AMICUS AI
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Attorney(S)
Judges
Acts
  • S. 2(kb) of the Employees' Provident Funds and Miscellaneous Provisions Act, 1952 (hereinafter referred to as E.P.F and M.P Act),
  • S. 46-B of the S.F.C Act and S. 11(2) of the Employees' Provident Funds and Miscellaneous Provisions Act
  • S. 29 of the State Financial Corporations Act, 1951 (hereinafter referred to as S.F.C Act)
  • S. 46-B of the S.F.C Act. Sub-secction (2) of S. 11 of the Employees' Provident Funds Act
  • EMPLOYEES PROVIDENT FUNDS AND MISCELLANEOUS PROVISIONS ACT 1952
  • S. 11(2) of the Employees' Provident Funds and Miscellaneous Provisions Act
  • S. 11(2) of the Employees' Provident Fund and Miscellaneous Provisions Act
  • provisions of rule 2 read with rule 16 of Sch. II of the Income Tax Act
  • S. 446(1) of the Companies Act read with Ss. 29 and 46 of the S.F.C Act
  • provisions of S. 100 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882,
  • provisions of S. 46-B of the S.F.C Act and S. 11(2)
  • Section 11-AAAA of the Rajasthan Sales Tax Act
  • S. 529-A prevails over S. 29 of the S.F.C Act.
  • Sub-section (1) of S. 11 of E.P.F and M.P Act
  • rule 6 of Sch. II of the Income Tax Act
  • provisions of S. 46-B of the S.F.C Act
  • S. 100 of the Transfer of Property Act,
  • STATE FINANCIAL CORPORATIONS ACT 1951
  • S. 11-AAAA of Rajasthan Sales Tax Act
  • (2) of S. 11 of the E.P.F and M.P Act
  • Act. Section 46-B of the S.F.C Act
  • S. 11(2) of the E.P.F and M.P Act
  • S. 2(kb) of the E.P.F and M.P Act,
  • S. 11 of the E.P.F and M.P Act
  • S. 529-A of the Companies Act
  • provisions of the S.F.C Act
  • S. 529 of the Companies Act.
  • S. 46-B of the S.F.C Act
  • S. 29 of the S.F.C Act
  • Act 56 of 1956, S. 46-B
  • S. 46-B of S.F.C Act.
  • INCOME TAX ACT 1961
  • S.F.C Act of 1951,
  • S.F.C Act, 1951.
  • M.P Act, 1952,
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Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Attorney(S)
Judges
Acts
  • S. 2(kb) of the Employees' Provident Funds and Miscellaneous Provisions Act, 1952 (hereinafter referred to as E.P.F and M.P Act),
  • S. 46-B of the S.F.C Act and S. 11(2) of the Employees' Provident Funds and Miscellaneous Provisions Act
  • S. 29 of the State Financial Corporations Act, 1951 (hereinafter referred to as S.F.C Act)
  • S. 46-B of the S.F.C Act. Sub-secction (2) of S. 11 of the Employees' Provident Funds Act
  • EMPLOYEES PROVIDENT FUNDS AND MISCELLANEOUS PROVISIONS ACT 1952
  • S. 11(2) of the Employees' Provident Funds and Miscellaneous Provisions Act
  • S. 11(2) of the Employees' Provident Fund and Miscellaneous Provisions Act
  • provisions of rule 2 read with rule 16 of Sch. II of the Income Tax Act
  • S. 446(1) of the Companies Act read with Ss. 29 and 46 of the S.F.C Act
  • provisions of S. 100 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882,
  • provisions of S. 46-B of the S.F.C Act and S. 11(2)
  • Section 11-AAAA of the Rajasthan Sales Tax Act
  • S. 529-A prevails over S. 29 of the S.F.C Act.
  • Sub-section (1) of S. 11 of E.P.F and M.P Act
  • rule 6 of Sch. II of the Income Tax Act
  • provisions of S. 46-B of the S.F.C Act
  • S. 100 of the Transfer of Property Act,
  • STATE FINANCIAL CORPORATIONS ACT 1951
  • S. 11-AAAA of Rajasthan Sales Tax Act
  • (2) of S. 11 of the E.P.F and M.P Act
  • Act. Section 46-B of the S.F.C Act
  • S. 11(2) of the E.P.F and M.P Act
  • S. 2(kb) of the E.P.F and M.P Act,
  • S. 11 of the E.P.F and M.P Act
  • S. 529-A of the Companies Act
  • provisions of the S.F.C Act
  • S. 529 of the Companies Act.
  • S. 46-B of the S.F.C Act
  • S. 29 of the S.F.C Act
  • Act 56 of 1956, S. 46-B
  • S. 46-B of S.F.C Act.
  • INCOME TAX ACT 1961
  • S.F.C Act of 1951,
  • S.F.C Act, 1951.
  • M.P Act, 1952,
Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

