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  • provisions contained in Sec. 230 of the Kerala Municipal Corporations Act, 1961, for short, the Act.
  • Act. S. 230, sub-sec. (1)
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  • provisions contained in Sec. 230 of the Kerala Municipal Corporations Act, 1961, for short, the Act.
  • Act. S. 230, sub-sec. (1)
Smart Summary

Case Summary — Opinion by Khalid, J.

Factual and Procedural Background

The appeal challenges an order of a learned Judge in C.M.P. No. 7907 of 1980 in O.P. No. 1176 of 1980-F. The appellants are the Corporation of Cochin and its Town Planning Officer; the respondent is the petitioner in the original proceeding.

Facts (brief): The respondent erected a milk booth on the footpath by Subhash Park without Corporation permission. After being asked to remove it, he obtained a stay from the Government and thereafter the Government directed him to shift the booth with Corporation permission. The respondent applied on 12-9-1977, offering to erect the booth in front of the Corporation office and proposed that it “will cover the open gutter, the area behind the gutter and a portion of land owned by the K.S.R.T.C”; the respondent said he would obtain formal K.S.R.T.C. sanction. The Corporation sanctioned the proposal by Ext. P-3 dated 17-2-1978 with a site-plan annexed as Ext. R-2, the sanction showing the booth was to cover only the gutter and the land behind it.

Instead of complying with Ext. P-3, the respondent continued unlawful occupation of the earlier booth and then constructed a new booth over the gutter and covering three-fourths of the footpath — contrary to Ext. R-2, the sanction Ext. P-3 and the earlier court direction (judgment dated 18-4-1980 in O.P. No. 1178/1176 series) that he shift to the Ext. P-3 site within two months.

On 2-6-1980 Corporation officers observed construction on the footpath in contravention of the sanction and removed the structure after a short notice and demands to desist were not complied with. The respondent filed a C.M.P. praying for repair of damage, restoration of the kiosk, and action for violation of the Court's judgment. The learned Judge accepted the respondent's contention that the demolition violated provisions of Section 230 of the Kerala Municipal Corporations Act, 1961, and ordered the Corporation to carry out repairs and to allow the petitioner to install the booth at the Ext. P-3 location. That order is the subject of the present writ appeal.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether Section 263 of the Kerala Municipal Corporations Act applies to the facts of this case (i.e., whether the procedural requirements in S.263 were required where the alleged encroachment was on property vested in the Corporation rather than on private property).
  2. Whether the Commissioner (and through him the Corporation) had jurisdiction and power under Section 230 read with Section 406 of the Act to remove or demolish the unauthorised structure placed on a street or public place vested in the Corporation.
  3. Whether the petitioner’s remedy by miscellaneous petition (C.M.P.) was maintainable for the relief claimed, or whether an independent Original Petition (O.P.) was required.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellants' Arguments

  • The C.M.P. was not maintainable; the petitioner should have filed an independent Original Petition (O.P.) because the relief sought in the C.M.P. was based on an independent cause of action and not ancillary to the earlier judgment.
  • The action of the Corporation in demolishing the booth was justified because the Commissioner had the requisite powers under Section 406 of the Kerala Municipal Corporations Act to execute work in default; in any event the combined operation of Section 230(1) and Section 406 authorized removal of the encroachment after giving reasonable time.
  • Section 263 (powers of the Commissioner under Chapter X dealing with building regulations) has no application because those provisions govern constructions on private property; the booth was on property vested in the Corporation and therefore Chapter IX (streets and encroachments) controls.

