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  • Sections 143, 147, 148, 504, 506, 323, 324, 354, 355, 341, 448, 342, 109 read with Section 149 I.P.C2. A-16 Mahantaswamy
  • Sections 239 and 240 of the Criminal Procedure Code. Sections 239 and 240 of the Criminal Procedure Code
  • Sections 143, 147, 148, 504, 506, 323, 324, 354, 355, 341, 448, 342 read with Section 109 or Section 149 IPC
  • Sections 143, 147, 148, 504, 506, 323, 324, 354, 355, 341, 448, 342, 109 read with Section 149 I.P.C7.
  • Sections 143, 147, 148, 504, 506, 323, 324, 354, 355, 341, 448, 342, 109, read with Section 149 I.P.C
  • provisions contained in Sections 202 and 203 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898,
  • Sections 143, 147, 148, 504, 506, 323, 324, 354, 355, 341, 448, 342, 109, and 149 I.P.C
  • Section 227 or Section 228 of the Code.
  • Section 239 Cr. P.C, Section 239 Cr. P.C
  • Section 251(A)(2) of the Cr. P.C 1898,
  • Petition.11. Section 239 Cr. P.C
  • above.15. Section 239 Cr. P.C
  • doing.12. Section 240 Cr. P.C
  • Section 173, Criminal P.C
  • Section 240 Cr. P.C
  • Section 239 Cr. P.C).
  • Section 204 Cr. P.C
  • Section 173 Cr. P.C
  • Section 109 I.P.C
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Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
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Acts
  • Sections 143, 147, 148, 504, 506, 323, 324, 354, 355, 341, 448, 342, 109 read with Section 149 I.P.C2. A-16 Mahantaswamy
  • Sections 239 and 240 of the Criminal Procedure Code. Sections 239 and 240 of the Criminal Procedure Code
  • Sections 143, 147, 148, 504, 506, 323, 324, 354, 355, 341, 448, 342 read with Section 109 or Section 149 IPC
  • Sections 143, 147, 148, 504, 506, 323, 324, 354, 355, 341, 448, 342, 109 read with Section 149 I.P.C7.
  • Sections 143, 147, 148, 504, 506, 323, 324, 354, 355, 341, 448, 342, 109, read with Section 149 I.P.C
  • provisions contained in Sections 202 and 203 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898,
  • Sections 143, 147, 148, 504, 506, 323, 324, 354, 355, 341, 448, 342, 109, and 149 I.P.C
  • Section 227 or Section 228 of the Code.
  • Section 239 Cr. P.C, Section 239 Cr. P.C
  • Section 251(A)(2) of the Cr. P.C 1898,
  • Petition.11. Section 239 Cr. P.C
  • above.15. Section 239 Cr. P.C
  • doing.12. Section 240 Cr. P.C
  • Section 173, Criminal P.C
  • Section 240 Cr. P.C
  • Section 239 Cr. P.C).
  • Section 204 Cr. P.C
  • Section 173 Cr. P.C
  • Section 109 I.P.C
Smart Summary

Summary of the Opinion — Kulkarni, J.

Factual and Procedural Background

This petition arises from an order dated 17-10-1985 by the Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Yelburga, proposing to frame charges in Criminal Case No. 157/85 against accused A-1 to A-18 under Sections 143, 147, 148, 504, 506, 323, 324, 354, 355, 341, 448, 342, 109 read with Section 149 of the Indian Penal Code (I.P.C.).

The factual matrix as stated in the prosecution materials: A-16 (Mahantaswamy), head of a mutt at Kudrimoti, was alleged by Parvatavva (C.W.1) to have made an illicit sexual advance on 9-4-1985 and again to have spoken to her on 10-4-1985. Letters allegedly assassinating her character and that of a friend were thereafter received. Parvatavva and her husband Virupaksha Gowda (C.W.2) disclosed the letters; attempts at compromise were discussed; threats were alleged to have been made by A-17 and A-18 on 10-6-1985 that the complainants would "face serious consequences by next day."

On 11-6-1985 an alleged assault took place in which Parvatavva and her husband were injured; a First Information Report (Crime No. 14/85) was lodged implicating A-1 to A-15 in the assault and alleging that A-16 to A-18 instigated or abetted the assault. Police investigation collected witness statements (C.Ws 1–38), mahazars and medical evidence and submitted a charge-sheet against A-1 to A-18 under the enumerated sections of the I.P.C. The Magistrate issued process and, after supplying Section 173 materials to the accused and hearing submissions, passed a lengthy order framing charges against all accused (1–18) including the petitioners A-16 to A-18.

