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Judgment Summary — V. V. Kamat, J.

Factual and Procedural Background

The Revenue appealed in respect of assessment year 1981-82 on the question whether the value of work-in-progress (WIP) should be included in computing "capital employed" for the purpose of relief under section 80J of the Income-Tax Act, 1961. The contested provision, specifically sub-section (1A), had been inserted retrospectively by the Finance (No. 2) Act, 1980, with effect from 1 April 1972.

The assessee is a private limited company engaged in chemical manufacture. The assessee claimed deduction under section 80J and claimed amounts relating to expenditure pending capitalization (expenditure to be capitalised). The Tribunal had rejected the claim relating to expenditure pending capitalization (an amount of Rs. 46,74,371), a decision which had become final. The Income-Tax Officer excluded the WIP-related claim on the ground that it was not relatable to any tangible asset of the business as on the relevant date.

The Commissioner of Income-Tax (Appeals) allowed the deduction in respect of WIP of Rs. 1,56,73,720, holding that WIP forms part of capital employed in view of this court's earlier decision in Periyar Chemicals Ltd. v. Commr. of Income-Tax [1986] 162 ITR 163, and directed the ITO to compute deduction under section 80J in respect of that amount. The Revenue challenged that allowance; the assessee had separately challenged the Tribunal's rejection of expenditure pending capitalization but that aspect was noted as final against the assessee.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the value of work-in-progress should be included in the computation of capital for the purpose of relief under section 80J of the Income-Tax Act, 1961?

Arguments of the Parties

Revenue / Income-Tax Officer

  • The Income-Tax Officer excluded the claim for WIP on the ground that the claim was not relatable to any tangible asset of the business as on the relevant date.
  • The Revenue appealed against the first appellate authority's allowance of deduction in respect of Rs. 1,56,73,720.

Assessee (learned senior tax counsel)

  • Contended that clause (II)(iii) of section 80J(1A) must be read with particular emphasis on the phrase "the value of the assets when they became assets of the business" and that the temporal element (i.e., the time when assets actually became assets of the business) requires consideration of actual use.
  • Argued that, by analogy with section 32 (depreciation), "use" or "user" is the operative factor for recognizing an asset for benefit claims and that exemptions/deductions should be strictly and principledly construed; therefore WIP should be treated only when actually in use as an asset of the business.
  • Noted that an identical question was the subject-matter of special leave to appeal to the Supreme Court in S.L.P. (Civil) No. 8690 of 1992 arising from a Karnataka High Court judgment in CIT v. H.M.T. Ltd.; submitted that the apex court was thus considering the issue.
  • Suggested that the question could be referred to a Full Bench for consideration.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Periyar Chemicals Ltd. v. Commr. of Income-Tax [1986] 162 ITR 163 (Ker) Held that the value of capital work-in-progress forms part of capital employed within the meaning of section 80J(1A) of the Act. The court treated Periyar as a binding decision of a co-ordinate bench and applied it to answer the question in favour of the assessee; the court found that Periyar had considered the relevant aspects now urged by counsel.
CIT v. Indian Oxygen Ltd. [1978] 113 ITR 109 (Cal) Principle that capital utilised to acquire assets for a business becomes employed in that business whether the asset is actually used or not. Quoted in Periyar and relied upon to support the proposition that WIP falls under "capital employed."
Ravi Machine Tools (P.) Ltd. v. CIT [1978] 114 ITR 459 (Kar) Authority cited for the proposition that assets acquired for the business, though not actually used, can form part of capital employed. Mentioned in Periyar's reasoning as a supporting authority for including assets not yet in use within "capital employed."
CIT v. Cibatul Ltd. [1978] 115 ITR 879 (Guj) Same proposition — assets acquired for business may be treated as capital employed even if not actually used in the accounting year. Referred to in Periyar as consistent authority.
CIT v. Alcock Ashdown and Co. Ltd. [1979] 119 ITR 164 (Bom) Same principle regarding inclusion of assets not actually used within capital employed. Referred to in Periyar to show consistent judicial treatment across High Courts.
CIT v. Mohan Meahin Breweries Ltd. [1980] 122 ITR 203 (HP) Authority cited in the same line that "capital employed" may include machinery/other assets not actually used. Referred to in Periyar as part of the body of supporting case law.
Birmingham Small Arms Co. Ltd. v. IRC [1951] 2 All ER 296 (HL) House of Lords authority (Lord Tucker, Lord Radcliffe) supporting that "capital employed" need not refer to the actual use of an asset in the relevant accounting period once shown to be capital put into and still in the business. Referred to in Periyar (via the Calcutta High Court's discussion) to support the construction that capital employed includes assets not yet in active use.
CIT v. H.M.T. Ltd. (Karnataka HC judgment dated 19 March 1992); S.L.P. (C) No. 8690 of 1992 (special leave granted) Raised an identical question as to whether WIP and cost of machinery in transit should be included in computation of capital for section 80J; apex court granted special leave. Cited by the assessee's counsel to show the question was under consideration by the Supreme Court. The present court noted this fact but also noted that Periyar had not been shown to have been taken up to the apex court.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court framed the dispute as a question whether WIP should be part of "capital employed" under section 80J(1A). It examined the precise statutory language of sub-section (1A), especially clause (II)(iii), which refers to "assets acquired otherwise than by purchase and not entitled to depreciation" and the valuation "when they became assets of the business."

