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  • Section 103-A of the Motor Vehicles Act. 1939 for short the Act, lays down:103-A. Transfer
  • sub-section (2) of section 103-A of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 that in sub-section (1)
  • clause (b) of sub-section (1) of section 95
  • SALE OF GOODS ACT
  • sub-section (1) of section 103-A,
  • sub-section (1) of section 96
  • sub-section (4) of section 95
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Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Attorney(S)
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Acts
  • Section 103-A of the Motor Vehicles Act. 1939 for short the Act, lays down:103-A. Transfer
  • sub-section (2) of section 103-A of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 that in sub-section (1)
  • clause (b) of sub-section (1) of section 95
  • SALE OF GOODS ACT
  • sub-section (1) of section 103-A,
  • sub-section (1) of section 96
  • sub-section (4) of section 95
Smart Summary

Structured Summary of the Court's Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

The appeals concern compensation claims arising from a motor accident involving car No. MDA 3353 on 10.10.1974 at about 9.00 p.m. near General Hospital Road, Kozhikode. Two injured persons, Thettan Alavikutty and P.K. Muhammed, instituted O.P. (MV) Nos. 197 and 203 of 1975 respectively before the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal, Kozhikode.

By judgment dated 18.11.1978 the Tribunal awarded in O.P. (MV) No. 197 of 1975 damages of Rs. 28,800 with interest at 6% per annum from the date of the petition, payable by respondents 1, 3 and 4 jointly and severally. In O.P. (MV) No. 203 of 1975 the Tribunal awarded Rs. 3,960 with interest at 6% per annum from the date of the petition, payable by respondents 1, 3 and 4 jointly and severally.

Parties before the Tribunal and on appeal: respondent 1 was the driver who drove the car; respondent 2 was the registered owner (in whose name the vehicle stood); respondent 3 was the person alleged to have acquired ownership by transfer; respondent 4 was the insurer with whom respondent 2 had insured the vehicle.

Aggrieved, the insurer (4th respondent in O.Ps) filed M.F.A. Nos. 111 and 116 of 1979. Respondents 1 and 3 filed M.F.A. Nos. 131 and 132 of 1979. The core dispute on appeal was limited to which of the parties (among those against whom the decree was passed) was liable to satisfy the Tribunal's awards.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether, when ownership of the insured vehicle had been transferred before the accident and the insurance certificate and policy were not transferred (nor deemed transferred) to the transferee under section 103-A of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939, the insurer remained liable to pay compensation awarded to third parties for injuries caused by that vehicle.
  2. How section 103-A(1) and (3) (transfer and deemed transfer of certificate of insurance and policy) operate as a condition precedent to insurer liability where intimation/application for transfer is involved and whether the 15-day deeming provision was satisfied.
  3. Whether the insurer's statutory obligation under section 96(1) of the Motor Vehicles Act to pay sums recoverable under a decree can be invoked where the policy had lapsed (by reason of transfer of ownership) and the certificate/policy had not been transferred or deemed transferred to the transferee.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant — the Insurance Company (M.F.A. Nos. 111 and 116 of 1979)

  • Contended that the registered owner (2nd respondent) had sold the car to the 3rd respondent on 30.9.1974, before the accident on 10.10.1974, and therefore the 2nd respondent (and the driver) could not claim under the certificate of insurance/policy in relation to a vehicle the insured had ceased to own.
  • Asserted that the insurer had not transferred the certificate of insurance and policy to the transferee (3rd respondent) and had not been given notice of transfer; therefore the insurer was not legally obliged to pay compensation for the accident involving the vehicle after ownership had passed to the 3rd respondent.
  • Argued that although the Tribunal accepted that ownership had passed to the 3rd respondent, it erred in nonetheless holding the insurance company liable, particularly since there was no evidence the 3rd respondent had insured the car with the company.

Appellants — respondents 1 and 3 in the original petitions (M.F.A. Nos. 131 and 132 of 1979)

  • Maintained that because the vehicle had been insured by the first appellant (the then owner) with the insurance company, the insurer was liable to pay the entire compensation awarded and the appellants (1 and 3) were under no legal obligation to pay the compensation themselves.
  • Argued (through counsel Mr. T.G. Rajendran) that pursuant to the sale note dated 30.9.1974, and an intimation given to the insurer on 5.10.1974, the insurer had been informed of the proposed transfer prior to the accident, and that the insurer should therefore be liable (including a contention that the transferee would be presumed to have insured with the company).

