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Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Attorney(S)
Judges
Acts
  • Section 141, C.P.C provisions of Order VII
  • Rule 1 of Order VII. Rule 1 clause (f)
  • provisions of Order 1, Rule 10, C.P.C
  • fee.5. Clauses (b), (c) and (e) of Rule 5,
  • Rule 5 of Order XXXIII I.P.C
  • clauses (b), (c) and (e) of Rule 5
  • Rule 10 of Order VII, C.P.C
  • provisions of Rule 10-A
  • provisions of Order 33
  • Order 1 Rule 13 C.P.C
  • Order 33, Rule 5, C.P.C
  • Rule 10 of Order VII
  • Order 2, Rule 7, C.P.C
  • 324.10. Section 141
  • Order 1 Rule 10
  • rule 5. Rule 5
  • Rule 1. Rule 1
  • Rule 5, Rule 6
  • sub-rule (1)
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Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Attorney(S)
Judges
Acts
  • Section 141, C.P.C provisions of Order VII
  • Rule 1 of Order VII. Rule 1 clause (f)
  • provisions of Order 1, Rule 10, C.P.C
  • fee.5. Clauses (b), (c) and (e) of Rule 5,
  • Rule 5 of Order XXXIII I.P.C
  • clauses (b), (c) and (e) of Rule 5
  • Rule 10 of Order VII, C.P.C
  • provisions of Rule 10-A
  • provisions of Order 33
  • Order 1 Rule 13 C.P.C
  • Order 33, Rule 5, C.P.C
  • Rule 10 of Order VII
  • Order 2, Rule 7, C.P.C
  • 324.10. Section 141
  • Order 1 Rule 10
  • rule 5. Rule 5
  • Rule 1. Rule 1
  • Rule 5, Rule 6
  • sub-rule (1)
Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

The appellant filed an application in the court below seeking permission to sue as an indigent person under Order XXXIII, C.P.C. The second respondent opposed the application, arguing that the appellant had means to pay court-fee and that no part of the cause of action had arisen within the jurisdiction of that court, such that the court lacked jurisdiction. The court below accepted the jurisdictional objection and rejected (in form) the application for "presentation before proper court," although it was satisfied that the appellant was an indigent person. The appellant challenged that order by way of appeal.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether an application for permission to sue as an indigent person under Order XXXIII can be rejected only on the grounds enumerated in Rule 5 of that Order, or whether other grounds (such as lack of jurisdiction) may justify returning/rejecting the application.
  2. Whether the question of jurisdiction in respect of an application under Order XXXIII arises only after the application has been registered as a plaint, or whether jurisdictional objections may be considered before registration.
  3. Whether Section 141 of the C.P.C. makes relevant provisions of Order VII (in particular Rule 10) applicable to applications under Order XXXIII, thereby permitting a court to return a plaint (or application deemed to be plaint) to be presented before the proper court for lack of jurisdiction.
  4. Whether an application for permission to sue as an indigent person should be treated as a composite proceeding that also functions as the plaint (thus attracting procedural rules applicable to plaints, including those relating to jurisdiction).

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

  • The court below contravened the scheme of Order XXXIII by rejecting the application on the ground of lack of jurisdiction; Rule 5 lists the exclusive grounds for rejection and does not include lack of jurisdiction.
  • The question of jurisdiction could only be considered after the application had been registered as a plaint; until then the matter was only an application and not a plaint.
  • Relied on Nur Muhammad v. Maulvi Jamil Ahmad ((1919) 52 Ind Cas 688 : AIR 1919 All 213) to support the proposition that returning/rejecting the application before registration as plaint was impermissible.