A-16 had earlier challenged issuance of process in Criminal Revision Petition No. 405 of 1985 which was rejected by this Court on 1-8-1985. Aggrieved by the Magistrate's order dated 17-10-1985 framing charges, A-16 to A-18 petitioned this Court for relief.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the materials on record are sufficient to justify framing a charge against A-16 (Mahantaswamy) under the alleged sections (including abetment under Section 109 and common-object / joint liability under Section 149 I.P.C.).
  2. Whether the materials on record are sufficient to justify framing charges against A-17 and A-18 for abetment of the offences alleged to have occurred on 11-6-1985.
  3. Whether the Magistrate erred in proposing to charge A-1 to A-15 under Section 109 I.P.C., where the prosecution case alleges they themselves committed the offences (and not that they abetted any other person).
  4. What is the correct legal standard at the stage under Sections 239 and 240 Cr.P.C. for discharging an accused or framing charges — i.e., the scope of "groundless" and the degree of judicial examination required before framing charges.

Arguments of the Parties

The opinion does not contain a detailed account of the parties' legal arguments.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Century Spinning and Manufacturing Co. Ltd. v. The State of Maharashtra, (1972) 3 SCC 282 That at the stage of framing charges the Court must apply its judicial mind; it must not mechanically adopt the prosecution's view and must consider whether there is ground for presuming commission of the offence. The Court relied on this principle to affirm that a Magistrate must judicially consider materials before framing a charge and must not blindly follow the police/prosecution; this informed the analysis whether charges against A-16 were sustainable.
State of Bihar v. Ramesh Singh, (1977) 4 SCC 39 Explains that at the initial stage the court should not meticulously weigh truth/veracity; the relevant test is whether there is ground for presuming the accused committed the offence — not whether conviction is inevitable. The Court used this authority to clarify the threshold for framing charges: while detailed proof is not required, there must nevertheless be sufficient material to form a prima facie presumption. The Court applied this by assessing whether materials against the petitioners met that threshold.
Nirmaljit Singh Hoon v. The State of West Bengal, (1973) 3 SCC 753 (AIR 1972 SC 2639) Confirms the test at preliminary stages is whether there is sufficient ground for proceeding (prima facie), not whether there is sufficient ground for conviction. The Court cited this to support the proposition that prima facie evidence suffices to require proceeding; it then contrasted such a standard with the lack of even prima facie material against A-16.
Chandra Deo Singh v. Prokash Chandra Bose, (1964) 1 SCR 639 (A.I.R. 1963 S.C. 1430) Affirms the same principle — the test is sufficiency of ground for proceeding, not sufficiency for conviction, and process should not be refused where prima facie evidence exists. The Court referred to this precedent as part of the cluster of authorities defining the minimal standard for framing charges and used it in evaluating the prosecution materials.
Superintendent and Remembrancer of Legal Affairs, West Bengal v. Anil Kumar Bhunja, (1979) 4 SCC 274 Holds that a very strong suspicion founded on materials before the Magistrate may justify framing charges; that suspicion must be grounded in the materials and not be a vacillating hunch. The Court adopted this formulation and tested whether a "very strong suspicion" founded on the materials existed against A-16; it concluded that materials did not meet that benchmark for A-16 but did support prima facie suspicion as to A-17 and A-18.
Criminal Revision Petition No. 405 of 1985 (order by Justice Venkatesh) Considered sufficiency of ground under Section 204 Cr.P.C. to issue process (the first stage of action after cognizance). The Court distinguished that earlier decision as having addressed only the Section 204 (sufficiency for issuing process) stage and not the higher/second-stage consideration under Section 239 Cr.P.C. (framing/discharging). Thus Justice Venkatesh's decision did not determine whether charges should be framed under Section 239 and so was of limited value for the present enquiry.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Judge began by identifying and reproducing the relevant statutory provisions (Sections 239 and 240 Cr.P.C.) and explaining their import. Section 239 requires discharge where the Magistrate considers the charge to be "groundless." Section 240 permits framing of charges if the Magistrate finds ground for presuming that the accused committed the offence.

The Court construed the term "groundless" in Section 239 to mean that there is no ground for presuming the accused committed the offence — i.e., the materials on record do not make out even a prima facie case. The Judge relied on authoritative commentary (Sarkar) and the cited Supreme Court decisions to set the legal standard: while the trial Court need not finally determine truth or weigh evidence as at trial, it must apply its judicial mind and be satisfied that there is at least a prima facie basis (or a very strong suspicion founded on materials, when the authorities discuss that formulation) to frame charges.

