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Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

The petitioner filed a writ petition seeking to quash Notification No. RPS 117/2004 dated 4th June 2008 issued by the respondent. The notification announced that the High Court of Karnataka would hold sittings of Judges and Division Courts at Circuit Benches in Dharwad and Gulbarga starting 7th July 2008. It specified that cases arising from certain districts would be heard and decided at these Circuit Benches, with pending cases transferred accordingly before the commencement date, and new cases to be filed at the respective Circuit Benches from that date.

The petitioner, a resident of Bellary with pending suits and appeals in Bellary courts and the High Court at Bangalore, challenged the territorial bifurcation of jurisdiction effected by the notification. He contended that the division of districts between the Circuit Benches and the Principal Bench was impermissible under the States Reorganisation Act, 1956, and that the Principal Bench should retain jurisdiction over all cases irrespective of the presence of Circuit Benches.

The background includes the establishment of Circuit Benches at Dharwad and Gulbarga to alleviate hardship faced by litigants in Northern Karnataka due to the great distances from Bangalore, the principal seat of the High Court. The Chief Justice, with the Governor’s approval, had earlier issued a notification in 2004 under Section 51(3) of the Act for this purpose. After infrastructure was prepared and a committee report received, the Full Court resolved on 3rd June 2008 to commence sittings from 7th July 2008 and specified district-wise jurisdiction for the Circuit Benches, which was formalized by the impugned notification.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the power of the Chief Justice under sub-section (3) of Section 51 of the States Reorganisation Act, 1956 includes the authority to establish Circuit Benches at specified places, specify their territorial jurisdiction, transfer pending cases thereto, and permit the filing of new cases at such Benches?

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner's Arguments

  • The petitioner did not oppose the establishment of Circuit Benches or their sittings but challenged the exclusive territorial jurisdiction conferred on them by the notification.
  • Relying on the Supreme Court decision in State of Maharashtra v. Narayan Sharhrao Puranik, he contended that the notification violated sub-section (3) of Section 51 of the Act.
  • He argued, with reference to Rajasthan High Court Advocates Association v. Union of India, that the bifurcation of areas/districts and conferral of exclusive jurisdiction on Circuit Benches deprived the Principal Bench of its jurisdiction, which was impermissible.
  • He also cited Federation of Bar Associations in Karnataka v. Union of India to contend that the arrangements in the impugned notification were unnecessary.

Respondent's Arguments

The opinion does not contain a detailed account of the respondent’s legal arguments.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
State of Maharashtra v. Narayan Sharhrao Puranik, (1982) 3 SCC 519 Interpreted Section 51(3) of the States Reorganisation Act to affirm that the Chief Justice has power to establish Circuit Benches with approval of the Governor, and no territorial bifurcation occurs by such establishment. The Court relied on this precedent to hold that the Chief Justice’s power to establish Circuit Benches and specify their jurisdiction is valid and within the scope of Section 51(3).
Rajasthan High Court Advocates Association v. Union of India, (2001) 2 SCC 294 Considered the Chief Justice’s power to define territorial jurisdiction in writ cases, specifically regarding the cause of action for filing such cases. The Court distinguished this case, holding it inapplicable to the present issue of establishing Circuit Benches and territorial jurisdiction under Section 51(3).
Federation of Bar Associations in Karnataka v. Union of India, (2000) 6 SCC 715 Addressed arrangements related to High Court benches and their necessity. The Court noted the petitioner’s reliance but did not find this precedent applicable to invalidate the impugned notification.
State of Rajasthan v. Prakash Chand, (1998) 1 SCC 1 Confirmed the Chief Justice’s prerogative as Master of the Roster to distribute judicial and administrative business within the High Court. The Court applied this principle to uphold the Chief Justice’s authority to allocate cases to Circuit Benches and to specify filing locations for new cases.
Seth Manji Dana v. C.I.T., Bombay (1958) Discussed territorial jurisdiction in relation to Permanent Benches under Section 51(2). Referenced in support of the distinction between Permanent Benches and Circuit Benches under Section 51(3).
Subbaya Pillai v. Somasundaram Pillai, AIR 1958 Ker 188 Held that temporary Benches under Section 51(3) function as part of the High Court without territorial bifurcation. Used to reinforce that Circuit Benches are integral parts of the High Court exercising full jurisdiction.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court examined the scope of the Chief Justice’s powers under sub-section (3) of Section 51 of the States Reorganisation Act, 1956. It noted that the establishment of Circuit Benches at Dharwad and Gulbarga was done with the Governor’s approval and was not challenged. The Court relied extensively on the Supreme Court’s decision in State of Maharashtra v. Narayan Sharhrao Puranik, which held that the Chief Justice’s power to appoint sittings of Judges and Division Courts at places other than the principal seat is absolute, subject only to the Governor’s approval, and does not amount to territorial bifurcation of the High Court.

