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  • provisions in the Kerala General Sales-tax Act, 1963,
  • S. 59A in the Kerala General Sales-tax Act, 1963.
  • ARTICLE 226 CONSTITUTION OF INDIA
  • section of the Delhi Sales Tax Act
  • Kerala General Sales-tax Act, 1963.
  • General Sales Tax Act
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citation codes
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  • provisions in the Kerala General Sales-tax Act, 1963,
  • S. 59A in the Kerala General Sales-tax Act, 1963.
  • ARTICLE 226 CONSTITUTION OF INDIA
  • section of the Delhi Sales Tax Act
  • Kerala General Sales-tax Act, 1963.
  • General Sales Tax Act
Smart Summary

Structured Summary of the Opinion on S. 59A, Kerala General Sales-tax Act, 1963

Factual and Procedural Background

This batch of writ petitions was filed by dealers in diverse goods (including bread, bun, horlicks, volatile oils, cosmetics, shampoos, imitation jewellery, tarpaulin, power line carriers, communication equipment, nylon fish nets, copper sulphate, microscopes, battery plates and others) challenging the constitutional validity of S. 59A of the Kerala General Sales-tax Act, 1963. Some earlier cases concerning the same provision had been decided without addressing constitutional validity because the courts found the governmental declarations under S. 59A to be in conformity with law; in other instances the declarations were invalidated. A Division Bench (Paripoornan and Jagannadha Raju, JJ.) examined and ultimately read down S. 59A (Dadha Pharma Pvt. Ltd. v. State of Kerala). The present Bench, sitting under Article 226, has full scope to examine the constitutional validity of the statutory provision and to adjudicate writ petitions filed by the affected traders.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether S. 59A of the Kerala General Sales-tax Act, 1963 unlawfully invests the Executive (the State Government) with judicial or quasi-judicial functions to determine rates of tax and whether such an investment is constitutionally permissible under the separation of powers.
  2. Whether the language, scope and operation of S. 59A are vague, indefinite or arbitrary and thereby violative of Article 14 of the Constitution.
  3. Whether S. 59A and decisions or notifications issued thereunder can bind the Tribunal or the High Court, or otherwise displace the statutory adjudicatory and revisional scheme already provided in the Act (including the roles of assessing officers, appellate authorities, the Tribunal and the High Court).
  4. Whether the exercise of power under S. 59A in practice (as shown by sample files and notifications) demonstrates failure to observe principles of fair procedure, reasoned decision-making and legal competence, thereby rendering the provision invalid.

Arguments of the Parties

The opinion does not contain a detailed account of the parties' legal arguments.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Importex International (P) Ltd. v. State of Kerala, 1990 (2) K.L.T. 487 Example of a case where governmental declaration under the impugned section was found to accord with correct legal position. Used as an instance where challenges were disposed without deciding constitutional validity because the Governmental declaration was in tune with law.
Rajan v. State of Kerala, 1990 (2) K.L.T. 511 Same contextual usage as Importex: governmental declaration upheld in that instance. Referenced as another example of disposal without pronouncing on constitutional validity because the Government's action was consistent with law.
Dadha Pharma Pvt. Ltd. v. State of Kerala, 1990 (2) K.L.T. 307 Division Bench analysis that S. 59A is of wide import; the Bench read down the section and specified safeguards and limitations on executive action under the provision. The present Court adopts and respectfully agrees with the Division Bench's analytical exposition and notes that the earlier Division Bench read down S.59A drastically; that decision informed the present scrutiny and is described as reflecting the position (and, post that decision, the section is treated as virtually dead).
Tharangini Records v. State of Kerala, 1990 (2) K.L.T. 400 Judgment invalidating an early notification issued under S. 59A (notification dated 8-4-1986) in a writ petition. Invoked as an example where a challenge to a notification under S.59A was upheld by this Court, illustrating the invalid exercise of power under the section.
Ram Prasad v. State of Bihar, AIR 1953 S.C. 215 Principle that political or executive preference cannot override the functioning of the legal system; an authoritative passage quoted to show courts' intolerance for executive encroachment on judicial functions. Relied upon to underscore the constitutional objection to conferring judicial-type powers on the executive and to justify strict scrutiny of S.59A.
P. Sambamurthy v. State of A.P., (1987) 1 SCC 362; AIR 1987 S.C. 663 Authority where statutory provisions invading quasi-judicial or judicial processes were struck down. Cited as one of the authorities demonstrating that statutes which encroach on judicial/quasi-judicial functions can be invalidated.
B.B. Rajwanshi v. State of U.P., (1988) 2 SCC 415; AIR 1988 S.C. 1089 Another authority where statutory invasion into adjudicatory space was struck down. Used with the same purpose as P. Sambamurthy — to illustrate established precedent for invalidating executive usurpation of judicial functions.
Dy. Commr. of Salestax v. Haji V.K. Hameed & Co., 1981 K.L.T. 107 Principle that even when there is difficulty of interpretation, a notification issued by the State Government cannot bind the Tribunal or the Court in determining the true meaning and scope of an entry in the statute's schedule. Quoted to support the view that courts (not the executive) are the proper forum to resolve interpretative difficulties and that executive notifications cannot displace judicial interpretation.
State of Gujarat v. Prakash Trading Co., 30 S.T.C. 257 Decision relied upon (by the Board) as holding that shampoo is liquid soap. Discussed to show a mistaken administrative approach where the Government relied on precedent improperly and thus exhibited legal infirmity in issuing clarificatory orders under S.59A.
State of Tamil Nadu v. Gopal Nair & Sons, (1982) 51 STC 257 High Court decision distinguishing shaving cream from shampoo; the opinion notes the decision dealt with shaving cream, not shampoo. Used to demonstrate administrative misreading/misapplication of precedent and to criticize the casual approach in files processed under S.59A.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court's analysis proceeds in a structured sequence, and is summarized here following the steps as presented in the opinion:

  1. Jurisdiction and approach: The Court proceeds under its wide jurisdiction conferred by Article 226 to subject S.59A to rigorous constitutional tests, including separation-of-powers considerations and tests of vagueness, arbitrariness and procedural fairness.
  2. Statutory and procedural background: The statutory adjudicatory scheme under the Sales-tax Act consists of assessment by officers, appeals to departmental appellate officers, a Tribunal and limited revision by the High Court (S.16, S.34, S.39, S.41 etc.). The Court emphasizes that tax assessment functions are quasi-judicial and entail procedural fairness, reasoned decision-making and impartial adjudication.
  3. Legislative history: S.59A was introduced in 1978 following recommendations of the Gulati Committee and was debated in the Legislative Assembly; the Bill and its objects were recorded, and Assembly debates reveal pronounced concerns by several members that the provision would confer uncontrolled power on the Government and risk abuse.
  4. Concerns of separation of powers and Article 265: The Court underscores the principle that judicial functions should not be exercised by the Executive. It also cites Article 265 (taxes can be levied only by authority of law) and observes that unjustified imposts are an unreasonable restriction on trade and have been condemned by higher courts.
  5. Review of Division Bench decision: The Court examines the prior Division Bench (Dadha Pharma) which found S.59A of very wide import, observed vagueness (no procedure, no indication who may refer questions, lack of binding rules), and read the section down by imposing limitations and safeguards. The present Court states respectful agreement with that exposition but proceeds to a fuller constitutional adjudication, unfettered by the jurisdictional limitations that earlier benches faced.
  6. Empirical review of administrative practice: The Court examined representative files and notifications issued under S.59A (shampoo, imitation jewellery, microscope and other items) and found repeated examples of casual, uninformed, legally unsound and arbitrary administrative action—such as misreading precedents, lack of reasoned legal advice from the Law Department, incorrect references to schedule entries, and absence of material showing quasi-judicial process (hearing, evidence, reasons).
  7. Legal consequences of practical operation: The Court reasons that where a statute's text is vague and the practice of the agency exercising the power demonstrates arbitrariness and lack of institutional competence, the presumption of constitutionality cannot sustain the provision. The opinion emphasizes that taxing statutes enjoy some latitude, but such deference withers when the statute's sweep is shown to be ferocious and prone to abuse.
  8. Application of precedents and constitutional principles: The Court cites authorities where statutory encroachment on judicial/quasi-judicial functions was struck down and reiterates the settled principle that interpretations and rectification of legal entries are matters for courts rather than executive notifications (citing Dy. Commr. v. Haji V.K. Hameed & Co.). The Court invokes the separation-of-powers and Article 14 to assess S.59A.
  9. Conclusion of analysis: Given the textual breadth of S.59A, the lack of procedural safeguards in the section itself, the evident failures in administrative practice, and the risk of executive usurpation of adjudicatory functions, the Court concludes that S.59A vests arbitrary and unguided power in the Executive, subverting the Act's adjudicatory scheme and violating Article 14 of the Constitution.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The Court declared that S. 59A of the Kerala General Sales-tax Act, 1963 contains arbitrary and unguided power on the Executive, subverting the statutory quasi-judicial and judicial adjudicatory scheme, and is violative of Article 14 of the Constitution and ultra vires the Constitution. The Court allowed the writ petitions and declared the provision unconstitutional. All orders passed in exercise of S.59A were quashed. There was no order as to costs.

Implications (direct consequences stated in the opinion):

  • The impugned provision (S.59A) is declared unconstitutional and cannot survive the test of constitutionality; the opinion describes it as "virtually a dead section" after the prior Division Bench decision and the present declaration.
  • All orders, notifications and decisions made under the invalid and unconstitutional provision S.59A shall stand quashed.
  • The writ petitions challenging S.59A were allowed. The Court made no order as to costs.

This summary is prepared exclusively from the content of the provided opinion. No information not present in the opinion has been added.