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
New Asiatic Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Pessumal Dhanamal Aswani, 1958-65 ACJ 559 (SC) That contractual conditions in an insurance policy (such as exclusions affecting a driver's right to indemnity) cannot defeat a third party's statutory right to recover from the insurer; insurer cannot evade third-party liability by relying on policy provisos restricting indemnity to the insured. The Court distinguished this Supreme Court decision as not applicable to the present facts. The Court held that New Asiatic did not establish that an insurer must pay where the policy had lapsed on transfer of ownership and the certificate/policy had not been transferred or deemed to have been transferred under section 103-A.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court analysed the statutory scheme of transfer of insurance under section 103-A of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 and the insurer's liability under section 96(1) of that Act.

On section 103-A(1): the Court explained that the deeming provision (that the certificate of insurance and the policy shall be deemed transferred to the transferee) operates only if the insurer, upon receipt of a prescribed-form application for transfer, does not intimate refusal to transfer within fifteen days. Thus the fictional/deeming transfer is conditional: the insurer must fail to intimate refusal within 15 days from receipt of the application. The condition precedent (application and insurer's non-refusal within 15 days) must be fulfilled before the deeming provision applies.

The Court emphasised that an insurance contract is personal; benefits under a policy cannot be unilaterally transferred while contingent. Transfer of ownership normally causes the policy to lapse unless the insurer agrees to accept the transferee as insured (novation). Section 103-A is intended to protect parties where an application/intimation has been given to the insurer and the insurer fails to refuse within the statutory period.

The Court placed the onus on the person claiming the benefit of transfer to prove that intimation/application had been given to the insurer and that the conditions of section 103-A(1) were satisfied. The Court rejected the contention that subsection (3) (refunding unexpired premium where insurer refuses) restricts the right to apply prior to transfer — subsection (3) deals with a different contingency (refund after actual transfer) and does not prohibit applying before transfer takes effect.

On the submission invoking section 96(1) that the insurer's liability is absolute, the Court accepted that section 96(1) imposes an obligation on the insurer to pay sums recoverable under decree in certain circumstances but held that section 96(1) does not expressly or by necessary implication impose such liability where the policy had already lapsed on transfer of ownership and had not been transferred or deemed transferred to the transferee. Thus the absolute liability under section 96(1) was not available to override the statutory requirements of section 103-A where those requirements were not met.

The Court considered the facts: by sale note dated 30.9.1974 (and applying provisions of the Sale of Goods Act), the 2nd respondent ceased to be owner from 30.9.1974. The accident occurred on 10.10.1974. Even if an application for transfer had been sent on 5.10.1974, the insurer had time until 20.10.1974 to refuse transfer; therefore mere application on 5.10.1974 did not by itself create insurer liability prior to the expiry of the 15-day period. On the date of the accident (10.10.1974) the certificate and policy had not been transferred to the 3rd respondent; thus neither the 2nd nor the 3rd respondent had a right to claim indemnity against the insurer for the accident.

The Court distinguished the New Asiatic decision, noting that it addressed a different question (that certain contractual provisos could not affect third-party rights) and did not lay down that an insurer must be held liable in circumstances where the insured had ceased to be owner and the certificate/policy had neither been transferred nor deemed transferred.

On the facts, the Court concluded that the appellants in M.F.A. Nos. 131 and 132 (respondents 1 and 3 in the original petitions) had failed to establish compliance with section 103-A; accordingly their appeals had to be dismissed. Conversely, the insurer-appellant in M.F.A. Nos. 111 and 116 was entitled to succeed because the statutory conditions for deeming transfer were not satisfied and the insurer was therefore not under obligation to pay the Tribunal's award.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The Court dismissed the appeals in M.F.A. Nos. 131 and 132 of 1979 and allowed the appeals in M.F.A. Nos. 111 and 116 of 1979. The Court modified the Tribunal's award so that the compensation awarded is to be paid by respondents 1 and 3 jointly and severally, and the 4th respondent (the insurance company) is under no obligation to pay those amounts. There are no orders as to costs in these appeals.