Respondent's Arguments

  • Rule 5 of Order XXXIII is not exhaustive and an application under Order XXXIII can be rejected on other grounds, including lack of jurisdiction.
  • Section 141 of the C.P.C. makes provisions of Order VII applicable to applications under Order XXXIII; thus Rule 10 of Order VII (regarding return of a plaint to be presented before the proper court) can justify returning/rejecting the application.
  • Relied on several decisions to support the applicability of ordinary plaint-procedure and jurisdictional rules to pauper applications under Order XXXIII.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Nur Muhammad…Plaintiff Applicant; v. Maulvi Jamil Ahmad…Defendant ((1919) 52 Ind Cas 688 : AIR 1919 All 213) Cited by appellant for the proposition that an application presented under Order XXXIII is not a plaint until granted and registered, and that returning the application before registration was not authorised by Order XXXIII. The court considered this authority but expressly stated it was unable to follow the decision; the court held that returning an application for presentation before the proper court is permissible under the applicable provisions.
Stuart Skinner alias Nawab Mirza v. William Orde ((1878-80) ILR 2 All 241) Authority holding that in pauper applications the suit is deemed instituted from the date of presenting the application (so limitation and other consequences run from that date). Relied upon to support the view that an application for permission to sue is composite in nature and functions as the plaint when granted; used to support treating the application as attracting plaint-procedures.
Vijai Pratap Singh v. Dukh Haran Nath Singh (AIR 1962 SC 941) Holds that an application to sue in forma pauperis is a method of instituting a suit and that the suit commences from presentation of the application; Order 1 Rule 10 would apply to such suits. The court relied on this Supreme Court authority as an important precedent confirming that plaint-procedures (e.g., Order 1 Rule 10) apply to pauper applications even before registration as a suit.
Chidambaram v. Nataraja Mudaliar (AIR 1939 Mad 80) Cited as part of a group of authorities supporting the view that pauper applications are to be treated in the manner of plaints for certain procedural consequences. Included among supporting authorities; cited to reinforce the composite nature of the pauper application and its procedural treatment.
Dhulipalla Brahamaramba v. Hulipalla Seetharamayya (AIR 1947 Mad 405) Supporting authority on procedural treatment of pauper applications as akin to plaints. Referred to as one of several cases that fortify the view that applications for permission to sue are treated as plaints for procedural purposes.
Jagadiswari Debi v. Tinkari Bibi (AIR 1936 Cal 28) Supporting authority on the same general proposition regarding pauper applications. Referred to in the list of cases supporting the court's view about the nature and treatment of pauper applications.
Bank of Bihar Limited v. Ramachanderji Maharaj (AIR 1929 Pat 637) Another supporting authority cited in respect of procedural questions concerning pauper applications. Included among cases relied upon to demonstrate consistent treatment of pauper applications across decisions.
Totaram Ichharam Wani v. Dattu Mangu Wani (AIR 1943 Bom 143) Supporting authority for procedural consequences of pauper applications. Cited as reinforcing authority for the composite nature of the application and its treatment under the Code.
Mahanth Jaikishun Dass… v. Ram Narain Das…Opposite Party. (AIR 1939 Pat 385) Supporting precedent related to pauper application procedure. Listed among authorities that support treating pauper applications as bringing plaint-procedures into play.
Raj Narain Sexana v. Bhim Sen (AIR 1966 All 84) (FB) Authority included in the list supporting the court's procedural conclusions. Referred to as part of the body of case-law relied upon to justify applying plaint-procedures to applications under Order XXXIII.
Mohammed Abbas Mallik v. Tahera Khatoon (AIR 1974 Pat 324) Cited by the court (along with Nur Muhammad) as a decision which the court was unable to follow on the point now under consideration. The court said it could not follow this decision and therefore did not treat it as binding in the present context.
Pandara Mukundan v. Pandara Kumaran (1967 Ker LR 372) Considered a case where objections of jurisdiction/non-joinder were held available in pauper applications and where Order 1 Rule 10 was applied to such applications. The court agreed with the single Judge's observations in this case and relied upon it to hold that a court can return an application for presentation before the proper court on jurisdictional grounds.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court proceeded by analysing both the Scheme of Order XXXIII and the effect of Section 141 of the C.P.C. Key points of its reasoning are set out below in the sequence presented by the opinion:

