The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
R. Rajendra Babu, J.:— Whether the petitioner is entitled to interest on the compensation amount awarded by the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal, from the date of deposit of the amount before the Tribunal till notice of such deposit is given to the petitioner or till the date of knowledge of such deposit, is the moot question for consideration.
2. The petitioner and his wife were awarded compensation of Rs. 2,42,400/- with interest at 12% thereon by the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal, Ernakulam in O.P(M.V) 466/88 due to the death of their son in a motor traffic accident. The liability of the insurance company was limited to 1.5 lakhs and the rest of the amount had to be paid by the owner of the offending vehicle. The Tribunal passed the award on 22-11-1991. As per Sec. 168(3) of the Motor Vehicles Act of 1988 (hereinafter referred to as the Act), the award amount had to be deposited as directed by the Tribunal within a period of one month front the date of the award. But the award amount was not deposited within the statutory period. On 14-2-1992 the petitioner filed I.A 2599/92 for the issue of a certificate under Sec. 174 of the Act to the District Collector for initiating the recovery proceedings. Copy of I.A 2599/92 was given to the insurance company and on 2-3-93 it was submitted before the Tribunal on behalf of the insurance company that the amount due from the insurance company had already been deposited before the Tribunal on 14-2-92. But notice regarding the above deposit was not given to the petitioner either on 14-2-92 or at a later date. Hence the petitioner filed I.A 6212/93 claiming interest on the compensation amount till the date of knowledge of the deposit. The Tribunal dismissed I.A 6212/93 as per Ext. P4 order dated 11-4-96 holding that the provisions under Order XXIV CPC and the Civil Rules of Practice were not applicable to the Claims Tribunal and that the respondents were not bound to give notice of deposit of the compensation amount to the petitioners. Aggrieved by the above order the petitioner filed this original petition to quash Ext. P4 order and for other consequential directions. The owner of the offending vehicle had challenged the award by preferring M.F.A 360/92 before this court and the above M.F.A was pending when the O.P was filed. Hence the original petition was posted along with M.F.A 360/92 before this Bench. The M.F.A had been disposed of separately. Heard the learned counsel for the petitioner and the respondents.
3. The petitioner advanced an argument that as per sub-section 3 of Sec. 168 of the Act, the person required to pay the compensation amount had to deposit the award amount as directed by the Tribunal within 30 days from the date of the award and as the award amount was not deposited by the insurance company within one month, the petitioners are entitled to the interest on the entire compensation amount till they had come to know of the deposit of the amount. It was further argued that, even if the respondents deposit the amount before the Tribunal after the lapse of one month from the date of the award, the petitioner is entitled to interest till notice of deposit is given, as Order XXI, rule 1(2) of C.P.C would apply in the execution of the award passed by the Tribunal. The learned counsel appearing for the respondent, insurance company argued that the provisions of Order XXI of C.P.C are not made applicable regarding the execution of the award of the Tribunal and there was no provision in the Act directing the persons required to pay the compensation amount to give notice of deposit and as such the petitioner was not entitled to any interest from the date of deposit of the amount before the Tribunal. The learned counsel further argued that whenever deposits are made before the Tribunal, the same shall be notified by the Tribunal and thereby the parties will be able to know about such deposits. The above argument does not appear to be plausible and it would be highly impracticable.
4. The learned counsel for the insurance company argued that the provisions of C.P.C made applicable to the proceedings before the M.A.C Tribunals had been specifically mentioned in Rule 395 of the Kerala Motor Vehicles Rules and as Order 21 C.P.C is not included in Rule 395, those provisions have no application in the proceedings before the Tribunal. Rule 395 reads:
“395. Code of Civil Procedure to apply in certain cases:— The provisions of rules 9 to 13 and 15 to 30 of Order V, rules 16 to 18 of Order VI, Order IX, rules 3 to 10 of Order XIII, rules 1 to 21 of Order XVI, rules 1 to 3 of Order XXIII and Order XXVI of the First Schedule to the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, shall, so far as may be, apply, to the proceedings before the Claims Tribunal”.
5. A reading of Rule 395 would make it clear that the provisions of C.P.C mentioned therein are in respect of the proceedings before the Tribunal excluding the execution of the award. In fact, the provisions of C.P.C mentioned in Rule 395 are applicable during the trial of the proceedings before the Tribunal and when once an award is passed then Rule 394 is made applicable. Rule 394 reads:
“Enforcement of an award of the Claims Tribunal.-(1) Without prejudice to its power under Sec. 174 of the Act, the Claims Tribunal shall for the purpose of enforcement of its award, have all the powers of a Civil Court in the execution of a decree under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 as if the award were a decree for payment of money passed by such court in a civil suit.
(2) The Claims Tribunal may institute suo motu execution proceedings if the amount of compensation awarded is not paid before the expiry of the period for payment stipulated in the award and the case shall be called on a date to be fixed in the award for the purpose.”
