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  • section 2(9)(c) of the Finance Act, 1976.14.
  • section 256(2) of the Income-tax Act,
  • clause (c) of section 2(9)]
  • section 8(3)(b) and rule
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Citation Codes
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citation codes
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  • section 2(9)(c) of the Finance Act, 1976.14.
  • section 256(2) of the Income-tax Act,
  • clause (c) of section 2(9)]
  • section 8(3)(b) and rule
Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

This judgment was delivered by K. Shivashankar Bhat, J., on a question referred under section 256(2) of the Income-tax Act, 1961:

The question referred was whether the Tribunal was right in holding that the assessee was not an "industrial company" within the meaning of section 2(9)(c) of the Finance Act, 1976. The relevant assessment year is 1976–77.

The assessee described its business as manufacturing and sale of wooden packing boxes, granite slabs, sinks and tombstones and grinding stones, and exporting granite blocks. The major component of turnover was the export of granite blocks. The assessee's position was that the granite blocks were manufactured for it by contractors (quarry owners) who delivered the blocks to the assessee's office at Madras, with the assessee appointing supervisors to check specifications and performing final adjustments to make transportation safer.

The Income-tax Officer recorded that: the assessee's total turnover was Rs. 39,82,406, of which Rs. 38,49,968 related to sale of granite blocks (exported from quarries straight to Madras Harbour); other sales included granite slabs and sinks (Rs. 15,789), packing boxes (Rs. 3,632), rebagging charges (Rs. 21,708) and labour charges for granite polishing (Rs. 43,465). The ITO noted that, by agreement, quarry owners extracted and cut the granite blocks as per the assessee's specifications and delivered them to Madras; the assessee incurred only supervisory charges at the quarries in relation to these sales.

On appeal the Appellate Assistant Commissioner accepted the assessee's claim, treating the activity as processing and holding the company to be an "industrial company". The Appellate Tribunal reversed that finding, holding that the sizing and polishing were incidental to a main business of export/trade in granite blocks and therefore the assessee did not fall within the concept of an "industrial company". The referral to this court followed under section 256(2).

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the Tribunal was right in holding that the assessee is not an "industrial company" within the meaning of section 2(9)(c) of the Finance Act, 1976.

Arguments of the Parties

Assessee's Arguments

  • The assessee (through Sri Sarangan, learned counsel) contended that the percentage of turnover attributable to processing (in monetary terms) is irrelevant to attract the main clause of section 2(9)(c), except when the case falls under the Explanation to clause (c) of section 2(9).
  • The assessee argued that it purchased and exported granite blocks that required processing; without such processing (which the assessee said was performed for it, albeit by contractors or under its supervision) the blocks could not be exported or sold, so processing formed part of the assessee's main activity.
  • Relying on prior authority (Cambay Electric Supply Industrial Co. Ltd. v. CIT), the assessee argued that the word "attributable" in the Explanation should be given a wide meaning so as to bring income within the scope of processing even if the processing activity was not the dominant monetary component.

Revenue / Tax Authorities' Position (as reflected in the record)

  • The Income-tax Officer's factual findings recorded that the assessee did not carry out quarrying and that the quarry owners extracted and cut the blocks to the assessee's specifications and delivered the blocks to Madras. The assessee's own activity comprised supervisory charges and minor polishing/adjustments (labour charges for polishing shown as Rs. 43,465).
  • The Tribunal concluded that the sizing and polishing carried out by or at the instance of the assessee were incidental activities and that the main business of the assessee was export of stones; thus the assessee did not qualify as an "industrial company".

