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  • Section 120-B read with 420 IPC and Section 276-C and 277 of the Income Tax Act, 1961.7.
  • Section 561A of the old Code, viz., Cr. P.C 1898. Dealing with Section 561-A of 1898 Code,
  • Sections 420 and 120B I PC read with Section 276C and 277 of Income tax Act.
  • Section 120B IPC read with Section 276C and 277 of the Income Tax Act, 1961.
  • Section 482 Cr. P.C read with Article 226 of the Constitution,
  • investigation.10. Section 482 Cr. P.C
  • (Protection) Act, 1972,
  • Section 482 Cr. P.C
  • Section 157 Cr. P.C
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citation codes
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  • Section 120-B read with 420 IPC and Section 276-C and 277 of the Income Tax Act, 1961.7.
  • Section 561A of the old Code, viz., Cr. P.C 1898. Dealing with Section 561-A of 1898 Code,
  • Sections 420 and 120B I PC read with Section 276C and 277 of Income tax Act.
  • Section 120B IPC read with Section 276C and 277 of the Income Tax Act, 1961.
  • Section 482 Cr. P.C read with Article 226 of the Constitution,
  • investigation.10. Section 482 Cr. P.C
  • (Protection) Act, 1972,
  • Section 482 Cr. P.C
  • Section 157 Cr. P.C
Smart Summary

Structured Summary of Opinion (Hanumanthappa, J.)

Factual and Procedural Background

This petition under Section 482 Cr. P.C. seeks quashing of a complaint filed on 30-6-1989 that alleged the petitioners (partners/directors of South Eastern Roadways, Bangalore) conspired with a person in Sikkim (S-4) and others to evade payment of income tax of about Rs. 10 lakhs. The complaint alleges that S-4 obtained demand drafts favouring minor children/wives of the petitioners, sent them along with affidavits claiming donations, the petitioners deposited the drafts into the minor/wives' accounts and later transferred funds to South Eastern Roadways and an associate firm. The authorities invoked Sections 120B and 420 IPC read with Sections 276C and 277 of the Income Tax Act. The petitioners applied to the High Court to quash the complaint; the matter was listed for admission but taken up for final hearing at the request of counsel. The petition was admitted for hearing and the prosecution's investigation had not been completed at the time of the order; the Court noted delay in investigation since the complaint was filed.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether, in the absence of a prima facie and reasonable case to proceed with investigation, the High Court should exercise its inherent powers under Section 482 Cr. P.C. to quash the complaint and stop investigation.
  2. Whether the allegations in the complaint, read as a whole, disclose offences punishable under Sections 415 and 420 IPC and Section 120B IPC read with Sections 276C and 277 of the Income Tax Act, 1961.
  3. Whether the High Court should quash proceedings at the stage of investigation when the complaint is alleged to be vague, frivolous or vexatious, or when investigation has been unduly delayed.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioners' Arguments (Sri B.V. Acharya / Sri Acharya)

  • The complaint, if read as a whole, does not disclose the commission of offences under Section 420 read with Section 120B IPC.
  • Comparison of the complaint's averments with Sections 415 and 420 IPC shows the complaint falls short of the legal requirements — specifically, there is no adequate allegation of deception causing the department to part with property or inducement as required by cheating offences.
  • Accordingly, the petitioners sought quashing of the complaint and related proceedings.

Respondents' Arguments (Sri Shylendra Kumar, Central Government Standing Counsel)

