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Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Attorney(S)
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Acts
  • sub-section (1) of S. 145 and under sub-section (1) of S. 146
  • sub-section (4) of S. 144 Crl. P.C,
  • sub-section (1) of's 146 Cr. P.C
  • sub-section (1) of S. 146.6.
  • sub-section (1) of S. 145.7.
  • sub-section (1) of S. 146
  • sub-section (1) of S. 145,
  • sub-section (5) of S. 144
  • sub-section (1) of S. 144
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Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Attorney(S)
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  • sub-section (1) of S. 145 and under sub-section (1) of S. 146
  • sub-section (4) of S. 144 Crl. P.C,
  • sub-section (1) of's 146 Cr. P.C
  • sub-section (1) of S. 146.6.
  • sub-section (1) of S. 145.7.
  • sub-section (1) of S. 146
  • sub-section (1) of S. 145,
  • sub-section (5) of S. 144
  • sub-section (1) of S. 144
Smart Summary

Structured Summary of the Provided Legal Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

The matter arises from a revision petition (Crl. R.P No. 165 of 1981) filed by the B party in M.C. No. 14/81 before the Sub Divisional Magistrate, Parinthalmanna. The revision challenges a composite order dated 4-4-1981 under Sections 145(1) and 146(1) of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973. The Magistrate, relying on credible information conveyed by the Circle Inspector of Police, Malapuram through the Deputy Superintendent of Police, Tirur, concluded there was a serious likelihood of breach of the peace concerning the property in R.S. No. 196/1A of Cherukavu Amsom and Village. The Magistrate directed the A and B parties to attend court on 9-4-81 to put in written statements, documents and adduce evidence to establish possession. The order also contained a clause (challenged in revision) attaching the property under S.146(1) and placing it in charge of the Village Officer, Cherukavu.

On admission of the revision petition, the attachment portion of the Magistrate's order was stayed by this Court in Crl. M.P No. 378 of 1981 and has not taken effect.

Separately, another revision (Crl. R.P 207 of 1981) challenges the Magistrate's rejection of an application under S.144(5) Cr. P.C. The Magistrate had earlier passed a prohibitory order under S.144(1) on 4-4-81 (preventing the public from entering land in Sy. No. 196/18 of Cherukavu Amsom), which was extended by Government under the proviso to S.144(4) and remains in force. The petitioners claiming possession of R.S. No. 196/1-B sought rescission under S.144(5), but the Magistrate rejected the application.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether a composite order that simultaneously initiates proceedings under Section 145(1) Cr. P.C. and attaches the subject of dispute under Section 146(1) Cr. P.C. can be sustained in law.
  2. Whether the Magistrate erred in rejecting an application under Section 144(5) Cr. P.C. to rescind a prohibitory order made under Section 144(1), where the prohibitory order had been extended by the Government under the proviso to Section 144(4).

Arguments of the Parties

The opinion does not contain a detailed account of the parties' legal arguments.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Lilly Franklin v. Wilson (1977 KLT 871) Held that a composite order initiating S.145(1) proceedings and simultaneously attaching the subject under S.146(1) is not warranted; S.146(1) contemplates attachment only after making the preliminary order under S.145(1). The Court cited Janaki Amma, J.'s reasoning in this case to support the proposition that the words "after making the order" in S.146(1) require the preliminary order under S.145(1) to precede any order of attachment, and that simultaneous exercise is not contemplated.
Bapputty v. Kayyu (1979 KLT 143) Followed the Supreme Court in Chandu Naik's case and held that the proposition that a Magistrate ceases to have jurisdiction to proceed with the enquiry once an attachment under S.146(1) is made is not correct; Magistrate retains jurisdiction to proceed with S.145 enquiry after attachment. The Court relied on this decision to clarify that Lilly Franklin's part-dictum — that attachment makes the order final and ends the Magistrate's enquiry — was overruled on that point; but the part of Lilly Franklin holding that a composite order is impermissible was not overruled by Bapputty.
Chandu Naik's case (1978 SCC (Cri) 100) Supreme Court authority used to support the view in Bapputty that the Magistrate does not lose jurisdiction to continue S.145 proceedings merely because an attachment under S.146(1) has been effected. Cited (via Bapputty) to show that the view that attachment renders the Magistrate's enquiry final was not sustained by higher authority and therefore that point in Lilly Franklin could not be treated as good law.
Mathuralal v. Bhanwarlal ((1979) 4 SCC 665 : AIR 1980 S.C. 242) Stated that making a preliminary order under S.145(1) is basic and essential; the Magistrate assumes jurisdiction to proceed under Ss. 145 and 146 only by making the preliminary order; attachment under S.146(1) may follow only after such preliminary order. This Supreme Court statement was applied as authoritative support for the proposition that an order of attachment under S.146(1) can be lawfully passed only after the preliminary order under S.145(1) has been made; it underpins the conclusion that the attachment portion of the impugned order lacked jurisdiction.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court's analysis proceeds from a close reading of Section 146(1) Cr. P.C. and the statutory requirement that an order under S.146(1) can be passed only after a preliminary order under S.145(1) has been made. The Court explicitly quotes S.146(1), which provides that "If the Magistrate at any time after making the order under sub-section (1) of S.145 considers the case to be one of emergency ..." he may attach the subject of dispute.

