The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

Jagannadha Raju, J.:— This is a revision by the assessee against the order dated 18-4-1989 in TA. No. 1173 of 1987 on the file of the Sales Tax Appellate Tribunal, Addl. Bench, Ernakulam. We are concerned with the assessment year 1982-83. The background in which the revision has been filed (briefly stated) is as follows. The revision petitioner is a dealer in allopathic drugs, tarpaulin, etc. The petitioner, treating the tarpaulin as an unclassified item taxable at multi-point at 4% collected the tax at that rate from the customers and paid it to the Government. The assessment for the year 1982-83 was made treating tarpaulin as an unclassified item chargeable at 4%. The assessment order was passed on 28-1-84. The Deputy Commissioner, Ernakulam, acting suo motu under S. 35 of the K.G.S.T Act, invited objections of the petitioner, and then relying upon a clarification issued by the Government in G.O(R) No. 60/86 TD dated 19-4-1986, came to the conclusion that tarpaulin will come under Entry 100 of the K.G.S.T Act and it is taxable at 10% with effect from 16-9-1980. He accordingly passed an order directing the assessing authority to revise assessment. In compliance with the order of the Deputy Commissioner dated 2-11-1987, the assessing authority revised the assessment for the year 1982-83 by order dated 22-1-1988. He subjected the turnover regarding tarpaulin to taxation at 10% and raised an additional demand for Rs. 35,503/- towards sales tax and Rs. 2,5527-towards surchage. The assessee-revision petitioner filed an appeal against the revised assessment order dated 22-1-1988, and the same is pending before the Deputy Commissioner (Appeals) as S.T.A No. 204 of 1988. The revision petitioner also filed an appeal before the Sales Tax Appellate Tribunal against the order of the Deputy Commissioner, dated 2-11-1987. The Tribunal refused to interfere with the Deputy Commissioner's order on the ground that the Tribunal being a creature of the statute is bound by the clarification issued by the Government in exercise of its power under S. 59-A of the Act. The Tribunal did not go into the merits of the contentions raised on behalf of the assessee.

2. In this Revision, Shri. T. Karunakaran Nambiar raised the following arguments: (1) the Sales Tax Appellate Tribunal, being a quasi-judicial authority, is not bound by the clarifications issued by the Government under S. 59-A; its duty is to interpret the statutory provisions; (2) the so-called clarification issued on 19-4-1986 cannot have retrospective operation, and it cannot declare that between the dates 16-9-1980 and 31-3-1984 tar paulins are taxable under Entry 100 of the First Schedule; (3) the very fact that with effect from 1-4-1984 the First Schedule is amended to introduce entry 100-C is a clear indication that the earlier Entry 100 did not cover tarpaulin; under no circumstances can a tarpaulin be described as “bonded fibre fabrics other than those made ofcoir” as described in Entry 100 of the First Schedule; and, (4) the manner in which the Government exercised its power under S. 59A and issued the clarification dated 19-4-1986 in G.O(R) No. 60/86 TD is a clear indication that under the guise of issuing a clarification the State Government is trying to modify or alter the entries in the Schedule. Such a power is not available to the State Government. That is a function which can be performed only by the legislature. On behalf of the revenue, Shri. N.N Divakaran Pillai, Spl. Senior Standing Counsel (Taxes), urged that the power to issue clarifications under S. 59A extends to deciding the questions which arise as to the rate of tax leviable on any goods. In effect, it is a sort of statutory adjudication and naturally the clarification issued under S. 59A is binding on all the authorities created under the statute. Shri. Pillai urged that there are numerous instances of Government issuing clarifications in exercise of its power under S. 59A and those clarifications have not been found to be invalid in law. Shri. Pillai further contends that a clarification issued under S. 59A is not merely an executive order, but it partakes the character of a statutory adjudication and exercise of the powers of delegated legislation. Such a clarification is binding on the various authorities under the Act, as well as the general public. Unless the clarification is challenged separately in appropriate proceedings, it cannot be challenged in this Revision.

3. On the basis of the facts of this case, and in view of the various contentions raised by both the parties, the three crucial questions that arise for consideration in this Revision are:

(1) What is the scope of the power of the Government under S. 59A of the Act? How is that power to be exercised?