  • The complaint contains ingredients of offences under Section 420 read with Section 120B IPC; the Department believed the petitioners attempted to cheat the Department and evade payment of tax amounting to about Rs. 10 lakhs.
  • The absence of verbatim wording from the Indian Penal Code in the complaint does not mean no prima facie case is made out; the complaint should be read as a whole.
  • The High Court should quash FIR or investigations only in exceptional and extraordinary circumstances; the present case is not such an exception.
  • The respondents relied on precedent — including State of Bihar v. Murad Ali Khan — to support the proposition that quashing is impermissible where allegations on their face could constitute the offence alleged.
  • The respondents also relied on State Of Karnataka v. Kallappa Yallappa Goni for the proposition that when different acts are committed (some cognizable and some non-cognizable), the competent authority may proceed against the petitioners for the offences made out.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
State of Bihar v. Murad Ali Khan, AIR 1989 SC 1 Where allegations in a complaint, taken on their face-value, amount in law to an offence, quashing by High Court is impermissible; Section 482 to be exercised sparingly. The respondents relied on it to argue against quashing. The Court referred to it as authority on the limited exercise of Section 482, but applied the broader test and found the present complaint did not disclose a prima facie offence.
R.P. Kapur v. State of Punjab, AIR 1960 SC 866 Explains inherent power (old Section 561A) to quash to prevent abuse of process or secure ends of justice; categorises cases where inherent jurisdiction may be exercised (i) legal bar, (ii) allegations do not constitute offence on face of complaint, (iii) no legal evidence or evidence manifestly fails. The Court used the categories from this decision as a framework to assess whether the complaint disclosed an offence and whether inherent jurisdiction should be exercised.
State of West Bengal v. Swapan Kumar Guha, AIR 1982 SC 949 Whether an offence is disclosed depends on facts; an F.I.R. that does not prima facie disclose essential requirements of the penal provision cannot lawfully start an investigation; investigation can be quashed if no cognizable offence is disclosed. The Court applied this principle to conclude that if a complaint/FIR does not prima facie disclose a cognizable offence, the High Court is justified in quashing investigation. The Court found the present complaint failed that test.
Trilok Singh v. Satya Deo Tripathi, AIR 1979 SC 850 Section 482 can be exercised where proceedings are clearly an abuse of process of Court, e.g., when allegations are essentially civil in nature. The Court cited this decision for the proposition that proceedings initiated as an abuse of process can be quashed. It held that the present proceedings amounted to abuse and therefore warranted quashing.
C.N. Seetharam v. State of Karnataka, ILR 1988 KAR 2053 High Court will normally refrain from interfering with police investigation in cognizable cases; exceptions exist where facts in FIR do not constitute any offence and High Court may quash investigation under Section 482 or writ jurisdiction. The Court relied on this state decision to support the view that where the FIR's facts do not constitute an offence, the High Court can interfere. The Court concluded the FIR here did not constitute an offence and interference was warranted.
Mrs. Dhanalakshmi v. R. Prasanna Kumar, AIR 1990 SC 494 Quashing under Section 482 is unwarranted when proceedings do not disclose malice or are not frivolous/vexatious; but complaint can be quashed if it does not disclose an offence or is frivolous, vexatious or oppressive. The Court cited this authority for the principle that quashing is appropriate where complaints are frivolous or do not disclose offences; it applied that principle, finding the present complaint frivolous/vexatious and not disclosing required ingredients of cheating.
State Of Karnataka v. Kallappa Yallappa Goni, ILR 1986 KAR 1225 Authority for proposition that when different acts are committed (some cognizable, some non-cognizable), the competent court/authority may proceed against the accused for offences made out. The respondents relied upon this decision to argue the Court could proceed even where some offences are cognizable and some are non-cognizable; the Court noted the reliance but concluded on the facts that the complaint did not make out the alleged offences.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court undertook a step-by-step analysis constrained by the authorities on Section 482 Cr. P.C. It first set out the statutory definitions relevant to the offence of cheating (Sections 415 and 420 IPC) as quoted in the opinion and compared those ingredients with the allegations in the complaint.