The Judge criticized the Magistrate's 39-page order as unnecessarily long when a charge was to be framed, observing that Section 240 does not require detailed reasons for framing a charge (unlike Section 239 which requires reasons for discharge). The Judge also noted a substantive error: the Magistrate proposed to charge A-1 to A-15 under Section 109 I.P.C. despite the prosecution's case alleging that A-1 to A-15 themselves committed the offences (and not that they abetted another); Section 109 applies only to abetment, so charging A-1 to A-15 under Section 109 was incorrect and needed rectification.

Turning to the evidence material as to each petitioner:

  • For A-17 and A-18: multiple witnesses (Parvatavva C.W.1, Virupaksha Gowda C.W.2, and sons C.Ws.3 and 4, plus other witnesses) deposed that A-17 and A-18 threatened the complainants on 10-6-1985 that they would suffer "disastrous consequences by next day." Given the temporal proximity to the assault on 11-6-1985, the Judge found that these materials prima facie indicated that A-17 and A-18 may have instigated or abetted the assault; accordingly, the trial Court's decision to frame charges against A-17 and A-18 could not be interfered with at that stage.
  • For A-16 Mahantaswamy: the Court reviewed witness statements in detail. Parvatavva alleged (in complaint) an unsolicited advance on 9-4-1985 and a subsequent letter attacking her character; some witnesses expressed suspicion that A-16 "might have" caused the assault. However, the Judge emphasized that most of the relevant statements either amount to hearsay, speculation, or a mere apprehension that A-16 "might have" instigated the assault. The crucial recital in the complaint was identified by the Judge as indicating the complainant's unfounded imagination and not a concrete allegation of instigation or abetment by A-16.

After weighing the materials against the legal standard drawn from authorities, the Judge concluded the materials were not sufficient to raise even a strong suspicion — much less the "very strong suspicion" grounded in material required for framing an abetment charge — against A-16. The Court also addressed the distinction between the first-stage satisfaction under Section 204 Cr.P.C. (sufficient ground to proceed / issuance of process) and the second-stage consideration under Section 239 Cr.P.C. (after hearing and opportunity to the accused): an earlier order by Justice Venkatesh had considered only the Section 204 stage and thus did not settle whether charges should be framed under Section 239.

Applying the statutory test and precedents to the facts, the Court found the charge against A-16 to be groundless and therefore quashed the Magistrate's proposal to frame charge against A-16 for the offences alleged (including alleged abetment). The Court explicitly limited its observations regarding A-17 and A-18 to the present stage and cautioned they should not fetter the trial Court at the final disposal on merits.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The petition is allowed in part. In particular, the Court QUASHED the order insofar as it proposed to frame charges against A-16 (Mahantaswamy) and DISCHARGED A-16. The bail bonds executed by A-16 and his sureties were ordered cancelled.

The Court upheld the Magistrate's framing of charges against A-17 and A-18 at this stage: the Judge found prima facie materials sufficient to sustain the view that A-17 and A-18 might have abetted the assault given their threats on 10-6-1985 and the proximate assault on 11-6-1985.

Additional directions and observations:

  • The Magistrate's proposal to charge A-1 to A-15 under Section 109 I.P.C. was identified as incorrect insofar as the prosecution case alleges A-1 to A-15 themselves committed the offences; Section 109 applies to abetment and thus the Magistrate's charge roster needed rectification on that point.
  • The Court clarified the legal standard at the preliminary stage: the Magistrate must apply judicial mind under Sections 239/240 Cr.P.C. and rely on materials sufficient to form a prima facie presumption (or very strong suspicion grounded in materials when required by authority) before framing charges; mere suspicion or hearsay is insufficient to sustain an abetment charge.

Implications for the parties: The direct effect is that A-16 is discharged and his bail bonds cancelled; proceedings against A-17 and A-18 proceed. The opinion applies established authorities on preliminary inquiry standards and does not purport to lay down any new legal precedent beyond application of those authorities to these facts.