This appeal challenges the judgment of the learned Single Judge dated 22 June 1994, which allowed the original petition and quashed recovery notices issued by the appellant, the Recovery Officer under the Employees' Provident Funds and Miscellaneous Provisions Act, 1952 (E.P.F and M.P Act), to the first respondent-Corporation. The first respondent is a Corporation established under the State Financial Corporations Act, 1951 (S.F.C Act), and the second respondent is a scheduled bank in Kerala.

The dispute arose from the company “M/s. Darpan Electronics (Private) Ltd.” which had defaulted in payment of provident fund contributions between March and December 1990 and also defaulted on loan repayments to the first respondent-Corporation. The Corporation took possession of the company’s assets under S. 29 of the S.F.C Act and sold movable assets to recover dues. The provident fund dues amounted to Rs. 37,150, and Rs. 89,083 was lying in the company’s bank account with the second respondent-bank.

The appellant, acting as Recovery Officer under the E.P.F and M.P Act and empowered by S. 8-G, issued demand notices and attached certain land mortgaged to the first respondent and prohibited the bank from transferring the amount in the company’s account. The first respondent challenged these notices and orders through an original petition, which was allowed by the Single Judge, leading to this appeal.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the provident fund dues under S. 11(2) of the E.P.F and M.P Act have priority as a first charge on the assets of the establishment over the prior mortgage and secured debts of the first respondent-Corporation under the S.F.C Act.
  2. Whether the overriding effect of S. 46-B of the S.F.C Act can prevail over the priority declared by S. 11(2) of the E.P.F and M.P Act.
  3. The legal effect of S. 100 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, in the contest between a mortgagee’s right and a statutory first charge created by the provident fund legislation.
  4. Whether the Recovery Officer was entitled to issue attachment and prohibitory orders against the company’s assets and bank account to recover provident fund dues.

Arguments of the Parties

First Respondent-Corporation's Arguments

  • The Corporation holds a prior mortgage executed on 21 February 1987 and took possession of the company's assets in 1991, thus claiming priority as a secured creditor.
  • The overriding provision under S. 46-B of the S.F.C Act supports their priority over other claims.
  • Reliance on S. 100 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, which provides that a charge must yield to a prior mortgage, and the Corporation claims to be a transferee for valuable consideration without notice of charge.
  • The provisions of the Income Tax Act and related case law support the Recovery Officer’s powers but do not establish a priority over secured creditors.