  1. Interpretation of Order XXXIII: The court reviewed the text of Order XXXIII (Rules 1, 2, 5, 6, 7 and 8) and noted that Rule 2 requires the application for permission to sue to contain particulars required in respect of plaints, and Rule 8 states that when the application is granted it shall be numbered and registered and deemed to be the plaint. This indicates the application is of a composite nature — part application, part plaint.
  2. Scope of Rule 5: The court acknowledged that Rule 5 does not explicitly include lack of jurisdiction as a ground for rejection. However, it concluded that Rule 5 is not exhaustive of all grounds on which an application could be rejected or otherwise disposed of.
  3. Applicability of plaint-procedures (Order VII and Order I): The court relied on Section 141, which directs that procedural provisions in the Code regarding suits apply, as far as they are applicable, to all proceedings in courts of civil jurisdiction. The court observed that particulars required in a plaint are specified in Order VII Rule 1 and that Order VII Rule 1(f) requires the plaint to contain facts showing that the court has jurisdiction.
  4. Return of plaint under Order VII Rule 10: The court pointed to Order VII Rule 10 (subject to Rule 10-A) which permits at any stage the plaint to be returned for presentation before the court in which it should have been instituted. The court reasoned that since the application under Order XXXIII must contain plaint particulars and is deemed a plaint when granted, the procedure under Order VII Rule 10 is available to deal with jurisdictional objections to an application even before registration as a suit.
  5. Precedential support: The court cited and relied on a number of authorities (including Privy Council and Supreme Court decisions) that treat pauper applications as giving rise to suits from the date of presentation and which support the application of plaint-procedures (e.g., Stuart Skinner, Vijai Pratap Singh, and others). On the other hand, the court expressly declined to follow Nur Muhammad and Mohammed Abbas Mallik to the extent they suggested otherwise.
  6. Conclusion on doctrine: For these reasons the court concluded that an application for permission to sue as an indigent person is not a "pure and simple" application but a composite proceeding that may be subject to the same procedural objections (including jurisdiction) as a plaint, and that a court has jurisdiction to return the application for presentation before the proper court on jurisdictional grounds.
  7. Application of law to facts: Turning to the facts, the court noted that the suit related to enforcement of a contract dated 14-8-1976 which was signed and entered into at Virajpet, Coorg, in Karnataka. The application did not allege performance within the jurisdiction of the trial court, nor residence or business of respondents in that jurisdiction, nor any part of the cause of action arising there. The appellant's argument that preliminary negotiations in Karnataka were confirmed at Trivandrum was not accepted as sufficient to form part of the cause of action or to determine jurisdiction.
  8. Resulting assessment: The court agreed with the trial court that it had no jurisdiction to try the application/suit. It also clarified that although the order below used the language of rejection, it in substance returned the application to be presented before the proper court.

Holding and Implications

Holding: APPEAL DISMISSED.

Direct implications and effect:

  • The appellate court dismissed the appeal and agreed with the lower court that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to try the application/suit.
  • The court clarified that the application to sue as an indigent person was not rejected outright; rather, it was returned to be presented before the proper court. The appellant was given two months' time to present the application before the appropriate forum.
  • The dismissal was ordered without costs.

The opinion does not expressly state any broader precedent-setting consequences beyond the court's application of existing provisions and authorities; it confines itself to applying the Code and cited authorities to the circumstances before it.

Appeal dismissed.

    V. Sreedharan v. T.T Nanu And Another

    Bhat, J.:— Appellant herein filed an application before the court below for permission to sue as an indigent person. Application was opposed by the second respondent, who contended that appellant has means to pay court-fee and that no part of the cause of action had arisen within the jurisdiction of that court and therefore the court has no jurisdiction. The court below upheld the latter contention and rejected the application for “presentation before proper court”, though it was satisfied that the appellant is indigent person. This order is now challenged.

    2. Learned counsel for the appellant contends that the court below contravened the scheme underlining the provisions of Order 33 of the C.P.C and that an application can be rejected only for reasons mentioned in rule 5. Rule 5 does not contemplate rejection of an application on account of lack of jurisdiction of the court. Learned counsel further contended that consideration of the question of jurisdiction would arise only after the application is registered as a plaint. Counsel placed reliance on the decision in Nur Muhammad…Plaintiff Applicant; v. Maulvi Jamil Ahmad…Defendant . (1919) 52 Ind Cas 688 : (AIR 1919 All 213), where it was observed:

    “It is thus manifest that what was presented to the court was not a plaint but an application and it would reach the stage of a plaint when the application was granted, and it would then be deemed to be the plaint in the suit …………….. As at that stage (i.e, before registration as plaint) there was no plaint before the court, the order must be deemed to be an order returning the application. For this there is no authority in Order XXXIII ……….. Such an order was passed without jurisdiction and should not have been passed.”