(2) Whether quasi-judicial authorities including the Sales Tax Appellate Tribunal functioning under the statute, K.G.S.T Act, are bound by the clarifications issued by the Government under S. 59A.

(3) Whether, in excrcise of its power under S. 59A, the Government is entitled to give retrospective effect, especially so as to increase the tax burden of, or adversely affect, an assessee.

4. Point Nos. 1 to 3: As can be seen from the reading of the Act, S. 59A was introduced in the K.G.S.T Act by S. 22 of Act 21 of 1978, which came into force on 1-4-1978. During the course of arguments, it has been submitted by learned advocates appearing for both sides that the validity of S. 59A and the manner in which the power to issue clarifications under this Section has been exercised, have not so far been the subject of any authoritative pronouncement by this Court. Both sides admit that the State Government was regularly issuing clarifications under S. 59A ever since this provision came into the statute.

5. To decide as to what exactly is the scope of S. 59A, and to decide as to how the power to issue clarifications under this Section has to be exercised, we have to examine the scheme of the Act. S. 59A was not there originally in the statute book. This Section has been introduced in Chapter IX, which deals with miscellaneous provisions. S. 57 lays down that the Government may, by notification in the Gazette, make rules to carryout the purposes of this Act. This is a clear indication that S. 57 is the only Section which gives the Government the power to exercise its power of delegated legislation. It cannot be said that the power under S. 59A also partakes of the character of delegated legislation. S. 58 gives the Government the power to add, omit, or amend any Entry in the First Schedule or Second Schedule, but this power is burdened witharider, which is as follows: “but not so as to enhance the rate of tax in any case”. The scheme of S. 58 clearly indicates that the Government is conferred with the limited power of adding, omitting or amending any entry in the First Schedule or Second Schedule. The Government cannot, while exercising that power, enhance the rate of tax. The legislature categorically prohibited the Government from exercising its power so as to adversely affect an assessee. The crucial question that comes up for consideration is when S. 58 which authorises the State Government to amend entries in the First and Second Schedules, prohibits increase of rate of tax, can the State Government by virtue of exercising its power under S. 59A give a clarification which adversely affects the assessee, and which has the effect of enhancing the rate of tax? It can straightaway be said that in view of the limitations imposed in S. 58, under the guise of issuing clarifications under S. 59A the State Government cannot issue orders that enhance the rate of tax or adversely affect an assessee. S. 60 is the Section under which the State Government has the power to remove difficulties. The Section contemplates that if any difficulty arises in giving effect to the provisions of this Act, the Government may by order do anything which appears to them necessary for the purpose of removing the difficulty. Under sub-section (2) of S. 60 orders made under S. 60(1) should be laid before the Legislative Assembly.

6. S. 59A which comes in between S. 58 and S. 60 has to be understood in the context in which it is placed in the, statute. S. 59A reads as follows:

“59A. Power of Government to determine rate of tax

If any question arises as to the rate of tax leviable under this Act on the sale or purchase of any goods, such question shall be referred to the Government for decision and the decisonof the Government thereon shall, notwithstanding any other provision in this Act, be final.”

7. It is interesting to see that the sub-title to the Section reads as “Power of Government to determine rate of tax.” The Section nowhere states that the Government is entitled, or authorised, to issue clarifications. When any question arises as to the rate of tax leviable under the Act on the sale or purchase of any goods, such question should be referred to the Government for decision and the decision of the Government thereon shall, notwithstanding any other provision in this Act, be final. From the way in which, the clarifications have been issued and circulars issued by the Government in exercise of its power under S. 59A, it looks as if, the State Government is acting under the Section as if it is authorised to issue executive instructions. S. 59A does not contemplate the State Government issuing clarifications or executive instructions or any circulars. It should be remembered that the Section does not specify as to who should refer the question as to the rate of tax leviable; to the Government for decision. It does not also specify what procedure the Government should follow to arrive at a decision regarding the rate of tax leviable. It does not specify who are all bound by the decision of the Government.