    Shri Mahantaswamy v. State Of Karnataka

    Kulkarni, J.:—

    This is a petition by A-16 to A-18 against the order dated 17-10-1985 passed by the Magistrate, Yelburga, in Criminal Case No. 157/85 proposing to frame a charge against them for the offences under Sections 143, 147, 148, 504, 506, 323, 324, 354, 355, 341, 448, 342, 109 read with Section 149 I.P.C

    2. A-16 Mahantaswamy is stated to be the Matadipathi of a Mutt known as Mysore Mutt situate in Kudrimoti village of Yelburga taluk. Virupaksha Gowda, C.W 2, was working as a teacher in a Primary School at Kudrimoti. He was living with his wife Parvatavva C.W 1 and his children including C.Ws 3 and 4 in Kudrimoti. His wife Parvatavva C.W 1 was going to the said Mutt to offer prayers to the Gaddige and also for attending Akkana Balaga. According to the prosecution, on 9-4-1985 Parvatavva C.W 1 had gone to the Mutt and at that time A-16 had an occasion to see her and requested her to have illicit connection with him. According to the prosecution, Parvatavva C.W 1 resented that move made by A-16 and told him that it was not proper for him to make such illicit advances towards her. She came back to the house but did not inform her husband C.W 2 fearing that something untoward might happen to her.

    3. On 10-4-1985, she again went to the Mutt. According to the prosecution, A-16 told her on that day that it was wrong on his part to have talked to her like that the previous day. She came back.

    4. Later on, a letter assassinating her character is said to have been received by her. Thereafter another letter addressed to Hussainbi was also received by her husband. Hussainbi's husband handedover that letter to C.W 2 Virupaksha Gowda. At that time Parvatavva C.W 1 disclosed to her husband C.W 2 about the letter received by her also in that matter. In that connection, her husband Virupaksha Gowda C.W 2 later approached A-16 and told him that he ought not to have behaved in that fashion. According to the prosecution subsequently some elders or well wishers of A-16 intervened, in the matter and made efforts for bringing about a compromise between Virupaksha Gowda C.W 2 and A-16. Virupaksha Gowda C.W 2 being afraid of A-16 complained to the Assistant Superintendent of Police, Kemapiah, at Koppal.

    5. On 10-6-1985, A-17 and A-18, C.Ws 5, 6 and 7 (brothers of C.W 1) went to A-16 but in vain. According to the prosecution, Virupaksha Gowda and Parvatavva told A-17 and A-18 and others at that time that some two others Eshappa Desai and Hanumanta Gowda had promised to come on 17-6-1985 for bringing about a compromise and until they came they were not prepared for the compromise. According to the prosecution, A-17 and A-18 threatened C.W 1 Parvatavva and her husband Virupaksha Gowda C.W 2 that they will have to face serious consequences by next day.

    6. On 11-6-1985 while Parvatavva C.W 1 was coming along with her son near a cross, A-1 to A-15 and some others are alleged to have got down from a tractor and started assaulting Parvatavva. She sustained injuries in the assault. She came back to the house and found that her husband also had been assaulted. She and her husband went to the police station at Bevoor and lodged a complaint implicating A-1 to A-15 in the actual assault and implicating A-16 to A-18 by alleging that they had instigated or abetted the other accused to commit the present offences. The police registered a case in Crime No. 14/85 for the offences under Sections 143, 147, 148, 504, 506, 323, 324, 354, 355, 341, 448, 342, 109 read with Section 149 I.P.C

    7. In the course of the investigation, the police have recorded the statements of C.Ws 1 to 38 and some others, prepared various mahazars and collected medical certificates and ultimately placed a charge sheet for the offences under Sections 143, 147, 148, 504, 506, 323, 324, 354, 355, 341, 448, 342, 109, and 149 I.P.C against A-1 to A-18.

    8. The Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Yelburga, took cognizance of the offences against the accused persons and issued the process.

    9. A-16 feeling aggrieved by the issue of process against him by the Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Yelburga, approched this Court with Criminal Revision Petition No. 405 of 1985 requesting this Court to quash the issue of process against him. This Court rejected that Petition by its order dated 1-8-1985.

    10. Thereafter A-1 to A-18 appeared before the Magistrate and he supplied to them all the copies of the documents referred to in Section 173 Cr. P.C The Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Yelburga, on considering the police report and the documents sent with it under Section 173 Cr. P.C and after hearing the prosecution and the accused, passed a very lengthy order. The final portion of that order dated 17-10-1985 reads as under:

    “The contention raised by the Learned Counsels for the accused Nos. 16 to 18 for discharge of accused persons 16 to 18 is rejected.

    The charges against all the accused persons 1 to 18 for the offences punishable under Sections 143, 147, 148, 504, 506, 323, 324, 354, 355, 341, 448, 342, 109 read with Section 149 I.P.C are ordered to be framed.