Appellant's Arguments

  • S. 11(2) of the E.P.F and M.P Act creates a statutory first charge on the assets of the establishment for provident fund dues, with priority over all other debts, including mortgages.
  • The social purpose behind the E.P.F and M.P Act requires protection of workers’ terminal benefits, justifying the priority over other creditors.
  • The later enactment of S. 11(2) of the E.P.F and M.P Act overrides earlier laws, including S. 46-B of the S.F.C Act.
  • Decisions under the Income Tax Act are not relevant as they do not confer substantive priority on tax dues.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
State Bank of Bikaner and Jaipur v. National Iron and Steel Rolling Corporation [(1995) 2 SCC 19] Interpretation of S. 100 of the Transfer of Property Act in relation to statutory first charges overriding mortgages. The Court relied on this precedent to hold that a statutory first charge created by law (like provident fund dues) has priority over a prior mortgage.
Dattatreya Shanker Mote v. Anand Chintaman Datar [(1974) 2 SCC 799] Distinction between mortgage and charge under Transfer of Property Act. Supported the understanding that transferee of entire interest differs from mortgagee and that statutory first charge covers the entire interest including mortgage.
Andhra Pradesh State Financial Corporation v. Official Liquidator [(2000) 7 SCC 291] Priority of workmen's dues under Companies Act and interplay with S.F.C Act. Used to reinforce the principle that social security dues have overriding priority over secured creditors, supporting the priority of provident fund dues.
Sundaram Finance, Ltd. v. Regional Transport Officer [(1979) 117 I.T.R 334] Recovery Officer’s powers under Income Tax Act and effect of notices on alienations. Distinguished as not conferring substantive priority to tax dues over other creditors under the Income Tax Act.
Suraj Pramod Gupta v. Chartered Bank, Kanpur [(1972) 83 I.T.R 494] Similar to Sundaram Finance on the scope of tax recovery powers. Also distinguished as not applicable to priority of provident fund dues.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court analyzed the statutory framework governing the priority of debts. It noted that S. 11(2) of the E.P.F and M.P Act expressly declares provident fund dues to be a first charge on the employer’s assets and mandates payment in priority over all other debts, notwithstanding any other law. This provision reflects Parliament’s social welfare intent to protect workers’ terminal benefits.

The Court rejected the first respondent’s reliance on S. 46-B of the S.F.C Act and S. 100 of the Transfer of Property Act, holding that a statutory first charge created subsequently by Parliament (S. 11(2) of the E.P.F and M.P Act) overrides prior mortgages and secured claims. The Court relied heavily on the Supreme Court’s decision in State Bank of Bikaner and Jaipur v. National Iron and Steel Rolling Corporation, which clarified that statutory first charges take precedence over mortgages.

The Court also distinguished the Income Tax Act provisions and related case law, explaining that they do not create substantive priority for tax dues but only void alienations after notice. Therefore, the Income Tax Act cases were not applicable to the present dispute regarding provident fund dues.

Further support was drawn from Andhra Pradesh State Financial Corporation v. Official Liquidator, which underscored the social purpose behind legislation protecting workmen’s dues and affirmed that such dues must be paid with priority over secured creditors’ claims.

In light of these principles, the Court concluded that the Recovery Officer was entitled to exercise powers to recover provident fund dues, including attachment and prohibitory orders against the company’s assets and bank account, notwithstanding prior mortgages held by the first respondent.

Holding and Implications

The appeal is allowed.

The Court set aside the Single Judge’s judgment that had quashed the recovery notices and attachment orders issued by the Recovery Officer. It held that the provident fund dues have statutory priority as a first charge over the assets of the company, both movable and immovable, including those mortgaged to the first respondent-Corporation. Consequently, the Recovery Officer’s notices and orders are revived and shall be enforced according to law.

The decision directly affects the parties by restoring the Recovery Officer’s authority to recover provident fund dues with priority over secured creditors. No new precedent beyond the application of existing statutory provisions and Supreme Court rulings was established.

    Recovery Officer And Assistant Provident Fund Commissioner v. Kerala Financial Corporation

    The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

    Srikrishna, C.J:— This appeal impugns the judgment of the learned Single Judge, dated 22 June, 1994, allowing the original petition and quashing recovery notices issued by the Recovery Officer and Assistant Provident Fund Commissioner to the first respondent-Corporation.

    2. The appellant before us is the “Recovery Officer” within the meaning of S. 2(kb) of the Employees' Provident Funds and Miscellaneous Provisions Act, 1952 (hereinafter referred to as E.P.F and M.P Act), who is also empowered to recover Provident Fund dues by reason of S. 8-G of the Act. The first respondent is a Corporation established under the State Financial Corporations Act, 1951. The second respondent is a scheduled bank carrying on business at Trivandrum, in the State of Kerala.