Implications:

  • Direct effect on the parties: Respondents 1 (driver) and 3 (transferee-owner) are made liable jointly and severally to pay the compensation awarded by the Tribunal; the insurer (4th respondent) is not liable to pay those amounts because the certificate of insurance and policy were neither transferred nor deemed to have been transferred under section 103-A at the time of the accident.
  • The decision rests on statutory interpretation of sections 103-A and 96(1) of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939, and on the factual finding that the statutory conditions for transfer (or deemed transfer) were not established. The opinion does not purport to create a broader novel precedent beyond the application of those statutory provisions to the facts of this case.

    New India Assurance Co. Ltd. And Others v. E.K Muhammed And Others

    The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

    Bhaskaran, A.C.J:— All these appeals have reference to the same cause of action; and are related to the claim for compensation arising out of the injuries sustained by two persons in a traffic accident involving the car No. MDA 3353, at 9.00 p.m on 10.10.1974 near the General Hospital Road, Kozhikode; and as such they were heard together, and are being disposed of by this common judgment. The injured persons, namely, Thettan Alavikutty, and P.K Muhammed, instituted O.P (MV) Nos. 197 and 203 of 1975 respectively on the file of the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal, Kozhikode. By the judgment dated 18.11.1978, the Tribunal awarded the injured-claimant in O.P (MV) No. 197 of 1975 a sum of Rs. 28,800/- by way of damages together with interest thereon at 6% per annum from the date of the petition till the date of payment made payable by respondents 1, 3 and 4 jointly and severally. In O.P (MV) No. 203 of 1975, the Tribunal allowed in favour of the petitioner therein a sum of Rs. 3,960/-; together with interest at 6% per annum, from the date of the petition till the date of payment made payable jointly and severally by respondents 1, 3 and 4. In both the O.Ps the first respondent is the driver, who drove the car, the 2nd respondent, the owner of the vehicle in whose name the registration of the vehicle stood, the 3rd respondent the person in whose name the ownership of the vehicle is alleged to have been transferred, and the 4th respondent, the insurer with whom the 2nd respondent had insured the vehicle.

    2. Aggrieved by the decision of the Tribunal, the 4th respondent-insurance company filed M.F.A Nos. 111 and 116 of 1979 against the decision in O.P (MV) No. 203 and 197 of 1975 respectively M.F.A Nos. 131 and 132 of 1979 have been filed by respondents 1 and 3 in O.P (MV) No. 197 and 203 of 1975. For the sake of convenience, reference to the parties would be as in the O.Ps The substance of the contentions in M.F.A Nos. 111 and 116 of 1979 is that the insurer was not liable to pay compensation for injuries resulting from accident involving a vehicle, of which the insured had ceased to be the owner, and the insurer had not transferred the certificate of insurance and policy to the transferee of the vehicle. The main contention raised by the appellants in M.F.A Nos. 131 and 132 of 1979 is that inasmuch as the vehicle had been insured by the first appellant with the insurance company (the appellant in the other appeals and the 4th respondent in the O.Ps), they are liable to pay the entire compensation as awarded by the Tribunal and the appellants in M.F.A Nos. 131 and 132 of 1979 were under no legal obligation to pay the compensation. There is no dispute regarding the quantum of the compensation awarded by the Tribunal. The only question, as already noticed, is among the three against whom the decree has been passed, who exactly are liable to pay the compensation awarded by the Tribunal.