Respondent's (Petitioner's) Arguments

  • The demolition by Corporation employees violated the provisions of Section 230 of the Kerala Municipal Corporations Act, 1961 and was therefore improper.
  • The petitioner sought restoration of the booth and damages and relied on the Court’s earlier direction (judgment dated 18-4-1980) that he be allowed to shift the booth to the place indicated in Ext. P-3; the demolition prevented that relief and thus contravened the earlier order.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
State of Kerala v. Govindan Nair (referred to as 1980 Ker LT 186) Authority for the proposition that a miscellaneous petition should not be used to set aside or challenge substantial orders and that substantial relief of the kind sought ought to be sought by a properly framed Original Petition; the Division Bench cautioned against permitting numerous miscellaneous petitions to grant substantial relief. The Court relied on this decision to support the view that the present C.M.P. was improper where the complaint related to an independent action unconnected with the direction contained in the original judgment; accordingly the Court sustained the objection that a miscellaneous petition was incompetent in these circumstances.
Judgment of this Court in O.P. No. 6002 of 1981 (and connected petitions) Principle stated in that judgment: the Corporation does not have power to grant lands vested in it to strangers except for the purposes mentioned in the Act. The Court observed that this subsequent decision may prevent the Corporation from permitting the petitioner to put up the milk booth at the Ext. R-2 location; for this reason the Court recorded counsel's agreement that an alternative poromboke site near the Law College would be made available to the petitioner as expedient.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court proceeded in stages, addressing first the statutory provisions and then the procedural question of maintainability.

1. On the question whether Section 263 applied: The Court noted the statutory architecture — Chapter IX of the Act (ss. 228–235) deals with "streets" and encroachment on streets (including Section 230), while Section 263 appears in Chapter X (building regulations) under the heading "powers of commissioner." The Court accepted the appellants' submission that Chapter X (and Section 263) primarily addresses construction on private property, whereas Chapter IX addresses property vested in the Corporation. Since the booth was on property vested in the Corporation (a street/public place), Section 263 was not applicable. Consequently, the learned Judge's reliance on Section 263 to fault the Corporation's action was held to be erroneous.

2. On the question whether the Commissioner had power to remove the encroachment: The Court examined Section 230(1), which empowers the Commissioner to require an owner or occupier to remove encroachments in or over any street or public place vested in the Corporation. Although Section 230 does not itself prescribe an enforcement procedure, Section 406 provides a general enforcement mechanism: after reasonable time is given for compliance with a notice or order, the Commissioner may cause the work to be executed or take such measures as necessary to give effect to the notice or order. The Court held that a combined reading of Section 230(1) and Section 406 supplies sufficient power to the Commissioner to remove the encroachment and to enforce compliance, and thus the demolition was within the statutory powers and not beyond jurisdiction.

3. On the maintainability of the C.M.P.: The appellants argued that the C.M.P. was not the proper procedure because the relief claimed arose out of an independent action (the demolition of the unapproved booth) and was not ancillary to the earlier judgment of 18-4-1980. The Court scrutinised the earlier decision relied upon (State of Kerala v. Govindan Nair, 1980 Ker LT 186) and observed that the demolition here resulted from the petitioner's construction contrary to Ext. P-3 and Ext. R-2; the subsequent complaint therefore related to an independent action unconnected with the direction in the original O.P. The Court concluded that the learned Judge below did not sufficiently consider the objection on merits and that the present petition was seeking relief outside and independent of the earlier judgment; in such circumstances a miscellaneous petition was inappropriate and the relief should properly have been sought by a separate Original Petition.

4. Practical consequence noted by the Court: The Court further observed that even if the respondent were permitted to reinstall at the Ext. R-2 site, a later judgment (O.P. No. 6002 of 1981) restricted the Corporation’s power to grant lands vested in it to strangers except for statutory purposes, potentially precluding such permission. On being informed of this predicament, counsel for the Corporation agreed to provide an alternative poromboke site near the Law College, and the Court recorded that agreement and expressed expectation of expeditious allotment.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The Court allowed the writ appeal. The Court set aside the order passed in the C.M.P. and directed that the parties bear their respective costs. In the Court's words, the appeal was "allowed" and the order in C.M.P. No. 7987 of 1980 was set aside.

Core Ruling: The judgment below directing restoration/repairs and enforcement in favour of the petitioner by way of the C.M.P was set aside on the grounds that (a) Section 263 did not apply to encroachments on Corporation-vested property and therefore could not be used to fault the Corporation's action; (b) Section 230 read with Section 406 provided the Commissioner with power to remove encroachments after reasonable notice; and (c) the relief claimed was by way of an independent cause of action and so a miscellaneous petition was an improper remedy — an Original Petition should have been filed.

