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Case Summary — Pepsi Food Ltd. v. Special Judicial Magistrate (1998 SC 128)

Factual and Procedural Background

The petitioners (accused Nos. 1 and 2) challenged an order dated 5.4.1999 in C.C. No. 931/99 on the file of the JMFC, Chitradurga, which issued process against them for an offence punishable under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act. The respondent presented a complaint under Section 142 of the Negotiable Instruments Act read with Section 200 Cr.P.C., alleging that accused No. 1 issued a cheque for Rs. 50,000 knowing there were insufficient funds. A demand notice dated 22.2.1999 was sent by registered post and served on 24.2.1999; as payment was not made within 15 days, the complainant presented the complaint. The Magistrate took cognizance, recorded the complainant's sworn statement, marked four documents and, being satisfied, ordered issuance of summons to the accused.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the proceedings initiated by the learned Magistrate, in the absence of compliance with provisions (as contended) of Section 202 Cr.P.C. and other procedural provisions, amounted to an abuse of the process of the Court and were liable to be quashed.
  2. Whether the demand notice complied with the requirements of Section 138, Clause (b) of the Negotiable Instruments Act (in particular whether the notice sufficiently specified the cheque amount as distinct from other amounts claimed), and therefore whether cognizance under Section 138 was proper.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioners' Arguments

  • There was no prima facie case against the accused; necessary ingredients of the offence under Section 138 N.I. Act were not established.
  • The statutory notice did not indicate the exact value of the cheque but embraced a larger transaction amount; it did not strictly comply with Clause (b) of Section 138.
  • There was a cognate violation of Sections 200 and 202 Cr.P.C. (procedural defects), including failure to comply with Section 202 Cr.P.C., and therefore cognizance was taken improperly.
  • The complaint was barred by time (limitation was asserted as a ground).
  • Reliance was placed on the decision in Dr. K.G. Ramachandra Guptha v. Dr. G. Adinarayana (ILR 2000 KAR 1570) to support contention on notice requirements.

Respondent's Arguments

  • Respondent relied on the law as laid down by the Apex Court in Suman Sethi v. Ajay Churiwal (AIR 2000 SC 828) to support validity of the notice and the procedure adopted.
  • Implicitly, respondent contended that the notice did specify the cheque amount and that additional claims (interest, costs, balance due) were severable and did not invalidate the notice.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Dr. K.G. Ramachandra Guptha v. Dr. G. Adinarayana (ILR 2000 KAR 1570) Interpreting requirement of demand notice under Section 138 proviso to Clause (b); observations on whether a notice demanding total transaction amount (including sums beyond the cheque value) is valid. The court examined the judgment and noted divergent observations within it. The court found the later interpretative emphasis (that additional claims may be severable if the cheque amount is specifically identified) difficult to follow in parts, but overall relied on Apex Court clarity in Suman Sethi to resolve the position in favour of severability where cheque amount is specified.
Suman Sethi v. Ajay K. Churiwal (AIR 2000 SC 828) Interpretation of Section 138 (including Clauses (b) and (c)) and Section 139 presumption; requirement that notice must make demand for the cheque amount and treatment of additional claims (interest, costs). The court relied principally on this Apex Court decision to hold that (i) notice must be read as a whole, (ii) where the cheque amount is separately specified, additional claims are severable and do not invalidate the notice, and (iii) omnibus demands without specification might fail. Applied to facts: the notice here specified the cheque amount separately, so it was valid.
Madhavan Nambiar v. Govindan (Kerala High Court) Held that proceedings are not vitiated for issuing process before filing list of witnesses by prosecution unless prejudice is caused to accused. Cited to support proposition that failure to file a witness list before issuance of summons is a procedural lapse that does not vitiate proceedings absent prejudice; thus the magistrate's action could be curable and not fatal.
Kahnu Ram v. Durga Dass (Himachal Pradesh High Court) Same proposition as Madhavan Nambiar regarding issuance of process before filing list of witnesses. Used similarly to show that non-filing of list of witnesses before issuing summons does not itself nullify proceedings unless prejudice shown.
Central Bank of India v. Saxons Farms (1999) Explained object of the notice under Section 138 — to give drawer chance to rectify omission; payment of cheque amount within 15 days absolves drawer of criminal liability under Section 138. Cited to reinforce that the crucial purpose of the notice is to allow payment of the cheque amount within the statutory period, and that additional claims do not defeat the notice if cheque amount is identifiable and paid.
Minakshi Bala v. Sudhir Kumar Stated that inherent jurisdiction of High Court to quash proceedings under Section 482 should be invoked only in limited circumstances (forensic exigencies/formidable compulsions). Applied to emphasize that quashing proceedings is exceptional and the High Court should exercise the power sparingly; thus this petition should not succeed absent rare circumstances.
State of Haryana v. Ch. Bhajan Lal Set out categories where High Court may interfere under Article 226 or Section 482 Cr.P.C.; guidance on sparing exercise of quashing powers. Relied upon as authoritative guidance on the limited scope for quashing criminal proceedings; court found none of the Bhajan Lal categories justified interference in the present matter.
Pepsi Food Ltd. v. Special Judicial Magistrate Observation that nomenclature of the petition is not decisive and does not debar the Court from exercising jurisdiction unless a special mandatory procedure exists. Cited for the proposition that procedural labels do not prevent exercise of jurisdiction; used to support the view that the Court should examine substance (compliance with mandatory procedure) rather than nomenclature alone.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court framed the central question as whether proceedings initiated by the learned Magistrate contrary to the provisions of law constituted an abuse of process and were liable to be quashed.

