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  • Section 33(2)(b) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, Exhibit P-5
  • Section 33(2)(b).
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  • Section 33(2)(b) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, Exhibit P-5
  • Section 33(2)(b).
Smart Summary

Structured Summary of the Provided Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

The second respondent was an employee of the petitioner. A co-worker, Ravindran Nair, lodged a complaint against the second respondent and the second respondent was charge-sheeted by Exhibit P-1 under four counts. A domestic enquiry followed, in which the complainant (Ravindran Nair) acted as the de facto complainant and prosecuted the enquiry. The second respondent stated that Ravindran Nair was assisted by another co-worker, Dayanandan, acting as the Presenting Officer; the petitioner denied that assertion. The second respondent was permitted to be assisted by a union leader. Ravindran Nair and another employee were examined as management witnesses; Ravindran Nair was not cross-examined though the other management witness was. The second respondent examined himself and another witness. The enquiry proceedings are Exhibit P-2 and the enquiry report is Exhibit P-3. All four charges were found proved, the management accepted the report and issued Exhibit P-4 (a show-cause notice). The cause shown was found not acceptable and the second respondent was dismissed on March 18, 1986.

At that time an industrial dispute (unconnected with the second respondent) was pending before the Industrial Tribunal, Kollam, as I.D. No. 41 of 1982. Under the proviso to Section 33(2)(b) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, the petitioner filed Exhibit P-5 seeking approval of the dismissal. By Exhibit P-6 the Industrial Tribunal refused approval. The present original petition seeks to quash Exhibit P-6.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the Industrial Tribunal correctly exercised its jurisdiction under Section 33(2)(b) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, or whether it impermissibly reappraised evidence and acted as an appellate authority.
  2. Whether the domestic enquiry was vitiated by a violation of the principles of natural justice because the complainant acted as Presenting Officer and may have been assisted by another person (Dayanandan), causing prejudice to the second respondent.
  3. Whether circumstantial evidence (without medical evidence) could suffice to support a finding of drunkenness in a domestic enquiry.
  4. Whether, upon apparent vitiation of a domestic enquiry, the Tribunal was obliged to give the employer an opportunity to adduce evidence before finally refusing approval, and whether the employer should have sought permission to adduce evidence at the earliest opportunity.

Arguments of the Parties

Second Respondent's Arguments

  • The second respondent stated that the complainant (Ravindran Nair) was assisted by Dayanandan as the Presenting Officer and prosecutor in the domestic enquiry.
  • Counsel for the second respondent represented to the court (relying on Kodakkat Service Co-operative Society Ltd. v. Labour Court) that an application for permission to adduce fresh evidence should be made at the earliest opportunity and pointed out that such an application was filed only after Exhibit P-6 was pronounced.

Petitioner's (Employer's) Arguments

  • The petitioner denied that Dayanandan assisted Ravindran Nair as Presenting Officer in the enquiry.
  • The petitioner complained that the Industrial Tribunal did not give him an opportunity to adduce evidence after indicating the enquiry was vitiated; the petitioner contended he should have been allowed to adduce evidence before a final refusal of approval was made.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Bharat Iron Works v. Bhagubhai Balubhai Patel (1976) 49 FJR 332 (SC) That the Tribunal may interfere when dismissal is by way of victimisation or unfair labour practice; and that if Tribunal finds principles of natural justice violated it must give employer opportunity to adduce evidence. The court relied on this authority to state the limited grounds on which a Tribunal may interfere under Section 33(2)(b) (victimisation/unfair labour practice) and to emphasise that when the Tribunal holds an enquiry vitiated it should give the employer a chance to adduce evidence before finally deciding the matter.
Pun-iob Beverages P. Ltd. v. Suresh Chand (1978-II-LLM(S.C)) To illustrate why the power of the Tribunal under Section 33 is restricted (i.e., approval does not validate the dismissal; the Tribunal's power is limited). The court cited this authority to support the proposition that even if approval is granted, the validity of dismissal remains open to challenge and that the Tribunal's power under Section 33(2)(b) is accordingly limited.
Maharashtra State Board of Secondary and Higher Secondary Education v. K.S. Gandhi, (1991) 2 SCC 716 That circumstantial evidence, where it satisfies the test of preponderance of probabilities, can be sufficient in a domestic enquiry; strict rules of evidence are not applicable and standard is preponderance of probabilities. The court applied this principle to hold that the Tribunal was not justified in rejecting the enquiry report merely because circumstantial evidence was relied upon to support drunkenness; circumstantial evidence can constitute prima facie proof if properly inferred.
Motor Industries Co. Ltd. v. Shaikh Mohammed, 1979-I-LLJ-23 That there is no principle of natural justice which absolutely prohibits a complainant from acting as Presenting Officer and Prosecutor in a domestic enquiry. The court relied on this authority to reject the Tribunal's view that the complainant acting as Presenting Officer automatically vitiated the enquiry; the court observed that such a fact by itself will not vitiate the enquiry absent other prejudice.
Kodakkat Service Co-operative Society Ltd. v. Labour Court, (1988) 73 FJR 12 (Ker) The proposition that an application to adduce fresh evidence should be filed at the earliest opportunity. The court acknowledged the principle but observed that courts and tribunals should not deny justice on technical grounds; in the present case the petitioner could not be blamed for not making the alternate application earlier because the Tribunal might have accepted the enquiry report.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court analysed the matter principally through the lens of the limited jurisdiction conferred on the Industrial Tribunal by Section 33(2)(b) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. The court's reasoning proceeded in the following steps (as expressed in the opinion):