    3. The counsel for the appellant in M.F.A Nos. 111 and 116 of 1979 submitted that the admitted fact is that the 2nd respondent (registered owner of the vehicle) had sold the car to the 3rd respondent on 30.9.1974, and, therefore, neither the first respondent (driver) nor the 2nd respondent (registered owner) was entitled to make any claim on the basis of the certificate of insurance and the policy described therein with respect to compensation arising out of accident involving that vehicle of which the 2nd respondent had ceased to be the owner; and the appellant (4th respondent) not having transferred the certificate of insurance and policy to the name of the 3rd respondent, the appellant-insurance company was not under any legal obligation to pay any compensation in respect of the accident involving that vehicle of which, by reason of transfer of ownership, the third respondent had become the owner but in whose favour the insurance company had not transferred the certificate of insurance or policy described therein. It was also pointed out that it was only on 10.10.1974 that the accident took place, whereas the transfer of the vehicle in favour of the third respondent had taken place as early as on 30.9.1974 The Tribunal had already entered the finding that the cause of the injury was the accident resulting from rash and negligent driving by the driver of the vehicle (1st respondent). In ground D it is specifically contended that the Tribunal should have held that there was no notice of transfer to the appellant prior to the date of the accident, and in ground B it is urged that after the termination of the insured's interest in the motor vehicle, the appellant insurance company was not liable to pay damages arising out of accident involving the vehicle. During the course of the arguments, the counsel for the appellant-insurance company contended before us that the Tribunal having accepted the case of the appellant that the ownership of the vehicle was transferred to the name of the 3rd respondent prior to the accident, and after having held that the 2nd respondent before the Tribunal had ceased to be the owner of the vehicle, the Tribunal erred in holding that the company was liable to pay the compensation and that there was no case or evidence that the 3rd respondent before the Tribunal had insured the car with the company. Mr. T.G Rajendran, the counsel for the appellants in M.F.A Nos. 131 and 132 of 1979 submitted that, pursuant to the sale note dated 30.9.1974, transferring the ownership of the car from the second respondent to the 3rd respondent on 5.10.1974 (before the accident took place on 10.10.1974) the intimation regarding the transfer was given to the 4th respondent and therefore, respondents 1 to 3 were not liable to pay the compensation as it was the liability of the 4th respondent with whom the 3rd respondent should be presumed to have insured the vehicle.

    4. The legal position, in our view, hardly admits of any doubt. Section 103-A of the Motor Vehicles Act. 1939 for short the Act, lays down:

    “103-A. Transfer of certificate of insurance.—(1) Where a person in whose favour the certificate of insurance has been issued in accordance with the provisions of this Chapter proposes to transfer to another person the ownership of the motor vehicle in respect of which such insurance was taken together with the policy of insurance relating thereto, he may apply in the prescribed form to the insurer for the transfer of the certificate of insurance and the policy described in the certificate in favour of the person to whom the motor vehicle is proposed to be transferred, and if within fifteen days of the receipt of such application by the insurer, the insurer has not intimated the insured and such other person, his refusal to transfer the certificate and the policy to the other person, the certificate of insurance and the policy described in the certificate shall be deemed to have been transferred in favour of the person to whom the motor vehicle is transferred with effect from the date of its transfer.”

    “(3) Where the insurer has refused to transfer, in favour of the person to whom the motor vehicle has been transferred, the certificate of insurance and the policy described in that certificate, he shall refund to such transferee the amount, if any, which, under the terms of the policy, he would have had to refund to the insured for the unexpired term of such policy.”

    5. From sub-section (1) of section 103-A, it is clear that the fictional transfer of the certificate of insurance and the policy described in the certificate taken by the transferor of a vehicle to the transferee thereof, could take effect only in cases where the insurer fails to give intimation of refusal to transfer the certificate of insurance and the policy mentioned therein to the transferee within 15 days of receipt of the application for transfer of the same in favour of the transferee. For this deeming provision to come into play, the condition precedent thereto should be fulfilled. A contract of insurance being contract of personal indemnity, the insured cannot transfer the benefits under the policy so long as such benefits are contingent. For that reason, the insurance policy in the name of one could not be transferred by him without the consent of the insurer. True, on the insured agreeing to such transfer, there would be a novation of the contract by which the original insured shall stand substituted by a new assured, the transferee to whom the policy has been transferred. Normally, the insurance policy lapses upon the transfer of ownership of the motor vehicle unless the insurance company agrees to accept the transferee as the insured in relation to the vehicle either at the instance of the transferor or at the instance of the transferee. It is to safeguard the interest of the parties to the transaction where the insured intends to transfer the ownership to another person, and intimation regarding the proposal for such transfer of the ownership is given to the insurer, and there is failure on the part of the insurer to give intimation regarding the refusal of the transfer for any of the reasons stated in sub-section (2) of section 103-A of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 that in sub-section (1) of that section, it is provided, ‘if within fifteen days of the receipt of such application by the insurer, the insurer has not intimated the insured and such other person, his refusal to transfer the certificate and the policy to the other person, the certificate of insurance and the policy described in the certificate shall be deemed to have been transferred in favour of the person to whom the motor vehicle is transferred with effect from the date of its transfer’.