The Court further referenced other authoritative decisions, including Subbaya Pillai v. Somasundaram Pillai, to affirm that Circuit Benches function as integral parts of the High Court with full jurisdiction, and that the Chief Justice’s administrative prerogative as Master of the Roster includes determining the constitution and territorial arrangements of Benches.

The petitioner’s reliance on Rajasthan High Court Advocates Association was found misplaced since that case dealt with the locus of cause of action in writ petitions rather than the establishment and jurisdiction of Circuit Benches. The Court concluded that the impugned notification was a lawful administrative arrangement intended to facilitate convenient and less expensive access to justice for litigants, and did not violate the Act.

Holding and Implications

The Court dismissed the writ petition as devoid of merit.

The direct effect of this decision is the validation of the impugned notification establishing Circuit Benches at Dharwad and Gulbarga with specified territorial jurisdiction and administrative arrangements for transfer and filing of cases. The ruling confirms that such arrangements fall within the Chief Justice’s powers under Section 51(3) of the States Reorganisation Act, 1956. No new precedent was set beyond affirming existing Supreme Court authority on the matter.

    E. Ram Mohan Chowdry v. Registrar General, High Court Of Karnataka

    Venugopala Gowda, J.:— Petitioner has filed this writ petition, praying to quash the notification No. RPS 117/2004 dated 4th June, 2008, issued by the respondent. By the said notification, it was notified that, the Hon'ble Chief Justice of the High Court of Karnataka, has been pleased to order that, sittings, of the Hon'ble Judges and Division Courts at the Circuit Benches at Dharwad and Gulbarga, will commence on 7-7-2008 and that the cases arising from the Districts named therein, will be heard and decided at the respective Circuit Benches and that the pending cases from the districts concerned, will be transferred to the respective Circuit Bench, before 7-7-2008 and that the filing of new cases at the Circuit Bench will be permitted from 7-7-2008.

    2. Petitioner, claims to be resident of Bellary and to have suits and appeals pending in the Courts at Bellary and in the High Court of Karnataka, Bangalore. According to him, the aforesaid notification is opposed to the spirit and essence of the States Reorganisation Act, 1956 (for short ‘the Act’) and there cannot be territorial bifurcation in the case of Circuit Benches and assigning of the districts to the respective Benches amounts to territorial bifurcation and the Benches created under Section 51(3) of the Act, cannot have exclusive jurisdiction which is reserved for a Principal or Permanent Bench. It is stated that, bifurcation of jurisdiction by allotment of districts to the respective Benches is impermissible and that the jurisdiction of the Principal Bench should always be open and should never be shut to the litigants, irrespective of the presence of Circuit Benches in their area.