Key analytical steps, as reflected in the opinion:

  • Examination of complaint allegations: The complaint alleged a conspiracy to evade income tax by transferring about Rs. 10 lakhs through demand drafts favouring minors/wives and using affidavits claiming donations; it alleged offences under Section 120B read with 420 IPC and Sections 276C/277 Income Tax Act.
  • Comparison with Sections 415 and 420 IPC: The Court considered whether the complaint's averments satisfied the elements of deception and dishonest inducement required by those sections. The Court concluded the averments fell short of the requirements of Sections 415 and 420 IPC.
  • Application of Section 482 jurisprudence: The Court reviewed the Supreme Court and High Court decisions governing the inherent power — emphasising that Section 482 is to be exercised sparingly, but that quashing is appropriate where (inter alia) the allegations on the face of the complaint do not constitute any offence, or where proceedings are frivolous, vexatious or amount to an abuse of process.
  • Testing the complaint against recognised grounds for quashing: The Court applied the established tests (e.g., whether grounds to suspect an offence are reasonable; whether allegations read as a whole constitute an offence; whether the FIR is frivolous/vexatious) and found the complaint wanting on these counts.
  • Assessment of abuse and non-application of mind: The Court found that the complaint resulted from vague and baseless allegations and a non-application of mind to the legal provisions relied upon by the Department. The Court concluded there was neither fraud played nor inducement made so as to cause the Department to part with any property.
  • Delay in investigation: The complaint was filed on 30-6-1989 and investigation had not been completed; the Court observed the delay and inferred that the seriousness had been diluted, adding weight to the conclusion that continuing such proceedings would be an abuse of process.
  • Balancing prosecutorial remedies: The Court expressly noted that it was not impinging upon the Department's statutory powers to book evaders of tax or recover revenue by appropriate means; those rights were left open.

On the basis of these findings, and applying the principles from the cited precedents, the Court concluded that the complaint did not disclose a prima facie case warranting continuation of investigation or prosecution and that permitting the proceedings to continue would amount to an abuse of the process of the Court.

Holding and Implications

Holding:

THE PETITION IS ALLOWED; THE COMPLAINT IS QUASHED AND THE PROCEEDINGS INITIATED BY THE PROSECUTION ON THE SAID COMPLAINT ARE QUASHED.

Implications and consequences:

  • Direct effect: The complaint lodged against the petitioners and all consequent criminal proceedings based on that complaint are quashed.
  • Reasoning-based consequence: The quash was ordered because the complaint did not, on its face, disclose the essential ingredients of the offences charged (particularly under Sections 415 and 420 IPC and Section 120B IPC read with Sections 276C/277 Income Tax Act), and continuation would amount to abuse of process.
  • Preservation of revenue remedies: The Court explicitly left open the Department's other contentions and rights, including its right to recover tax, if any, from the petitioners by the statutory methods available to it.
  • Precedential note: The opinion applies established principles governing Section 482 Cr. P.C. (as discussed and cited), but the Court did not purport to lay down any new general rule beyond applying those precedents to the facts of this case.

All content in this summary is drawn exclusively from the provided opinion. No information beyond the opinion has been added.

    Yeshvir Goyal v. Union Of India

    Hanumanthappa, J.:—

    Though the matter is listed for admission, on the request made by the learned Counsel for the petitioner and the learned Central Government Standing Counsel, the matter is taken up for final hearing.

    Admit.

    2. This Petition is filed under Section 482 Cr. P.C seeking to quash the complaint lodged against the petitioners for the offences punishable under Sections 420 and 120B I PC read with Section 276C and 277 of Income tax Act. The point for consideration in this case is whether in the absence of prima facie and a reasonable case to proceed with investigation this Court should refuse to exercise its powers under Section 482 of Cr. P.C

    3. Sri B.V Acharya, learned Counsel for the petitioners, submits that, if the entire complaint is read, it does not disclose that offences punishable under Section 420 read with Section 120B IPC has been made out.

    4. Sri Shylendra Kumar, learned Central Government Standing Counsel for the respondents, submits that the ingredients of the offences punishable Under Section 420 read with Section 120B IPC have been made out in the complaint. The Department felt that the main idea of the petitioners was to cheat the Department in making an attempt to escape from payment of tax amounting to the tune of Rupees ten lakhs. He further submits that the complaint if read as a whole, it is clear that a case has been made out, merely because the wordings as mentioned in the Indian Penal Code are not mentioned in the complaint, that itself is not sufficient to contend that no prima facie case has been made out. He further submits that this Court can quash either F.I.R or investigations only under exceptional and extraordinary circumstances. The present proceedings are not of that type.