6. A reading of Rule 394(1) would clearly reveal that an award passed by the Tribunal has to be treated a;s a money decree passed by a civil court and regarding the enforcement of the award, the provisions under C.P.C ie. Order 21, Rule (1) would apply as if it was a money decree passed by the civil court. Thus the provisions regarding the execution of a money decree passed by the civil court is made applicable in the enforcement of the award. Hence Order XXI, Rule (1) C.P.C would apply in the execution of the awards passed by the M.A.C.T The learned counsel for the petitioner relied on the decision of the Supreme Court in R.S.R.T.C v. Smt. Poonam Pahwa (1998 Com. Cases 444 Vol. 92), wherein it was held:
“It appears to us that the provisions of Order XXI, rule 1, are not in any way inconsistent with the provisions for awarding just and fair compensation in motor accident claims. The real purpose of awarding just and fair compensation to the victim of the accident or the legal heirs of such victim will be fulfilled by applying the principle of Order XXI, rule 1, C.P.C, so that the awardee is not deprived of the opportunity of gainfully utilising the amount under the award for want of notice about the deposit made by the judgment-debtor resulting in the sum remaining unutilised. In our view, therefore, there is no difficulty to apply the underlying principles under Order XXI, rule 1, Civil Procedure Code, in executing the award of compensation passed by the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal and the Tribunal must be held to be competent to invoke the beneficial provisions of Order XXI, rule 1, Civil Procedure Code.”
7. Thus the provisions of Order XXXI, Rule 1 can be applied in the matter of execution of award passed by the Tribunal. The procedure regarding the payment of amount due under a decree is dealt with in Rule 1 of Order XXI CPC. Sub-rule 1 of Rule 1 of Order XXI deals with the modes of paying money under the decree and one of the modes is by deposit into court whose duty is to execute the decree. Sub-rule 2 stipulates that where any payment is made under clause (a) or clause (c) of sub-rule 1, the judgment debtor shall give notice thereof to the decree holder either through court or directly by him by registered post with acknowledgment due. So whenever a deposit of any amount is made before the court towards any decree amount, it is the duty of the judgment debtor to give notice of such deposit to the decree holder either through the court or directly informing by registered post. Sub-rule (4) further stipulates that any amount paid under clause (a) or clause (c) of sub-rule 1, interest if any, shall cease to run from the date of service of notice referred to in Sub-rule 2. Thus it is clear from sub-rule 4 that the interest shall cease run to only from the date of service of notice referred to in Sub-rule 2 and till notice of such deposit is given, the decree holder will be entitled to interest on the decree amount. Thus the different provisions of Rule 1 of Order XXI would make it clear that the obligation to pay interest would continue until notice was given to the decree holder regarding the deposit of the decree amount in court with interest thereon and any payment into court without notice would not disentitle the decree holder from claiming interest till notice of deposit was given to him. In State of Kerala v. Mahadeva Iyer Venkita Subramanya Iyer (AIR 1969 Ker. 8) this court held that when the interest is awarded by the decree on the decretal amount until payment, it does not cease to run merely by reason of the making of the deposit of the amount into court unless it is followed up by the service of notice as required by sub-rule (2).
8. The learned counsel for the insurance company argued that when once amount is deposited in court, it is the duty of the court to inform regarding such deposit to the petitioner and the depositor not bound to inform about such deposit to the petitioner. The above argument cannot be accepted in view of the specific provision in Sub-rule 2 of Rule 1 of Order XXI, wherein it is specifically provided that the judgment debtor shall give notice thereon to the decree holder either through the court or directly by registered post with acknowledgment due. The question whether it was the duty of the judgment debtor to give notice of such deposit to the decree holder had been considered by the Supreme Court in the above cited decision (1988 Com. Cases. 444 Vol. 2) and held:
“After the amendment of Order XXI, rule 1 in 1976, there is no scope for any controversy as to the liability of the judgment debtor when the decretal amount is deposited in court but the notice of such deposit is not given to the decree-holder. It is imperative that the judgment debtor has to give notice to the decree holder about deposit of the decretal amount. Since the motor accident in the instant case had taken place on May 7, 1983, Order XXI Rule 1 as amended in 1976 is clearly applicable. Even otherwise also, the provisions of Order XXI, rule 1, being a procedural law, the amended provisions of Order XXI, rule 1 are applicable even if the accident had taken place prior to 1976 because such amendment of procedural law is retrospective in its operation.”
9. Thus it is the duty of the judgment debtor to give notice of such deposit to the decree holder and till notice of such deposit is given or till the decree holder becomes aware of the deposit of the amount, he is entitled to interest on the award amount. The tribunal had gone wrong in holding that the provisions of C.P.C regarding the execution of the decree are not applicable in respect of the execution of awards before Tribunal. The Tribunal found that the provisions of Order XXIV of C.P.C is not applicable before the claims tribunal. In fact, Order XXIV deals with payment of suit amount before the court prior to the passing of a decree. There also notice has to be given to the plaintiff as per Rule 2 of Order XXIV. As the Order XXI Rule 1 would apply to the execution of the award passed by the Tribunal, the petitioner is entitled to interest on the decree amount till notice of such deposit is given to the petitioner or till the date of knowledge of the petitioner regarding the deposit. In the present case the petitioner came to know about the deposit only on 2-3-93 and hence he is entitled to interest till 2-3-93, even though amount was deposited on 15-2-1992. Thus Ext. P4 order passed by the Tribunal in I.A 6212/93 disallowing interest is liable to be quashed and the petitioner is entitled to interest on the entire compensation amount till 2-3-93.
10. In the result the original petition is allowed. Ext. P4 order passed by M.A.C.T, Ernakulam in I.A 6212/93 in O.P(MV) 466/88 shall stand quashed. The parties will suffer their respective costs.