The Court reasons as follows:

  • Section 146(1) contains three discrete situations in which attachment is permitted, and each arises only "after making the order under sub-section (1) of S.145". Thus the statutory phrasing contemplates sequence: the preliminary order under S.145(1) must be complete before a S.146(1) attachment can be considered.
  • The Court reviews Lilly Franklin v. Wilson, where the High Court observed that a composite order simultaneously initiating S.145 proceedings and attaching property under S.146(1) is not warranted by the statute because S.146(1) begins with the words "If the Magistrate at any time after making the order under sub-section (1) of S.145". The Lilly Franklin view emphasized that the order under S.145(1) becomes complete only when signed, and only thereafter may the Magistrate consider attachment in appropriate cases.
  • The Court notes that a later Division Bench decision in Bapputty v. Kayyu (following the Supreme Court in Chandu Naik's case) disagreed with Lilly Franklin on a distinct point — namely that an attachment under S.146(1) does not necessarily oust the Magistrate's jurisdiction to proceed with the S.145 enquiry. The part of Lilly Franklin holding that attachment makes the proceedings final was thus disapproved; however, Lilly Franklin's conclusion that a composite order initiating S.145(1) and simultaneously attaching under S.146(1) is beyond jurisdiction remains intact.
  • The Court relies on the Supreme Court's statement in Mathuralal v. Bhanwarlal that a preliminary order is "basic" to S.145 proceedings and that failure to draw up such an order vitiates subsequent proceedings. From this authority the Court reaffirms that jurisdiction to pass an attachment under S.146(1) arises only after the preliminary order under S.145(1) has been made.
  • Applying these authorities to the facts, the Court finds that the impugned order dated 4-4-81 is valid insofar as it constitutes a preliminary order under S.145(1), but the subsequent part of that same order purporting to place the disputed property under attachment under S.146(1) was issued without jurisdiction and cannot be sustained.

Holding and Implications

Core Holding: The Court held that a composite order which purports simultaneously to initiate proceedings under Section 145(1) and to attach the subject of dispute under Section 146(1) is not sustainable: the Magistrate may pass an order of attachment under Section 146(1) only after a preliminary order under Section 145(1) has been made. Consequently, the part of the Magistrate's order dated 4-4-81 that effected attachment under S.146(1) was without jurisdiction and was set aside.

Disposition and direct consequences:

  • Crl. R.P No. 166 of 1981 (as reported in the opinion) was allowed in part: the order of attachment under S.146(1) was set aside; the revision was dismissed in other respects.
  • The Magistrate was directed to proceed with and dispose of the proceedings under S.145 Cr. P.C. within three months after the receipt of records in his court. The Court noted that this judgment does not preclude the Magistrate, if occasion arises after making the preliminary order, from passing appropriate orders under S.146(1) thereafter.
  • In respect of Crl. R.P 207 of 1981 (challenge to the rejection of an application under S.144(5)), the revision was dismissed. The Court concluded that where a prohibitory S.144(1) order has been validly passed and extended by Government under the proviso to S.144(4), and petitioners have not satisfied the Magistrate of their right to possession, the Magistrate was not wrong in refusing rescission under S.144(5).

Broader implications: The decision reaffirms established statutory sequencing between S.145(1) and S.146(1) as reflected in Supreme Court authority (Mathuralal). The immediate effect is procedural: the attachment made in the composite order is quashed, the preliminary S.145(1) order stands, the Magistrate must continue and conclude the S.145 proceedings, and only thereafter may attachment under S.146(1) be considered. The opinion does not purport to create a new general precedent beyond applying and reconciling earlier authorities.