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Chowgule and Co. Pvt. Ltd. v. Union of India, (1981) 1 SCC 653; AIR 1981 SC 1014 Leading authority on the meaning of "processing" — endorses a broad, plain-meaning approach (illustrations from Webster's) showing processing as any operation resulting in change/preparation for market. The court acknowledged this authority as defining "processing" widely, but held that the point did not arise on the facts because the processing (cutting/sizing) had already been done by the sellers before sale to the assessee.
Orient Longman Ltd. v. Commissioner Of Income-Tax, Delhi-II, [1981] 130 ITR 477 (Del.) Example that "processing" can include activities like book-binding of printed sheets—shows the concept's breadth. Referred to as an example of the broad scope of processing; court observed such breadth but found it inapplicable because the alleged processing had been performed by the sellers, not constituting the assessee's main activity.
CIT v. Kutch Oil and Allied Industries Pvt. Ltd., [1987] 163 ITR 237 (Guj.) Example where powdering of raw lumps of minerals was treated as processing. Used to illustrate the width of "processing"; court noted the example but held the facts here showed no substantial processing by the assessee itself.
G.A. Renderian Ltd. v. Commissioner Of Income-Tax, West Bengal-I, [1984] 145 ITR 387 (Cal.) Example that processing can include tea blending and packing. Referred to as illustrating the wide notion of processing; court nevertheless found the assessee's activities incidental and insufficient to qualify as industrial processing.
Cambay Electric Supply Industrial Co. Ltd. v. CIT, [1978] 113 ITR 84 (SC) Authority cited on interpretation (in a different context) of the word "attributable". The assessee relied on this decision to argue for a wide meaning of "attributable". The court noted the reliance but rejected the contention on the facts: income could not be treated as "attributable" to the marginal processing unless it met the threshold in the Explanation (at least 51% of total income).
Koshy's Private Limited v. Commissioner Of Income-Tax, Karnataka, [1985] 154 ITR 53 (Karnataka High Court) Stood for the proposition that the effect of an operation on the commodity is material in determining processing/manufacture and that absence of evidence as to income attributable to processing prevents treating the whole income as attributable to processing. The court relied on this decision to support the approach that marginal processing does not allow attribution of the assessee's whole income to processing and to emphasize the need for evidentiary allocation of income.
Casino (Pvt.) Ltd.'s case, [1973] 91 ITR 289 (Kerala High Court) Authority referenced for the view that a restaurant is largely a trading concern, not a manufacturing/processing undertaking. Quoted in Koshy's decision and used to illustrate that an activity's object matters when classifying it; the court relied on that reasoning as supportive of treating the assessee here as primarily a trader/exporter rather than an industrial/processing company.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court's analysis proceeded by comparing the factual findings to the statutory concept of an "industrial company" under section 2(9)(c) of the Finance Act, 1976, and to the breadth of the concept of "processing" as established in precedent.

Key steps in the reasoning:

  1. Factual determination: quarrying and the principal cutting/sizing of granite blocks were performed by the quarry owners (sellers) pursuant to agreements specifying sizes; the assessee did not perform quarrying and, in relation to the major turnover item (Rs. 38,49,968), the assessee's direct expenditure for polishing was small (Rs. 43,465) and otherwise limited to supervisory charges.
  2. Legal meaning of "processing": the court acknowledged authorities establishing a wide meaning of "processing" (e.g., Chowgule), including that processing may be slight or extensive but involves change in the commodity. However, the court held the broad definition did not determine the outcome because the principal processing in this instance had already been effected by the sellers prior to sale to the assessee.
  3. Character of the assessee's activity: given that the commodity (granite blocks) had come into existence to the assessee's specifications prior to purchase, and that the assessee's operations were limited to supervision and marginal finishing, the court treated the assessee akin to a trader (comparison made to a bookseller or a trader in tea/powdered minerals) rather than a manufacturer/processor whose main activity is processing.
  4. On the Explanation (attribution): the assessee argued that income was "attributable" to processing even if the processing was marginal. The court rejected that contention on these facts, holding that income could not be treated as attributable to such marginal and exceptional processing unless the relevant income met the threshold in the Explanation (the court refers to the need for such income to be at least 51% of total income).
  5. Reliance on precedent: the court invoked Koshy's Private Limited to support the view that mere incidence of some processing does not permit attribution of the entire income to processing absent evidence; similarly, prior authorities illustrating the wide concept of processing were acknowledged but found not to change the factual conclusion.
  6. Conclusion from facts and law: because the substantial processing was done by the sellers and the assessee's role in processing was marginal and incidental, the assessee's main activity was trading/export and not processing/industrial activity within section 2(9)(c).

Holding and Implications

Holding: The question referred is answered in the affirmative and in favour of the Revenue: the assessee was rightly held not to be an "industrial company" within the meaning of section 2(9)(c) of the Finance Act, 1976.

Implications:

  • Direct effect on the parties: The Tribunal's conclusion that the assessee did not qualify as an "industrial company" is upheld; the assessee is not entitled to any benefits that would flow from classification as an industrial company under the cited provision for the assessment year in question.
  • On attribution and evidentiary burden: The decision underscores that marginal or incidental processing carried out by an assessee does not automatically convert trading income into processing-derived income; evidence of income attributable to processing is material, and the Explanation's threshold (as interpreted in the judgment) is relevant to attribution.
  • Precedential effect: The court applied existing authorities on the meaning of processing and on attribution of income to processing, and resolved the case on its facts. The opinion does not purport to establish a new broad principle beyond applying the cited authorities to these facts.

    Hind Nippon Rural Industries Pvt. Ltd. (No. 1) v. Commissioner Of Income-Tax.

    The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

    K. Shivashankar Bhat, J.:— The following question has been referred under section 256(2) of the Income-tax Act, 1961:

    “Whether, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the Tribunal was right in holding that the assessee is not an industrial company within the meaning of section 2(9)(c) of the Finance Act, 1976?”