8. A plain reading of S. 59A would prima facie give an impression that a Sales Tax Appellate Tribunal is also bound by the decision of the Government under S. 59A. It cannot be doubted that the language used in S. 59A is of very wide import. It is contended that the Section is vague, ambiguous and indefinite in many aspects. If literal meaning is given to the words used therein, then such a literal interpretation would render the Section vulnerable to attack as vague as uncertain, and as one taking away guaranteed rights. As far as possible the Court should try to construe the Section in accordance with the established law and the intention of the legislature. Only in cases where it is impossible to do so, and the authorities applying the law are “thrown to the sea of uncertainty”, the court and the authorities will be persuaded to hold that the law is uncertain and vague and so unenforceable. Instead of holding so, the court will try to give meaning to the words occurring in the section, and instead of holding the law vague and unenforceable draw a line of demarcation where possible, and endeavour to understand the law in accord with the established rights and in a reasonable manner. This is the approach made by the Supreme court in K.A Abbas v. Union of India, (1970) 2 SCC 780 : AIR 1971 S.C 481. At page 496, a Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court observed in paragraph 48 as follows:

“48. The real rule is that if a 1 aw is vague or appears to be so, the Court must try to construe it, as far as may be, and language permitting, the construction sought to be placed on it, must be in accordance with the intention of the legislature. Thus if the law is open to diverse construction, that construction which accords best with the intention of the legislature and advances the purpose of legislation, is to be preferred. Where, however, the law admits of no such construction and the persons applying it are in a boundless sea of uncertainty, and the law prima fade takes away a guaranteed freedom the law must be held to offend the Constitution as was done in the case of the Goonda Act. This is not application of the doctrine of due procees. The invalidity arises from the probability of the misuse of the law to the detriment of the individual. If possible, the Court instead of striking down the law may itself draw the line of demarcation where possible but this effort should be sparingly made and only in the clearest of cases”.

9. The court should always prefer the construction which will lead to the position that the legislature is presumed not to have intended to exceed the limits of its jurisdiction. If two constructions are possible, if on one construction a given statute is exposed or vulnerable to attack as offending guaranteed rights, whereas on the other construction, the statute will remain effective and operative, the court should be inclined to adopt the latter construction.

10. Courts will always lean in favour of the construction which will sustain the law: Refer to Express Newspaper (Private) Ltd. v. Union of India, AIR 1958 SC 578. In the above decision at page 623, the Constitution Bench laid down the law as follows:

“………It is, however, well recognized that the Court would lean towards the constitutionality of an enactment.…………”.

11. In State of Kerala v. M.K Krishnan Nair, (1978) 1 SCC 552 : AIR 1978 SC 747, a majority of the Constitution Bench observed as follows:

“…………There is; ample authority of this Court for the proposition that where two constructions are possible that one which leads to unconstitutionality must be avoided and the other which tends to make provision constitutional should be adopted, even if straining of language is necessary……………”

(page 759)

12. In Olga Teilis v. Bombay Municipal Corporation, (1985) 3 SCC 545, another Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court observed at page 581 as follows:

“44. ……………We must lean in favour of this interpretation because it helps sustain the validity of the law. Readings. 314 as containing a command not to issue notice before the removal of an encroachment will make the law invalid”.

13. We shall adopt these well established principles enunciated by the Supreme Court while examining S. 59A of the K.G.S.T Act. In the present case, the Section does not say the point of time when the question should be referred for the decision of the Government. In our considered opinion, the following aspects are indefi nite or vague:

(a) When does the question arise? Is it at the assessment stage, first appellate stage, or second appellate stage?

(b) Can the statutory authority act suo motu, or, should it be alterted or moved in that behalf, and if so, by whom?.

(c) Who should refer the question? What is the procedure to be adopted for the reference? Who are all the persons entitled to be heard in the process? Is evidence to be taken during the proceedings?

(d) It is mandatory to refer the question, when once it is mooted? If one party moots it, and the other party is not willing to have it referred to Government for decision, what should be done?

(e) While exercising powers under S. 59A, does the Government act administratively or quasi-judicially?

(f) What is the scope and content of the determination or decision under S. 59A?

(g) Who are all persons who are bound by such decision?

(h) Is the decision binding for all time to come? Is it binding on all person who are similarly situate, though the reference was not at their instance, nor were they heard?

14. These are all vital aspects which are germane to our enquiry, but the statute is not clear or definite on these vital aspects. This Court has to understand the Section in a meaningful and practical way consistent with the guaranteed rights and normal norms of interpretation.

15. We shall now consider the important words or limbs of the Section, in the light of the above mentioned facts and principles. We find that the key words or the important words in the Section are the following:

1. “any question arises”

2. “referred”

3. “for decision”

4. “the decision of the Government thereon shall, notwithstanding any other provision in this Act, be final”.