    3. Karnataka is a big State with 29 Districts and a population of 5,273 Crores. At the time of State Re-organisation in 1956, Bangalore was declared as the capital and also the seat of the High Court. The distance between Bangalore and Bidar (head quarters of the Northern most district) is 729 kms. The distance between Bangalore and Gulbarga is 663 kms. The distance between Bangalore and Dharwad is 425 kms. The people of Northern Karnataka area were facing serious hardship and difficulties in having access to justice and the High Court due to the distance between their areas and Bangalore and the cost and time of travel to reach Bangalore. Hence they were demanding establishment of Circuit Bench of the High Court in their area. Considering the demand of the litigant public of Northern Karnataka and with the approval of the Governor of Karnataka, a notification dated 19-10-2004 was issued by the Chief Justice, High Court of Karnataka under Section 51(3) of the Act, notifying the sittings of Judges and Division Courts of the High Court of Karnataka, at Dharwad and Gulbarga. It was also notified therein that, the date of sittings will be notified after getting satisfactory report of the Committee constituted by the order of the Hon'ble Chief Justice. The Committee, after making visits and inspecting the buildings constructed for the propose of establishing of the Circuit Benches, has submitted the reports. The construction of buildings for the Circuit Benches at Dharwad and Gulbarga was started on 25-8-2006 and 2-11-2006 respectively. On completion of the construction of the buildings and after ensuring necessary infrastructure for the functioning of the Courts, the Full Court of the High Court, has resolved on 3-6-2008 to commence the sittings of the Judges and Division Courts at the Circuit Benches at Dharwad and Gulbarga on 7-7-2008. The Full Court has also resolved that, the cases arising from the Districts of Bagalkot, Bellary, Belgaum, Dharwad, Gadag, Haveri, Uttara Kannada-Karwar and Koppal will be heard and decided at the Circuit Bench at Dharwad and that the cases arising from the Districts of Bidar. Bijapur, Gulbarga and Raichur, will be rreard and decided at the Circuit Bench at Gulbarga. It was further resolved that, pending cases from the above mentioned districts will be transferred to the respective Circuit Benches before 7-7-2008. Pursuant to the resolution passed by the Full Court of the High Court on 3-6-2008 and based on the orders of the Hon'ble Chief Justice, the Registrar General has issued the impugned notification dated 4-6-2008.

    4. Sri M.V.V Ramana, learned counsel for the petitioner at the outset submitted that, the writ petition is not against the establishment of Circuit Benches at Dharwad and Gulbarga or the hearing of the cases at the Circuit Benches. Learned counsel submitted that the grievance of the petitioner is only with regard to the exclusive jurisdiction of the Circuit Benches over the particular districts which fall under the respective Circuit Benches. Learned counsel, relying upon the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of State of Maharashtra v. Narayan Sharhrao Puranik reported in (1982) 3 SCC 519 : (AIR 1982 SC 1198) contended that, the impugned notification is violative of sub-section (3) of Section 51 of the Act. Learned counsel, relying upon the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Rajasthan High Court Advocates Association v. Union of India reported in (2001) 2 SCC 294 : (AIR 2001 SC 416) contended that, by the bifurcation of the areas/districts to the respective Circuit Benches and defining their territorial jurisdiction, the jurisdiction of the Principal Bench has been taken away and conferred on the respective Circuit Benches, which is not permissible. Learned counsel also referred to the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Federation of Bar Associations in Karnataka v. Union of India reported in (2000) 6 SCC 715 : (AIR 2000 SC 2544) to contend that, there is no need for making the arrangements in terms of the impugned notification.

    5. Considering the contentions urged by the learned Counsel, the point that arises for our consideration is:

    Whether the power of the Chief Justice under sub-section (3) of Section 51 of the Act includes the power to establish a Bench or Benches at such place or places and to specify the territorial jurisdiction of such Circuit Benches and to transfer the pending cases to such circuit Benches and to permit filing of new cases at such Circuit Benches?

    6. As already noticed, with the approval of the Governor of Karnataka, the Hon'ble Chief Justice, High Court of Karnataka, in exercise of power under Section 51(3) of the act, had notified the sittings of the Hon'ble Judges and Division Courts of the High Court at Dharwad and Gulbarga, by issuing the notification dated 19-10-2004. The said notification was not questioned by any person and is also not under challenge, in this writ petition. The petitioner has no objection to the establishment of the Circuit Benches or to the commencement of sitings on 7-7-2008. We have to examine, the scope of the powers of the Chief Justice under Section 51(3) of the Act, to answer the point which has arisen for consideration.