    Travancore Chemical & Manufacturing Go. Ltd. v. State Of Kerala

    The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

    Sukumaran, J.:— Dealers in diverse goods have come to the Constitutional Court seeking the striking down of S. 59A in the Kerala General Sales-tax Act, 1963. The goods in which they deal range from bread, bun and horlicks to volatile oils, cosmetics and shampoos, and imitation jewellery. Even odd goods like tarpaulin, power line carriers, communication equipments, nylon fish nets, copper sulphate, microscope, battery plates and the like are arrayed in the list. Many cases have been disposed of without a pronouncement on the crucial question of Constitutional validity, they could be so disposed of: for, the court, on an examination of relevant facts and factors, found that the governmental declaration under the impugned section was in tune with the correct legal position. Such decisions cover Importex International (P) Ltd. v. State Of Kerala, 1990 (2) K.L.T 487 and Rajan v. State of Kerala, 1990 (2) K.L.T 511; in some others, the declaration was found to be totally unsustainable, and accordingly invalidated.

    2. A residue of cases in a grey area, in a twilight zone as it were, still remains. The question has to be discussed and decided upon. Judicial atrophy is counter-productive. A challenge to the very section was raised before a Bench consisting a Paripoornan and Jagannadha Raju, JJ., which examined thereadbare the section in its analytical highlight and operational potency. The Division Bench could not, however, pronounce on its constitutional validity. The cases had come under S. 41 providing for a limited jurisdiction of tax revision. The Revision is provided against the final fact finding Tribunal. The Tribunal is an authority created under the statute. That authority could not question the validity of the statute under which it was so created. That limitation pursues the proceedings even in the revisional jurisdiction. What the Tribunal could not do, the High Court functioning under the very same statute, could not attempt. You need not bark when you cannot bite. The Division Bench therefore did the next best thing. It read down the statute. A severe reading down was found necessary and called for. We are in respectful agreement with that legal exposition. The decision gets its reflection in Dadha Pharma Pvt. Ltd. v. State Of Kerala, 1990 (2) K.L.T 307.

    3. As for us, fetters are absent. The question has been posed pointedly. The wide jurisdiction of Article 226 of the Constitution, gives us the necessary poise, to subject the statutory provision to all the tests, some of them rigorous tests, for ascertaining the constitutional purity. We shall presently perform that onerous task.

    4. It is basic in any system of modem law that judicial functions are not handled by the Executive. The three organs of the State should have due consideration and respect for each other. There have been problems where existence of unintended trespass had been discernible and debated upon. Such cases are, however, few and far between. There is a critical view that the Executive is quite often eager to grab powers of the other limbs of the State. It gets caught, when trespass is in clear day light, and is nastily naked. It may escape unhurt if the transgression is marginal, unintended or negligible. To which category does S. 59A belong? is the question. An answer thereto will dispose of the writ petitions.

    5. Before examining the exact statutory provision, it is desirable to have a general background of the Sales-tax Law. The statutory scheme is akin to others in established taxing enactments. An assessment by the officer, (S. 16 etc.) an appeal to a departmental functionary-an Appellate Asst. Commissioner (S. 34), a further appeal to the Tribunal (S. 39) and a limited revision to the High Court (s. 41). The Deputy Commissioner has powers of Revision in the contingencies specified in Ss. 35 and 36. Functionaries with higher hierarchical position, larger powers and clearer governmen tal affinity like the Board of Revenue also have enumerated functions in revisional jurisdiction (S. 37 and 38). A decision rendered by the Board of Revenue is, however, amenable to judicial scrutiny whether under a tax appeal under S. 40 or under the writ jurisdiction. In other words, assessment under the Act, is done in tune with the well established principles of law governing the functioning of a quasi-judicial authority. Procedural fairness and requirements of reasonableness and rationality, could be initially scrutinised by the hierarchy of the taxing officials and finally over viewed by the Tribunal and High Court. The final filtration is by the Court. An assessment, by its very nature, does not depend upon the whim or fancy of the functionaries. A disciplined judicial mind and an acquired habit of objectivity in viewing things are the hall marks of the essential functioning of assessment process. If the adjudicatory agencies at various levels are manned properly, (we need not enquire whether there has not been a serious dilution in the quality of the officers as revealed from disturbing experiences in the scrutiny of tax determinations), and decisions rendered by discussions across the table, (as distinguished from hand movements under it) it should give a reasonable measure of satisfaction to an ordinary citizen. Arbitrariness would not go unchecked, so long as the courts of the land do the duty as the Sentinel Qui Vive of the Constitution and the laws.

    6. If this vitality of quasi-judicial and judicial functioning is seriously sapped or attacked unnecessarily or unjustifiably, the court has the power, and in a sense a duty, to step in and to repulse the trespass.

    7. The Sales-tax Law of the country did not, in early times have a provision with that colour and content seen in S. 59A. It was only in the 1960s, that provisions somewhat resembling the impugned section surfaced in the laws. The State of Maharashtra, and following it, the State of Gujarat and the State of Madhya Pradesh have provisions enabling a dispute resolution process by the Government. The statutory provisions therein are not as wide or vague as in S. 59A of the Kerala Act. Even then, it was not a wanton attack on the quasi-judicial and judicial system in relation to the assessment procedure.

    8. It has to be remembered in this connection that a taxcollection is necessarily linked with a fair and proper legal procedure as mandated by Article 265 of the Constitution which reads:

    “265. Taxesnot tobeimposed save by authority of law.-No tax shall be levied or collected except by authority of law.”