    3. Learned counsel for the contesting respondent rebutted these contentions. According to him, Rule 5 of Order XXXIII I.P.C is not exhaustive of the circumstances under which an application under Order XXXIII could be rejected. That application could be rejected on other grounds. Learned counsel also contended that by virtue of Section 141, C.P.C provisions of Order VII are rendered applicable to an application under Order XXXIII and therefore rejection or return could be justified under Rule 10 of Order VII, C.P.C Learned counsel also placed reliance on a number of decisions.

    4. Order XXXIII deals with suits by indigent persons, which expression is defined in explanation (1) to Rule 1. Rule 1 states that subject to the provisions of the Order any suit may be instituted by an indigent person. Rule 2 inter alia states that every application for permission shall contain the particulars required in regard to plaints in suits, and that it shall be signed and verified in the manner prescribed for the signing and verification of pleadings. Rule 5 states that the court shall reject an application in any one of the circumstances covered by clauses (a) to (g). If the application is not rejected under Rule 5, Rule 6 requires the court to fix a day for receiving such evidence as the applicant may adduce in proof of his indigency and for hearing any evidence which may be adduced in disproof thereof. According to Rule 7, on such day the court shall examine the witnesses produced by either party and may examine the applicant or his agent, but the examination of the witnesses under sub-rule (1) shall be confined to matters specified in clauses (b), (c) and (e) of Rule 5 and hear the arguments on the question whether the applicant is or is not subject to any of the prohibition specified in Rule 5. According to Rule 8, where the application is granted it shall be numbered and registered and shall be deemed the plaint in the suit, and the suit shall proceed in all other respects as a suit instituted in the ordinary manner, except that the plaintiff shall not be liable to pay any court-fee or process fee.

    5. clauses (b), (c) and (e) of Rule 5, in regard to which evidence could be adduced under Rule 7, relate to the alleged indigency of the applicant and related matters. Clause (a) relates to frame of the application and the manner of presentation. Clause (d) relates to the allegations not showing a cause of action. Clause (f) relates to the allegations not disclosing that the suit will not be barred by time. Clause (g) relates to agreement entered into by the applicant with any other person to finance the litigation. It is argued that Rule 5 does not contemplate rejection of an application on the ground that the court has no jurisdiction to try the suit and therefore the court could not have rejected the application.

    6. No doubt, Rule 5 does not contemplate rejection of an application on the ground that the suit would not be within the jurisdiction, pecuniary or otherwise of the court. However, it has to be pointed out that Rule 5 is not exhaustive of the circumstances under which an application could be rejected. We discuss how the reason for this view.

    7. It appears to us that an application for permission to sue as an indigent person is not an application pure and simple but a combination of such an application and plaint. Rule 2 clearly indicates that the application for permission to sue must contain the particulars required in regard to plaints in suits. Rule 8 states that when the application is granted it shall be numbered and registered and shall be deemed the plaint in the suit. The date of institution of the suit, if permission to sue as an indigent person is granted would be the date of institution of the application and not the date of registration of the application as the suit. These circumstances would normally indicate that application for permission to sue is not a pure and simple application but is a proceeding of composite nature that is composed of an application and the plaint. We are fortified in this view by a number of precedents.

    8. In Stuart Skinner alias Nawab Mirza v. William Orde (1878-80) ILR 2 All 241 Privy Council had to consider the question where in the case of a pauper application, pending enquiry into pauperism, applicant obtains funds and pays court-fee and thereupon the application is registered as plaint, whether the suit shall be deemed to have been instituted from the date when he filed the application and limitation runs against him only up to that time. The Privy Council answered question in the affirmative after analysing the provisions of C.P.C 1850, which contains provisions parallel to those in the present Code. In Vijai Pratap Singh v. Dukh Haran Nath Singh, AIR 1962 SC 941, the Supreme Court pointed out:

    “An application to sue in forma pauperis is but a method prescribed by the Code for institution of a suit by a pauper without payment of fee prescribed by the Court-Fees Act. If the claim made by the applicant that he is a pauper, is not established the application may fail ……………… The suit commences from the moment an application for permission to sue in forma pauperis as required by Order XXXIII is presented, and Order 1 Rule 10 would be as much applicable in such a suit as in a suit in which court-fee had been duly paid”.