Learned senior counsel argued that "when they became assets of the business" must be read with a temporal and factual emphasis on actual use (drawing an analogy to section 32 where "use" is critical for depreciation). Counsel urged that exemptions such as those under section 80J should be construed strictly and that the timing of when an asset becomes an asset of the business must be understood as the time it is actually used by the business.

The court reviewed its earlier decision in Periyar Chemicals Ltd. v. Commr. of Income-Tax [1986] 162 ITR 163. It observed that Periyar had considered and discussed the question (including a quote from Kanga & Palkhivala and multiple High Court authorities) and had expressly held that WIP forms part of capital employed under section 80J(1A). Periyar had relied on the Calcutta High Court's reasoning in CIT v. Indian Oxygen Ltd., and on a line of High Court authorities and the House of Lords decision in Birmingham Small Arms Co. Ltd. v. IRC to the effect that once capital is put into the business to acquire assets, it is employed in the business whether or not the asset is then actually used.

On reviewing Periyar, the court concluded that the aspects now urged (the meaning of "when they became assets" and the emphasis on actual use) were either before the Periyar court or otherwise could not be said to have been overlooked. The court further noted that clause (II)(iii) deals expressly with assets not entitled to depreciation (i.e., assets which may not be in "use") and that the language supports including such assets within capital employed. Because Periyar is a decision of a co-ordinate bench and binding on a court of the same jurisdiction, the present court found itself bound to follow it.

The court declined the request to refer the question to a Full Bench on grounds of internal consistency and judicial discipline, and also noted that the question was under consideration by the Supreme Court in a separate SLP but that Periyar had not been shown to have been taken to the apex court.

Holding and Implications

HOLDING: The court answered the question in the affirmative — the value of work-in-progress is to be included in the computation of capital employed for the purposes of section 80J of the Income-Tax Act, 1961. The ruling is against the Revenue and in favour of the assessee.

Implications:

  • The first appellate authority's allowance of deduction in respect of Rs. 1,56,73,720 (work-in-progress) is sustained by following Periyar Chemicals Ltd.'s decision.
  • The Tribunal's earlier decision rejecting the assessee's claim in respect of expenditure pending capitalization (Rs. 46,74,371) remains final and is not disturbed by this judgment.
  • The court treated Periyar as a binding decision of a co-ordinate bench and thus did not refer the matter to a Full Bench; no new principle contrary to Periyar was established by this court.
  • The court directed that a copy of the judgment be forwarded under the seal of the court to the Income-Tax Appellate Tribunal, Cochin Bench, for passing consequential orders.

Note: This summary is restricted to and faithful to the matters expressly stated in the provided opinion.

    Commissioner Of Income-Tax v. Kerala Chemicals And Proteins Ltd.

    The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

    V.V Kamat, J.:— The Revenue approaches us for the assessment year 1981-82 with regard to the consideration of the question of deduction under section 80J, with special reference to the provisions of sub-section (1A) thereof, which is inserted by the Finance (No. 2) Act, 1980, retrospectively, with effect from April 1, 1972. The question is as follows:

    “Whether, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the value of work-in-progress should be included in, the computation of capital for the purpose of relief under section 80J of the Income-Tax Act, 1961?”

    2. The assessee is a private limited company engaged in the business of manufacture of chemicals. The assessee claimed deduction under section 80J. As regards the value of capital work in progress, although there was a claim relating to expenditure pending capitalisation, the said claim has been rejected by the Tribunal rendering the situation to that effect a finality.

    3. The Income-Tax Officer excluded the claim. The reason according to him was that the claim was not relatable to any tangible asset of the business as on the relevant date.

    4. The Commissioner of Income-Tax (Appeals) considered the situation in favour of the assessee. The said authority accepted the claim for deduction, relatable to an amount of Rs. 1,56,73,720. It is held that the work-in-progress would form part of the capital employed in view of the decision of this court in Periyar Chemicals Ltd. v. Commr. Of Incometax [1986] 162 ITR 163, and accordingly directed the Income-Tax Officer to calculate deduction under the provisions of section 80J of the Income-Tax Act, 1961, with regard to the above amount.