    9. An impost unjustified under Article 265 is an unreasonable restriction of a person's right to carry on business. It has been frowned upon as such by the apex court.

    10. S. 59A was introduced in the Kerala Statute, when the Act was amended in 1978. A commission which went into the working of Tax Department, now known by the name of its Chairman, I.S Gulati, suggested drastic amendments to the frame work and fabric of the statute. It is unnecessary to go into all those proposals at this juncture. One recommendation pertinent for appreciating the background material is available in paragraph 8.29 of its report, which reads:

    “8.29 A provision has recently been made in the law conferring on the Board powers of superintendence which have Been interpreted to include powers to issue clarifications about disputed questions. This provision, however, does not provide any opportunity for the assessee to present his case. To this extent, it seems to the Committee to be inequitable. The Committee recommends the introduction of a section on the lines in vogue in Maharashtra and Delhi. The relevant section of the Delhi Sales Tax Act is reproduced at Annexure DC”.

    11. The Government took a decision to restructure the rates of sales tax and implement other recommendations of Gulati Committee. This was reflected in the Budget speech made bythe Minister for Finance and Law on 14-3-1978. An Ordinance was initially issued on 31-3-1978 to translate into action, the decision of the Government. The Ordinance was replaced by the amendment bill. Paragraph 18 of the Note on Clause dealt with Clause 21 of the Bill, which was to be enacted as S. 59A of the Act. It reads:

    “Clause 21.— This clause seeks to insert a new section as S. 59A in the Act empowering the Government to determine the rate of tax, if a question arises as to the rate of tax leviable under the Act on the date of purchase of any goods”.

    12. To carry out the suggestions of the Report, a Bill was introduced. The Objects and Reasons stated:

    “The Committee on Commodity Taxation headed by Prof. J.S Gulathi appointed by the Government has in its report made various recommendations for restructuring the rates of salestax on goods for modifying exemption from sales tax, for plugging the loopholes for evasion of sales tax and also for streamlining the administration of the sales tax law. The Minister Finance and Law in his statement made in the Legislative Assembly on the 4th July 1977, indicated among other things that a restructuring of the rates of Sales tax in the light of the Gulathi Committee recommendations would be attempted during the year 1977-78. The need for implementing the Gulathi Committee's recommendations wasstressed bythe Minister (Finance and Law) in his Budget Speech dated the 14th March 1978 also. Accordingly it was proposed to implement certain recommendations of the Gulathi Committee, which were calculated to enhance the revenue, by suitabty amending the Kerala General Sales-tax Act, 1963. It was also considered necessary to amend certain procedural provisions in the Kerala General Sales-tax Act, 1963, for making the administration of the law more efficient as the Legislative Assembly was not in session and as the proposals had to be given effect to immediately, the Kerala General Sales-tax (Amendment) Ordinance 1978 (10 of 1978), was promulgated by the Governor on the 31st March 1978.”

    13. The draft provision of the Bill has been subjected to discussions on the floor of the Assembly.

    14. The deliberations in the Legislative Assembly are now available from the Kerala Legislative Assembly Proceedings, 1978, pages 2062 to 2202. They cover the narration of various events starting with the introduction of the Amendment Bill on 18-7-1978 by the Finance Minister and ending with the recording of the poll when the Speaker counted 55 Ayes, 36 Noes with no Neutrals, and accordingly declared the Bill as passed. Prominent among those who dealt with S. 59A are Messrs. N.I Devassykutty, T.M Jacob, P.K Sankarankutty, M.P Gangadharan, Xavier Arakkal, and naturally the Finance Minister himself.

    15. It is useful to note the emerging trends of the deliberations in the Assembly. Shri. Devassykutty was pointed in his assertion that S. 59A was deliberately introduced to confer uncontrolled power on the Government. According to him, a vicious vision was behind that seemingly innocent provision. It was to serve not a public purpose but to enable the Government to intervene and grant tax concessions with a view to help thevested interests, the tax dodgers, the servile elements of the Government and thoseattached to the Ministers. Is there not a scheme for the determination of the correct tax rate for a commodity, in the Act itself? Is there not a Tribunal? Is it not sufficient that the determination is done by the Tribunal or by the High Court? Such is the approximate summary of that portion of his speech on S. 59A T.M Jacob presented the opposite view. He did not see any mala fide intention in that provision. He gave an illustration from his own personal experience: “A pipe is bought for electrification of the house. Pipe is useful alike for electrification and for agricultural purposes. There could be disputes about the payment of tax for them. If there is a dispute, among the traders or for the consumer, the Government must be empowered to settle it”. He admitted that therewas a provision in the Act for adjudication of the issue in case a higher rate is imposed. That was in answer to the query he faced from Mr. Devassykutty and Dr. K.G Adiyodi. The defence Mr. Jacob attempted was an absence, according to him, of a malicious motive in the enactment of that section. Shri P.K Sankarankutty emphasised the quasi-judicial aspect of the taxation administration. In particular, he referred to the machinery for resolving the dispute upto the Tribunal and thereafter by the High Court. He reminded Shri. Jacob about his earlier views about the impropriety of the Executive dabbling with the judicial power. Shri. T.M Jacob intervened to say that a Governmental decision is easier and more expeditious. He found a greater ease in the determination of the issue by the Government; and said: “Both of us know the delay when one goes to the Court. I said that this was an approach for a great simplification and earlier determination of matters.” Shri. Sankarankutty reiterated his view that the section was fraught with the potentialities of the abuse of power. Shri. M.P Gangadharan spoke next. A legal mind was discernible in his speech. He implored, in the name of God, for the deletion of the provision. He referred to the scheme of the enactment, about the assessment and the adjudication by the Appellate Authorities, and the provision under S. 37 empowering the Board to exercise powers of revision in the manner dealt with therein. Xavier Arakkal cautioned that the Minister may examine the views expressed on Section 59A He pointed out that the conferment of such a power on the Government will lead to excessive corruption and give rise to many allegations. The deletion, or in the alternative a restriction of thescope of the section was advocated by him. In his defence the Finance Minister relied heavily on what was contained at page 23 in para. 29 of Chapter 8 of the Gulati Report. Apart from that reference, there was no elaboration of the idea.