On the procedural contention regarding non-compliance with the requirement to file a list of prosecution witnesses (Section 204 part (2) Cr.P.C.): the court acknowledged that Section 204(2) Cr.P.C. is mandatory and requires that no summons or warrant be issued until a list of prosecution witnesses has been filed. However, it treated this requirement as a procedural formality rather than a jurisdictional defect which automatically vitiates subsequent proceedings. The court cited decisions from the Kerala and Himachal Pradesh High Courts (Madhavan Nambiar and Kahnu Ram) holding that issuance of process prior to filing the witness list does not vitiate proceedings unless prejudice to the accused is shown. The court noted that if the list is produced before evidence is taken, no prejudice is caused, and that the defect may be curable under Section 465 Cr.P.C. The court also observed that absence of a list may simply indicate there are no prosecution witnesses to be examined and permitted the magistrate discretion to allow filing later if sufficient cause shown.

On the contention about the sufficiency and form of the demand notice under Section 138(b) N.I. Act: the court examined the actual notice dated 19.2.1999 which described the commercial transaction (331 bags of groundnut seed totalling 9,950 kgs worth Rs. 1,24,553 inclusive of commission), the issuance of cheque No. 0504465 dated 20.11.1998 for Rs. 50,000, and the bank's return memo stating insufficient funds. The notice demanded the cheque amount (Rs. 50,000) and also claimed the balance due with 18% interest. The court considered the apparent tension in the earlier state-court judgment (Dr. K.G. Ramachandra Gupta) but placed principal reliance on the Supreme Court's interpretation in Suman Sethi, which clarified that:

  • Notice must be read as a whole; the demand should be for the cheque amount ("said amount").
  • If the notice specifies cheque amount separately and additionally claims interest/costs, those additional claims are severable and do not invalidate the notice.
  • If the notice contains an omnibus demand without specifying what was due under the dishonoured cheque, the notice may fail to meet legal requirements.

Applying these principles, the court found that in the present case the notice did specifically demand the cheque amount apart from the balance due. There was no denial of the demand and no compliance by the accused. The court reasoned that if the accused had paid the cheque amount demanded, they would have complied with the statutory demand; the extra amounts claimed were severable. Consequently, the notice was not invalid on the grounds advanced.

On the exercise of inherent powers of the High Court under Section 482 Cr.P.C. (and Article 226), the court reiterated the limited and sparing nature of such power, citing Minakshi Bala and the categories in State of Haryana v. Ch. Bhajan Lal. The court concluded there were no circumstances warranting interference in this case.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The petition was dismissed. The court's core ruling may be summarized as: the impugned order issuing process under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act will not be quashed.

Implications:

  • Direct effect: The magistrate's order dated 5.4.1999 in C.C. No. 931/99 stands; criminal proceedings under Section 138 N.I. Act against the petitioners may continue.
  • On procedure: Failure to file a list of prosecution witnesses prior to issuance of summons under Section 204(2) Cr.P.C., while mandatory in form, will not automatically vitiate proceedings absent demonstrable prejudice; such defects may be curable and are not invariably fatal.
  • On notice under Section 138: A demand notice that specifically identifies the cheque amount and also claims other amounts (interest, costs, balance) will not be invalidated by the latter claims if the cheque amount is separately identifiable — additional claims are severable. An omnibus demand without specification remains vulnerable.
  • No new broader precedent was established by this single-order disposition; the court applied existing Supreme Court authority (notably Suman Sethi) and relevant High Court observations and declined to exercise inherent jurisdiction to quash the proceedings in the absence of rare or exceptional circumstances.