16. The use of these words in the Section indicates that there is “alis” between parties and that the Government is made the arbitrator or adjudicator in the matter and the adjudication or determination is made by the Government. In the peculiar context of the Section, the words indicate that the Government is discharging a judicial or quasijudicial function. It renders a “decision”. These aspects clearly imply that:

(a) the Government should bear both parties to the dispute, that is the revenue as well as the assessee;

(b) both parties should be allowed an opportunity to put forward their case, and lead evidence.

(c) a decision or determination will be rendered by the Government in the matter on the basis of material and evidence placed before it, and after hearing both parties.

17. Such a decision, ordinarily arrived at between the parties, only binds them and their privies. It cannot bind others, even if they are similarly placed, unless they are also heard and/or made parties to the proceeding.

18. According to the wording of the Section, such a decision rendered by the Government is final, notwithstanding any other provision in the Act It binds the parties thereto, and shall not be questioned before the authorities constituted under the Act, perhaps including the Sales Tax Appellate Tribunal, which is a quasi-judicial Tribunal. Perhaps such a decision would even bind the High Court in a revision filed under S. 41 of the Act, because the scope of jurisdiction of the High Court under S. 41 of the Act is very limited. In effect the adjudication so made is final and one in “substitution” of the adjudication of the matter by the authorities constituted under the Act. It may be that such a decision is not final and binding in proceedings under Art. 226 of the Constitution of India, to challenge the decision or the validity of the Section. It is quite open to the parties to challenge the validity of S. 59A as ultra vires the Constitution. From 1978 till this day, the validity of the Section does not appear to have been challenged. There is no authoritative prononcement by this Court on this aspect. Whether S. 59A is vulnerable in a writ proceeding under Art. 226 of the Constitution of India is left open. We are now dealing with a revision filed under S. 41 of the K.G.S.T Act only.

19. As the decision is being rendered in relation to an assessment, it is axiomatic that the decision of the Government is binding and conclusive only for the particular assessment year. Each year is an independent unit under the Sales Tax law and the findings and conclusions arrived at in proceedings for one year are not binding or conclusive for any other assessment year. It should be remembered that the principles of res judicata are inapplicable in taxation matters. When a question is decided or adjudicated between parties, and if the identical question arises for consideration in a subsequent assessment year, the findings arrived at in the earlier year will be cogent and relevant material, which will be taken into consideration for deciding the matter for the subsequent year. It is also open to the parties to displace the findings of the previous year by placing reliance on new aspects or by adducing new material. This proposition is well established by numerous decisions. Annamalai Reddiar v. C.I.T, 53 I.T.R 601, clearly lays down that the assessment in each year is a separate proceeding under the Indian Income tax Act, and the view adopted by the department in any particular year cannot possibly bind it in respect of a year subsequent thereto. New materials may produce a change of approach; the old materials themselves, on a more careful or intelligent analysis, may effect the same result. In M.M Ipoh v. C.I.T, (1968) 67 I.T.R 106, the Supreme Court laid down the law as follows:

“The doctrine of res judicata does not apply so as to make a decision on a question of fact or law in a proceeding for assessment in one year binding in another year. The assessment and the facts found are conclusive only in the year of assessment; the findings on questions of fact may be good and cogent evidence in subsequent years, when the same question falls to be determined in another year, but they are not binding and conclusive.”…………………… (page 118)

20. Since the adjudication (a statutory adjudication, if we may say so) made under S. 59A of the Act is in substitution of the adjudication that should normally be made by the statutory authorities under the Act at different levels, the decision of the Government can normally be final only between the parties to the proceedings and it would be final only for the particular year of assessment in question.

21. Perhaps it would be of advantage to compare S. 59A of the K.G.S.T Act with S. 119(1) & (2) of the Income-tax Act, 1961. Under S. 119(1) & (2) of the Income-tax Act, the Central Board of Direct Taxes can unilaterally issue orders, directions or instructions, and such orders, directions or instructions are binding on all authorities functioning under the Act. It has been held that such circulars have the effect of law and they supplant the law and not supplement the law. It has also been held that “Benevolent circulars are binding on the authorities”: see page 6414 of Vol. 7 of Income-tax Law by Chaturvedi and Pithisaria. The same authors at page 6415 observed as follows:

“While a circular of the Board will be biding upon an Income-tax Officer in matters relating to the general interpretation of any provisions of the statute, the circular cannot override judicial decisions rendered on the statute. In fields which are covered by judicial decisions, the circular will not be conclusive even so far as the Income-tax Officer is concerned.”