Implications:

  • The direct effect on the parties is that the order in the C.M.P. in favour of the respondent is vacated; the respondent's remedy should have been pursued by an Original Petition rather than a miscellaneous petition.
  • The Court recognised a practical constraint arising from a later judgment (O.P. No. 6002 of 1981) limiting the Corporation's power to allot vested lands to strangers; the Court recorded the Corporation’s undertaking to offer an alternative poromboke site near the Law College and urged expeditious allotment.
  • The opinion does not purport to create any broader new legal principle beyond its statutory interpretation and the application of existing authorities; the Court principally applied existing statutory provisions and precedent to the facts before it. The decision's immediate consequence is confined to the setting aside of the C.M.P. order and the direction to approach appropriate procedure (O.P.) for substantive relief.
Appeal allowed.

    Corporation Of Cochin And Another v. K. Janardhanan .

    Khalid, J.:— This appeal is directed against the order of a learned Judge of this Court in C.M.P No. 7907 of 1980 in O.P No. 1176 of 1980-F. The appellants are the Corporation of Cochin and its Town planning Officer and the respondent, the petitioner in the O.P

    2. The facts of the case, in brief, are as follows. The respondent erected a milk booth for the purpose of carrying on milk trade on the footpath by the side of Subhash Park without obtaining any permission from the Corporation. When he was asked to dismantle and remove the same, he moved the Government and obtained a stay of the proceedings by the Corporation. Thereafter the Government passed orders asking him to shift the booth to another convenient place with the permission of the Corporation. He then made an application on 12-9-1977 offering to erect the booth in front of the Corporation office and inter alia proposed that the booth “will cover the open gutter, the area behind the gutter and a portion of land owned by the K.S.R.T.C”. He also stated that he will obtain the formal sanction from K.S.R.T.C at an early date. This was sanctioned by the Corporation by Ext. P-3 order dt. 17-2-1978 with which was annexed a site-plan produced as Ext. R2. The proposed booth was to cover only the gutter and the land behind as offered in his application. The respondent however did not avail himself of the sanction and continued his unlawful occupation of the booth erected by him. The Corporation then issued a notice to him to remove the booth. Thereupon he filed the O.P and obtained a stay of the proceedings of the Corporation. The O.P was disposed of by the learned Judge as follow? by his judgment dt. 18-4-1980:—

    “Having gone through the records and having heard the counsel for the petitioner and the counsel for the Corporation, I am satisfied that the ends of justice would be met if a direction is given to the respondents to allow the petitioner to shift his milk booth to the place suggested in Ext. P-3 notice TP6/16342/77 dated 17-2-78. The petitioner is directed to see that the shifting is completed within two months from this date. I am sure the respondents will also extend their co-operation for the petitioner obtaining electric connection and other facilities.”

    3. Instead of shifting the booth to the site in Ext. P3 as directed by the judgment he constructed the booth above the gutter and on the footpath by which 3/4th of the footpath was covered, in clear violation of the proposal in Ext. R1, the sanction granted under Ext. P3 and the direction in the judgment. On 2-6-1980 it was brought to the notice of the Assistant Town Planning Officer that the booth was being constructed on the footpath, and in contravention of the sanction, opposite to the Corporation office. Thereupon, the Assistant Town Planning Officer gave notice to persons who were carrying on the construction to desist from further construction and to remove the unlawful structure within an hour. As this was not complied with, the Corporation removed the unlawfully erected structure. Then the petitioner moved, this Court by the C.M.P praying that the damage done to him may be repaired, his Milma Kiosk may be directed to be restored to its original place and for appropriate action for violating this Court's judgment. The respondent alleged that on the morning of 2-6-1980, the respondent's salesman opened the booth by about 9.00 A.M Immediately thereafter 7 or 8 employees of the Corporation came in a van belonging to the Corporation asked the salesman to keep away from the booth and started demolishing the booth. The salesman pleaded with the men not to demolish the booth. But he was driven away by the Corporation employees. The case put forward before the learned Judge was that the demolition of the booth was in violation of the provisions contained in Sec. 230 of the Kerala Municipal Corporations Act, 1961, for short, the Act. The learned Judge accepted this plea and directed the Corporation to carry out the repairs asked for within a week from the date of the order, and required the petitioner to instal the booth if he chose to do so in the place indicated in Ext. P3 order. It is this order that is challenged before us in this writ petition.