    3. A company by name “M/s. Darpan Electronics (Private), Ltd.” (hereinafter referred to as the company) was running an industrial concern engaging employees and was covered by the provisions of the Employees' Provident Funds and Miscellaneous Provisions Act, 1952. The Company had obtained loans from the first respondent-Corporation for the purpose of setting up its business. On 21 February, 1997, it executed a loan agreement securing by mortgage certain immovable property belonging to it and by a deed of hypothecation certain movable properties. During the period March 1990 and December 1990 the company committed default in payment of the contributions to the Employees Provident Fund under the Employees' Provident Funds and Miscellaneous Provisions Act. It also committed default in repayment of the loan which it had taken from the first respondent-Corporation. The first respondent initiated proceedings under S. 29 of the State Financial Corporations Act, 1951 (hereinafter referred to as S.F.C Act) and took over all the movable and immovable assets of the company on 18 November, 1991. On 20 December, 1993, the movable assets were sold towards realisation of the debts due to the first respondent-Corporation. A sum of Rs. 89,083 is lying in the account of the said company with the second respondent-bank. A sum of Rs. 37,150 is said to be due from the company toward the employer's contribution to the provident fund.

    4. The appellant, who is also the Recovery Officer as defined in S. 2(kb) of the E.P.F and M.P Act, exercising powers of a tax Recovery Officer under Sch. II of the Income Tax Act, 1961, which is made applicable to recovery of provident fund contribution by reason of S. 8-G of the said Act, issued demand notices to the company demanding payment of the amount fund due towards the employer's contribution. In exercise of his powers, he also attached 37 cents of land from Sy. Nos. 1763 and 1784 of Palkulangara Village which had already been mortgaged to the first respondent-Corporation. He issued a notice, dated 16 December, 1993, vide Exhibit R1(g), calling upon the first respondent as to why the amount due should not be recovered from it. By another order, dated 6 January, 1994, the appellant also prohibited second respondent-bank from transferring the amount of Rs. 89,083 lying in the amount of the company.

    5. The first respondent-Corporationmoved this Court by its Original Petition No. 1164 of 1994 and challenged all notices of attachment and prohibitory orders issued by the appellant. This original petition was allowed and the learned Single Judge was pleased to quash all the notices and the orders issued by the appellant. Hence, this appeal.

    6. In order to appreciate the controversy, it is necessary to notice certain statutory provisions. The S.F.C Act, 1951, was enacted to provide for establishing of Financial Corporations which could help in the establishment and development of industries in States. Though the Act is of the year 1951, by an amendment made by Act 56 of 1956, S. 46-B was introduced to give extra-ordinary powers to the Corporation set up under this Act. Section 46-B of the S.F.C Act reads as under:

    “46B. Effect of the Act on other laws.— The provisions of this Act and of any rules or orders made thereunder shall have effect notwithstanding anything inconsistent therewith contained in any other law for the time being in force or in the memorandum or articles of association of an industrial concern or in any other instrument having effect by virtue of any law other than this Act, but save as aforesaid, the provisions of this Act shall be in addition to, and not in derogation of, any other law for the time being applicable to an industrial concern.”

    7. The E.P.F and M.P Act, 1952, is an Act to provide for the institution of Provident Fund, Pension Fund, Deposit Linked Insurance Fund etc. in factories and other establishments, to carry forward the constitutional mandate of rendering social justice to the working class. It is intended to give social security to industrial workers at the end of their careers. The E.P.F and M.P Act requires every employer to deduct certain prescribed amounts from the wages payable to employees along with prescribed contribution by the employer and deposit such contributions in the provident fund. The provident fund is administered by the Central and Regional Provident Fund Commissioners, who are statutory authorities. What is of importance to us is that S. 11 of the E.P.F and M.P Act declares the priority of payment of contributions under the Act over other debts. Sub-section (1) of S. 11 of E.P.F and M.P Act deals with the question of priority where an employer is adjudicated insolvent or subjected to an order of winding up. Sub-secction (2) of S. 11 deals with other types of priorities and reads as under:

    “11(2). Without prejudice to the provisions of Sub-sec. (1), if any amount is due from an employer, whether in respect of the employee's contribution deducted from the wages of the employee or the employer's contribution, the amount so due shall be deemed to be the first charge on the assets of the establishment, and shall, notwithstanding anything contained in any other law, for the time being in force, be paid in priority to all other debts.”