    A-16 to A-18 being aggrieved by the said order passed by the Magistrate have approached this Court with this Petition.

    11. Section 239 Cr. P.C reads as:—

    “If, upon considering the police report and the documents sent with it under Section 173 and making such examination, if any, of the accused as the Magistrate thinks necessary and after giving the prosecution and the accused an opportunity of being heard, the Magistrate considers the charge against the accused to be groundless, he shall discharge the accused, and record his reasons for so doing.”

    12. Section 240 Cr. P.C reads as under:

    “(1) If, upon such consideration, examination, if any, and hearing, the Magistrate is of opinion that there is ground for presuming that the accused has committed an offence triable under this Chapter, which such Magistrate is competent to try and which, in his opinion could be adequately punished by him, he shall frame in writing a charge against the accused.

    (2) The charge shall then be read and explained to the accused, and he shall be asked whether he pleads guilty of the offence charged or claims to be tried”.

    The Learned Magistrate has written a lengthy order running into 39 typed pages. Section 240 Cr. P.C does not contemplate of giving reasons for framing of a charge or for writing such a detailed order. The question of giving reasons would arise only if the Magistrate wants to discharge the accused persons (vide Section 239 Cr. P.C). Therefore, the Learned Magistrate has unnecessarily wasted a good deal of time over writing such a detailed order when he had made up his mind to frame a charge for the various offences against the accused persons.

    13. The Magistrate has proposed to frame a charge against A-1 to A-18 for the offences punishable under Sections 143, 147, 148, 504, 506, 323, 324, 354, 355, 341, 448, 342, 109, read with Section 149 I.P.C It is not the case of the prosecution itself that A-1 to A-15 have committed the offence under Section 109 I.P.C Therefore his proposal to frame a charge for the alleged offence under Section 109 I.P.C against all the accused, does not appear to be correct. Section 109 I.P.C applies only to those persons who abet the commission of the offence. There is no allegation against A-1 to A-15 regarding the abetment. The prosecution case is that A-1 to A-15 themselves committed the said various offences. Therefore, a slight mistake appears to have been committed by the lower Court in proposing to charge A-1 to A-15 even under Section 109 I.P.C To this extent his proposal to frame the charge needs to be rectified.

    14. Before proceeding to discuss the question as to whether there are materials to frame a charge against A-16 to A-18 in the case, I would like to consider the scope of Sections 239 and 240 of the Criminal Procedure Code. Sections 239 and 240 of the Criminal Procedure Code have already been reproduced by me in extenso above.

    15. Section 239 Cr. P.C lays down that if the Magistrate considers the charge against the accused to be groundless, he shall discharge the accused. The word ‘groundless’, in my opinion, means that there must be no ground for presuming that the accused has committed the offence. The word ‘groundless’ used in Section 239 Cr. P.C means that the materials placed before the Court do not make out or are not sufficient to make out a prima facie case against the accused.

    16. The Learned author Shri Sarkar in his Criminal Procedure Code, 5th Edition, on page 427, has opined as:—

    “The provision is the same as in Section 227, the only difference being that the Magistrate may examine the accused, if necessary, of also Section 245. The Magistrate shall discharge the accused recording reasons, if after (i) considering the police report and documents mentioned in Section 173; (ii) examining the accused, if necessary and (iii) hearing the arguments of both sides he thinks the charge against him to be groundless, i.e, either there is no legal evidence or that the facts do not make out any offence at all.”

    In short it means that, if no prima facie case regarding the commission of any offence is made out it would amount to a charge being groundless.

    17. In Century Spinning and Manufacturing Co., Ltd. v. The State of Maharashtra . 1972 3 SCC 282, the Supreme Court has stated about the ambit of Section 251(A)(2) of the Cr. P.C 1898, which is in parimateria with the wordings used in Section 239 Cr. P.C as follows:—

    “It cannot be said that the Court at the stage of framing the charges has not to apply its judicial mind for considering whether or not there is a ground for presuming the commission of the offence by the accused. The order framing the charges does substantially affect the person's liberty and it cannot be said that the Court must automatically frame the charge merely because the prosecuting authorities by relying on the documents referred to in Section 173 consider it proper to institute the case. The responsibility of framing the charges is that of the Court and it has to judicially consider the question of doing so. Without fully adverting to the material on the record it must not blindly adopt the decision of the prosecution.”