    6. All the same, unless the requirements of such a fictional transfer of the certificate of insurance and the policy described therein are satisfied, it could not be heard to say that the transfer had taken effect. The onus of proving that the intimation to the insurer regarding the proposal to transfer the vehicle had been given is on the person (or persons) who claims the benefit arising out of the transfer of the certificate of insurance and the policy described therein. In fact, sub-section (1) of the section enables the insured to apply in the prescribed form to the insurer for the transfer of the certificate of insurance and the policy described therein in favour of the person to whom the motor vehicle is proposed to be transferred; and that would mean that even at the stage of the proposal, for the transfer of ownership of the vehicle, the insured is entitled to apply for the transfer of the certificate of insurance and the policy described therein in favour of the person to whom the ownership of the vehicle was proposed to be transferred.

    7. Mr. Rajendran drew our attention to the wording in sub-section (3) of the section, where the expression used is ‘the motor vehicle has been transferred’. It is his contention that the section contemplates intimation only after the transfer of ownership had taken effect as the expression used is ‘the motor vehicle has been transferred’. It has to be noted that expression has been used in a different context; with respect to the right of the insured to get refund of the amount, if any, which under the term of the policy, the insurer would have had to refund to the insured for the unexpired portion of such policy. That contingency would normally arise only where the transfer of ownership had already taken effect, and the insurer had refused to transfer the certificate of insurance and the policy described therein in favour of the person to whom the ownership of the vehicle had been transferred. It does not in any way restrict, much less prohibit, the right of the insured to apply for the transfer of the certificate of insurance and the policy described therein in favour of person to whom he proposed to transfer the ownership of the vehicle even before the transfer of ownership takes effect in terms of section 103-A(1) of the Act.

    8. It was next contended by Mr. Rajendran that the liability of the insurer under sub-section (1) of section 96 of the Act is absolute; and irrespective of the fact that due intimation regarding the transfer of the ownership of the vehicle was sent or not; or an application for the transfer of the certificate of insurance and the policy described therein was made or not; the insurer was bound to honour the commitment to pay compensation arising out of the accident involving vehicle with respect to which the policy had been taken by the insured. In support of this contention, he cited the decision of the Supreme Court in New Asiatic Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Pessumal Dhanamal Aswani, 1958-65 ACJ 559 (SC). On a careful consideration of the facts leading to the appeal to the Supreme Court, and the legal aspects which fell for decision of that Court, we find the dictum laid down therein is not applicable to the facts of the present case. That was a case in which ‘A’ insured his motor car against third party risk as required under Chapter VIII of the Act under a comprehensive policy; paragraph 3 of that policy was as under:

    “3…….The company will indemnify any driver who is driving the motor car on the insured's order or with his permission, provided that such driver (a) is not entitled to indemnity under any other policy.”

    9. A permitted one P. to drive his car; then it met with an accident resulting in the death of a person and injuries to another. In suits by the persons affected by the accident against P. who also owned a motor car and had insured it under a similar comprehensive policy indemnifying him (P) while driving any other motor car, it was contended by the insurance company that by reason of proviso (a) to para 3, P. could not be said to be insured under A's policy. Repelling the contentions of the insurance company, the Supreme Court held that the proviso was not really a classification of drivers but is a restriction on the right of the driver to recover any damages he had to pay, from the company; the driver who could get indemnity from any other company under any other policy, was under this contractual term, not to get indemnity from the company; the proviso thus affected the question of indemnity between a particular driver and the company and had nothing to do with the liability which the driver had incurred to the third party for the injuries caused to it. In paragraph 22 of the decision, at page 566, the Supreme Court observed;

    “22. Thus the contract between the insured and the company may not provide for all the liabilities which the company has to undertake vis-a-vis the third parties, in view of the provisions of the Act. We are of opinion that once the company had undertaken liability to third parties incurred by the persons specified in the policy, the third parties' right to recover any amount under or by virtue of the provisions of the Act is not affected by any condition in the policy. Considering this aspect of the terms of the policy, it is reasonable to conclude that proviso (a) of para 3 of section II is a mere condition affecting the rights of the insured who effected the policy and the persons to whom the cover of the policy was extended by the company, and does not, come in the way of third parties' claim against the company on account of its claim against a person specified in para 3 as one to whom cover of the policy was extended.”