22. The same authors in Vol. 3, at page 2490 observed as follows:

“……………the benefit of such a circular has to be extended to an assessee even though there is a decision of the High Court of the same State to the contrary rendered without noticing the contents of such circular (see Pankaj Oil Mills v. C.I.T, (1978) 115 I.T.R 824).”

23. At page 2487, the authors point out that:

“Scction 119(1) provides in unmistakable terms, that every officer and person employed in the execution of the Act shall observe and follow the orders, instructions and directions of the Board. Circulars issued by the Board are generally binding on officers and persons employed in the execution of the Act. (see, Navnit Lal C. Javeri v. K.K Sen, (1965) 56 I.T.R 198.)”

24. In a recent decision in Keshavji Ravji and Co. v. C.I.T, (1990) 2 SCC 231, the Supreme Court observed in paragraphs 31 and 32 that circulars beneficial to the assessees and which turn down the rigour of the law issued in exercise of the statutory power under S. 119 of the Act or under corresponding provisions of the predecessor Act are binding on the authorities in the administration of the Act; the Tribunal, much Iras the High Court, is an authority under the Act; the circulars do not bind them; but the benefits of such circulars to the assessees have been held to be permissible even though the circulars might have departed from the strict tenor of the statutory provision and mitigated the rigour of the law.

25. We make it clear that S. 59A no where mentions that the State Government has got power to issue circulars or clarifications as it has been doing. When we read the Section and observe the numerous clarifications issued purporting to act under S. 59A, we have a feeling that this power is being used by the State Government to issue some sort of “firmans”, notwithstanding the law operating in the State. We humbly add that in a democratic society, the State Government is not entitled to issue circulars or clarifications which will have effect notwithstanding the provisions of the Act.

26. If the Section is to be construed as one indicating that a decision under S. 59A has the effect of amending the provisions of the Act, or schedules of the Act, then the power would easily be classified as unbridled and arbitrary. In the very nature of things, the State Government cannot have such an unbridled and uncontrolled power to take decisions on the administrative side, so as to override the statutory provisions. Inspite of the vagueness on several aspects, and inspite of the arbitrary character of the power, as indicated by the Section we cannot and do not propose to strike down the Section as ultra vires in these proceedings. In our considered opinion, we would tone down the Section and give it an interpretation which is in conformity with the established law and the pronouncements of the Supreme Court.

27. We would hold that when any question arises only the parties to the question, namely, the assesee and the assessing authority, can refer the question for the decision of the Government. We are also of the opinion that the question referred will have to be decided by the Government and a decision arrived at following the principles of quasi-judicial adjudication. This necessarily implies that both parties should be given an opportunity to represent their respective cases and then a decision arrived at. Such a decision would be applicable or binding only on the parties to the dispute. It cannot have universal application. If the Government feels that if any decision taken by it, while exercising powers under S. 59A, requires either a change in the Rules or an amendment of the Act or amendment of the Schedules, then it can take appropriate action relying upon S. 57 which authorises the Government to make Rules and Section 58 which gives power to amend the Schedules, subject to certain limitations, and the Government can also initiate action to amend the law, if it is so required. Under any circumstances, the State Government cannot take unilateral decisions which are to be deemed as applicable universally and that they would be operative notwithstanding the provisions to the contrary in the Act. We are of the view that the power exercised under S. 59A is something analogous to statutory adjudication by the Government, in addition to the various authorities, who are competent under the Act to decide the matters quasi-judicially. This power of statutory adjudication has to be done conforming to the normal principles of quasi-judicial adjudication. We also make it clear that this power under S. 59A is confined to deciding questions as to the rate of tax leviable and it can never be utilised for giving circulars or clarifications, which are more in the nature of executive instructions. We also make it clear that any decision rendered under S. 59A will not bind the quasijudicial Tribunal, namely, the Salestax Appellate Tribunal, which deals with matters under S. 39, and under no circumstances, is the decision of the Government binding upon the High Court. The decision will bind only the parties to the dispute. S. 59A does not authorise the State Government to issue clarifications or circulars which have the effect of enhancing the rate of tax or which have the effect of retrospective operation so as to adversely affect an assessee. Any decision given by the Government under S. 59A would only have prospective operation.