    In para 15 the Supreme Court has stated as:—

    “Under sub-section (2), if upon consideration of all the documents referred to in Section 173, Criminal P.C and examining the accused, if considered necessary by the Magistrate and also after hearing both sides, the Magistrate considers the charge to be groundless; he must discharge the accused. This sub-section has to be read along with sub-section (3), according to which, if after considering the documents and hearing the accused, the Magistrate thinks that there is ground for presuming that the accused has committed an offence triable under Chapter XXI of the Code within the Magistrate's competence and for which he can punish adequately, he has to frame in writing a charge against the accused. Reading the two sub-sections together, it clearly means that if there is no ground for presuming that the accused has committed an offence, the charges must be considered to be groundless, which is the same thing as saying that there is no ground for framing the charges.”

    Thus the word ‘ground less’ as interpreted by the Supreme Court means that there is no ground for presuming that the accused has committed an offence.

    18. The Supreme Court has again considered this aspect of the matter in State Of Bihar v. Ramesh Singh . 1977 4 SCC 39. In para 4 it is stated as:—

    “If the Judge considers that there is not sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused, he shall discharge the accused and record his reasons for so doing as enjoined by Section 227. If, on the other hand, ‘the Judge is of opinion that there is ground for presuming that the accused has committed an offence which:

    ******

    (b) is exclusively triable by the Court, ‘he shall frame in writing a charge against the accused’, as provided in Section 228. Reading the two provisions together in juxtaposition, as they have got to be, it would be clear that at the beginning and the initial stage of the trial the truth, veracity and effect of the evidence which the Prosecutor proposes to adduce are not to be meticulously judged. Nor is any weight to be attached to the probable defence of the accused. It is not obligatory for the Judge at that stage of the trial to consider in any detail and weigh in a sensitive balance whether the facts, if proved, would be incompatible with the innocence of the accused or not. The standard of test and judgment which is to be finally applied before recording a finding regarding the guilt or otherwise of the accused is not exactly to be applied at the stage of deciding the matter under Section 227 or Section 228 of the Code. At that stage the Court is not to see whether there is sufficient ground for conviction of the accused or whether the trial is sure to end in his conviction. Strong suspicion against the accused, if the matter remains in the region of suspicion, cannot take the place of proof of his guilt at the conclusion of the trial. But at the initial stage if there is a strong suspicion which leads the Court to think that there is ground for presuming that the accused has committed an offence then it is not open to the Court to say that there is no sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. The presumption of the guilt of the accused which is to be drawn at the initial stage is not in the sense of the law governing the trial of Criminal cases in France where the accused is presumed to be guilty unless the contrary is proved. But it is only for the purpose of deciding prima facie whether the Court should proceed with the trial or not. If the evidence which the Prosecutor proposes to adduce to prove the guilt of the accused even if fully accepted before it is challenged in cross-examination or rebutted by the defence evidence, if any, cannot show that the accused committed the offence, then there will be no sufficient ground for proceeding with the trial.”

    In para 5, the Supreme Court has stated as:—

    “In Nirmaljit Singh Hoon v. The State of West Bengal, (1973) 2 SCR 66 : (1973) 3 SCC 753 : AIR 1972 SC 2639) Shelat, J., delivering the judgment on behalf of the majority of the Court referred at page 79 of the report to the earlier decisions of this Court in Chandra Deo Singh v. Prokash Chandra Bose, (1964) 1 SCR 639: (A.I.R 1963 S.C 1430) where this Court was held to have laid down with reference to the similar provisions contained in Sections 202 and 203 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898, “that the test was whether there was sufficent ground for proceeding and not whether there was sufficient ground for conviction, and observed that where there was prima facic evidence, even though the person charged of an offence in the complaint might have a defence, the matter had to be left to be decided by the appropriate forum at the appropriate stage and issue of a process could not be refused.”

    19. The Supreme Court had again dealt with this aspect of the matter in Superintendent and Remembrancer of Legal Affairs, West Bengal v. Anil Kumar Bhunja . 1979 4 SCC 274. The Supreme Court has stated in the said case as:—

    “At this stage, even a very strong suspicion found upon materials before the Magistrate, which leads him to form a presumptive opinion as to the existence of the factual ingredients constituting the offence alleged, may justify the framing of charges against the accused in respect of the commission of that offence.”

    The suspicion referred to by the Supreme Court must be founded upon the materials placed before the Magistrate which leads him to form a presumptive opinion as to the existence of the factual ingredients constituting the offence alleged. Therefore, the words “a very strong suspicion” used by the Supreme Court must not be a strong suspicion of a vascillating mind of a Judge. That suspicion must be founded upon the materials placed before the Magistrate which leads him to form a presumptive opinion about the existence of the factual ingredients constituting the offence alleged.