  1. The court characterised the Tribunal's refusal of approval (Exhibit P-6) as perverse in relation to its powers under Section 33(2)(b), because the Tribunal effectively acted as an appellate authority and reappraised the evidence rather than confining itself to determining whether a prima facie case was made out.
  2. The court explained the proper scope of the Tribunal's function under Section 33(2)(b): where a domestic enquiry is free from defects (i.e., free from denial of natural justice), the Tribunal's role is limited to examining whether a prima facie case of misconduct has been established by the enquiry findings. The Tribunal is not to act as a court of appeal reweighing evidence.
  3. The court delineated the exception: if the Tribunal finds a violation of natural justice in the domestic enquiry, it must give the employer an opportunity to adduce evidence (if any) and allow the workman to rebut it; in that situation the Tribunal may then come to its own conclusions on the merits based on the evidence before it, and consideration of a mere prima facie case is not the controlling criterion.
  4. Applying those principles to the facts, the court found that the contingency justifying a full reappraisal of evidence (i.e., a genuine finding that the enquiry was vitiated) had not occurred. The Tribunal misunderstood the nature of evidence in domestic enquiries and the standard of proof (preponderance of probabilities rather than strict rules). The Tribunal wrongly rejected circumstantial evidence regarding drunkenness without adequately considering whether it could constitute prima facie proof, despite the enquiry officer's reliance on prior conduct and punishments.
  5. The court further found that the Tribunal misconceived what constitutes denial of natural justice. There was no material to show that Dayanandan examined or cross-examined witnesses; precedent establishes that a complainant acting as Presenting Officer does not, by itself, vitiate an enquiry. The second respondent was allowed assistance by a union leader and had opportunities for cross-examination; witness No. 2 was cross-examined and witness No. 1 (the complainant) was not cross-examined though an opportunity was given.
  6. On the question of fresh evidence, while the second respondent's counsel relied on a decision to argue an application for fresh evidence should have been made earlier, the court emphasised that courts and tribunals exist to dispense justice and not to deny it on technical grounds. The petitioner could reasonably have expected the Tribunal to accept the enquiry report and therefore might not have pursued an application to adduce evidence in advance. The Tribunal erred in passing a composite order refusing approval without first giving the petitioner a chance to seek permission to adduce evidence or to amend its petition.
  7. In conclusion, for these cumulative reasons the court held Exhibit P-6 could not be justified and ordered that the Industrial Tribunal reconsider the matter afresh according to law.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The original petition is allowed and Exhibit P-6 (the Industrial Tribunal's order refusing approval) is quashed.

Direct consequences and implications:

  • The Industrial Tribunal is directed to take the petition back on its file and proceed to deal with it afresh according to law in the light of the court's reasons set out in the judgment.
  • No costs were awarded.

The opinion does not purport to set a new broad precedent beyond applying established principles concerning the limited jurisdiction of a Tribunal under Section 33(2)(b), the standard of proof in domestic enquiries (preponderance of probabilities), the permissibility of circumstantial evidence, and the procedure to be followed if a Tribunal finds that an enquiry is vitiated. The decision's immediate effect is the quashing of Exhibit P-6 and remittal for fresh consideration.

    Vijaya Mohini Mills v. Industrial Tribunal And Anr.