    Sub-secction (2) of S. 11 of the E.P.F and M.P Act has two facets. First, it declares that the amount due from the employer towards contribution under the E.P.F and M.P Act shall be deemed to be a first charge on the assets of the establishment. Second, it also declares that notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force, such debt shall be paid in priority to all other debts. Both these provisions bring out the intention of Parliament to ensure the social benefit as contained in the legislation. There are other provisions in the Act rendering the amounts of provident fund payable immune from attachment of civil Court's decree, which also indicate such intention of Parliament.

    8. The first respondent-Corporation contends that it has a prior mortgage in its favour executed on 21 February, 1987 pursuant to which it has already taken possession of the assets of the company on 18 November, 1991. Hence, the first respondent contends that it has a priority in the matter of satisfaction of its debts, being a prior secured creditor. The provisions of S. 46-B of the S.F.C Act are also urged in support of the overriding provision. It is contended that wider S. 46-B, there is a non obstante clause, which gives an overriding effect to the provisions of the S.F.C Act as against the laws in force. It was successfully urged before the learned Single Judge that what the first respondent has is a mortgage in its favour while the provident fund dues are merely demand to be a charge on the assets. In a contest between a mortgagee's right and a charge, it is submitted, the provisions of S. 100 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, make it clear that, the charge must yield unless the charge is given priority by reason of an express provision of law of the charge is against any property in the hands of a person to whom the property has been transferred for consideration and without notice of charge. It is contended by the first respondent that, since the charge itself came into effect subsequently, the first respondent-Corporation is a transferee for valuable consideration and, obviously, without notice of charge. For this reason, it is contended that the first respondent's debts are to be first met out of the assets before the provident fund dues can be realised therefrom. These arguments have substantially been accepted by the learned Single Judge for coming to the conclusion that the first respondent has a higher priority in the matter of realisation of its debts.

    9. With regard to the argument based on S. 100 of the Transfer of Property Act, the matter is no longer res integra. In State Bank of Bikaner and Jaipur v. National Iron and Steel Rolling Corporation [(1995) 2 SCC 19], this question came up specifically for consideration of the Supreme Court and the answer given by the Supreme Court is unmistakably against the first respondent. That was a case where the State Bank of Bikaner claimed priority over Sales Tax arrears due to the State on the ground that it was a secured creditor. Section 11-AAAA of the Rajasthan Sales Tax Act declares that any amount of tax, penalty, interest and any other sum, if any, payable by a dealer, or any other person under the Act, shall be the first charge on the property of the dealer, or such person. On behalf of the State Bank of Bikaner S. 100 of the Transfer of Property Act was relied upon to contend that, since there was a mortgage in favour of the bank, the bank would have precedence over the claim of sales tax dues, which was only by way of a charge. After analysis of S. 100 of the Transfer of Property Act, and considering the distinction drawn between a mortgage and charge as discussed in the earlier decision in Dattatreya Shanker Mote v. Anand Chintaman Datar [(1974) 2 SCC 799], it was held that the expression “transferee of property” used in S. 100 refers to transferee of entire interest in the property and it does not cover the transfer of only an interest in the property by way of a mortgage. It was further held that the charge created under S. 11-AAAA of Rajasthan Sales Tax Act over the property of the dealer or a person liable to pay-scales tax or other dues was created in respect of the entire interest in respect of the property, since the section declares the dues of the Sales Tax Department as a first charge, the first charge would operate over the entire title of the property which continues with the mortgagor, Therefore, when a statutory first charge is created on the property of the dealer, the interest of the mortgagee is not excluded from the first charge. The Supreme Court also relied on Fisher and Lightwood's Law of Mortgage, 10th Edn. and the judgment of the Appeal Court in Westminster City Council v. Haymarket Publishing, Ltd. [(1981) 2 All E.R 555], and finally concluded that since the statute created a first charge, it clearly gave priority to the statutory charge over all other charges on the property including a mortgage. The expression “first charge” was explained to mean that, it would cover within its ambit a mortgage also. Consequently, when a first charge is created by statute, that charge will have precedence over an existing mortgage.