Disposition: Petition dismissed.

    T.M Jakkanna Tippanna Mallappa Jakkannavar And Another v. Rajalaxmi Traders

    8. 1998 SC 128- Pepsi Food Ltd., v. Special Judicial Magistrate (do) 9

    Sri S.P Kulkarni, Advocate for Petitioners
    Sri G. Shanthappa, Advocate for Respondent

    Narayan, J.:—

    This matter coming on for orders this day is taken up for final disposal by consent of the Learned Counsel appearing on both sides, heard and disposed of by this order.

    2. Petitioners herein who are accused Nos. 1 and 2 have assailed the order dated 5.4.1999 passed in C.C No. 931/99 on the file of the JMFC, Chitradurga issuing process against them for an offence punishable under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act. Few facts necessary for disposal of this petition are stated as under:—

    The respondent herein presented a complaint under Section 142 of the negotiable Instruments Act read with Section 200 Cr. P.C interalia contending that accused No. 1 had issued a cheque for a sum of Rs. 50,000 knowing fully well that there was no sufficient fund in his account. The complainant issued a notice dated 22.2.1999 demanding the amount due and the said notice sent by Registered post is duly served on the accused on 24.2.1999 Since the accused failed to pay the amount within 15 days from the date of service of notice, the complainant presented the said complaint to initiate criminal action and punish the accused in accordance with Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act. The learned Magistrate before whom the said complaint was presented, took cognizance of the offence, recorded the sworn statement of the complainant and marked 4 documents. On being satisfied with the complaint allegations and the sworn statement made by the complainant and the documents marked on his behalf, the learned magistrate was of the opinion that there were sufficient grounds to proceed against the accused for offence punishable under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act and therefore ordered issue of summons to the accused.

    3. This order is challenged on the following grounds:—

    That there exists no prima facie case against the accused to proceed for the offence alleged against them and necessary ingredients in prima facie proof of the offence punishable under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act are not forthcoming. The statutory notice does not indicate the exact value of cheque but attracts entire large amount of transaction and it does not strictly comply the provisions of Clause (b) of Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act and there is cognate violation of Section 200 and 202 Cr. P.C and the complaint is also barred by time.

    4. I have heard the learned Counsel on both sides and perused the records. Learned Counsel for the petitioners raised two contentions for my consideration viz., that the learned Magistrate has erred in taking cognizance of the offence under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act in the absence of compliance of Section 202 Cr. P.C and the demand notice issued by the complainant is not in accordance with law and, is contrary to the ratio laid down by this Court in Dr. K.G Ramachandra Guptha v. Dr. G. Adinarayana . ILR 2000 KAR 1570. Learned Counsel for the petitioners has raised no other contention for my consideration. Controverting these submissions, learned Counsel for the respondent draw my attention to the law laid down by the Apex Court in Suman Sethi v. Ajay Churiwal . AIR 2000 SC 828.

    5. I have given my careful consideration to these submissions the bar. Therefore the short question which arises for consideration in this petition is whether the proceeding initiated by the learned Magistrate contrary to the provisions of law is an abuse of process of Court and is liable to be quashed.

    6. After hearing the Learned Counsel on both sides, I am of the opinion that the two grounds canvassed for consideration by the learned Counsel for the petitioner have no merit. Section 204 part (2) Cr. P.C is no doubt mandatory which provides that no summons or warrant shall be issued against the accused under sub-Section (1) until a list of the prosecution witness has been filed. This is only a procedural formality which requires to be observed by the magistrate who has taken cognizance of the offence and was about to issue summons to the accused. The law requires that he shall not issue summons or warrant until a list of the prosecution witnesses has been filed. The Kerala High Court in Madhavan Nambiar v. Govindan and the Himachal Pradesh High Court in Kahnu Ram v. Durga Dass held that proceeding is not vitiated for passing the order of issue of process against the accused before filing of list of witnesses by the prosecution unless prejudice has been caused to the accused. If such list is produced before evidence is taken, no prejudice is cause. Even if the filing of the list held to be mandatory, the issue of process before the list being filed may be curable under Section 465 Cr. P.C If there is no list of the witnesses filed by the complainant, it only means that there is no witness to examine on his behalf. If he makes an application with a list of witnesses subsequently showing sufficient cause for non-filing the list at the time of issue of notice, a magistrate in his discretion may allow it.