    20. With this legal background in view, I would proceed to find out whether the materials placed before the Court so far as the three petitioners are concerned, are sufficient to raise a very strong suspicion founded upon the materials which lead him to form a presumptive opinion about the existence of the factual ingredients constituting the various offences.

    21. So far as A-17 Chandra Shekarayya, Petitioner-2 and A-18 Anandappa, Petitioner-3 are concerned, their case appears to stand on a different footing. Parvatavva C.W 1, Virupaksha Gowda C.W 2, and her sons Prabhulingana Gowda C.W 3 and Anandana Gowda C.W 4 speak about A-17 and A-18 threatening them (Parvatavva C.W 1 and Virupaksha Gowda C.W 2) that if they did not agree to the compromise, they would have to face disastrous consequences by next day morning. The other witnesses also speak about A-17 and A-18 holding out threats to Parvatavva C.W 1 and Virupaksha Gowda C.W 2 in this connection. The said threat is alleged to have been held out by them on 10-6-1985 while the actual incident has taken place on 11-6-85. Therefore the proximity of time is prima facie sufficient at this stage to show that they must be behind the back of the incident that took place on 11-6-1985. The said materials would indicate that they must have instigated A-1 to A-15 to commit the offences. Therefore this material, in my opinion, distinguishes their case from the case of A-16. Therefore the view of the trial Court that a prima facie case against A-17 and A-18 for abetting the various offences is made out, cannot be interfered with at this stage.

    22. A-16 Mahantaswamy, according to the various prosecution witnesses, is the Head of the Mutt known as Mysore Mutt situate in Kudrimoti village. Parvatavva C.W 1 speaks that when she had gone to the Mutt on 9-4-1985, A-16 requested her to have illicit connection with him. According to her, she resented that proposal and advised A-16 that it was not proper for A-16 who is a Swami, to make such advances. According to her, she went to the Mutt even the next day. Thereafter, it appears, a letter was received by her in which her character was assassinated. Thereafter her friend Hussainbi's husband is said to have received a similar letter assassinating the character of Hussainbi and also Parvatavva. These letters were disclosed to C.W 1's husband Virupaksha Gowda. Thereafter various attempts were made to bring about a compromise between A-16 and Virupaksha Gowda C.W 2. As can be seen from the statements of Parvatavva C.W 1 and Virupaksha Gowda C.W 2, Eshappa Desai and Hanumanta Gowda had told them that they would bring about a compromise between them and A-16 and for that purpose they would come on 17-6-1985. The statements of C.W 1 and 2 indicate that A-17 and A-18 approached them on 10-6-1985 and threatened them to compromise with A-16. The statements of C.Ws 1 and 2 indicate that they told A-17 and A-18 that they would not come on that day for the compromise as Eshappa Desai and Hanumanta Gowda had promised them to come on 17-6-1985 and to bring about a compromise. Their statements indicate that A-17 and A-18 threatened them with dire consequences by next day morning. The material portion in the complaint is to be found at the fag end of the complaint. It reads as:—

    “The reason for the commission of all these incidents is:

    Mahantaswami asked me to have illicit connection with him and in this connection letters were received and Mahantaswami felt that a case might be filed against him on informing the police and she refused to compromise with Mahantaswami and on account of this he got committed the incident in this fashion at the hands of Shekaraiah and Andappa Sobigana and by the above mentioned persons. On account of this, action should be taken against all of them.”