28. In the light of the view we have taken, we answer the three questions formulated in paragraph 4 as follows. Question No. 1: The scope of the power of the Government under S. 59A is in the nature of a statutory adjudication, which has to be done following the principles of procedure prescribed for quasi-judicial Tribunals. It can only be a decision after hearing both parties and on a question referred to the Government by the parties to the dispute. It cannot be exercised unilaterally. Question No. 2: The quasi-judicial authorities functioning under the statute, namely, KGST Act, are not bound by the decisons or clarifications issued by the Government under S. 59A It is the primary responsibility or duty of the quasi-judicial authorities, including the Appellate Tribunal, to interpret the provisions of the Act and the Rules. Question No. 3: In exercising powers under S. 59A, the Government is not empowered to give retrospective effect to its decision. The decision will have only prospective operation. It will not have retrospective operation, especially when the decision increases the tax burden on the assessee or adversely affects an assessee.

29. In the light of the views expressed above, we will now examine the facts of the present revision. Tarpaulins were not originally liable for any sales tax prior to 1-6-1974, that is by reason of the exemption granted as per item No. 19 in S.R.O No. 342/63. That exemption was withdrawn with effect from 1-6-1974 by virtue of notification G.O(Ms.)No. 70/74.TD dated 1-6-1974. During the period from 1-6-1974 to 31-3-1984 tarpaulins are liable for sales tax as unclassified general items and they are liable to tax at 4%. By virtue of the amendment of the First Schedule and by introduction of entry 100-C with effect from 1-4-1984, and by virtue of the amendment made by the Kerala Finance Act, tarpaulin is liable for sales tax at 8%. At no point of time, are tarpaulins exigible to sales tax at 10% under entry 100 of the First Schedule. That entry only deals with “bonded fibre fabrics other than those made out of coir”. It is not liable for taxation at the rate of 10%. In the present case, the assessing authority was dealing with an assessment for the year 1982-83. Hence the original assessment made by the assessing authority on 28-1-1984 is perfectly correct. The Deputy Commissioner, acting under S. 35 committed a mistake in relying upon a clarification issued by the Government in G.O(P) N0.6O/86.TD dated 19-4-1986, and directing the assesment officer to revise the assessment taxing the turnover relating to tarpaulins under entry 100 with the rate of tax at 10%.

30. Though the Deputy Commissioner, who was exercising his executive functions, might have committed a mistake in relying upon the clarification issued by the Government under S. 59A, and felt bound by it, the Sales Tax Appellate Tribunal, which is a quasi-judicial authority, has committed a blunder in abdicating its responsibility to function as a quasi-judicial authority. The observation of the Tribunal that being a creature of the statute, the Tribunal is bound by the clarification issued by the Government under S. 59A of the K.G.S.T Act is not correct. It is the bounden duty of the Tribunal to decide questions in the light of the provisions of the Act and the Rules and it is not bound by any clarifications or executive instructions issued by the State Government. In our opinion, the Tribunal abdicated its responsibility in not going into the merits of the various contentions raised before it in T.A No. 1173 of 1987.

31. Before we part with this case, we would like to make one observation. The contentions raised in this Revision once came up for consideration before a Single Judge of this Court (K.S Paripoornan, J.) in O.P No. 3689 of 1983-A But at that time, as a representation was pending with the Government, His Lordship was pleased to direct that the Government would consider all aspects and render a decision in accordance with S. 59A. The judgment in O.P No. 3689 of 1983-A dated 29-6-1984 has been perused by us and we are not quoting from that judgment, because no judicial pronouncement has been given by the Court.

32. In the result, the Revision is allowed, and the original order of assessment dated 28-1-1984 is restored. As regards S.T.A NO. 204 of 1988 filed against the revised assessment order dated 22-1-1988, we direct the Deputy Commissioner to decide the matter, bearing in mind the observations in this judgment.

33. In the result, the Revision is allowed, and the order of the Tribunal is set aside. The original assessment order dated 28-1-1984 is restored as it is correct and in accordanee with law. Issue photo copy of this judgment to counsel on both sides on usual terms.

34. Allowed.