    5. As stated earlier, the Revenue took up the matter with regard to the amount of Rs. 1,56,73,720, which was accepted by the first appellate authority, and at the other end the assessee took up the matter relating to the expenditure pending capitalisation amounting to Rs. 46,74,371. We have already stated that this aspect has received finality there being no challenge in regard thereto as regards the decision of the Tribunal to the effect that the assessee is not entitled to take into account the expenditure pending capitalisation as part of its capital in computing the capital employed for the purpose of section 80J of the Act. The Tribunal took into consideration that even though commercial production had begun with effect from June 1, 1979, it could not be said that it could be done overnight. The raw material had to be acquired in advance, labour had to be trained or at least recruited and power supply had to be ensured. The Tribunal has further proceeded in the context to note that the moment the raw material is purchased and the activity of recruiting and training of labour took place, it can be said that the business has commenced even though the first commercial production has taken place at a later stage. In the context of the situation the contention of the Revenue has been dismissed by the Tribunal as of no substance in view of the above decision of this court in the case of Periyar Chemicals Ltd.'s case [1986] 162 ITR 163 as a binding decision in regard to the situation.

    6. Therefore, learned senior tax counsel had to circumscribe his submissions to come out of the rigour of the above decision of this court. As stated in the statement of case itself, it was brought to our notice by learned senior tax counsel, referring to [1992] 197 ITR (St.) 151, that to an identical question arising out of the judgment dated March 19, 1992, of the Karnataka High Court in ITRC No. 21 of 1991 (CIT v. H.M.T Ltd. [1994] 206 ITR 125), thereof, the apex court granted special leave to appeal on August 6, 1992, in regard to the question as to whether the value of the work-in-progress and the cost of machinery in transit should be included in the computation of capital for the purpose of relief under section 80J of the Act. This was in S.L.P (Civil) No. 8690 of 1992. The learned senior tax counsel contended that the question as a result thereof is under consideration at the apex court. We would like to point out that the decision of this court in Periyar Chemicals Ltd.'s case [1986] 162 ITR 163, does not appear to have been taken up to the apex court as we are not told anything in regard thereto*.

    7. After taking us through the statutory provision of section 80J of the Income-Tax Act, 1961, especially sub-section (1A) thereof, learned counsel made some submissions. He invited our attention particularly to clause (II)(iii) thereof. To appreciate his submissions we reproduce hereinbelow the relevant portion thereof:

    “80J. (1A)(II) The aggregate of the amounts representing the values of the assets as on the first day of the computation period of the undertaking or of the business of the hotel to which this section applies shall first be ascertained in the following manner:…

    (iii) in the case of assets acquired otherwise than by purchase and not entitled to depreciation, the value of the assets when they became assets of the business;”

    8. It is submitted by him that it is necessary to appreciate that the capital assets acquired otherwise than by a purchase and not entitled to depreciation would have to be understood in terms of the value thereof in the context of time as to when they could be properly understood to have become assets of the business. Learned senior tax counsel submitted that the capital employed in the context will have to be computed in accordance with clauses (II) to (IV) of sub-section (1A) of section 80J of the Act and the emphasis in regard thereto would have to be appreciated in the context of time with reference to the value of the assets in question and the time would be the time when the assets could be understood to have become the assets of the business. Emphasising the above aspect to appreciate his further submission that in the earlier decision of this court in Periyar Chemicals Ltd.'s case [1986] 162 ITR 163, it would be necessary to consider the manner in which this court has approached the situation. This is because learned senior tax counsel submitted that the importance of the statutory phrase “the value of the assets when they became the assets of the business” has not been properly considered with special emphasis on the meaning of the above phrase. For this purpose, learned senior tax counsel took us through the entire discussion in the context referable to question No. 3 thereof. Learned counsel, apart from the pendency in the form of special leave petition referred to above, submitted that in view of his submissions the question should be properly referred to a Full Bench for consideration.