    16. In the present case, there was an attempted defence of the provision by the Finance Minister leaning on the Gulati Committee report. That report does not, in any way, give any helpful material for the State Government to sustain the validity of the statutory provision.

    17. The legal position in relation to the deliberations in the Legislative Assembly on an enactment is now well established. It is, however, advantageous to have the view points of the representatives of the people, when pointedly an issue is deliberated upon, discussed and debated. The anxiety and apprehension expressed by the Hon'ble Members about the potentiality of a patent abuse of the power conferred on the Government under the new provision, have their significance.

    18. The Division Bench consisting of Paripoornan and Jagannadha Raju. JJ. examined the scheme of the General Sales Tax Act and the controversial content of the impugned section in Dadha Pharma Pvt. Ltd. v. State Of Kerala, 1990 (2) KLT 307. Jagannadha Raju, J. speaking for the Court, pointedly stressed the aspect in paragraph 7 of the judgment:

    “It is interesting to see that the sub-title to the Section reads as “Power of Government to determine rate of tax”. The Section nowhere states that the Government is entitled, or authorised, to issue clarifications.”

    (emphasis supplied)

    19. Another feature focussed by the Court is the decision of the Government being final. The conspicuous absence of an indication as to the person who shall refer the question to the Government or about the procedure the Government should follow before it arrives at a decision, or again of an indication about the persons bound by the decision, were also stressed in the judgment. That the Section may give a prima facie impression that the decision of the Government may even bind the Tribunal, was also indicated therein. The judgment summed up the position:

    “It cannot be doubted that the language used in S. 59A is of very wide import.”

    and proceeded to observe:

    “If literal meaning is given to the words used therein, then such a literal interpretation would render the Section vulnerable to attack as vague and uncertain, and as one taking away guaranteed rights.”

    (emphasis supplied)

    20. The Division Bench stressed the areas of uncertainty, indefiniteness and vagueness of the Section, in paragraph 11 and observed in paragraph 12:

    “……………………the statute is not clear or definite on these vital aspects.”

    21. The following prepositions emerge from the judgment. (1) The word ‘decision’ under S. 59A implies that the Government discharges a judicial or quasi-judicial function. That feature has other integrally connected attributes like (a) an obligation on the part of the Government to hear the parties to the dispute (b) affording an opportunity to the parties to put forward their case and lead the evidence and (c) a duty to render the decision on the basis of material and evidence placed before it, and after hearing both parties. (2) The decision will only bind parties and their privies, and cannot bind others unless they are already heard and/or made parties to the proceedings. (3) The decision of the Government is final notwithstanding any other provision in the Act. It has a disturbing potency of having a binding effect even on the Tribunal or the High Court while functioning as a Revisional Court under S. 41 of the Act.

    22. The Bench, as noted earlier, read down the Section and read it down in a drastic manner. Some of the slicings and chisellings are the following: (i) The decision of the Government is binding and conclusive only for the particular assessment year, (ii) The decision can normally be final only between the parties to the proceedings, (iii) This power is being used by the State Government to issue some sort of firmans', notwithstanding the law operating in the State. In a democratic society, the State Government is not entitled to issue circulars or clarifications which will have effect notwithstanding the provisions of the Act. (iv) Construed as having the effect of amending the provisions or schedules of the Act, S. 59A would easily be classified as unbridled and arbitrary. The State Government cannot have such unbridled and uncontrolled power to take decisions on the administrative side.