    10. The contention of the first respondent based on the overriding effect of S. 46-B of the S.F.C Act has no substance in our judgment. Undoubtedly, the intention of Parliament in enacting S. 46-B in the year, 1956, was to ensure that a State Financial Corporation could quickly and effectively recover the amounts due by taking possession of the property of the defaulter instead of having resort to the cumbersome method of recovery through a Court of law. While this was the law, Parliament amended S. 11 of the E.P.F and M.P Act by specifically enacting Sub-sec. (2) thereof, declaring that the amount due as contribution to the Employees' Provident Fund has first charge on the assets of the establishment and that, notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force, it shall be paid in priority against all other debts. In fact, the second facet of S. 11(2) of the E.P.F and M.P Act goes one step further than what is provided in S. 46-B of S.F.C Act. The reason for this is obvious. While the State Financial Corporation would have to be helped to recover the debts due to it from a defaulting debtor, the Provident Fund payable to workers is of greater moment, since it is a matter of terminal social security benefit made available by statute to the working class. Taking into consideration that E.P.F and M.P Act is a social benefit legislation, and the evil consequences of provident fund dues being defeated by prior claims of secured or unsecured creditors, the Legislature took care to decjare that irrespective of when a debt is created, the dues under the E.P.F and M.P Act would always remain first charge and shall be paid first out of the assets of the establishment. We are also not impressed by the contention of the first respondent that upon usage of non obstante clause in S. 46-B of the S.F.C Act. Sub-secction (2) of S. 11 of the Employees' Provident Funds Act is of subsequent date. No doubt, both S. 46-B of the S.F.C Act and S. 11(2) of the Employees' Provident Funds and Miscellaneous Provisions Act declare their intent by usage of the non obstante clause. But, since S. 11(2) of the Employees' Provident Funds and Miscellaneous Provisions Act has been enacted later, we must ascribe to the Parliament the intention to override the earlier legislation also. It is, therefore, clear that S. 11(2) of the Employees' Provident Fund and Miscellaneous Provisions Act overrides all provisions of other enactments including S. 46-B of the S.F.C Act.

    11. We are supported in our conclusion by the judgment of the Supreme Court in Andhra Pradesh State Financial Corporation v. Official Liquidator [(2000) 7 SCC 291]. This was also a case arising under the S.F.C Act, 1951. The Corporation therein had exercised its powers under S. 29 of the Act in respect of a debtor company which was under liquidation. The Corporation claiming to be a secured creditor filed two applications under S. 446(1) of the Companies Act read with Ss. 29 and 46 of the S.F.C Act for staying outside the liquidation proceedings. The learned Company Judge allowed these applications on the specific condition that the Corporation should undertake to discharge its liability due to the workers under S. 529-A of the Companies Act and also inform the Official Liquidator by advance notice about the proposed sale of the company's properties and further obtain the company Court's permission before finalising the tender. This order of the company Judge was upheld by the Division Bench of the Andhra Pradesh High Court. An appeal was carried there against by the State Financial Corporation to the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court considered the, reason for enactment of the S.F.C Act as against the reason for amendment of S. 529-A of the Companies Act. The Supreme Court pointed out that, though the S.F.C Act of 1951, was a special Act for grant of financial assistance to industrial concerns with a view to boost industrialisation and to enable recovery of amounts advanced and the Companies Act was also an Act dealing with companies including winding up such companies, the proviso to Sub-sec. (1) of the S. 529 and S. 529-A being a subsequent enactment, the non obstante clause in S. 529-A prevails over S. 29 of the S.F.C Act. Hence, the Supreme Court held that statutory right to sell the property under S. 29 of the S.F.C Act had to be exercised with the rights of pari passu charge to the workmen specifically created by the proviso to S. 529 of the Companies Act. Under the proviso to Sub-sec. (1) of S. 529, the liquidator shall be entitled to represent the workmen to enforce the above pari passu charge. The judgment of the company Court was upheld. While upholding the judgment of the Company Court, it was pointed out by the Supreme Court that State Financial Corporation could not stay outside the winding up proceedings. It was also held that S. 529 A of the Companies Act imposes upon the company Court the duty to ensure that the workmens dues are paid in priority to all other debts in accordance with the provisions of the above section. The Legislature amended the Companies Act in 1985 with a social purpose, viz., to protect the dues of the workmen. If conditions are not imposed to protect the right of the workmen, there is every possibility that a secured creditor may frustrate the pari passu right of the workmen under the said provision of law.