    2. The relevant assessment year is 1976–77. According to the assessee, it is a company which carries on the business of manufacturing and sale of wooden packing boxes, granite slabs, sinks and tombstones and grinding stones and export of granite blocks. The major component of the sales is sale of granite blocks. These are stated to be manufactured by it by employing a contractor, who is to deliver the granite blocks at the office of the assessee at Madras, and it has appointed supervisors to check the specification of the granite blocks manufactured by the contractor. In addition to checking up the product, the assessee's own staff made final adjustments of these granite blocks so that transportation of the same will be safer. Therefore, the assessee contends that it is mainly engaged in the manufacture or processing of goods. However, the findings regarding the relevant facts recorded by the Income-tax Officer are:

    “The company, M/s. Hind Nippon Rural Industries (P) Ltd., is engaged in the business of manufacture and sale of wooden packing boxes (2) manufacture and sale of granite slabs, sinks and tombstones and grinding stones (3) export of granite blocks to foreign companies and rebagging of wheat bags. The manufacturing unit of the company with regard to granite slabs, sinks, etc., is in Bangalore. The total turnover of the assessee is Rs. 39,82,406. Out of this the break-up of the sales is as follows:

    (Rs.) Sale of granite blocks (exported from quarries straight to Madras Harbour) 38,49,968 Sale of granite slabs and sinks 15,789 Sale of packing boxes 3,632 Rebagging charges of wheat bags 21,708 Labour charges for granite polishing Other receipts: 43,465 Interest 47,660 Miscellaneous 184 Total 39,82,406

    With regard to the sale of granite blocks, the assessee has admitted that as per the agreements with the quarry owners, the quarry owner would extract the granite and would cut the granite blocks as per the specifications prescribed by the assessee. Quarry owners also undertook to supply the blocks to the assessee at the Madras Harbur or anywhere in Madras. During the year under consideration regarding the total sales of Rs. 38,49,968, the only expenses incurred by the assessee-company were supervisory charges at the quarries of the employees of the assessee-company to see that the granite blocks were made as per the specifications of the assessee-company.”

    3. The Appellate Assistant Commissioner, however, accepted the assessee's claim by holding that granite blocks are not found in nature as such and they required processing which, in this case, were done by the assessee's contractors; therefore, the assessee was an “industrial company”.

    4. The Appellate Tribunal reversed this finding. The Tribunal observed:

    “It is not the assessee's case that the contractors who supply granite to the assessee are extracting granite from the quarry on behalf of the assessee. But it appears that the assessee's employees are allowed to size and polish the stone ready for supply at the quarry itself because according to the agreement the stones are to be transported from the quarry direct to the port for export. It was claimed that the sizing and polishing would fall within the scope of processing of goods and, hence, the assessee should be given the concessional rate. We find that the sizing and polishing are only incidental activities of the assessee whose main business is the export of stones.”

    5. Consequently, the Tribunal held that the assessee does not fall within the concept of an “industrial company”, even if a most liberal construction is applied to a Circular dated February 17, 1975, issued by the Central Board of Direct Taxes.

    6. It is clear that quarrying is not done by the assessee. It purchases the granite blocks with specifications as to their sizes given to the owners of granites. Those who carry on the quarrying activities cut and size these granite blocks to the satisfaction of the assessee, though the assessee polishes them and may clip the sizes in some cases to suit their export. Out of a total turnover of Rs. 39,82,406, the charges incurred for polishing were only Rs. 43,465.

    7. The contention advanced before us, by Sri Sarangan, learned counsel for the assessee, is that the percentage of turnover attributable to the processing activity, in terms of money, is entirely irrelevant [except when the case falls under the Explanation to clause (c) of section 2(9)] to attract the main clause of the said provision. The assessee has been purchasing and exporting the granite slabs, etc., these granite blocks require processing, without which they cannot be exported or sold; if so, the processing of granite blocks is part of the main activity of the assessee; in other words, it was argued, that the main activity of the assessee was processing of goods, which is an integral part of the assessee's business.