    23. The following safeguards as indicated in paragraphs 21 to 23 were provided to the Section as so read down: (1) The assessee and assessing authority can refer the question for the decision of the Government. (2) The decision will have to be arrived at following the principles of quasi-judicial adjudication such as hearing both parties and giving an opportunity to each of them to represent their respective cases. (3) The decision already rendered under S. 59A can be altered by invoking Ss. 57 and 58, if the Government feels that any decision taken by it while exercising powers under S. 59A requires a change in the rules or an amendment of the Act or Schedule thereto, subject to the limitations indicated. The Government can amend the law, if so advised. (4) The Government cannot take unilateral decisions which are to be deemed as applicable universally or operative notwithstanding the provisions to the contrary in the Act. (5) Thedecision under S. 59A is confined as to the rate of tax leviable and canot be utilised for circulars or clarifications. (6) The decision rendered under S. 59A will not bind the Sales Tax Appellate Tribunal; and afortiorari, it will not bind the High Court. (7)A decision will not have retrospective operation so as to adversely affect the rights of the assessees.

    24. One of the earliest notifications issued under this newly got power was one dated 8-4-1986. This was immediately challenged by the aggrieved assessee by O.P No. 540 of 1987, The challenge had been upheld by this Court in Tharangini Records v. State Of Kerala, 1990 (2) KLT 400.

    25. Government Pleader conceded the fact that the pendency of this writ petition had not been specifically brought to the notice of the Division Bench. That appears to be the case in relation to the other cases, which are not altogether insignificant in number.

    26. Noting these disconcerting features of the mischievous potentialities of the Section, which, in its mad rush, knocks down every fence and guide-post provided under the Constitution, the judgment proceeded to observe:

    “It is quite open to the parties to challenge the vlidity of S. 59A as ultra vires the Constitution”.

    27. The Bench further found:

    “From 1978 till this day, the validity of the Section does not appear to have been challenged. There is no authoritative pronouncement by this Court on this aspect. Whether S. 59A is vulnerable in a writ proceeding under Article 226 of the Constitution of India is left open”.

    28. We have been now confronted with the Constitutional challenges directed against S. 59A and in proceedings under Article 226 of the Constitution.

    29. The challenges cannot be dismissed summarily on the ground of delay. Grievance arising out of what was felt to be the obnoxious statutory provision, arose in individual cases only at a later stage, with the exercise of the power injuriously affecting the legitimate and constitutional rights of the citizen. A challenge under Article 226 of the Constitution was raised before this Court in O.P No. 3689 of 1983. It was disposed of by a judgment dated 29-6-1984 with a direction to the Government to dispose of a representation pending before it where the identical contention had been raised. The traders have approached the Court soon after the cause of action so arose. We are therefore bound to consider the validity of the Section and pronounce on the contentions of the parties.

    30. The courts have, understandably, expressed intolerance in the investiture of essential judicial functions in the Executive. More so when they tend to erode the rights of a citizen conferred under the Constitution or the laws. There is a precious passage in thejudgment of Patanjali Sastri C.J, speaking for the Supreme Court in Ram Prasad v. State of Bihar, AIR 1953 S.C 215. A political party's desire cannot over ride the working of the legal system-it was held. Other decisions where statutory provisions invading areas of quasi-judicial and judicial process had been struck down are: P. Sambamurthy v. State of A.P, (1987) 1 SCC 362 : AIR 1987 S.C 663 and B.B Rajwanshi v. State of U.P, (1988) 2 SCC 415 : AIR 1988 S.C 1089.

    31. This Court too had to consider an analogous provision contained in a State enactment. The Court declared that the responsibility for resolution of difficulty of that nature rests with the Court and not with the Executive. That decision was rendered in the context of the General Sales Tax Act but in relation to the exercise of the power referable to S. 60 therein. Purporting to remove the difficulties in the working of the provisions in theenactment, the Government issued an order which virtually set at naught the decision of this Court in relation to the interpretation of two entries. The crucial observation of the Court is:

    “Even in cases where there is any difficulty in the matter of interpretation of an entry such difficulty will have to be resolved by the court and any notification issued by the State Government concerning the matter will not bind the Tribunal or the Court in the matter of determining the true meaning and scope of the entry contained in the Schedule to the Statute”.

    32. (See Dy. Commr. of Dy. Commr. Of Salestax v. Haji V.K Hameed & Co., 1981 K.L.T 107).

    33. A citizen of this country has his fundamental right to carry on a trade or a business. Theoreticions may debate upon shifting emphasis on massive or heavy industry, and the desirability or purposefulness in having it in the public sector. The place of the small trader and a small industrialist cannot, however, be forgotten. While evaluating the precious rights of the freedom of trade, we cannot diassociate ourselves with a pragmatism and practicality connected with te real life. Divorced from life, law degenerates into a scarecrow.

    34. A trader naturally takes certain business risks. It is, however, unreasonable and unjustifiable for a State to drown him in a sea of rolling risks. Such vicious powers, which have such deleterious results have to be checkmated. A trader may take a risk while dealing in the sale of commodities, (passing on to the consumer the tax liability) with a self-preserving interest of reckoning the worst in relation to his fiscal liability byway of sales tax. A manufacturer may so price his goods taking into consideration the possibility of an unfavourable interpretation ultimately placed by a taxing authority. The hierarchy of Tribunals and an adjudication by the High Court and the apex court should give him reasonable solace. However, if a section clothes the Executive arm of the State with a hard weapon of striking him from a hidden corner, the situation would be different. The fairness integrally involved in an adversary system or quasi-adversary system in the earlier stages (before the officer and the Commissioner) with an all powerful overviewing by the High Court and the Supreme Court, is totally absent in an adventitious adjudication attempted by the State Government, ill-equipped and ill-disciplined to have the necessary judicial approach and untrained in an impartial impassionate and objective determination of issues. This is a vice of unusual magnitude contained in S. 59A.

