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  • section 110A of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939.
  • section 103A of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939,
  • section 96(1) of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939).
  • rule 22 of Order 41 C.P.C10.
  • Rule 33 of Order 41
  • Order 41 Rule 22
  • Order 41 Rule 33
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Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Attorney(S)
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Acts
  • section 110A of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939.
  • section 103A of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939,
  • section 96(1) of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939).
  • rule 22 of Order 41 C.P.C10.
  • Rule 33 of Order 41
  • Order 41 Rule 22
  • Order 41 Rule 33
Smart Summary

Judgment Summary: Viswanatha Iyer, J.

Factual and Procedural Background

On 14-10-1979 at about 9:30 P.M. a jeep (KLC 4448) knocked down three persons; two of them, Raghavan and Devanarayan, died. Their legal representatives filed claims for compensation under section 110A of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939. The vehicle was alleged to have been driven rashly and negligently by the second respondent (the driver). The first respondent was described as the owner at the time of the accident; the fourth respondent was the previous owner. The third respondent was the insurer.

The Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal found the driver negligent and awarded compensation of Rs. 5,600 and Rs. 7,600 respectively (after deducting Rs. 1,000 already paid in each case), making the insurer liable to pay. The insurer appealed, contending there was no valid insurance policy covering the vehicle in the name of the first respondent and therefore they could not be held liable. The claimants filed memoranda of cross-objection seeking enhanced compensation.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the insurer (third respondent) was liable to indemnify payment of the Tribunal's awards where the insurance policy was in the name of a prior owner and there was no proved transfer of the policy to the first respondent (owner at time of accident), including whether a "deemed transfer" arose under section 103A of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939.
  2. Whether memoranda of cross-objection filed by the claimants seeking enhancement of compensation are maintainable in an appeal prosecuted by the insurer alone, particularly by invoking Order 41 Rule 33 and/or Order 41 Rule 22 of the Code of Civil Procedure.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant (Insurer)

  • There was no valid policy of insurance covering the vehicle in question in the name of the first respondent (owner at the time of the accident), and therefore the insurer could not be made liable to pay the compensation awarded by the Tribunal.
  • Evidence from the insurer's officer (R.W.4) was that office records and registers showed no application for transfer of the policy from the fourth respondent to the first respondent.

First Respondent (Owner)

  • The first respondent claimed that he and the fourth respondent had applied to the insurer for transfer of the insurance policy to his name under section 103A of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939, and having received no reply within fifteen days (or by the time he gave evidence), a valid policy should be deemed to exist in his name, making the insurer liable to indemnify him for the awards.
  • Counsel for the first respondent contended he had been prejudiced by the insurer's initial denial of any policy and that the insurer raised the lack of transfer only at the stage of evidence.

Claimants (Legal Representatives of Deceased)

  • The claimants filed memoranda of cross-objection seeking enhancement of the compensation awarded by the Tribunal.
  • Their counsel relied on decisions of the Rajasthan High Court (Murari Lal v. Gomati Devi; National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Tulasi Devi) to contend that cross-objections could be entertained and compensation enhanced under Rule 33 of Order 41 C.P.C., even though the appeal was by the insurer alone.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
United India Insurance Company Ltd. v. Jameela Beevi, 1991 (1) K.L.T. 832 That the insurer's position is only that of an indemnifier and a memorandum of cross-objection for enhancement of compensation will not lie in an appeal filed by the insurer. The court applied this principle to hold that cross-objections by claimants for enhanced compensation are prima facie not maintainable in an appeal by the insurer and declined to reconsider that decision.
Murari Lal v. Gomati Devi, 1986 A.C.J. 316 (Rajasthan High Court) Held (in that case) that relief against a co-respondent could be granted under Order 41 Rule 33 where appropriate (as applied in facts of that case). The court discussed this decision but disagreed with its application to the present facts, distinguishing that case from the present appeals and declining to follow its reasoning for allowing cross-objections in an insurer-only appeal.
National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Tulasi Devi, 1988 A.C.J. 962 (Rajasthan High Court) Decision of the Rajasthan High Court used to support entertainability of cross-objections under Rule 33 in certain circumstances. The court considered and rejected reliance on this decision, holding Rule 33 does not permit reopening of decrees between co-respondents where the appeal is by the insurer alone.
Venkateswarlu v. Ramamma, AIR 1950 Mad. 379 (Full Bench) Explains exceptional circumstances where an objection under Order 41 Rule 22 may be directed also against other respondents (when relief against appellant is intermixed with relief granted to other respondents), discussed in detail. The court relied on the principle to explain that, as a general rule, an objection under Order 41 Rule 22 is primarily against the appellant; only in exceptional cases can it be directed against other respondents. The present case was not such an exceptional case.
Panna Lal v. State of Bombay, AIR 1963 S.C. 1516 Approved the detailed discussion in Venkateswarlu v. Ramamma concerning the scope of Order 41 Rule 22. The court cited the approval to support its conclusion that the present cross-objections were not maintainable against the insurer alone, since the owner (co-respondent) had not appealed.
State of Kerala v. Padmavathi, 1983 K.L.T. 17 Explains that Order 41 Rule 33 is aimed at avoiding contrary and inconsistent decisions and to adjust the rights of parties where necessary as a result of interference with a decree in favour of the appellant. The court used this explanation to conclude that Rule 33 is not intended to provide a separate route to reopen decrees between co-respondents (such as to enhance compensation) in an appeal brought solely by the insurer; hence Rule 33 could not be invoked to entertain the claimants' cross-objections for enhancement.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

