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  • Rule 99 of Order XXI C.P.C
  • Order XXI Rule 101 C.P.C
  • Order XXI Rule 99
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Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Attorney(S)
Judges
Acts
  • Rule 99 of Order XXI C.P.C
  • Order XXI Rule 101 C.P.C
  • Order XXI Rule 99
Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

The revision petitioner is the decree-holder in a suit for partition and separate possession of the plaintiff's share. A preliminary decree was passed, and while the application for the final decree was pending, the respondents sought to be impleaded as additional parties, claiming their predecessors had an oral lease over the suit property. The trial court dismissed this application, holding the respondents to be unnecessary parties. Subsequently, a final decree was passed. After the final decree, the respondents filed a caveat under Section 148-A of the Code of Civil Procedure (CPC), requesting notice before any order was passed during execution of the decree. The lower court accepted the caveat. The decree-holder filed a revision petition challenging the lodging of this caveat.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the respondents, who were dismissed as unnecessary parties during the trial, have the right to lodge a caveat under Section 148-A CPC to appear before the court during execution proceedings initiated by the decree-holder.
  2. Whether a person claiming possession under an oral lease can oppose execution of a decree prior to actual dispossession or eviction.

Arguments of the Parties

Revision Petitioner’s Arguments

  • The respondents were dismissed as unnecessary parties and therefore have no right to appear before the court during execution proceedings.
  • If the respondents claim any right or interest in the property, their remedy is limited to obstructing delivery during execution or filing an application under Order XXI Rule 99 CPC if dispossessed.
  • The respondents are not entitled to anticipatory obstruction or to lodge a caveat under Section 148-A CPC.

Respondents’ Arguments

The opinion does not contain a detailed account of the respondents' legal arguments beyond their claim of independent possession based on an oral lease and their reliance on a decision from the Andhra Pradesh High Court.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Mammoo v. Krisknan (1978 KLT 901) Right of possession holders under oral lease cannot pre-emptively oppose execution proceedings before dispossession. Supported the principle that such persons must wait until dispossession to file an application under Order XXI Rule 99 CPC.
Chandrika v. Gangadharan (1983 KLT 953) Same as above Reinforced the limitation on interlocutory rights of possession claimants in execution proceedings.
Raman v. Karthikeyan (1984 KLT 1071) Same as above Further confirmed the approach limiting preventive claims before dispossession.
Prabhakaran v. Kuttian Prakashan Interpretation of Order XXI CPC regarding rights of obstructors and remedies under Rule 99. Held that obstructors have no right to adjudicate claims before dispossession and must resort to Rule 99 applications post-dispossession.
Tahera Sayeed v. M. Shanmugam (AIR 1987 AP 206) Right to move court for adjudication of possession rights under Order XXI Rule 101 CPC before delivery order. The court respectfully dissented from this precedent, preferring the contrary view established by Kerala High Court decisions.
Nav Digvijaya Co-operative Housing Society Ltd. v. Sadhana Builders (AIR 1984 Bombay 114) Application of Section 148-A CPC and caveat rights in execution proceedings. Supported the view that caveats are maintainable only if the person has a right to be heard before orders are passed.
Chloride India Ltd. v. Ganesh Das Ramgopal (AIR 1986 Cal. 74) Same as above Reinforced the limitation on lodging caveats without a right to be heard in execution proceedings.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court examined Section 148-A(1) CPC, which permits any person claiming a right to appear before the court on an application to lodge a caveat. The court found that the respondents, dismissed as unnecessary parties during the trial, have no right at the execution stage to oppose the decree-holder's application. The respondents' claim of possession under an oral lease does not entitle them to preemptive adjudication of rights before actual dispossession. The court relied on established Kerala High Court precedents holding that obstructors can only act by obstructing physical delivery or by filing an application under Order XXI Rule 99 CPC if dispossessed. The court distinguished and declined to follow the Andhra Pradesh High Court decision in Tahera Sayeed, noting it conflicts with binding precedents. The court concluded that since the respondents have no right to be heard at the execution stage, they are not entitled to lodge a caveat under Section 148-A CPC. Accordingly, the caveat accepted by the lower court was held to be not maintainable and was set aside.

Holding and Implications

The caveat filed by the respondents is not maintainable and is set aside.

The Civil Revision Petition filed by the decree-holder is allowed. There is no order as to costs. The decision directly affects the parties by denying the respondents the right to lodge a caveat or appear in the execution proceedings before dispossession. No new precedent was set beyond affirming existing principles limiting interlocutory rights of possession claimants during execution.

    Moideen v. Kadeesa Umma & Another

    1. The decree-holder is the revision petitioner. The suit is for partition and separate possession of the plaintiff's share. A preliminary decree was passed in the case. During the pendency of the application for passing of a final decree, respondents herein filed an application for impleading them as additional parties contending that their predecessors had an oral lease in respect of the suit property and that it devolved on them. That application for impleading them was dismissed by the trial court holding them as unnecessary parties to the suit. Thereafter a final decree was also passed.