    1. The second respondent is an employee under the petitioner. A co-worker by name Ravindran Nair filed a complaint against him. The second respondent was charge-sheeted by Exhibit P-l under four counts. A domestic enquiry followed Ravindran Nair, the de facto complainant, himself prosecuted the enquiry. The second respondent says that Ravindran Nair was assisted by a co-worker, Dayanandan, as the Presenting Officer, but the petitioner dentes this fact. The second respondent was also allowed to be assisted in the enquiry by a union leader. Ravindran Nair and another employee were examined as witnesses by the management. Ravindran Nair was not cross-examined, but the other witnesses were cross-examined. The second respondent examined himself and another witness. Exhibit P-2 is the enquiry proceedings and Exhibit P-3 is the enquiry report. All the four charges were found proved. The management accepted the report and issued Exhibit P-4, show-cause notice, why the second respondent should not be dismissed. The cause shown was found not acceptable. The second respondent was dismissed on March 18, 1986.

    2. An industrial dispute concerning the petitioner but unconnected with the second respondent was at that time pending before the first respondent, the Industrial Tribunal, Kollam, as I.D. No. 41 of 1982.Therefore, under the proviso to Section 33(2)(b) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, Exhibit P-5 application was filed by the petitioner for approval of the action dismissing the second respondent. By Exhibit P-6 order, approval was refused. This original petition is to quash Exhibit P-6.

    3. The reasons which weighed with the Industrial Tribunal for refusing approval are: (1) Though there was no Presenting Officer for the management and the complainant himself acted as the Presenting Officer and prosecutor, he was allowed to be assisted by one Dayanandan. The complainant and Dayanandan examined the management witness and cross- examined the defence witnesses. This is violation of the principles of natural justice which caused serious prejudice to the second respondent (2) The defence witness was disbelieved for the simple reason that he was a witness for the second respondent on an earlier occasion. His evidence was not objectively assessed and the finding was on the interested testimony of the complainant, (3) Drunkenness which was one of the charges was accepted on the basis of circumstantial evidence without any medical evidence, and (4) On one of the charges of dereliction of duty, the explanation of giddiness offered by the second respondent was not considered.

    4. I am not going into the evidence or express any opinion except saying that the approach made by the Industrial Tribunal is perverse in relation to his powers under Section 33(2)(b). That provision is intended only as a protection to the worker against victimisation and unfair labour practice. The first respondent, unaware of the restriction on his powers, acted as an appellate authority and reappraised the evidence to disagree with the Enquiry Officer on his findings recorded on the evidence. When an application under Section 33, whether for approval or for permission, is made to the Tribunal it has initially only a limited jurisdiction to see whether a prima facie case is made out in: respect of the misconduct charged. This is the position only when the domestic enquiry preceding the order of dismissal is free from any defect, that is to say, free from the vice of violation of the principles of natural justice or; otherwise. If there is violation of the principles of natural justice, the Tribunal will have to give the employer an opportunity of adducing evidence, if any, and also to the workman to rebut it if he chooses. In that event, the Tribunal will be free to come to his own conclusions on the merits of the evidence with regard to proof of misconduct charged. In such a contingency, consideration of prima facie case is alone is not the criterion. That is because the employer's: findings in the domestic enquiry will lapse and will be substituted by the conclusions of the Industrial Tribunal on the evidence adduced before him. Such a contingency has not happened in this case.

    5. The Tribunal is not sitting as a court of appeal weighing or reappraising the evidence. It only examines the findings of the Enquiry Officer hi order to find out whether there is a prima facie case or whether the findings are perverse, simply for the purpose of granting or refusing approval. A prima facie case is not, as in a criminal case, a case proved to the hilt. If there is no defect in procedure such as non-compliance with the principles of natural justice, the other grounds on which the Tribunal can interfere are only when (1) there is no legal evidence at all recorded in the domestic enquiry as if no reasonable person can arrive at a conclusion of guilt on the evidence recorded in the domestic enquiry, or (2) if the Tribunal finds that the dismissal is by way of victimisation of unfair labour practice (Bharat Iron Works v. Bhahub-hai Balubhai Patet(1976) 49 FJR 332 (SC)). If there was a proper enquiry into the misconduct and no victimisation or unfair labour practice is involved, the Tribunal has to limit its enquiry under Section 33(2)(b) only to the question as to whether a prima facie case has been made out or nat. It is not open to the Tribunal to consider whether the order proposed to be passed is proper or adequate.