    5. In support of this contention, he relied upon the Decision of the Supreme Court in State of Bihar v. Murad Ali Khan . AIR 1989 SC 1. wherein it is held as follows:

    “Where it was alleged in the written complaint filed by the Range Forest Officer that the accused person shot and killed an elephant in a particular Range forest and removed the ivory tusks of the elephant and it was mentioned in the complaint that elephant was included in the Schedule I of the Wild Life (Protection) Act, 1972, and that the complainant was authorised by the Bihar Government's notification No. SO. 1022/418/73 to file complaints under the Act and the Magistrate took cognizance of the offence under Wilf Life Protection Act and ordered issue of the process to the accused, it could not be said that the allegations in the complaint, taken on their face-value, would not amount in law to any offence against the ‘Act’. Therefore, the quashing of the proceedings of the Magistrate, on the facts of the case by the High Court was impermissible as an exercise under Section 482 Cr. P.C Crl. Misc. Nos. 258 and 259 of 1987 (R), D/- 18-2-1987 (Pat) and Crl. Misc. No. 223 of 1987, dated 13-2-1987 (Pat), Reversed.

    It is trite that jurisdiction under Section 482 Cr. P.C which saves the inherent power of the High Court, to make such orders as may be necessary to prevent abuse of the process of any Court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice, has to be exercised sparingly and with circumspection. In exercising that jurisdiction the High Court would not embark upon an enquiry whether the allegations in the complaint are likely to be established by evidence or not. That is the function of the trial Magistrate when the evidence comes before him. Though it is neither possible nor advisable to lay down any inflexible rules to regulate that jurisdiction, one thing, however, appears clear and it is that when the High Court is called upon to exercise this jurisdiction to quash a proceeding at the stage of the Magistrate taking cognizance of an offence the High Court is guided by the allegations, whether those allegations, set out in the complaint or the charge-sheet, do not in law constitute or spell out any offence and that resort to criminal proceedings, would, in the circumstances, amount to an abuse of the process of the Court or not.”

    The other contention is that the offence punishable is not merely under Section 420 IPC but also under Section 120B IPC read with Section 276C and 277 of the Income Tax Act, 1961. When different acts are committed, the Court which has got jurisdiction or the authority can as well proceed against the petitioners for the offences made out unmindful of the fact that some of the offences are cognizable and some are non-cognizable. For this proposition Sri Shylendra Kumar relied upon a Decision of this Court in State Of Karnataka v. Kallappa Yallappa Goni* . ILR 1986 KAR 1225.. He also submits that this Court can exercise its inherent powers under Section 482 Cr. P.C only when it is required to correct any order passed under the Cr. P.C or to prevent abuse of the process of Court or to secure ends of justice. According to him that in the instant case none of the above three ingredients is made out. Hence, the request of the petitioners to set aside the proceedings is neither tenable nor reasonable.

    6. As an answer to these contentions Sri Acharya, learned Counsel for the petitioners, submits that, if the entire complaint is read, there is nothing to indicate that the petitioners have committed any of the offences as alleged. The complaint reads as follows:

    “Credible information has been received to the effect that S-1 to S-3 who are Partners/Directors of South Eastern Roadways, Bangalore entered into a criminal conspiracy with S-4 who is a resident of Gongtok, East Sikkim and some unknown officials/persons during 1985 to cheat the Government of India, i.e, Income Tax Department by way of evading payment of income tax and in pursuance of the conspiracy S-1 to S-3 handed over to S-4 unaccounted black money to the tune of about Rs. 10 lakhs, S-4 obtained eight demand drafts in November 1981 from State Bank of India and United Commercial Bank branches in Sikkim on Bangalore Branch of these banks favouring minor children/wives of S-1 to S-3 for a total sum of Rs. 10 lakhs and sent them to S-1 to S-3 along with affidavits sworn, before the Court of the Judicial Magistrate, East Sikkim, Gongtok to the effect that he had donated the amount to the minor children/wives of S-1 to S-3 out of love and affection and out of his capital etc., S-1 to S-3 opened accounts in the names of their minor children/wives in Canara Bank, Benson Town Branch between July and November, 1985 land deposited the demand drafts in those accounts which were cleared from SBI and United Commercial Bank and credited to the respective accounts from where the funds were later on transferred to the credit of South Eastern Roadways and Nandavanam Roadways - an associate firm. Thus S-1 to S-3 with the connivance of S-4 and others cheated the Government of India of Income Tax on Rs. 10 lakhs and thereby committed offences punishable under Section 120-B read with 420 IPC and Section 276-C and 277 of the Income Tax Act, 1961.”

    7. In order to know whether any offence has been committed particularly the offence punishable under Section 420 IPC, as submitted by Sri Shylendra Kumar, it is proper to bear in mind Sections 415 and 420 IPC which deal with ‘cheating’. Section 415 reads thus:

    “415. Whoever, by deceiving any person, fraudulently or dishonestly induces the person so deceived to deliver any property to any person, or to consent that any person shall retain any property, or intentionally induces the person so deceived to do or omit to do anything which he would not do or omit if he were not so deceived, and which act or omission causes or is likely to cause damage or harm to that person in body, mind, reputation or property, is said to ‘cheat’.

    Explanation - A dishonest concealment of facts is a deception within the meaning of this Section.”

    Section 420 IPC reads thus:

    “420. Whoever cheats and thereby dishonestly induces the person deceived to deliver any property to any person, or to make, alter or destroy the whole or any part of a valuable security, or anything which is signed or sealed, and which is capable of being converted into a valuable security, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to seven years and shall also be liable to fine.”

    According to Sri Acharya, if the averments made in the complaint and the words used in the above Sections are compared and understood properly, the conclusion will be that the averments made in the complaint fall short of the requirements as provided under Sections 415 and 420 IPC. Hence, the request of Sri Acharya is to quash the proceedings.

    8. Perusal of the allegations made in the complaint and requirements in Sections 415 and 420 IPC, the conclusion will be that the complaint does not make out a prima facie case to proceed with the case.

    9. The next point is whether this Court will be justified in quashing the proceedings at the stage of investigation.

    10. Section 482 Cr. P.C is analoguous to Section 561A of the old Code, viz., Cr. P.C 1898. Dealing with Section 561-A of 1898 Code, the Supreme Court in R.P Kapur v. State Of Punjab. . AIR 1960 SC 866. observed that the inherent power of this Court to quash any proceeding can be exercised in a proper case either to prevent abuse of the process of Court or to secure ends of justice. However, the Court must be cautious. Ordinarily criminal proceedings instituted against the accused person must be tried under the provisions of the Code and the High Court must be reluctant to interfere with the proceedings at an interlocutory stage. The Supreme Court further held that it is not possible, desirable or expedient to lay down any inflexible rule which would govern the exercise of this inherent jurisdiction. Thus the Supreme Court categorises the cases where the inherent jurisdiction to quash proceedings can be exercised thus:

    “(i) Where it manifestly appears that there is a legal bar against the institution or continuance of the criminal proceedings in respect of the offence alleged. Absence of the requisite sanction may, for instance, furnish cases under this category.

    (ii) Where the allegations in the First Information Report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety, do not constitute the offence alleged; in such cases no question of appreciating evidence arises; it is a matter merely of looking at the complaint or the First Information Report to decide whether the offence alleged is disclosed or not.