Liability under insurance and the existence of a valid policy in the name of the owner: The Tribunal had accepted the first respondent's evidence (R.W.1) as if unchallenged and concluded a "deemed transfer" under section 103A of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939. The High Court examined the record and found that R.W.1 had in fact been cross-examined at length on the matter and had made admissions inconsistent with an uncontradicted application-for-transfer narrative.

Key evidentiary points relied on by the court:

  • R.W.1 admitted handing over a "transfer endorsement No." to his counsel, but the endorsement itself was not produced; this omission undermined the first respondent's claim that nothing further was heard after an application was made.
  • No copy of any application for transfer was produced, and the first respondent did not disclose when any such application was made; there was a "total dearth of any evidence" regarding the alleged application for transfer.
  • R.W.4, an officer of the insurer, stated after examining office records and registers that no application for transfer by the first respondent was found.

The Tribunal had drawn an adverse inference against the insurer for non-production of registers. The High Court held that drawing such an adverse inference was improper where the claimants (first and fourth respondents) had not taken the elementary step of summoning the insurer to produce the documents that would have supported their case. In short, the court found that the first respondent had the initial burden of proving the existence of a valid policy in his name (or in his favour) and had failed to discharge this burden.

On the maintainability of cross-objections for enhancement: The court analysed the legal position that an insurer's liability is that of an indemnifier (citing section 96(1) of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939). An insurer is liable only to pay the sum adjudged payable by the insured (the owner), up to the sum assured. Because the owner (co-respondent) had not joined in the appeal, and because relief of enhancement would be directed against the co-respondent-owner, the court held that the memorandum of cross-objection by the claimants was not maintainable under Order 41 Rule 22. The court then considered Order 41 Rule 33 and observed that its object is to avoid inconsistent decisions and to adjust parties' rights when necessary as a result of interference with a decree in favour of an appellant; it is not intended to permit reopening decrees between co-respondents as a free-standing route to enhancement. The court therefore refused to apply Rule 33 to permit enhancement in the present insurer-only appeals.

Holding and Implications

Core Ruling: The appeals filed by the insurer are allowed and the Tribunal's award insofar as it makes the appellant insurer liable for payment of the amounts awarded is vacated.

Direct Consequences for the Parties:

  • The court held that there was no transfer of the insurance policy from the fourth respondent to the first respondent; accordingly, the third respondent insurer could not be made liable for payment of the compensation awarded by the Claims Tribunal.
  • The amounts awarded by the Tribunal shall be payable by the other persons made liable by the Claims Tribunal (i.e., the co-respondents/owners as previously held liable by the Tribunal), and not by the appellant insurer.
  • Memoranda of cross-objections filed by the claimants in each case seeking enhanced compensation are rejected as not maintainable.

Broader implications: The court did not purport to lay down any new principle beyond application and reinforcement of established rules concerning (a) the burden on a party to prove a transfer of insurance policy, (b) the limited role of adverse inference where the party fails to take steps to summon documents, and (c) the limits on entertaining cross-objections for enhancement in an insurer-only appeal (drawing on existing precedent). The decision applies those principles to the facts and does not claim to establish a novel precedent.

    New India Assurance Co. Ltd. v. Kunhiraman Nambiar And Others

    Viswanatha Iyer, J.:— Three persons were knocked down by a jeep KLC 4448 at about 9.30 P.M on 14-10-1979. Of these three, two persons Raghavan and Devanarayan died and their legal representatives filed claims for award of compensation for the loss caused by their death, under section 110A of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939. The first respondent was stated to be the owner of the vehicle at the time of the accident and the fourth respondent, the previous owner. The second respondent was the driver, and the third respondent the insurer, speaking with reference to the array of parties before the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal. Though the first respondent was impleaded as the owner of the vehicle, there was no insurance for the vehicle in his name: it stood in the name of the fourth respondent. The Tribunal held that the vehicle was driven rashly and negligently by the second respondent driver and an award was accordingly passed for amounts of Rs. 5600/- and Rs. 7600/- respectively as compensation, after deducting an amount of Rs. 1000/- each paid earlier to the legal representatives of the deceased persons. The insurer was made liable for payment of the amounts. Being aggrieved, the insurer has filed these appeals contending that there was no valid policy of insurance covering the vehicle in question and therefore they could not be made liable for payment of the amounts awarded.