    4. The objection to the application before the learned Judge was two fold: (1) the petitioner should have filed an independent O.P and not a C.M.P, and (2) the action of the Corporation was justified since the Commissioner had the requisite powers to demolish the unauthorised construction u/s. 406 of the Act. The learned Judge held against the plea regarding the maintainability of the C.M.P observing that relief cannot be denied to the petitioner on such a technical ground. According to the learned Judge, the procedure in such cases is laid down in S. 263 of the Act and since that procedure was not complied with, the petitioner was entitled to succeed.

    5. The learned counsel for the appellants submits that the learned Judge was in error in holding that S. 263 applied to the facts of the case. According to him, S. 263 has no application to the case. The case is governed by S. 230 read with S. 406. We will now examine the correctness of the submissions.

    6. Section 230 is in Chapter IX of the Act, which deals with “streets”. Ss. 228 to 235 come under the sub-heading “encroachment on streets”. S. 263 is in Chap. X, dealing with building regulations. S. 263 is under the heading “powers of commissioner”. What is contended is that the provisions contained in Chap. X deal with construction of buildings on private properties while Chap. IX deals with properties which have vested in the Corporation. As a corollary to this submission, it is contended that the procedure laid down in S. 263, which mandates the issuance of a provisional order on the owner or the builder to demolish the work done, need be complied with only if the structure involved is situated on a private property Since admittedly the booth in question was not on private property but on a property which had vested in the Corporation, S. 263 and the procedure laid down therein are not applicable. In our view, this submission is well founded, and has to be accepted. With great respect, the reliance placed by the learned Judge on S. 263 of the Act, to fault the action of the Corporation and to give the direction contained in the order under appeal cannot be justified.

    7. Now we will examine the case put forward u/s. 230 of the Act. S. 230, sub-sec. (1) reads as follows:

    “230 Removal of encroachment. — (1) The Commissioner may by notice require the owner or occupier of any premise to remove or alter any projection, encroachment, or obstruction (other than a door, gate, bar, or ground-floor window) situated against or in front of such premises and in or over any street or any public place the control of which is vested in the Corporation.”

    It is true that the section does not provide for the procedure to be adopted by the Commissioner for removal of encroachment. According to the learned counsel for the appellants, this power is provided in S. 406 of the Act, which, according to him, is a general power given to the Commissioner to execute any work in default. S. 406 reads as follows:

    “406. Time for complying with order and power to enforce in default:— (1) Whenever by any notice, requisition, or order under this Act or under any rule, bye-law or regulation made under it any person is required to execute any work or to take any measures or do anything, a reasonable time shall be named in such notice, requisition or order within which the work shall be executed, the measure taken or the thing done.

    (2) If such notice, requisition or order is not complied with within the time so named, then whether or not a fine is provided for such default and whether or not the person in default is liable to punishment or has been prosecuted or sentenced to any punishment for such default, the Commissioner may cause such work to be executed, or may take any measures or do anything which may, in his opinion, be necessary for giving due effect to the notice, requisition or order as aforesaid.

    (3) If no penalty has been specially provided in this Act for failure to comply with such notice, the said person shall, on conviction be punished with fine not exceeding fifty rupees for such offence.”

    We find that this contention also has to be upheld. A combined reading of S. 230(1) and S. 406 makes it clear that the Commissioner has enough powers to execute any work or to take any measure after giving reasonable time to the defaulter to do the same. Therefore, the case that Section 230 cannot be made use of for the purpose of removal of encroachment in question for want of powers with the Commissioner cannot be sustained. According to the appellants' counsel, the nature of the construction being one which needed immediate action, a short notice alone was given. The action of the appellants under these circumstances was well within the powers u/s. 406 and cannot be said to be one without jurisdiction. The contention that the action of the Commissioner was in excess of the powers cannot be accepted.

    8. The learned counsel for the appellants raised an additional plea that interlocutory application filed was not maintainable since it was based on an independent cause of action and was not ancillary to the judgment rendered on 18-4-1980 and that the petitioner should have filed a separate O.P In support of this submission, reliance was placed on the decision reported in State Of Kerala v. Govindan Nair 186) before the learned Judge and before us. The learned Judge after noticing this decision observed,

    “On the facts and in the circumstances of the case, I do not think that this Court would be justified in declining to enforce the directions contained in the consensual judgment, without doing violence to their true spirit, on a technical plea in the nature of one raised by the respondents.”