    7. In so far as the second contention is concerned, learned Counsel draw my attention to the notice dated 19.2.1999 issued by the complainant through his Advocate, a copy of which is enclosed wherein he has notified certain purchases made by the accused from the complainant which was supplied to them through Lorry bearing Registration No. KA. 25/5226, 331 bags of Groundnuts seeds of 30 K.G each in all weighing 9950 K.Gs worth Rs. 1,24,553.00 (inclusive of their commission). It is stated that towards part payment of the money, after taking the delivery of the goods at the destination point viz., Gadag, he issued a cheque bearing No. 0504465 dated 20.11.1998 drawn on the Station Road Branch of Vijay Bank, in favour of his client's concern for Rs. 50,000/- assuring his clients of its encasement when presented. The cheque was presented to the Vijaya Bank at Chitradurga. But to their surprise they received a reference bearing No. 54/99 dated 16.2.1999 from the Manager of Chitradurga Branch of Vijaya Bank returning the cheque stating that the cheque is returned as unenclosed at the Gadag branch of Vijaya Bank, due to non-maintenance of sufficient funds in the account of the accused. He therefore called upon them not only to pay the cheque amount of Rs. 50,000 but also the balance amount due to him with 18% interest.

    8. Reliance is placed by the learned Counsel for the petitioners to the decision rendered by this Court in Dr. K.G Ramachandra Gupta v. Dr. G. Adinarayana and relied upon the observation made at para 6 page 1587 as under:

    “Since the demand was made for the total amount of Rs. 2,51,600 but not merely for the value of the dishonoured cheque amounts, though it is mentioned that the said demand made is inclusive of the valued of the dishonoured cheques, I find that the said demand made is not the demand to be made as required under Section 138 proviso to Clause (b) of the Act. The balance amount due under the original loan transaction has been combined with the value of the dishonoured cheque amounts and a common demand has been made by the said notice to the accused to make payment.”

    His Lordship-was considering two sets of facts. In the earlier part of the judgment in the criminal appeals arising out of the order of acquittal rendered by the trial Court for the offence under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, his Lordship observed relying upon the Apex Court's judgment in Suman Sethi v. Ajay K. Churiwal . AIR 2000 SC 828. as under:

    “Though in the said notice, a demand is also made for payment of the balance of the principal amount of the loan with up-to-date interest, in addition to the value of the two dishonoured cheques of Rs. 1,00,000 on that ground, it cannot be said that the notice is invalid in view of the latest decision of the Supreme Court reported in Suman Sethi v. Ajay K. Churiwal.”

    But while considering the second set of facts, it is held that:

    “The complainants are different and the cheques have been issued in discharge of liability under separate loan transactions. So in the circumstances, I find that a combined notice issued on behalf of the complainants in two different cases, though the complainants are related to each other as husband and wife in respect of separate cheques issued in their favour, making a demand for payment of the total value of all the three cheques issued in favour of different complainants is not valid. Further, since the demand was made for the total amount of Rs. 2,51,600 but not merely for the values of the dishonoured cheque amounts, though it is mentioned that the said demand made is inclusive of the value of the dishonoured cheques, I find that the said demand made is not the demand to be made as require under Section 138 proviso to Clause (b) of the Act. The balance amount due under the original loan transaction has been combined with the value of the dishonoured cheque amounts and a common demand has been made by the said notice to the accused to make payment.”

    9. Infact these two observations made at different intervals in the said judgment contradicts but I do not see any contradiction when his Lordship has rejected the contention that claiming interest, costs etc. alongwith the cheque amount is not in compliance with the provisions of Section 138 Clause (b) of the Act. Infact, the Apex Court in Suman Sethi's case cited supra has clarified this position. The Apex Court was considering and interpreting the language used in Section 138 of the Act including Clauses (b) and (c) and also the presumption arises under Section 139 of the act and the law is laid down by the Apex Court as follows:

    “7. There is no ambiguity or doubt in the language of Section 138. Reading the entire Section as a whole and applying commonsense, from the words, as stated above, it is clear that the legislature intended that in notice under Clause (b) to the proviso, the demand has to be made for the cheque amount. According to Dr. Dhawan, the notice of demand should not contain anything more or less than what is due under the cheque.