    8. Several decisions were cited to show that the concept of processing is quite wide so as to include any activity necessary to make an article of trade marketable such as book-binding (of printed sheets — decision of the Delhi High Court in Orient Longman Ltd. v. Commissioner Of Income-Tax, Delhi-Ii, [1981] 130 ITR 477); refrigeration; powdering of raw lumps of minerals (CIT v. Kutch Oil and Allied Industries Pvt. Ltd., [1987] 163 ITR 237 (Guj); tea blending and packing (decision of the Calcutta High Court in G.A Renderian Ltd. v. Commissioner Of Income-Tax, West Bengal-I., [1984] 145 ITR 387). The leading case on the meaning of the word “processing”, is, Chowgule and Co. Pvt. Ltd. v. Union of India, [1981] 47 STC 124, 130 : (1981) 1 SCC 653 : AIR 1981 SC 1014, wherein, it was observed at page 1018:

    “This word has not been defined in the Act and it must therefore be interpreted according to its plain natural meaning. Webster's Dictionary gives the following meaning of the word ‘process’; ‘to subject to some special process or treatment, to subject (especially raw material) to a process of manufacture, development or preparation for the market, etc., to convert into marketable form as livestock by slaughtering, grain by milling, cotton by spinning, milk by pasteurizing, fruits and vegetables by sorting and repacking.’ Where, therefore, any commodity is subjected to a process or treatment with a view to its ‘development or preparation for the market’, as, for example, by sorting and repacking fruits and vegetables, it would amount to processing of the commodity within the meaning of section 8(3)(b) and rule 13. The nature and extent of processing may vary from case to case; in one case, the processing may be slight and in another it may be extensive; but with each process suffered, the commodity would experience a change. Wherever a commodity undergoes a change as a result of some operation performed on it or in regard to it, such operation would amount to processing of the commodity.”

    9. We are of the view that this aspect of the case actually does not arise for consideration in this case. The finding is that the granite blocks are sold to the assessee to the specifications stated by the assessee; therefore, the processing was already done by the seller as part of the consideration for sale. The assessee has its staff to see that the requisite specifications were satisfied by its sellers. The works that may be effected by the assessee are only marginal in cases where the specifications were not fully satisfied by the vendors. It is clear that the main activity of the assessee is the sale or export of the granite blocks which had already come into existence, before the assessee bought them. The case of the assessee is comparable to a bookseller and not a printer of books; the assessee is like a trader of tea packets or powdered minerals, having obtained them after the commodity has been processed. The alleged processing, if at all, carried out by the assessee is too marginal to elevate its status to that of a main activity of the assessee.

    10. Relying on the Explanation to the provision, Sri Sarangan contended that the income of the assessee is also “attributable” to the processing of goods as, without such processing (even if it is only marginal), income could not be derived by the assessee. The word “attributable” in the explanation, it was contended, has a wider meaning, as observed by the Supreme Court, under a different context, in Cambay Electric Supply Industrial Co. Ltd. v. CIT, [1978] 113 ITR 84 (SC).

    11. We have already held that the processing of granite blocks carried out by the assessee is not its normal activity; it is only as an exceptional measure that the processing, if at all, is done. The income of the assessee cannot, in the circumstances, be “attributable” to such an activity (unless such an income is at least 51% of the total income).

    12. The approach we have adopted finds support from a decision of this court in Koshy'S Private Limited v. Commissioner Of Income-Tax, Karnataka, [1985] 154 ITR 53. The question was whether the total income from bakery and restaurant forming more than 51 per cent. of the total income entitled the assessee, there, to claim the benefit as an “industrial company”. After referring to the width of the meaning of the word “processing”, the Bench proceeded to hold, on facts, thus, at page 58:

    “Whatever be the means employed for the purpose of carrying out the operation, it is the effect of the operation on the commodity that is material for the purpose of determining whether the operation is ‘processing’ or ‘manufacture’.

    Having thus seen the broad distinction between ‘manufacture’ and ‘processing’, we may now turn to the facts of the case. In the restaurant, the menu list contains different varieties of food and beverages. Some preparations offered to customers are mixtures of a number of articles of food. It is quite common that some readymade drinks and food are also offered which never undergo any processing or handling by the workmen. Some preparations, however, may undergo some kind of processing.

    But there is no evidence of the income separately attributable to such preparations. In the absence of such evidence, the assessee's claim that the entire income from the restaurant section could be attributable to activities falling within the meaning of ‘manufacture’ or ‘processing’ of goods cannot, therefore, be entertained.

    As observed by the Kerala High Court in Casino (Pvt.) Ltd.'s case, [1973] 91 ITR 289, a restaurant, by and large, is a trading concern and the object of the restaurant is not the manufacturing or processing of goods for the purpose of sale.”

    13. It is implicit in the above finding that merely because some articles may undergo some kind of processing, the entire income cannot be attributed to the processing of the said articles. It is also implicit in the finding that the object of the activity carried on by the assessee is relevant to consider the nature of the main activity of the assessee. Therefore, we are of the view that the assessee in this case was rightly held, as not an “industrial company” within the meaning of section 2(9)(c) of the Finance Act, 1976.

    14. The question is accordingly answered in the affirmative and in favour of the Revenue.

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    Comments

    Hind Nippon Rural Industries Pvt. Ltd. (No. 1) v. Commissioner Of Income-Tax.
    (Dec 13, 1989)