    (iii) Where the allegations made against the accused person do constitute an offence alleged but there is either no legal evidence adduced in support of the case or the evidence adduced clearly or manifestly fails to prove the charge. In dealing with this class of cases it is important to bear in mind the distinction between a case where there is no legal evidence or where there is evidence which is manifestly and clearly inconsistent with the accusation made and cases where there is legal evidence which on its appreciation may or may not support the accusation in question. In exercising its jurisdiction under Section 561A the High Court would not embark upon an enquiry as to whether the evidence in question is reliable or not. That is the function of the trial Magistrate, and ordinarily it would not be open to any party to invoke the High Court's inherent jurisdiction and contend that on a reasonable appreciation of the evidence the accusation made against the accused would not be sustained.

    Broadly stated that is the nature and scope of the inherent jurisdiction of the High Court under Section 561A in the matter of quashing criminal proceedings, and that is the effect of the judicial decisions on the point.”

    While interpreting Section 482 Cr. P.C read with Article 226 of the Constitution, the Supreme Court in State of West Bengal and Others v. Swap an Kumar Guha . AIR 1982 SC 949. held whether an offence has been disclosed or not must necessarily depend on the facts and circumstances of each particular case. If on a consideration of the relevant materials, the Court is satisfied that an offence is disclosed, the Court will normally not interfere with the investigation into the offence and will generally allow the investigation in the offence to be completed for collecting materials for proving the offence. If, on the other hand, the Court on a consideration of the relevant materials is satisfied that no offence is disclosed, it will be the duty of the Court to interfere with any investigation and to stop the same to prevent any kind of uncalled for and unnecessary harassment to an individual. The Supreme Court further held:

    “A First Information Report which does not allege or disclose that the essential requirements of the penal provision are prima facie satisfied, cannot form the foundation or constitute the starting point of a lawful investigation.

    An investigation can be quashed if no cognizable offence is disclosed by the F.I.R It is surely not within the province of the police to investigate into a Report (F.I.R) which does not disclose the commission of a cognizable offence and the Code does not impose upon them the duty of inquiry in such cases.

    The condition precedent to the commencement of investigation under Section 157 of the Code is that the F.I.R must disclose, prima facie, that a cognizable offence has been committed. It is wrong to suppose that the police have an unfettered discretion to commence investigation under Section 157 of the Code. Their right of inquiry is conditioned by the existence of reason to suspect the commission of a cognizable offence and they cannot, reasonably, have reason so to suspect unless the F.I.R, prima facie, discloses the commission of such offence. If that condition is satisfied, the investigation must go on. The Court has then no power to stop the investigation, for to do so would be to trench upon the lawful power of the police to investigate into cognizable offences. On the other hand, if the F.I.R does not disclose the commission of a cognizable offence, the Court would be justified in quashing the investigation on the basis of the information as laid or received. The power to investigate into cognizable Offences must, therefore, be exercised strictly on the condition on which it is granted by the Code.”

    Earlier the Supreme Court in Trilok Singh v. Satya Deo Tripathi . AIR 1979 SC 850. explaining the scope of Section 482 Cr. P.C held that the inherent jurisdiction can be exercised to quash the proceedings, if so required to prevent the abuse of the process of the Court. That was a case where on the material the Court came to the conclusion that the allegations made were purely civil in nature and held as follows:

    “The proceeding initiated was clearly an abuse of the process of the Court. It was not a case where any process ought to have been directed to be issued against the accused (appellants). On the well-settled principles of law it was a very suitable case where this criminal proceeding ought to have been quashed by the High Court in exercise of its inherent power. The dispute raised by the respondent was purely of a civil nature even assuming the facts stated by him to be substantially correct.”

    Apart from the Decisions of the Supreme Court referred to above, this Court in C.N Seetharam v. State Of Karnataka* . ILR 1988 KAR 2053. explaining the scope of Section 482 Cr. P.C held thus:

    “Where, within the limits of the exercise of the statutory power, the police in cognizable case takes up investigation under Section 157 Cr. P.C the High Court will refrain from interfering in the course of investigation. There are exceptions to this broad principle of law as laid in various decisions. For instance where the facts in the FIR themselves do not constitute any cognizable or non-cognizable offence and if the police proceed to register a case and take up investigation, the High Court will be within its powers to interfere with such investigation and quash the FIR either in exercise of the powers of Writ Jurisdiction or inherent powers conferred under Section 482 Cr. P.C to prevent abuse of the process of Court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice.”