    With great respect, we find that the learned Judge did not consider the objection raised on this judgment on merits in detail. The judgment in O.P No. 1178 of 1980-F dated 18th April, 1980 gave a direction to the appellants to allow the petitioner to shift his milk booth to the place suggested in Ext. P-3. The subsequent action, taken by the appellants, which formed the subject matter of the C.M.P, was as a sequel to the construction by the petitioner of a building contrary to Ext. P-3 and against the details contained in Ext. R-2 sketch. The demolition was as a result of this unauthorised construction. The petitioner in the C.M.P therefore complained of an independent action unconnected with the direction given in the judgment in O.P No. 1178 of 1980. Under these circumstances, it may not be proper to hold that the Corporation was putting forward a technical plea that the C.M.P was not maintainable.

    9. In 1980 Ker LT 186, the direction originally given read as follows:

    “For the reasons given earlier, I quash Ext. P7 and direct the Director of Public Instructions to pass a proper order in accordance with law on the petitioner's application. Certainly he will have to take into consideration the position of law in regard to Ext. P-3 and R. 2 of Chap. XXVI K.E.R which has been indicated above. The O.P is disposed of in the above terms. There will be no order as to costs.”

    The Director of Public Instructions passed an order Ext. A2, pursuant to this direction. With that order, the petitioner in the O.P was not satisfied. He filed a C.M.P praying for a direction to pass fresh orders which in effect and substance amounted to a prayer to quash Ext. A-2. The learned single Judge quashed Ext. A2 by his order in the miscellaneous petition. The State took the matter in appeal. The order was set aside in appeal. The Division Bench assumed for the purpose of the appeal that Ext. A2 was passed in violation of the judgment is the O.P and still posed the question whether the subsequent order could be set aside on a mere C.M.P for direction, and answered it against the petitioner. The prayer asked for was not granted in that case for the reason that to grant the said prayer would be to flood this Court with miscellaneous petitions claiming substantial relief. The petition in that case was thus dismissed holding that the petitioner should have moved the Court by an independent O.P Similar is the case before us, if not stronger. The present complaint is not against any violation of the direction contained in the judgment in the O.P The present petition is to direct the Corporation to do something outside the direction contained in the original judgment. The violation complained of has nothing to do with the direction contained in the judgment in O.P No. 1178 of 1980-F, but is an independent action unconnected with the judgment. We, therefore, sustain the objection that a miscellaneous petition is incompetent and that the relief claimed should have been in a properly framed original petition.

    10. In the result, we allow this writ appeal and set aside the order passed in C.M.P No. 7987 of 1980.

    11. It is the admitted case that the respondent was permitted to put up his milk booth in accordance with Ext. P-3 Order and Ext. R-2 sketch. It is submitted by the appellants' counsel that on account of certain subsequent developments, the Corporation is now helpless to permit the respondent from putting up the milk booth in the spot indicated in the sketch. The new development mentioned is the judgment rendered by this Court in O.P No. 6002 of 1981 and connected petitions in which it has been held that the Corporation does not have powers to grant lands vasted in it to strangers, except for the purposes mentioned in the Act. If the petitioner is now permitted to put up a milk booth in the place noted in Ext. R-2 sketch, that would amount to going against the judgment mentioned above. Under these circumstances, the learned counsel for the respondent made a fervent plea to give appropriate directions to the Corporation to rescue the respondent from this predicament. According to him alternative site is available in poromboke land near the Law College, the allotment of which was at one stage requested for by the respondent. When we put this request to the learned counsel for the appellant-Corporation, he agreed that the Corporation would grant to the petitioner such alternative site in the poromboke land, near the plot in question, as is expedient for the Corporation. This submission is recorded. We hope that the allotment of the land as agreed would be made as expeditiously as possible.

    12. We allow this writ appeal and direct the parties to bear their costs.

    Appeal allowed.

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    Corporation Of Cochin And Another v. K. Janardhanan .
    (Jan 12, 1982)