    35. Time was when the Supreme Court had all the confidence in assuming that a discretion given to the highest functionaries would not be easily abused. The experience over the years after the advent of the Constitution, however, did not establish an earnestness on the part of the Government to preserve that, trust and confidence. There had been many cases in which alien considerations and unjustified aberrations had resulted in strange decisions even by the peak of the executive power, the Government itself. It is unnecessary to chronicle the very many cases noticed by the courts in this Country and the very many others, which remain unexposed and unnoticed. The same Supreme Court which rested its trust in the proper utilisation of a discretionary power, cautioned later that no such assumption could be drawn in the light of the past experience. Chandrachud, J. speaking for the Court, expressed it in clear enough terms.

    36. The Division bench in 1990 (2) KLT 307 supra, posed that problem pointedly. We have had occasion to peruse the files produced before us in relation to the actual exercise of powers under S. 59A The manner in which the power had been exercised, does not measure up to the required level of a fair, reasonable and rational decision making process. The Court had expressed itself fairly emphatically in one of the cases (Vide Tharangini case supra). In many others, courts have just set at naught the Governmental decision which was out of tune with an objective adjudication even as visualised under S. 59A Having had occasion to scrutinise the files in relation to a variety of matters, during a fairly long period of the working of the section, we are clearly satisfied that the institutional equipments for giving a rational and reasonable decision under S. 59A are totally lacking.-When the statute under which an adjudicatory power is so exercised by an untrained agency like the Executive wing and when experience has shown a reckless way of handling such adjudicatory process, and when it is demonstrated that such adjudications have adverse impact of an enormous proportion, of the honest citizens carrying on a legitimate trade, the Court has necessarily to declare its arbitrariness and invalidity.

    37. We do not overlook the fact that a statute carries with it, a presumption of constitutionality. Taxing statutes, in particular, are viewed with greater understanidng and consideration by the courts of law. Flexibility at the joints is conceded liberally in relation to the tax statutes. These favourable considerations, projecting a view of the Court as leaning in favour of the State, should not carry matters to the extreme of claiming a total immunity for any taxing provision. The presumption dries up when the ferocity and fearful potency of the section are visible even to the naked eye. The sweep of mischief integrally and intensely involved in the decision has been exposed by the Bench decision which employed infra-red-rays and a powerful microscope simultaneously. The statutory provision in question has strayed much beyond the permissible limits. The power is let loose without any control or guide and without any check or watch. The position of the provision then is in a narrow precipice unsupported by strong enough side support. The trial runs have shown the shaky way. We have necessarily to declare its dangerous pose and bar its unauthorised use.

    38. Quite often, even the Law Department is not consulted. Instances are not rare when the Administrative Department itself makes no effective application of mind to the problem posed. In these circumstances, vagueness, lack of guidance, and exposure to uncertainties are not merely theoretical apprehensions but live and lethal blocks obstructing the exercise of trade. That being the position, it is the court's duty to remove the obstacles, when it is called upon to do so. In certain situations, an attempt to squeeze through may be suggested. That will not effectively serve the removal of stumbling-blocks of massive monstrosity. If the blocks are grossly objectionable and the passage sought for is for legitimate purposes, the Court need not have a halting stand or a doubting mind. All features of deleterious vagueness of the obnoxious type are present in the section. We have therefore no hesitation in declaring it as unconstitutional and violative of Art. 14 of the Constitution. Some samples oftheworking of S. 59A will make matters clear.

    39. The file relating to shampoo, dealt with in G.O(P) 59/86.TD dated 19-4-1986 which is subject matter of O.P Nos. 4896 of 1986, 1334, 1505 and 2414 of 1987, clearly demonstrates the casualness with which the matter is dealt with invoking S. 59A The Board of Revenue in its communication noted the decision of the Supreme Court of India in State of Gujarath v. Prakash Trading Co., 30 S.T.C 257, holding that shampoo is liquid soap. Strange to say, it felt that a clarification would be justified for the reason that the High Court of Madras had a different view and that the State of Gujarath had amended the schedule to the Sales-tax Act. The sentence reading “but the decision subsequently pronounced by the High Court of Madras (51 STC 257) defers from that of the Supreme Court” (emphasis supplied), evidences not only a disregard of the language (defers must be an intolerable erroneous substitute for ‘differs’, in that context) and of a profound ignorance of a Constitutional provision like Article 141 therein. A decision rendered by the Supreme Court is the law of the country. The State can, no doubt, seek to amend the law. A subsequent ruling of a High Court, taking a different view will not be sufficient justification for issuing what is termed as a clarificatory order invoking S. 59A. In the Law Department, someone has signed for Joint Secretary, with a cryptic note:

    “This Department agrees to the position stated by the Administrative Depart ment…………”

    40. If only the decision in The State of Tamil Nadu v. Gopal Nair & Sons, (1982) 51 STC 257 had been read-it is a short decision it would have been noticed that the Madras High Court considered only shaving cream and not shampoo. The Court specifically referred to that difference in the concluding paragraph of the judgment by observing:

    “Shampoo is different from a shaving cream and we do not consider that a shaving cream can be considered to be either liquid or any category of soap.”