    7. In the case of Narayan Shamrao Puranik (supra), the notification issued by the Chief Justice of Bombay High Court, in exercise of the power under Section 51(3) of the Act, with the prior approval of the Governor of Maharashtra, directing that the Judges and Division Courts of the High Court of Bombay, will sit also at Aurangabad, with effect from August 27, 1981 for the disposal of cases arising out of the Marathwada region of the State of Maharashtra which was struck down by the Bombay High Court by its judgment dated 14-12-1981, was the subject matter of consideration. Interpreting Section 51(3) of the Act, it was held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court as follows:

    “25. …………………. In contrast, the power of the Chief Justice to appoint under sub-section (3) of Section 51 of the Act the sittings of the Judges and Division Courts of the High Court for a new State at places other than the place of the principal seat or the Permanent Bench is in the unquestioned domain of the Chief Justice, the only condition being that he must act with the approval of the Governor. It is basically an internal matter pertaining to the High Court, he has full power, authority and jurisdiction in the matter of allocation of business of the High Court which flows not only from the provision contained in sub-section (3) of Section 51 of the Act but inheres in him in the very nature of things. The opinion of the Chief Justice to appoint the seat of the High Court for a new State at a place other than the principal seat under sub-section (3) of Section 51 of the Act must therefore normally prevail because it is for the more convenient transaction of judicial business. The non obstante clause contained in sub-section (3) of Section 51 gives an overriding effect to the power of the Chief Justice. There is no territorial bifurcation of the High Court merely because the Chief Justice directs under sub-section (3) of Section 51 of the Act that the Judges and Division Courts shall also sit at such other places as he may with the approval of the Governor, appoint. It must accordingly be held that there was no territorial bifurcation of the Bombay High Court merely because the Chief Justice by the impugned notification issued under sub-section (3) of Section 51 of the Act directed that the Judges and Division Courts shall also sit at Aurangabad. The Judges and Division Courts at Aurangabad are part of the same High Court as those at the principal seat at Bombay and they exercise jurisdiction as Judges of the High Court of Bombay at Aurangabad. The Chief Justice acted within the scope of his powers. We see no substance in the charge that the impugned notification issued by the Chief Justice under sub-section (3) of Section 51 of the Act was a colourable exercise of power.”

    (Emphasis supplied by us)

    Noticing the decision of the Bombay High Court in the case of Seth Manji Dana v. C.I.T, Bombay in Civil Appeal No. 995 of 1957, decided on July 22, 1958 and the Full Bench decision of the Kerala High Court in the case of Subbaya Pillai…* v. Somasundaram Pillai…., High Court, Kerala, Trivandrum, AIR 1958 Ker 188, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held as follows:

    “27. In Manickam Pillai case, the Kerala High Court held that the curtailment of the territorial jurisdiction of the main seat of the High Court of a new State is a necessary concomitant to the establishment of a Permanent Bench under sub-section (2) of Section 51 of the Act while contrasting sub-section (3) with sub-section (2). There, a question arose whether the temporry Bench of the High Court of Kerala with its principal seat at Ernakulam created by the Chief Justice at Trivandrum by an order issued under sub-section (3) of Section 51 of the Act was not the High Court of Kerala, and the Judges and Division Courts sitting at Trivandrum were precisely in the same position as Judges and Division Courts sitting in the several court-rooms of the High Court at its principal seat in Ernakulam. In other words, the contention was that the Judges and Division Courts sitting at Trivandrum could only hear and dispose of such cases as were directed to be posted before them by the Chief Justice but no new case could be instituted there. Raman Nayar, J. (as he then was) speaking for the Court held that the Trivandrum Bench was not the High Court of Kerala and the Judges and Division Courts sitting at Trivandrum could hear and dispose of only such cases as may be assigned to them. With respect, we are of the opinion that the view expressed by Chagla. C.J in Manji Dana case, is to be preferred. Chagla, C.J, rightly observes that the Judges and Division Courts at a temporary Bench established under sub-section (3) of Section 51 of the Act function as Judges and Division Courts of the High Court at the principal seat, and while so sitting at such temporary Bench they may exercise the jurisdiction and power of the High Court itself in relation to all the matters entrusted to them.”