    2. Memorandum of cross objection has been filed by the claimants in each of these appeals claiming enhanced compensation. Though the plea raised by the insurer in the written statement was that there was no policy of insurance at all issued by them, covering the vehicle, it turned out subsequently that there was a policy of insurance in relation to this vehicle issued in the name of one Kunhahmed, who was the owner of the vehicle, before it was transferred to the fourth respondent at the request of Kunhahmed, and the fourth respondent. The policy thus stood in the name of the fourth respondent. There is no dispute on this point. But after the vehicle was transferred by the fourth respondent to the first respondent, there was no proceeding transferring the insurance cover to the name of the latter; and there lies the dispute between the parties, on which they were in issue before the Tribunal as well. It was the case of the first respondent, the present owner, that himself and the fourth respondent had made application to the third respondent insurer, for transfer of the insurance policy to his name; as prescribed in section 103A of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939, to which they did not receive any reply within a period of fifteen days, or even by the time the first respondent was examined in the case as Rs. W. 1. Therefore, and according to the first respondent, a valid policy should be deemed to exist in relation to the vehicle in his name, which made the insurer liable for payment of the amounts of compensation.

    3. The first respondent examined himself as R.W 1 in support of this plea. In defence, the insurer examined one of its officers as R.W 4. The Tribunal proceeded as if there was no cross-examination of R.W 1 on his deposition that an application for transfer had been made by him and the fourth respondent. It was based primarily on this circumstance that the Tribunal held that there was a deemed transfer of the policy to the first respondent under section 103A of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939. The order of the Tribunal proceeds as if there was no other evidence in the case relating to the transfer of the policy except the alleged uncontradicted statement of R.W 1. But a perusal of the evidence of R.Ws 1 and 4 belies this line of reasoning of the Tribunal. As a matter of fact, the Tribunal has omitted to note material portions in the evidence of R.W 1 besides totally ignoring the evidence of R.W 4. R.W 1 was actually cross-examined at length regarding the application for transfer when he deposed as follows:

    “Document transfer endorsement No.

    4. This endorsement is not produced. This really cuts at the very root of the first respondent's case that nothing was heard of in the matter after the application for transfer was made by him and the fourth respondent. Apart from this, the very case of such an application for transfer cannot be entertained, in the absence of any valid evidence to support it. No copy of the application stated to have been made is produced. The first respondent has not chosen to disclose as to when the application was made by him and the fourth respondent. There was thus total dearth of any evidence regarding the alleged application for transfer. All this, coupled with his admission in cross-examination to which the Tribunal failed to advert, that he had handed over transfer endorsement No. to his counsel is proof positive that the case set up by the first respondent of a deemed transfer of the policy could not be true. As a matter of fact, the officer of the insurance company who was examined as R.W 4 has stated in cross-examination that he had examined the records in his office, but could not find any such application filed by the first respondent for transfer of the policy. The insurer is maintaining registers about the policy holders as well as the transferes and those registers were examined by him without any trace of such an application being filed. In this state of the evidence, we have no hesitation in holding that there was application for transfer of the policy from the fourth respondent to the first respondent.

    5. The Tribunal has drawn adverse inference against the insurer by reason of the non-production of the registers maintained, by them. But then it must be noted that neither the first respondent nor the fourth respondent took any steps to summon the insurer to produce any of the documents in their possession. An adverse inference could not be drawn in the circumstances, particularly when respondents 1 and 4 did not take the minimum steps that they were expected to take in the matter of summoning the insurer to produce the documents in their possession.

    6. Counsel for the first respondent Sri. E.V Nayanar was however very vehement in his contention that the first respondent had been misled in his defence by the total denial of the existence of the policy by the insurer. According to him the stand that there was no transfer of the policy to the first respondent was taken only at the stage of evidence when the existence of the policy in the name of Kunhahmed was disclosed, and therefore he is prejudiced. We do not find any substance in this plea. Parties went to trial fully aware that the first respondent had to prove the existence of a valid policy in his name or in his favour, if he were to get indemnity from the insurer. It was therefore the duty of the first respondent to prove all those facts which were necessary to cast liability on the insurer to indemnify him for the compensation. The initial burden of proof was on the first respondent, and he has failed to discharge that burden. The complaint of prejudice does not therefore appeal to us and we overrule the same.

    7. We have therefore no hesitation in holding that there was no transfer of the policy from the fourth respondent to the first respondent, and therefore the third respondent insurer could not be made liable for the amount of compensation payable to the respective claimants in these cases. The appeals filed by the insurer have therefore to be allowed.