    Mavunni v. State Of Kerala

    1. Crl. R.P No. 165 of 1981 is by the B party in M.C No. 14/81 on the file of the Sub Divisional Magistrate, Parinthalmanna. The revision is against a composite order dated 4-4-1981 under Ss. 145(1) and 146(1) of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973, as per which the Magistrate has stated that for the reason of credible information laid by the Circle Inspector of Police, Malapuram through the Deputy Superintendent of Police. Tirur, that there exists serious likelihood of breach of peace concerning the property in R.S No. 196/1A of Cherukavu Amsom and Village he is satisfied that there are sufficient grounds for taking proceedings. The A and B parties were directed to attend the Court of the Sub Divisional Magistrate at 11 A.M on 9-4-81 either in person or by pleader and put in written statements and documents in respect of their claims to prove actual possession of the subject of dispute and also to adduce evidence if any that the parties want to rely upon in support of their claims. The third paragraph of the order reads as follows:

    “3. ………. I am satisfied that there is serious tension concerning the possession of the above said property and also this being a case of emergency I further order the attachment of the property under S. 146(1) Cr. P.C pending decision. The Village Officer Cherukavu will be in charge of the attached property.

    2. It is the latter part of the order that is challenged in this revision. On admission of the revision-petition, this part of the order had been stayed by this Court in Crl. M.P No. 378 of 1981 and the attachment has not taken effect until this date.

    3. The only question is whether a composite order of the nature passed by the Magistrate incorporating a preliminary order under S. 145(1) and an order of attachment under S. 146(1) Crl. P.C can be sustained in law.

    4. S. 146(1) of the Crl. P.C empowers the Magistrate to attach the subject of dispute until a competent court has determined the rights of parties with regard to the person entitled to possession of the property. S. 146(1) is extracted below:

    “146.—Power to attach subject of dispute and to appoint receiver.—

    (1) If the Magistrate at any time after making the order under sub-section (1) of S. 145 considers the case to be one of emergency, or if he decides that none of the parties was then in such possession as is referred to in S. 145, or if he is unable to satisfy himself as to which of them was then in such possession of the subject of dispute, he may attach the subject of dispute until a competent court has determined the rights of the parties thereto with regard to the person entitled to the possession thereof:

    Provided that such Magistrate may withdraw the attachment at any time if he is satisfied that there is no longer any likelihood of breach of the peace with regard to the subject of dispute”.

    5. Only on satisfaction of any one of the three conditions mentioned in the Section and after a preliminary order under sub-section (1) of S. 145 has been made, can the Magistrate pass an order of attachment under sub-section (1) of S. 146.

    6. Janaki Amma, J. in Lilly Franklin v. Wilson (1977 KLT. 871) stated in paragraph 9 as follows:

    ‘9. The learned Additional Sessions Judge has held that in the instant case, the order of attachment does not conform to the requirements of S. 145(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The conclusion seems to be well-founded. The order of the Magistrate extracted above shows that it is a composite order initiating proceedings under S. 145(1) and at the same time attaching the subject of dispute on the ground that there is an emergency. In other words, the initiation of proceedings under S. 145(1) and the attachment of property are seen effected by the same order. This is not warranted by the provisions of S. 146(1). S. 146(1) begins with the words:

    “If the Magistrate at any time after making the order in sub-section (1) of S. 145…….”

    7. The expression “after making the order” makes it clear that proceedings under S. 145(1) should precede the order attaching the property. S. 146(1) does not contemplate a simultaneous exercise of jurisdiction under S. 145(1) and S. 146(1). The order under S. 145(1) becomes complete only when the Magistrate puts his signature therein. It is only thereafter that he is expected to consider whether it is a case of emergency requiring attachment of property. Since the order attaching property in the instant case did not satisfy the above requirements, it was rightly set aside by the Additional Sessions Judge. Now that the preliminary order under S. 145(1) has been confirmed by the Additional Sessions Judge, it is open to the Magistrate to consider whether a case of emergency exists and whether the property should be attached and if he is so satisfied it is upto him to issue fresh order of attachment followed by appointment of receiver.”