    This portion of the recital in the complaint only indicates that it is only her unfounded imagination that made her to think that A-16 might have got the incident dated 11-6-1985 perpetrated at the hands of the accused persons. Even if it is closely read, it does not even indicate that A-16 instigated or abetted any one of the accused persons to commit the offences on 11-6-1985. This recital in the complaint cannot be said to make out even remotely a case of abetment against A-16. In her supplementary statement recorded on 13-6-1985, she does not speak anything implicating A-16 at all. Even the statement of her husband Virupaksha Gowda C.W 2 would only indicate that he too was of the opinion that A-16 fearing that a criminal case might be launched against him, might have got committed the assault on them. Even his statement would not be sufficient to raise a suspicion even remotely that A-16 abetted any one of the accused persons to commit the offences in question. The statements of Prabhulingana Gowda C.W 3 and Andana Gowda C.W 4 who are the sons of Parvatavva C.W 1, only indicate that they were of the view that A-16 might have got the assault committed. These statements are not sufficient to raise even a strong suspicion that A-16 abetted the commission of the offence dated 11-6-1985. The last portion of the statement of Hoolappa contains similar recitals which indicate that he apprehended that the assault might have been got committed by A-16. Therefore, this would not be even remotely sufficient to level the charge of abetment against A-16. The statement of Shantappa recorded on 27-6-1985 speaks at the end that on account of the incidents that took place on 9-4-1985 and 10-4-1985, A-16 might have instigated A-1 to A-15 to commit the assault. Even this material would not be even remotely sufficient to level a charge of abetment against A-16. The statement of Sharanappa shows that he heard people talking that the followers of A-16 on account of the said incidents committed the assault on 19-6-1985. There is nothing in it to indicate that A-16 abetted the other accused persons to commit the offences. Similar is the statement of Hotteppa recorded on 19-6-1985. The statement of Hussainbi recorded on 18-6-1985 only indicates that A-16 got irritated against her as Parvatavva refused to have illicit connection with him and as Parvatavva resented that advancement. The statement of Kare Gowda recorded on 4-7-1985 reads as:—

    Therefore this material would go to show that he does not personally know anything about the abetment. His knowledge in the matter is only hearsay and is not based on any material.

    23. I have referred copiously to all the materials available from the statements of almost all the witnesses in this connection. The said materials even if they remain what they are, would not be sufficient to raise even remotely a very strong suspicion to form a presumptive opinion that A-16 instigated any one of the accused persons to commit the said offences or abetted any one of them to commit the said offences.

    24. The learned Advocate General referred me to a decision rendered by my learned brother Justice Venkatesh in Criminal Revision Petition No. 405/854 whereby A-16 had challenged the issue of process against him by the Magistrate. He, after referring to the various materials and after referring to Section 204 Cr. P.C held that there was sufficient ground for the Magistrate to proceed for the purpose of issuing the process. Section 204 Cr. P.C prescribes the first stage for the Magistrate to take action after taking cognizance of the offences. The first stage requires that there should be sufficient ground for proceeding. It is only a subjective satisfaction of the Magistrate unguided by the pros and cons of the story that might emanate from the materials after the prosecution and the accused are heard. It is practically an exparte opinion to be formed by the Magistrate by himself perusing the materials referred to in Section 173 Cr. P.C It is only after this first stage envisaged by Section 204 Cr. P.C is over, the law prescribes the second stage in Section 239 Cr. P.C If the ingredients required to issue process as mentioned in Section 204 Cr. P.C are the same as the ingredients that are laid down by Section 239 Cr. P.C, Section 239 Cr. P.C would become redundant and unnecessary. The second stage laid down by Section 239 Cr. P.C requires the Magistrate to form an opinion after going through the papers and the documents and after examining the accused if it is necessary and after hearing the prosecution and the accused. Therefore the standard required by Section 239 Cr. P.C appears to be a little higher than the standard required by Section 204 Cr. P.C Therefore what Justice Venkatesh considered in Criminal Revision Petition No. 405 of 1985 was whether there was sufficient ground to proceed against the accused person or not for the purpose of issuing the process. The position relating to framing a charge or discharging the accused persons was not considered by him while he disposed of the said Criminal Revision Petition. Therefore the said decision would not be of help while finding out whether the materials on record are sufficient or not to frame a charge against A-16.

    25. Thus, in my opinion, the materials collected by the police are not even remotely sufficient to raise even a strong suspicion against A-16. The said materials, in my opinion, render the charge against A-16 groundless. In short, there is no material or ground to even remotely suspect that A-16 instigated or abetted the commission of the offences by any one of the accused persons. Therefore the order passed by the Magistrate proposing to frame a charge against A-16 for the offences under Sections 143, 147, 148, 504, 506, 323, 324, 354, 355, 341, 448, 342 read with Section 109 or Section 149 IPC is quashed. The Petition is allowed. A-16 Mahantaswamy is discharged. The bail bonds executed by A-16 Mahantaswamy and his sureties stand cancelled.

    26. Whatever observations have been made by me in respect of the case against A-17 and A-18, are only for the purpose of finding out as to whether the materials are sufficient or not at this stage to frame a charge against them. I am sure that the observations made by me regarding A-17 and A-18 at this stage will not weigh with the Magistrate at the time of finally disposing of the case on merits.

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    Shri Mahantaswamy v. State Of Karnataka
    (Aug 1, 1986)