    8. Memorandum of cross objection has been filed by the claimants in each of these cases, claiming enhanced compensation. Prima facie the cross objections are not maintainable having regard to the decision of this court in United India Insurance Company Ltd. v. Jameela Beevi, 1991 (1) K.L.T 832, where Bhat and Guttal, JJ. held that the position of the sinsurer being only that of an indemnifier, a memorandum of cross objection for enhancement of compensation will not lie in an appeal filed by the insurer.

    9. But, counsel for the claimants, Sri. Therattil contends, relying on the decisions of the High Court of Rajasthan in Murari Lal v. Gomati Devi, 1986 A.C.J 316 and National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Tulasi Devi, 1988 A.C.J 962 that cross objections could be entertained and the compensation enhanced in exercise of the powers vested in this court under Rule 33 of Order 41 of the C.P.C even though the appeal is by the insurer only. We find it unable to agree with this submission. The liability of the appellant insurer is only to indemnify the insured, by paying to the claimant the amount of the decree obtained by him (but not exceeding the sum assured), as if he were the judgment debtor. (Vide section 96(1) of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939). The liability is only to pay such sum as is adjudged payable by the insured, the owner of the vehicle. Admittedly the owner of the vehicle has not joined the appeal. An objection under Order 41 Rule 22 should, as a general rule, primarily be against the appellant. It is only in exceptional cases, such as where the relief sought against the appellant in the objection is intermixed with the relief granted to the other respondents, so that the relief against the appellant cannot be granted without the question being reopened between the objecting respondent and the others, that it can be directed also against the other respondents (Venkateswarlu v. Ramamma, AIR 1950 Mad. 379 (FB) where the matter is discussed in elaborate detail and which was approved in Panna Lal v. State of Bombay, AIR 1963 S.C 1516). The relief of enhancement of the compensation is directed against the co-respondent-owner of the vehicle. The appellant insurer does not become liable for any further amount unless an enhanced award is passed against the owner of the vehicle, who is only a co-respondent. The memorandum of cross objection is therefore not maintainable under rule 22 of Order 41 C.P.C

    10. Nor is it possible to grant enhancement under order 33 of Order 41. The object of rule 33 is to avoid contrary and inconsistent decisions on the same questions in the same suit. The rule does not ordinarily confer a right to reopen decrees which have become final. The object of the rule is to adjust the rights of parties according to justice where it becomes necessary as a result of interference with the decree, in favour of the appellant (State of Kerala v. Padmavathi, 1983 K.L.T 17). The rule is not intended to provide a kind of separate appeal on disputes essentially between corespondents and not arising as a result of any decision in favour of the appellant in the appeal.

    11. In the first of the cases decided by the Rajasthan High Court, the question of enhancement of compensation was not involved. The accident involved two buses, one a private bus of M and the other of the Rajasthan State Road Transport Corporation (the RSRTC) The Claims Tribunal found both the drivers guilty of negligence, but passed an award only against M.M appealed with the plea that he was not the real owner of the vehicle but one G. The claimants had not filed an appeal or cross objections, nevertheless hey claimed an award against the RSRTC in view of the finding of composite negligence of both the drivers. This they claimed under Order 41 Rule 33 and that was granted.

    12. In the other appeal, the appeal was by the insurer of a car, who had been made liable on the death of the passengers and driver of the car in a collision with a truck. Both the drivers were found negligent and an award was passed against the owners and drivers of both the vehicles. On an appeal by the insurer of the car seeking enhancement of the compensation cross objection was filed. The court invoked Rule 33 of Order 41 to make the insurer of the truck liable for the enhanced amount, though he was only a co-respondent.

    13. In the view that we have taken on the scope of rule 33, in Paragraph 10 above, we are unable to agree with these decisions of the Rajasthan High Court. The question of enhancement of the compensation claimed in the cross-objections is one arising only between the co-respondents and is not a matter for consideration in the appeal at all. It does not even arise incidentally therefrom. No adjustment of rights between co-respondent is necessitated by any decision in the appeal. Rule 33 cannot therefore be pressed into service to grant the relief of enhancement of compensation to the claimants respondents. We do not therefore find any reason to reconsider the decision in United India insurance Co. v. Jameela Beevi, 1991 (1) K.L.T 832 as requested by the claimants-respondents.

    14. The appeals are therefore allowed and the award in so far as it makes the appellant liable for payment of the amount awarded is vacated. The amounts awarded shall be payable by the other persons made liable by the Claims Tribunal. Memorandum of cross objections in each case is rejected as not maintainable.

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    New India Assurance Co. Ltd. v. Kunhiraman Nambiar And Others
    (Nov 17, 1993)