    Again in 1990 the Supreme Court in Mrs. Dhanalakshmi v. R. Prasanna Kumar . AIR 1990 SC 494., held that quashing of proceedings by exercising the power under Section 482 Cr. P.C is unwarranted and uncalled for particularly when the proceedings do not disclose any malafides or in any way frivolous or vexatious. However, in the same Decision, the Supreme Court laid down the circumstances in which the High Court can quash the proceedings. The relevant portion reads thus:

    “Section 482 empowers the High Court to exercise its inherent powers to prevent abuse of the process of Court. In proceedings instituted on complaint exercise of the inherent power to quash the proceedings is called for only in cases where the complaint does not disclose any offence or is frivolous, vexatious or oppressive. If the allegations set out in the complaint do not constitute the offence of which cognizance is taken by the Magistrate is open to the High Court to quash the same in exercise of the inherent powers under Section 482. It is not, however, necessary that there should be a meticulous analysis of the case, before the trial to find out whether the case would end in conviction or not. The complaint has to be read as a whole.”

    From the above Rulings of the Supreme Court and also of this Court, it is clear that the inherent powers under Section 482 Cr. P.C are to be used sparingly and with circumspection. But, it cannot be said that, if the allegations made in the complaint are either vague and frivolous in nature or vexatious, this Court should close its eyes and refuse to quash the proceedings initiated on such baseless allegations. Thus powers under Section 482 Cr. P.C to quash the F.I.R or investigation be exercised when it is shown on consideration of relevant material that: (i) Grounds made out in the complaint to suspect that an offence has been committed are not reasonable; (ii) Allegations in the complaint if read as a whole do not constitute an offence; (iii) F.I.R is quite frivolous and vexatious in that prima facie no cognizable or non-cognizable offence has been made out; (iv)(a) Interference under Section 482 Cr. P.C is required to correct any order passed under this Code, or, (b) to prevent of abuse process of the Court, or (c) to secure ends of justice.

    11. Keeping the above principles laid down by this Court as well as by the Supreme Court, if the complaint is read as a whole the only conclusion that could be arrived at is that the proceedings Initiated are vague, vexatious and unreasonable and the resultant of non-application of mind on the part of the Department to the provisions of Sections 120B, read with Sections 415 and 420 IPC. Because, there is neither fraud played or inducement made so as to make the Department to part with any property for the benefit of the petitioners. When it is said that the complaint itself is resultant of vague and baseless allegations coupled with non-application of mind to the provisions of the Act upon which the Department relies, it has to be said that any investigation pursuant to such a complaint is a mis-conceived one and, if such proceedings are allowed to continue, the same would result in abuse of the process of the Court. When such a probable abuse of process of the Court is brought to the notice of this Court, it is paramount duty of this Court to prevent such abuse of the process of the Court at its threshold instead of driving the parties to a disadvantageous position.

    12. It is not the case of the prosecution that in case of evasion of tax, the Department has no power to book the evader and recover the revenue to the State. When such a course is still available, it is difficult to understand why the Department is interested in present proceedings initiated on baseless allegations. Hence, in order to prevent abuse of the process of the Court and to secure ends of justice, the proceedings have to be quashed.

    13. Another peculiarity in this case is that the complaint was filed on 30-6-1989. So far, the prosecution has not completed its investigation. The delay caused is sufficient to infer that everything is going in a very leisurely manner and the seriousness which the Department thought of at the time of filing the complaint has been diluted at a later stage.

    14. Accordingly, this Petition is allowed and the complaint is quashed. Consequently, the proceedings initiated by the prosecution on the said complaint also are quashed. All other contentions which are available to the Department including its right to recover the tax, if any, from the petitioners in the manner known to it are left open.

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    Yeshvir Goyal v. Union Of India
    (Oct 10, 1991)