    10. In short, what the Supreme Court highlighted in the decision was that the insurance company could not evade its liability taking shelter under the proviso to a certain clause in the policy, which restricted the right of the driver to recover damages he had to pay, from the company. We do not understand that decision as one laying down a principle that where the insured ceased to be the owner of the vehicle, with reference to which the certificate of insurance and the policy described therein was issued, and the policy was not transferred or deemed to have been transferred to another person, the insurer-company could be held liable to pay the compensation arising out of the injuries resulting from the accident involving the vehicle in question.

    11. Moreover, assuming that in this case the 3rd respondent (the insured who ceased to be the owner of the vehicle) had sent the application for transfer under section 103-A on 5.10.1974, that by itself would not create any liability to pay compensation with respect to that vehicle on the part of the insurance company, which had time till 20.10.74 to effect or refuse to transfer the certificate of insurance and policy described therein to the name of the 3rd respondent (transferee). By the application of the provisions of the Sale of Goods Act the 2nd respondent had ceased to be the owner of the vehicle from 30.9.1974 when he passed the sale note in favour of the 3rd respondent. With the transfer of ownership of the vehicle, the transfer of the certificate of insurance and policy described therein, which is a matter governed by the provisions of the Act does not take place automatically. On 10.10.1974, on which date the accident involving the vehicle took place, the transfer of the certificate of insurance and the policy described therein, not having been transferred to the name of the 3rd respondent (transferee of the vehicle) neither the 2nd respondent nor the 3rd respondent had the right to claim indemnity against damages arising out of accident involving the vehicle in question.

    12. For a better appreciation of the legal position taken by Mr. Rajendran we would extract sub-section (1) of section 96 of the Act:

    “If, after a certificate of insurance has been issued under sub-section (4) of section 95 in favour of the person by whom a policy has been effected, judgment in respect of any such liability as is required to be covered by a policy under clause (b) of sub-section (1) of section 95 (being a liability covered by the terms of the policy) is obtained against any person insured by the policy, then, notwithstanding, that the insurer may be entitled to avoid or cancel, or may have avoided or cancelled the policy, the insurer shall, subject to the provisions of this section, pay to the person entitled to the benefit of the decree any sum not exceeding the sum assured payable thereunder, as if he were the judgment-debtor, in respect of the liability, together with any amount payable in respect of costs and any sum payable in respect of interest on that sum by virtue of any enactment relating to interest on judgment.”

    13. No doubt, the liability cast on the insurer to pay the compensation awarded to the beneficiary of the decree is absolute. It does not, however, expressly or by necessary implication state that there is such liability on the part of the insurer in the case of the policy that had already lapsed, as in the present case, on account of the transfer of the ownership of the vehicle by the insured, in whose name the policy stood, to another person in whose favour the policy had not been transferred and could not be deemed to have been transferred. This contention also, therefore, fails. The insured and the transferee of the vehicle having failed to establish that the insured had applied in the prescribed form to the insurer for the transfer of the policy; or that after receipt of such an application had either transferred the certificate of insurance and the policy relating to that to the name of the transferee; or that within fifteen days from the date of the receipt of such application for transfer, the insurer had failed to intimate the insured and the transferee his refusal to transfer the certificate of insurance and the policy, the appellants in M.F.A No. 131 and 132 of 1979 could not succeed. Their appeals have therefore to be dismissed; and we do so, without any orders as to costs. For the same reason, the appellant in M.F.A Nos. 111 and 116 of 1979 is entitled to succeed; and we allow these appeals modifying the judgment (award) under appeal holding that the compensation awarded is made payable by respondents 1 and 3 jointly and severally, and that the 4th respondent insurance company is under no obligation to pay that amount to the petitioners in the original petitions. There will be no orders as to costs in these appeals also.

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    Comments

    New India Assurance Co. Ltd. And Others v. E.K Muhammed And Others
    (Jul 27, 1984)