    9. Additionally, learned senior tax counsel submitted that with regard to the question of depreciation under the provisions of section 32 of the Income-Tax Act, in regard to buildings, machinery, plant or furniture, what is required is not only that these items should be owned by the assessee, but what is further required is that that the items are necessary to be used for the purpose of the business or profession. Therefore, learned counsel submits that the user is the most important aspect in regard to the question of a claim for depreciation. In understanding the statutory phrase under consideration, the situation as to when the concerned asset became the asset of the business would also be required to be considered meaningfully because these claims are in the nature of exemptions and are required to be understood and applied in that sense of the situation. Learned counsel submitted that the word “use” is to be found in section 32 in the context of a claim for depreciation. He submitted that the situations such as depreciation and deduction are in the nature of benefits offered to the assessee under the relevant statutory provisions and a strict and principled approach is necessary in regard thereto especially while appreciating the use of the words and phrases in regard thereto. He submitted that in the context “the value of the assets when they became assets of the business” would necessarily have to be appreciated in the context of the time in regard to the assets actually becoming assets of the business; in other words, actually being used as the assets of the business. Learned counsel also submitted referring to the phrase in clause (iii) of section 80J(1A)(II) of the Act that this will also have to be considered with reference to the assets not entitled to depreciation. In other words, the provision takes into consideration the factual situation that they are not used at all in the context. In our judgment, in the event of our coming to the conclusion that this court in deciding the question has not considered the above aspects or that these aspects could be said not to have been present to this court at the time of deciding the situation, it would be possible to consider the submissions of learned senior tax counsel. However, on going through the decision, we are afraid, it is not possible to come to such a conclusion. Additionally, even the bare reading of sub-clause (iii) would show that the said clause would govern the situation of the assessee who is not entitled to depreciation. In other words, it would naturally mean that the assessee, not being entitled to depreciation, may be by reason of there being no material of use, the said clause would govern the situation.

    10. Therefore, the language of the clause under consideration also additionally goes to support the view taken by this court earlier.

    11. The question as taken up for consideration by this court in Periyar Chemicals Ltd.'s case [1986] 162 ITR 163 is available in question No. 3 before it and it is as follows (page 165):

    “Whether, on the facts and circumstances of the case, Rs. 5,59,689, being the value of the work-in-progress should be excluded in the computation of the capital employed for the purpose of determining the amount of deduction allowable under section 80J of the Income-Tax Act, 1961, for the assessment year under consideration?”

    12. The said question is taken up for discussion at pages 168 to 169 of the report. It is clearly held that the value of the capital work-in-progress forms part of the capital employed in the industrial undertaking of the assessee within the meaning of section 80J(1A) of the Act. In the process of reasoning a paragraph from the professional treatise Law and Practice of Income-Tax by Kanga and Palkhivala, Supplement to Seventh Edition, at page 1-138 is quoted and it is to the following effect:

    “‘Capital employed’ includes work-in-progress, and also machinery, land or other assets acquired for the business though they may not be actually used in the accounting year: CIT v. Indian Oxygen Ltd. [1978] 113 ITR 109 (Cal), Ravi Machine Tools (P.) Ltd. v. CIT [1978] 114 ITR 459 (Kar); CIT v. Cibatul Ltd. [1978] 115 ITR 879 (Guj); CIT v. Alcock Ashdown and Co. Ltd. [1979] 119 ITR 164 (Bom) and CIT v. Mohan Meahin Breweries Ltd. [1980] 122 ITR 203 (HP).”

    13. It is also observed thereafter with the help of the decision of the Calcutta High Court in CIT v. Indian Oxygen Ltd. [1978] 113 ITR 109, that the moment capital is utilised for the purpose of acquiring any assets for a business, such capital becomes employed in that business, whether the asset is actually used for the business or not. Then it is observed that the work-in-progress would, therefore, fall under section 80J(1A) as forming part of the capital employed in the industrial undertaking. This court also has further observed that the Karnataka High Court and the Gujarat High Court have taken the same view. Referring to a decision of the House of Lords in Birmingham Small Arms Co. Ltd. v. IRC [1951] 2 All ER 296 (HL), referred to by the Calcutta High Court, especially Lord Tucker, to the effect that the words “capital employed” point to the conclusion that in their context they do not refer to the actual use made of a particular asset in the relevant accounting period once it is shown to have been a form of capital put into the business and still there.

    14. Going through the reasoning of this court in Periyar Chemicals Ltd. 's case [1986] 162 ITR 163, it would not be possible to say that the aspect was not present to the mind of this court when it decided Periyar Chemicals Ltd.'s case [1986] 162 ITR 163 (Ker). The decision is of the court of co-ordinate jurisdiction and of a binding nature. In a situation in which we also feel to take the same view, it is not possible to think of a reference to a Full Bench on the ground of internal consistency and judicial discipline in regard thereto. Additionally, this court has also emphasised that the Karnataka High Court, Gujarat High Court, Calcutta High Court and the House of Lords, especially Lord Tucker and Lord Radcliffe speak with the same voice, and decision.

    15. In this view of the question, we answer the question in the affirmative, against the Revenue and in favour of the assessee.

    16. A copy of this judgment under the seal of the court and the signature of the Registrar shall be forwarded to the Income-Tax Appellate Tribunal, Cochin Bench, for passing consequential orders.

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    Commissioner Of Income-Tax v. Kerala Chemicals And Proteins Ltd.
    (Oct 28, 1996)