    See also Chidambaram v. Nataraja Mudaliar, AIR 1939 Mad 80 Dhulipalla Brahamaramba v. Hulipalla Seetharamayya, AIR 1947 Mad 405, Jagadiswari Debi v. Tinkari Bibi, AIR 1936 Cal 28, Bank of Bihar Limited v. Ramachanderji Maharaj, AIR 1929 Pat 637, Totaram Ichharam Wani v. Dattu Mangu Wani, AIR 1943 Bom 143, Mahanth Jaikishun Dass… v. Ram Narain Das…Opposite Party., AIR 1939 Pat 385, and Raj Narain Sexana v. Bhim Sen, AIR 1966 All 84 (FB).

    9. Considering the logic of the reasoning which we have indicated above, we are, with great respect, unable to follow the decision in Nur Muhammed v. Maulvi Jamil Ahmad (1919) 52 Ind Cas 688 : (AIR 1919 All 213), or Mohammed Abbas Mallik v. Tahera Khatoon, AIR 1974 Pat 324.

    10. Section 141 of the C.P.C states that procedure provided in the Code in regard to suits shall be followed, as far as it can be made applicable, in all proceedings in any court of civil jurisdiction. The application for permission to sue as an indigent person under Order XXXIII, C.P.C is a proceeding in a court of civil jurisdiction and therefore procedure provided in the Code shall be followed in such applications. We have already indicated that Order XXXIII itself provides that the application for permission to sue as an indigent person shall contain all particulars required in a plaint and that application itself shall be deemed to be a plaint on permission being granted. The particulars to be contained in the plaint are those indicated in Rule 1 of Order VII. Rule 1 clause (f) requires that the plaint shall contain facts showing that the court has jurisdiction. Rule 10 states that subject to the provisions of Rule 10-A plaint shall at any stage of the suit be returned to be presented to the court in which it should have been instituted. In other words, on a consideration of the averments in the plaint regarding facts showing the court has jurisdiction it is open to the court at any stage and on being satisfied that it has no jurisdiction to return the plaint to be presented before proper court. The procedure prescribed in Rule 10 of Order VII would be applicable to the application for permission to sue.

    11. A learned single Judge of this court had occasion to consider the question in Pandara Mukundan v. Pandara Kumaran 1967 Ker LR 372. That was a case in which the trial court dismissed the application in respect of part of the claim and returned the application for presentation before proper court to enforce the relief in regard to another part of the claim. Learned single Judge observed after referring to the observations of the Supreme Court in AIR 1962 SC 941: The above decision is therefore an authority for the proposition that the provisions of Order 1, Rule 10, C.P.C can be applied to an application to sue as a pauper even before registering the same as a suit. On the same principle objections under Order 1 Rule 13 C.P.C on the ground of non-joinder or mis-joinder of parties or objections on the ground of mis-joinder of cause of action under Order 2, Rule 7, C.P.C can also be taken in respect of an application to file the suit in forma pauperis. Even though Order 33, Rule 5, C.P.C does not specifically deal with a ground relating to the pecuniary jurisdiction of the court to entertain an application to sue in forma pauperis, when such an objection is raised by the opposite party it is the duty of the court to deal with such an objection. We find no difficulty in agreeing with the above observation. We therefore hold that the court considering an application for permission to sue as an indigent person has jurisdiction to return the application for presentation before proper court on the ground that it lacks jurisdiction. The order impugned in this case though it purports to reject the application in fact passed an order returning the application.

    12. We now turn to the facts of the case. The averments in the application filed by the appellant show that the suit is for realisation of money arising out of a contract dated 14-8-1976. The contract was admittedly signed and entered into at Virajpet, Coorg in Karnataka State. It is not averred in the application that any of the promises was to be performed within the jurisdiction of the trial Court. It is also not averred that the respondents reside or conduct business within the jurisdiction of the trial court. There is also nothing to show that any part of the cause of action arose within the jurisdiction of that court. The only contention urged by the learned counsel for the appellant is that the preliminary negotiations were entered into in Karnataka State were confirmed at Trivandrum. We do not think that the preliminary negotiations would form part of the cause of action or determine the jurisdiction of the court. We therefore agree with the court below that it has no jurisdiction to try the application or suit.

    13. We therefore dismiss the appeal, but without costs. However, we indicate that the application to sue as an indigent person is not rejected, it is only returned to be presented before proper court. Time two months.

    Appeal dismissed.

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    Comments

    V. Sreedharan v. T.T Nanu And Another
    (Mar 5, 1987)