    (Emphasis supplied by us)

    Hon'ble Supreme Court has concluded as follows:

    28. …………… order passed by the High Court is set aside and the writ petition filed by respondent 1 is dismissed. In terms of the Order passed by us on May 4, 1982 ((1982) 2 SCC 440), we direct that in accordance with the notification issued by the Chief Justice of High Court of Bombay dated August 27, 1981. The sittings of the Judges and Division Courts may be held and continue to be held at Aurangabad with full and normal powers to entertain and dispose of all matters arising out of the Marathwada region, that is to say, the area comprising the districts of Aurangabad, Bhir, Jalna, Nanded, Osmanbad and Parbani. All cases pertaining to that region and pending as on May 4, 1982 at the main seat of the High Court at Bombay shall be dealt with and disposed of as the Chief Justice of the High Court may direct, consistently with the terms of the aforesaid notifiction dated August 27, 1981.”

    (Emphasis supplied by us)

    Hence, it is apparent that, by virtue of the power conferred on the Chief Justice under sub-section (3) of Section 51 of the Act, the Chief Justice can establish a Bench or Benches, at such place or places where the Judges and Division Courts may sit and that he has the power and authority to issue administrative directions for the filing of cases or institution of proceedings at such place or places. By that process, there will be no territorial bifurcation of the High Court of Karnataka, merely because of the arrangement made in terms of the impugned notification. Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of State of Rajasthan v. Prakash Chand reported in (1998) 1 SCC 1 : (AIR 1998 SC 1344) has held that, the Hon'ble Chief Justice of the High Court has the prerogative to distribute the business of the High Court, both judicial and administrative, that the Chief Justice is the Master of the Roster and that he alone has the right and power to decide how the Benches of the High Court are to be constituted, which Judge has to sit along and which cases he can and as required to hear and also as to which judges shall constitute a Division Bench and what work those Benches shall do. In exercise of the said prerogative, right and power, if the Chief Justice of the High Court of Karnataka has directed that cases arising from certain districts shall be heard and decided by the Judges sitting at a particular Circuit Bench, it cannot held to be wrong or illegal. There is nothing wrong in specifying that new cases arising from certain districts shall be filed at the particular Circuit Bench, as those cases are to be, heard and decided by the Judges sitting at that Circuit Bench. Such an arrangement, is for administrative convenience and the advantage of the litigants. After all, the Courts are for the benefit of the litigant public and hence their convenience should be the paramount consideration. The impugned notification is a positive and concrete step to achieve the goal of providing easy and less expensive access to justice.

    8. The decision relied upon by the learned counsel in the case of Rahjasthan High Court Advocates' Association (supra), has no application to the contentions urged and the point that has arisen for our consideration. In the said case, the only issue considered and dealt with by the Hon'ble Supreme Court is with regard to the power of Chief Justice, to define, where ‘a cause of action’ in a writ case, would be taken to have arisen, so as to determine, where it could be filed. Hence the said decision has no application for deciding the validity of the impugned notification.

    9. In view of the clear enunciation of law by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Narayan Shamrao Puranik (supra) with regard to the power of the Chief Justice of the High Court to establish Circuit Bench or Benches and to make the consequential administrative arrangements, the contentions raised in this writ petition are untenable and the writ petition is devoid of merit.

    For the foregoing reasons, writ petition is hereby dismissed. No costs.

    Petition dismissed.

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    E. Ram Mohan Chowdry v. Registrar General, High Court Of Karnataka
    (Jun 30, 2008)