    8. In paragraph 7 of the judgment the learned Judge held that once an order is passed under S. 146(1) Cr. P.C the Magistrate is not expected to proceed with the enquiry under S. 145 or to decide whether any and which of the parties was in possession of the subject of dispute on the date of the preliminary order. According to the learned Judge, the order of attachment puts an end to the proceedings so far as it relates to the enquiry by the Magistrate as to who was in possession of the property and in that view an order of attachment is a final order, against which a revision would lie to this Court. The correctness of this decision was questioned before a Division Bench of this Court and this Court in Bapputty v. Kayyu (1979 KLT 143), following the decision of the Supreme Court in Chandu Naik's case (1978 SCC (Cri) 100), held that the view expressed by Janaki Amma, J. in Lilly Franklin's case (1977 KLT. 871) that the Magistrate ceases to have jurisdiction to proceed with the enquiry once an order is passed under sub-section (1) of S. 146 is no longer good law, and the Magistrate has jurisdiction to proceed with the enquiry and pass appropriate orders under S. 145 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. In paragraph 4 of the decision of the Supreme Court reported in Mathuralal v. Bhanwarlal ((1979) 4 SCC 665 : AIR. 1980 S.C 242) it is stated thus:

    “4……… A preliminary order is considered so basic to a proceeding under S. 145 that a failure to draw up a preliminary order has been held by several High Courts to vitiate all the subsequent proceedings. It is by making a preliminary order that the Magistrate assumes jurisdiction to proceed under Ss. 145 and 146. In fact, the first of the situations in which an attachment may be effected under S. 146 of the 1973 Code has to be “at any time after making the order under sub-section (1) of S. 145”, while the other two situations have, necessarily to be at the final stage of the proceeding initiated by the preliminary order”.

    9. From this, it is clear that the Magistrate gets jurisdiction to pass an order of attachment under sub-section (1) of S. 146 only after a preliminary order under sub-section (1) of S. 145 is passed. The view expressed by Janaki Amma, J. in 1977 KLT. 871 that a composite order under sub-section (1) of S. 145 and under sub-section (1) of S. 146 is beyond the jurisdiction of the Magistrate is not overruled by the Division Bench of this Court in 1979 KLT. 143. What was overruled was only that part of the dictum laid down in the decision that by effecting an attachment under sub-section (1) of S. 146 the Magistrate ceases to have jurisdiction to proceed with the enquiry and for that reason the order itself is rendered a final order. From the wording of S. 146(1) as well as from the decision of the Supreme Court extracted above, it is clear that a composite order under sub-section (1) of S. 145 and under sub-section (1) of S. 146 cannot be passed as an order of attachment under sub-section (1) can be passed only after the preliminary order under sub-section (1) of S. 145 had already been passed by the Magistrate. The impugned order of the Magistrate dated 4-4-81 is valid as a preliminary order under sub-section (1) of S. 145, but the later part of the order placing the disputed property under attachment under sub-section (1) of S. 146 is without jurisdiction and cannot be sustained in law.

    10. Crl. R.P No. 166 of 1981 is allowed in part, setting aside the order of attachment under sub-sec. (1) of S. 146 and dismissed in other respects. The Magistrate is directed to dispose of the proceedings under S. 145 Crl. P.C within three months after the receipt of records in his court. This judgment will not preclude the Magistrate if occasion arises to pass appropriate orders under sub-section (1) of's 146 Cr. P.C Despatch records immediately.

    Crl. R.P 207 of 1981.

    11. This revision is against the order of the Sub Divisional Magistrate’ Perinthalmanna rejecting an application submitted by the petitioners under sub-section (5) of S. 144 of the Crl. P.C The Magistrate had on 4-4-81 passed a prohibitory order under S. 144(1) Crl. P.C preventing the general public from entering into the land in Sy. No. 196/18 of Cherukav amsom. This order was extended from time to time. The revision petitioners claiming to be persons in possession of the land in R.S No. 196/1-B submitted an application under sub-section (5) of S. 144 to rescind the order under sub-section (1) of S. 144 and this application has been rejected by the impugned order of the Magistrate. It is brought to my notice that the Government had extended the period of the prohibitory order passed by the Magistrate in exercise of its powers under the proviso to sub-section (4) of S. 144 Crl. P.C, and the order passed by the Government is even now in force. On the satisfaction of the Magistrate that immediate steps are required to be taken to prevent danger to human life and safety. The prohibitory order has been passed to prevent breach of the peace and that order has been extended by the Government under the provisions of S. 144 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Until the petitioners satisfy the Magistrate of their right to possession of the property, it cannot be said that the Magistrate was wrong in passing an order prohibiting them also from entering upon the property and it is not shown that the order is in any way defective. I do not find any error or illegality in the order of the Magistrate. This revision petition is accordingly dismissed.

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    Comments

    Mavunni v. State Of Kerala
    (Aug 26, 1981)