    8. It is well settled principle of law that the notice has to be read as a whole. In the notice, demand has to be made for the “said amount” i.e, cheque amount. If no such demand is made the notice no doubt would fall short of its legal requirement. Where in addition to “Said amount” there is also a claim by way of interest cost etc. Whether the notice is bad would depend on the language of the notice. If in a notice while giving up break up of the claim the cheque amount, interest damages etc. are separately specified, other such claims for interest, cost etc. Would be superfluous and these additional claims would be severable and will not invalidate the notice. If, however, in the notice an omnibus demand is made without specifying what was due under the dishonoured cheque, notice might well fail to meet the legal requirement and may be regarded as bad.”

    At para 9 it is held that:

    “9. This Court had occasion to deal with Section 138 of the Act in Central Bank of India v. Saxons Farms, (1999) 8 JT (SC) 58 : (1999 AIR SCW 3621 : AIR 1999 SC 3607 : 1999 Cri L.J 4571) and held that the object of the notice is to give chance to the drawer of the cheque to rectify his omission. Though in the notice demand for compensation, interest, etc. is also made drawer will be absolved from his liability under Section 138 if he makes the payment of the amount covered by the cheque of which he was aware within 15 days from the date of receipt of the notice or before complaint is filed.”

    The purpose of issue of a notice is stated at pare 10 as follows:

    “10. In Section 138 legislature clearly stated that for the dishonoured cheque the drawer shall be liable for conviction of the demand is not made within 15 days of the receipt of notice but this is without prejudice to any other provision of the Act. If the cheque amount is paid within the above period or before the complaint is filed the legal liability under Section 138 will cease and for recovery of other demands as compensation, costs, interest etc., a civil proceeding will lie. Therefore, if in a notice any other sum is indicated in addition to the “said amount” the notice cannot be faulted, as stated above.”

    Therefore, the Supreme Court has laid down the purport and object of the notice required under Section 138(b) the object being to notify the accused to repay the amount so demanded in the notice within 15 days from the date of service of notice. Failure to comply the demand is to face the prosecution under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act. There is a specific demand for the cheque amount apart from the balance of amount due to the complainant by the accused. There is no denial of the demand made nor compliance of the demand. If the accused had paid the cheque amount demanded in the notice, they would have compiled the notice of demand as the extra amount claimed in the notice is severable and are not bound to honour that extra demand. In view of the settled position of law, the interpretation given by his Lordship Justice K.R Prasad Rao in the later part of the judgment in Dr. K.G Ramachandra Gupta v. Dr. G. Adinarayana specifically cited supra is difficult to follow. No other contentions are canvassed for consideration. No infirmity in the presentation of the complaint and the cognizance taken by the learned Magistrate is pointed out by the learned Counsel for the petitioners. Therefore, the presentation of the complaint and the cognizance taken by the learned Magistrate against the petitioners under the circumstances in my opinion is not an abuse of process of Court calling for interference to meet the ends of justice. What circumstances, interference under Section 482 Cr. P.C is called for has been amply demonstrated and explained by the Apex Court. In Minakshi Bala v. Sudhir Kumar the Apex Court held that the inherent jurisdiction of the High Court to quash the proceeding can only be invoked except where forensic exigencies and formidable compulsions justify such a course. Therefore in State of Haryana v. Ch. Bhajan Lal at para 108, the Supreme Court has listed certain categories of cases wherein the High Court may, in exercise of powers under Article 226 or u/r 482 Cr. P.C interfere in proceedings relating to cognizance or to prevent abuse of the process of any Court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice. But the power should be exercised very sparingly and that too in the rarest of rare cases. In Pepsi Food Ltd., v. Special Judicial Magistrate the Supreme Court has observed that nomenclature under which petition is filed is not quite relevant and that does not debar the Court from exercising its jurisdiction which otherwise it possess unless there is special procedure prescribed which procedure is mandatory.

    10. The discussion made supra does not compel the Court to interfere with the impugned order and therefore there is no material for quashing the proceedings. Petitions is accordingly dismissed.

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    T.M Jakkanna Tippanna Mallappa Jakkannavar And Another v. Rajalaxmi Traders
    (Jul 26, 2000)