    41. It is unfortunate that even those expected to give a sensible and serious advice on point of law, have not bestowed elementary care in understanding the problem before a general approval for the proposal of the administrative department had been given from the legal angle.

    42. The file relating to imitation Jewellery, G.O.NO 170/88.TD dated 29-11-1988, also does not indicate a due or careful consideration of the various aspects, by the various authorities including the Law Department.

    43. The forwarding letter of the Board contains a mistaken reference to Entry 191 as pertaining to jewellery …… The correct entry is 101. The application under S. 59A also does not give a correct reference to the entry. The Law Department does not give a reasoned or considered view on the question. An opinion couched in a language reading: “it may not be proper to include imitation jewellery in item 119……,” without any analysis of that entry or any helpful judicial precedents, would not be a proper discharge of the onerous functions of the Law Department.

    44. Yet another file scrutinised by us relates to the rate of tax on microscope. By the clarification, it was brought under entry 150 reading “binoculars, telescopes and opera glasses”. It does not require a microscopic examination of the entry or the legal precedents to be convinced that a microscope is not a binocular, telescope or opera glass. The Board by its letter dated 4-8-1983 proposed for amending the entry 150 so as to rope in the microscope also. It also requested that till such amendment is made, a clarification under S. 59A may also be issued. The former was sensible and legal. The latter was impermissible and illegal. Yet the Law Department gave a blanket approval to the proposal of the Board. G.O Rt. 241/84.TD dated 2-4-1984 declaring a shocking clarification about the microscope coming within the binoculars, telescopes and opera glasses was accordingly made. The arbitrariness actually involved in the issue of various clarificatory orders is demonstrated in this instance as well. Similar appears to be the position in relation to the clarificatory orders issued under G.O Rt. 408/82.TD dated 5-7-1982. The details of this case are separately dealt with in the writ petitions specifically concerning them.

    45. The file furnished to us regarding G.O(P) 51/86.TD dated 8-4-1986 does not contain any papers whatever other than a gazette notification. We have dealt with that question specifically in the judgment dealing with that commodity. It is sufficient to note in this context that the court is not furnished with any materials indicating the processing of the file or the thought process connected therewith in the Law Department.

    46. The cases are only illustrative and not exhaustive of the manner in which the power under S. 59A has been exercised arbitrarily and without application of mind.

    47. The preceding discussion would clearly demonstrate that the section is not merely arbitrary and unguided in its wording and content but also had been in actual reality, invoked with patent arbitrariness. In such a situation, the court has to do its duty. We declare that S. 59A contains arbitrary and unguided power on the Executive subverting the scheme of a quasi-judicial and judicial resolution of a lis between the State and the assessees, and consequently it is violative of Article 14 of the Constitution, and ultra vires the provisions of the Constitution. In a sense, subsequent to the decision in Dadha Pharma Pvt. Ltd. v. State Of Kerala, 1990 (2) KLT 307, it is virtually a dead section. It cannot survive the test of constitutionality. The court then need not hesitate to make the declaration about its constitutional invalidity. All the orders passed in exercise of such invalid and unconstitutional provision shall stand quashed. We allow the writ petitions in the manner indicated above. There will be no order as to costs. There is an illuminating article by M. Sunkin in (1987) Modern Law Review, 432. The caption is “What is Happending to Applications for Judicial Review?”. The article concludes thus:

    “During the past five or six years, judicial review has provided a facility primarily used by applicants in a very limited range of subject areas against a correspondingly narrow band of public agencies. In quantitative terms, at least, judicial review has……indeed been ‘peripheral and sporadic’. It appears to have played a minimal role in the redress of grievance and has provided the community with a very partial and limited check against governmental illegality.”

    48. Phil Harris, in the third edition of the book, “An Introduction to Law”, published in the series “Law in context”, comments after noting the above view of Sunkin, thus:

    “Sunkin's study suggests that the courts are not particularly effective in imposing limits on administrative action through the procedure of judicial review….”.

    49. Perhaps, Griffith was more caustic in his comment on judicial forces at work behind the scenes. Adverting to an attitude that “everything was at the discretion of the administrator”, he made what is described as “acerbic remarks”:

    ‘This nonsense, screaming its absurdities to heaven, was received with respectful even smug, acceptance by His Majesty's judges. Respectful, because they agreed with it. Smug because they were larery responsible for it.…………”

    50. The criticism and caution should not go unnoticed by a Constitutional court. When arbitrariness is writ large, there is a clear enough duty for the Court to act. We have endeavoured to do so.

    51. Allowed.

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    Travancore Chemical & Manufacturing Go. Ltd. v. State Of Kerala
    (Nov 15, 1990)