions of sub-sec. (2) of sec. 12. It seems to me, however, that sub-sec. (2) can have no application to these proceedings at all if the date of the commencement of the Act in sub-sec. (2) means December 1, 1948. If on the other hand, when assuming that the Act was in force in August, 1947, some date in August, 1947, is regarded as the commencement of the Act then the bank is clearly not within sub-sec. (2) because it had not paid what it was required to pay within one month from the date of the service of the process on the tenant.

    19. In my judgment it is quite impossible to apply sec. 18 to the facts of this case if the date of the commencement of the Act is to be taken as the date stated in the Act itself. What Mr. Sinha really wants the Court to do is to construe sec. 18 as meaning that if the Court came to the conclusion that no decree would have been passed if it had been called upon to pass the decree not in August, 1947, but some time after the Act had come into force then the decree could be set aside or varied. If that was what the legislature intended I cannot understand why they did not say so. The section does not ask the Court to assume whether the decree would have been passed after the Act had come into force, but what the Court is asked to assume is whether or not, if the Act had been in force in August of 1947, the decree would have been passed. To give effect to Mr. Sinha's contentions, it appears to me that the whole of sec. 18 would have to be recast.

    20. Mr. Sinha also asked us to take into consideration sec. 17 (1) of the Act. That section provides that in any suit or proceeding for the recovery of possession of premises on one or more of the grounds specified in the proviso to sub-sec. (1) of sec. 11 the Court must at the first hearing of the suit come to a conclusion whether there is a sufficient cause for proceeding with the suit and that it should do after hearing the parties and considering any affidavits which the parties might have filed.

    21. It appears to me quite clear from the wording of the section that it was never intended to apply to suits filed before the Act came into force. However, Mr. Sinha has asked us to apply sec. 17 to the facts of this case by reason of sec. 18 of the Act. He has contended that assuming sec. 17 to have been in force in August of 1947, no Court at the first hearing of the suit would have held that there was sufficient cause to allow the suit to proceed.

    22. The draftsman of this Act apparently did not realise that on the Original Side of this Court there is no first hearing within the meaning of that phrase as used in Or. 15 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The first time the suit comes for hearing on the Original Side it is usually heard and decided. The section, therefore, as drafted is wholly inapplicable to the Original Side where there is no first hearing as opposed to any other hearing.

    23. Further, how can a Court ask itself whether or not it would have held in August, 1948, after hearing the parties and on consideration of affidavits that there was sufficient ground for proceeding with the suit? As the Act was not in force in 1947 the Court had not heard the parties on this matter and had not required any affidavits or considered them. How, therefore, can a Court ask itself to-day what it would have done in August of 1947, assuming an Act was in force which required all sorts of conditions to be performed, the performance of which was not necessary in August of 1947? It seems to me that it is impossible to apply this section to decrees passed before the Act came into force as required by sec. 18 of the Act.

    24. Banerjee, J., in an exhaustive judgment had dealt with this aspect of the case. He has pointed out that the rule of construction as laid down by Jervis, C.J, in Ablev v. Dale(1) still holds good. The learned Chief Justice observed:

    “If the precise words used are plain and unambiguous in our judgment we are bound to construe them in their ordinary sense, even though it do lead in our view of the case to an absurdity or manifest injustice. Words may be modified or varied where their import is doubtful or obscure; but we assume the functions of legislators when we depart from the ordinary meaning of the precise words used, merely because we see, or fancy we see, an absurdity or manifest injustice from an adherence to their literal meaning.”

    25. The learned Judge later points out that the duty of the Court is neither to add words to a statute nor to subtract any words from it. The plain duty of the Court is to gather the intention of the legislature from the words used in the statute taking its plain and ordinary meaning.

    26. Applying these rules the learned Judge came to the conclusion that he could not hold that this decree would never have been passed if this Act had been in force in August, 1947.

    27. It appears to me that the view of the learned Judge cannot possibly be assailed.

    28. In order to give effect to the argument for the Appellants in this case, sec. 18 would have to be recast in its entirety. As it stands at present it is quite impossible to give the Appellants the relief which they would have been entitled to after December 1, 1948, under sec. 12 (1) (b), or sec. 2 (2) or sec. 17 (1) of the Act.

    29. That being so, this appeal must fail and is dismissed with costs.

    Sinha, J.:— I agree.

    30. Certified for two Counsel.

    31. Solicitors: M.K Roy Choudhury & Co. for the Appellant; B.M Bagaria for the Respondent.

    N.D.R

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    Comments

    Federation Bank Of India Ltd. v. Hanutmal Boid .
    (Aug 9, 1949)