    6. The jurisdiction is only to decide whether the ban imposed on the employer by Section 33 is to be lifted or maintained by granting or refusing the permission or approval. If the permission or approval is refused by the Tribunal the employer would be precluded from discharging or punishing the workman as the action taken would be void. But the reverse is not true because even if permission or approval is granted that would not validate the action of discharge or dismissal. Permission or approval would merely remove the ban but the validity of the order would still be liable to be tested in a reference at the instance of the workman under Section 10. That seems to be one of the reasons why the power of the Tribunal is restricted (Pun-iob Beverages P. Ltd. v. Suresh Chand 1978-II-LLM(S.C)

    7. As earlier stated, the Industrial Tribunal was proceeding as if he is sitting in appeal. That seems to be the reason why he reappraised the evidence and came to different conclusions. He did not realise the nature of evidence required in a domestic enquiry. He was also unaware of the fact that strict rules of evidence are not applicable to a domestic enquiry. Standard of proof required in a domestic enquiry is only preponderance of probabilities. It is not necessity that there should be direct evidence. Circumstantial evidence satisfying the test of preponderance of probabilities will be sufficient (Maharashtra State Board of Secondary and Higher Secondary Education v. K.S. Gandhi, (1991) 2 SCC 716 . Only thing is that inference from evidence and circumstances must be clearly distinguished from conjectures or speculation. The Tribunal was, therefore, not justified ; in rejecting the enquiry report on the ground that circumstantial evidence regarding drunkenness was relied on. Whether that affords prima facie evidence was not considered especially when the Enquiry Officer relied on prior conduct and prior punishments also.

    8. What is prima facie case itself was not considered by the Tribunal on the basis of the findings of the Enquiry Officer on the evidence considered by him. What amounts to denial of natural justice was not understood or appreciated by the Tribunal. There is nothing to show that any witness was examined or cross-examined by Dayanandan. As held in Motor Industries Co. Ltd. v Shaikh Mohammed, 1979-I-LLJ-23, there is no principle of natural justice which requires that a person who has lodged a complaint cannot be a Presenting Officer and a Prosecutor in a domestic enquiry. It is an accepted proposition of law that the fact that the complainant acted as the Presenting and Prosecuting Officer by itself will not vitiate the domestic enquiry if no other question of prejudice is there. Even taking for granted that one: Dayanandan assisted the complainant and he also put questions to the witnesses, it is not known how it will operate as a reason for saying that there was denial of natural justice and consequent prejudice especially when the second; respondent has no case that he was denied the opportunities of presenting his case or cross-examination and hearing. He was in fact allowed to be assisted by a union leader and witness No. 2 was cross-examined. Witness No. 1, namely, the complainant was not cross-examined though opportunity was given.

    9. Another complaint of the petitioner is that the first respondent did not give him an opportunity to adduce evidence, gut counsel for the second respondent told me on the basis of the decision in Kodakkat Service Co-operative Society Ltd. v. Labour Court, (1988) 73 FJR 12 (Ker), that the application seeking opportunity to adduce fresh evidence ought to have been filed at the earliest opportunity and such an application was filed only after Exhibit P-6 order was pronounced. There cannot be any dispute regarding the proposition that permission to adduce evidence should be sought at the earliest. Both the Courts and the Tribunals are existing for dispensation of justice and not for its denial on technical grounds. Especially in view of the limited jurisdiction of the Tribunal the petitioner cannot be blamed in not taking such an alternate ground in the petition itself. The petitioner might have thought that the first respondent would accept Exhibit P-3 and grant approval. As held in Bharat Iron Works v. Bhagubhai Balubhai Patel (supra), there is nothing wrong in the petitioner expecting that if the Tribunal comes to a finding that the principles of natural justice were violated he will be given an opportunity of adducing evidence. Without doing so, what the Tribunal did was to pass a composite order refusing approval without giving a chance to the petitioner to amend his petition or seek such a chance by a return or oral application. The application for permission to adduce evidence was filed on the date on which Exhibit P-6 order was pronounced. If a preliminary order was passed holding that the enquiry was vitiated, the petitioner could be expected to have applied for permission to adduce evidence and then the Tribunal would have been bound, as held in Bharat Iron Works, v. Bhagubhai Balubhai Patel, (supra) to give an opportunity to adduce evidence,

    10. As a cumulative effect of all these facts, and circumstances, I feel that Exhibit P-6 order J which cannot be justified on any ground, must I go. The Industrial Tribunal will have to consider the matter afresh according to law and pass orders.

    11. The original petition is allowed. Exhibit P-6 order is quashed. The first respondent will take back the petition to file and proceed to deal with it afresh according to law in the light of what is stated above in this judgment. No costs.

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    Comments

    Vijaya Mohini Mills v. Industrial Tribunal And Anr.
    (Oct 31, 1991)