    12. For the first respondent-Corporation, the learned counsel relied on the judgments which were placed before the learned Single Judge and which weighed with him. They are Sundaram Finance, Ltd. v. Regional Transport Officer [(1979) 117 I.T.R 334] and Suraj Pramod Gupta v. Chartered Bank, Kanpur, [(1972) 83 I.T.R 494]. He contended that inasmuch as S. 8-G of the E.P.F and M.R Act gives the same powers to the Recovery Officer as given to the Tax Recovery Officer under Sch. II of the Income Tax Act, 1961, the decision under the Income Tax Act has great relevance. He also referred to rule 6 of Sch. II of the Income Tax Act to contend that title which passes upon sale of property shall be the title of the previous owner subject to any limitation or encumbrance thereupon.

    13. We are unable to accept this contention. In the first place, the Income Tax Act contains no provision which declares the priority of income tax dues as against the dues of any other secured or unsecured creditor. The provisions of rule 2 read with rule 16 of Sch. II of the Income Tax Act merely make it clear that where a notice from the Tax Recovery Officer has been issued, any transfer or alienation made thereafter is void. The presumption, therefore, is, all such alienation made or interest created prior to the issuance of notice remain untouched. Both the judgments in Sundaram Finance, Ltd. (vide supra) and Suraj Pramod Gupta (vide supra) proceed upon this very principle, namely the Income Tax Act does not have any substantive provision that tax due has a priority over the dues of other creditors. We nave seen that as far as the dues under the Employees' Provident Fund are concerned, S. 11(2) of the E.P.F and M.P Act specifically has a substantive provision to declare that provident fund dues shall be made a first charge on the assets of the establishment and shall be paid in priority to all other debts. In view thereof, we do not find that the decisions under the Income Tax Act are of any assistance in answering the question before us.

    14. In our view, the reasoning advanced by the Supreme Court in Andhra Pradesh State Financial Corporation (vide supra) is equally applicable to the case before us. Firstly, S. 11(2) of the E.P.F and M.P Act is subsequent in point of time and, therefore, must be taken to be the latest manifestation of the intendment of the Parliament. Secondly, the social purpose behind the amendment of S. 11(2) is to protect the terminal social security dues of workmen, and therefore, needs to be given higher priority as intended by Parliament.

    15. We are, therefore, of the view that the appellant shall be entitled to exercise his powers as a Recovery Officer for recovering the provident fund dues. Hence, the notices issued vide Exhibits P1 and P3, and the orders at Exhibits P4, P5(a), P5(b) and P5(c) were perfectly legal and justified. We are unable to accept the reasoning of the learned Single Judge and conclusions arrived at on the inter se contest between the provisions of S. 46-B of the S.F.C Act and S. 11(2) of the E.P.F and M.P Act.

    16. In the result, we set aside the judgment of the learned Single Judge holding that the dues of the Employees' Provident Fund have higher priority as against the assets of the Darpan Electronics (Private), Ltd, movable or immovable. Consequently, the appellant as Recovery Officer was entitled to issue the order of prohibition to the second respondent bank not to transfer Rs. 89,083 standing to the credit of the company in its account. The notice at Exhibits P1 and P3 and the orders at Exhibits P4, 95(a), P5(b) and P5(c) are hereby revived and shall be disposed of in accordance with law.

    The appeal is allowed.

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    Recovery Officer And Assistant Provident Fund Commissioner v. Kerala Financial Corporation
    (Jun 12, 2002)