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Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

This revision petition raised two questions: (1) whether Shri T.R. Velunni, District Magistrate at Trichur and Commissioner of Inquiry under the Commissions of Inquiry Act, 1952 (the Act), was competent to prefer the complaint; and (2) whether, under proviso (aa) to Section 200, Cr.P.C., his examination by the Magistrate on taking cognizance of the offence on the complaint could have been dispensed with. The matter proceeded on those issues and the Court considered statutory provisions of the Cr.P.C. and the Act in resolving them.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether Shri T.R. Velunni, as District Magistrate and Commissioner of Inquiry under the Act, was competent to prefer the complaint.
  2. Whether proviso (aa) to Section 200, Cr.P.C. permitted dispensing with the complainant's examination when the complainant was acting or purporting to act in the discharge of official duty.

Arguments of the Parties

Revision Petitioner's (or Revision Petitioner's Counsel) Submissions

  • The two questions identified above were raised in the petition. The learned counsel for the revision petitioner conceded that the complaint fulfills the definition of 'complaint' in Section 4(1)(h), Cr.P.C., and that the Magistrate was competent under Section 190(1)(a), Cr.P.C., to take cognizance of the offence.

Government Pleader's Arguments

  • The Government pleader contended that, having been appointed Commissioner of Inquiry and having submitted his report to Government, the complainant could be authorised by Government to prefer the complaint and, if so authorised, it must be deemed that he was acting in the discharge of his official duty.
  • Reliance was placed on Sections 3 and 10 of the Commissions of Inquiry Act, 1952: Section 3(1) (power of appropriate Government to appoint a Commission by notification) and Section 10 (every member or authorised officer of the Commission deemed to be a public servant under section 21 IPC).
  • The government argument rested on a Government Order directing the complainant to prefer the complaint, though that order did not purport to be made under Section 3.

Table of Precedents Cited

No precedents were cited in the provided opinion.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court addressed the two questions sequentially. On the first question, the Court found no difficulty in answering against the revision petitioner because the complaint met the definition in Section 4(1)(h), Cr.P.C., and the Magistrate was competent under Section 190(1)(a), Cr.P.C., to take cognizance; this was conceded by the revision petitioner's counsel.

On the second question, the Court framed the issue as dependent on whether the complainant was acting or purporting to act in the discharge of his official duty; if so, proviso (aa) to Section 200, Cr.P.C. could apply to dispense with examination. The Court noted it was not contended that, as District Magistrate, he had such a duty.

The Government pleader's reliance on Sections 3 and 10 of the Act was examined. Section 3(1) permits the appropriate Government to appoint a Commission of Inquiry by notification; Section 10 deems members or authorised officers of a Commission to be public servants under section 21 IPC. The Government's position was that these provisions, taken with a Government Order directing the complainant to prefer the complaint, meant the complainant was acting in the discharge of official duty.

The Court rejected this reasoning: the Government Order did not purport to be issued under Section 3 and did not confer any power to be exercised by the complainant as an official other than preferring the complaint. Even if the complainant was a public servant as Commissioner of Inquiry under Section 10, preferring the complaint was not part of his official duty. The Court also declined to accept the lower court's view that mere governmental authorisation to prefer a complaint equated to acting in the discharge of official duty. Consequently, the Court held proviso (aa) to Section 200, Cr.P.C. was not applicable.

Because the proviso did not apply, the Court directed that the procedure prescribed by Section 200 (i.e., examination of the complainant) should be followed by the Magistrate when taking cognizance of the offence on the complaint, and ordered the Magistrate to proceed accordingly.

Holding and Implications

Revision petition allowed in part: proviso (aa) to Section 200, Cr.P.C. is not applicable; the complainant must be examined under the procedure of Section 200, Cr.P.C.

Consequences: The Magistrate is directed to adopt the Section 200 procedure and examine the complainant when taking cognizance of the offence on the complaint. No broader precedent or novel legal principle was announced beyond the direct application of the cited statutory provisions to these facts.

    Krishna Warrier v. Velunny & Another

    Velu Pillai, J.:— In this revision petition two questions were raised:

    2. first, whether Shri T.R Velunni, District Magistrate at Trichur at the relevant time, who was also the Commissioner of Inquiry under the Commissions of Inquiry Act, 1952, referred to hereafter as the Act, was competent to prefer the complaint and

    3. secondly, whether under the proviso (aa) to section 200, Crl. P.C his examination by the Magistrate on taking cognizance of the offence on the complaint, could have been dispensed with.

    4. I see no difficulty whatever in answering the first question against the revision petitioner, for the complaint in this case fulfills the definition of the term ‘complaint’ in Section 4(1)(h), Crl. P.C and the Magistrate is competent under Section 190(1)(a), Crl. P.C to take cognizance of the offence. This was also conceded by the learned counsel for the revison petitioner.

    5. On the second question, the answer would depend on whether, the complainant in preferring the complaint, was acting or purporting to act in the discharge of his official duty; if he was, his examination upon the complaint could have been dispensed with under the proviso referred to above.

    6. It was not contended, that as a District Magistrate he had any such duty to discharge. The contention of the learned government pleader was, that having been appointed as Commissioner of Inquiry under the Act and having submitted his report to Government, he could be authorised by Government to prefer the complaint, and if so, it must be deemed, that he was acting in the discharge of his official duty. He relied on Sections 3 and 10 of the Act, the material parts of which are as follows:

    Sec. 3(1) “The appropriate Government may, if it is of opinion that it is necessary so to do, and shall, if a resolution in this behalf is passed by the House of the People or, as the case may be, the Legislative Assembly of the State, by notification in the Official Gazette, appoint a Commission of Inquiry for the purpose of making an inquiry into any definite matter of public importance and performing such functions and within such time as may be specified in the notification, and the Commission so appointed shall make the inquiry and perform the functions accordingly.”.

    Sec. 10. “Every member of the Commission and every officer appointed or authorised by the Commission to exercise functions under this Act shall be deemed to be a public servant within the meaning of section 21 of the Indian Penal Code (Act XLV of I860).”

    7. His argument being, that under Section 3, Government could invest a Commissioner with all powers it may think fit, and under Section 10, as a public servant, the act of filing the complaint was his official duty. It was not contended however, that by the notification under Section 3, the complainant was authorised, not merely to hold an enquiry and submit his report, but also to prosecute the offenders in the event of his report being adverse to them. Reliance was placed only upon the Government Order directing the complainant to prefer the complaint, and that direction does not purport to be made under Section 3. In my view, Section 10 of the Act also cannot avail the complainant, for the reason, that assuming as Commissioner of Inquiry, he was a public servant, it was not part of his duty to prefer the complaint. I cannot also accept the view taken by the learned Judge below, that by the mere order of Government authorising the complainant to prefer the complaint, he could be deemed to be acting in the discharge of his official duty, because the Government Order did not confer any power on him to be exercised by him as an official, save that of preferring the complaint. On the basis, that he had no official duty whatever to prefer a complaint, as the District Magistrate or as the Commissioner of Inquiry. It is difficult to hold, that he purported to act in the discharge of official duty; he could not be deemed to have acted, in either of the two capacities.

    8. Differing from the courts below, I hold, that proviso (aa) to Section 200, Crl. P.C is not applicable. It therefore follows, that the procedure prescribed by section 200 without the proviso, should have been adopted by the learned Magistrate for taking cognizance of the offence on complaint, by examining the complainant. The Magistrate is directed to proceed accordingly. This revision petition is allowed to the above extent.

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    Krishna Warrier v. Velunny & Another
    (Mar 24, 1960)