    2. After the final decree was passed, the respondents filed a caveat, under sec. 148-A of the Code of Civil Procedure praying that they also may be given notice before any order is passed while executing the decree on an application made by the decree-holder. Under the impugned order dt. 10-10-1990 the lower court lodged the caveat. The revision is by the decree-holder against the above order lodging the caveat filed by the respondents.

    3. The contention of the counsel for the revision petitioner is that the application for impleading the respondents in the suit as necessary parties was dismissed by the trial court at the trial stage and that they cannot claim a right to appear before the court on the filing of the execution application. The counsel for the revision petitioner contended that if they have any right or interest in the property or possession, their remedy is only to obstruct when the Amin goes to the property for effecting delivery or to file an application under Order XXI Rule 99 if they are dispossessed in spite of their objection.

    4. According to him on the filing of an execution application they have no right to come to court and oppose the application of the decree-holder for executing the decree. In other words, the contention of the revision petitioner is that they are not entitled to have an anticipatory obstruction of any order of delivery that may be passed in their favour and in that view of the matter they are not entitled to lodge a caveat under sec. 148-A of the C.P.C

    5. The question to be decided is as to whether in such circumstances the respondents are entitled to lodge a caveat. Sec. 148-A(1) which is relevant for the purpose of this case is to the following effect:

    “Where an application is expected to be made, or has been made, in a suit or proceeding instituted or about to be instituted, in a Court, any person claiming a right to appear before the Court on the hearing of such application may lodge a caveat in respect thereof.”

    6. From the above provision it is clear that if any application is expected to be made in a suit or proceeding or about to be instituted, any person claiming a right to appear before the court on the hearing of such an application alone may lodge a caveat. After hearing counsel for the petitioner and the respondents I am clearly of the opinion that the respondents herein have no right at this stage to appear before the court and oppose the application filed by the decree-holder for execution of the decree. As stated earlier the case of the respondents is that they are in independent possession of the property on the basis of an oral lease. In other words, their case is that they cannot be dispossessed from the property in execution of the decree. It is well settled by the decisions of this court that such a person is not entitled to file an application for establishing his right before he is actually sought to be evicted. His right is only to obstruct when the Amin goes to deliver the property or, if he is dispossessed in spite of his obstruction, to file an application under Rule 99 of Order XXI C.P.C for re-delivery of the property. In this connection see the decisions of this court in Mammoo v. Krisknan (1978 KLT 901), Chandrika v. Gangadharan (1983 KLT 953) and Raman v. Karthikeyan (1984 KLT 1071). These decisions by learned Single Judges of this Court ware considered by a Division Bench of this Court in Prabhakaran v. Kuttian Prakashan and it was observed as follows:—

    “A plain reading of the provisions of O. XXI makes it clear that no application for adjudication of the right, title and interest of an obstructor would lie before he is dispossessed in execution of a decree to which he is not a party. The only remedy of a dispossessed obstructor is to apply under R. 99 to the execution court and have his claim adjudicated upon by the execution court itself. A separate suit at his instance after dispossession will not be maintainable in view of the aforesaid provisions of the C.P.C as amended in 1976. This does not, however, preclude the obstructor from having recourse to a civil court by way of a separate suit before he is dispossessed in execution of a decree to which he is not a party.”

    7. From the aforesaid decisions of this Court it is clear that the respondents in this case have no right to appear before the court on the hearing of the execution petition which the decree-holder may file and in that view they are not entitled to lodge a caveat.

    8. Counsel for the respondents placed very great reliance on a Single Judge's decision of the Andhra Pradesh High Court reported in Tahera Sayeed v. M. Shanmugam (AIR 1987 AP 206). In that decision it is no doubt true that His Lordship Ramaswamy, J. held that even before an order for delivery is passed a person who is said to be in possession of the property is entitled to move the court for an adjudication of his rights as contemplated under Order XXI Rule 101 C.P.C In view of the catena of decisions of our Court taking a different view and which I am bound to follow, I have to respectfully dissent from the decision of the Andhra Pradesh High Court.

    9. It is also clear that the provisions of Sec. 148-A will be attracted only in cases where the caveat or is entitled to be heard before any order is passed on the application already filed or proposed to be filed. As held by this Court in a number of decisions mentioned above, the respondents herein have no right to be heard on the execution application filed by the decree-holder and accordingly they are not entitled to lodge any caveat. To the same effect is the decision in Nav Digvijaya Co-operative Housing Society Ltd. v. Sadhana Builders (AIR 1984 Bombay 114) and Chloride India Ltd. v. Ganesh Das Ramgopal (AIR 1986 Cal. 74).

    10. In view of what is stated above I hold that the caveat filed by the respondents is not maintainable and accordingly the caveat lodged by the respondents and accepted by the lower court is set aside.

    11. The Civil Revision Petition is allowed as indicated above. There will be no order as to costs.

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    Comments

    Moideen v. Kadeesa Umma & Another
    (Jan 24, 1991)