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Structured Summary of the Opinion (Somnath Iyer, J.)

Factual and Procedural Background

By a Government Notification dated November 25, 1959 under Section 10(1)(d) of the Industrial Disputes Act a reference which the Government regarded as an industrial dispute was referred to the Industrial Tribunal then presided over by Mr. D. H. Chandrasekharaiah. The presiding officer's term expired on July 4, 1960 and, by a notification under Section 7A of the Act, Mr. Malimath (a retired Judge) was appointed to preside over that Tribunal. The hearing of the reference, which had been pending, was continued before Mr. Malimath.

On behalf of ten employers (the second party to the reference) a request was made that certain issues (which the petitioners characterized as issues of law) be decided at the outset. Mr. Hanumantiah, a legal practitioner, was permitted to represent the employers with the consent of the employees. The Tribunal allowed the preliminary hearing of issues of law and the reference was posted to August 20, 1960.

On August 20, 1960, the employers' representative, Mr. Hanumantiah, was absent; the Tribunal treated Issues 2 and 3 as the only pure issues of law and decided them against the employers. When the matter again came up on October 8, 1960, Mr. Hanumantiah requested that Issue 4 also be treated as a preliminary issue of law. The Tribunal refused, giving two grounds: (1) the employer's representative was absent on the earlier date when preliminary issues were to be heard and so should have raised the matter then, and (2) Issue 4 raised a mixed question of law and fact rather than a pure question of law.

The petitioners challenged the Tribunal's order by way of writ petition seeking (a) certiorari to quash the Tribunal's order, (b) prohibition to restrain the Tribunal from proceeding, and (c) a direction (in effect mandamus) that the Tribunal decide Issue 4 as a preliminary issue before proceeding with other issues.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the Tribunal was obliged to decide the fourth issue — a question whether the reference was an industrial dispute — as a preliminary issue even though it raised a mixed question of law and fact.
  2. Whether the petitioners were entitled to writs (certiorari, prohibition or mandamus) to compel the Tribunal to decide that jurisdictional (mixed) question in the first instance.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioners' Arguments (as presented by Mr. Ullal)

  • The fourth issue concerned the Tribunal's jurisdiction — specifically whether the dispute referred under Section 10(1)(d) was in fact an industrial dispute — and so was a jurisdictional question which ought to be decided first.
  • Although Issue 4 involved a mixed question of law and fact, the factual element was a jurisdictional fact; therefore the Tribunal could not decline to decide it as a preliminary issue and proceed without deciding it.
  • Reliance was placed on the decision in Kaleswari Handloom Factory v. State of Madras (AIR 1958 Mad 108) to support the contention that a superior court can interfere where a tribunal wrongly determines a jurisdictional fact.

The opinion does not contain a detailed account of arguments advanced on behalf of the respondents (the employees or the Tribunal) beyond the Tribunal's reasons recorded in its order refusing to treat Issue 4 as preliminary.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Kaleswari Handloom Factory v. State of Madras, AIR 1958 Mad 108 That if a Tribunal incorrectly determines a jurisdictional fact and thereby assumes jurisdiction wrongly, the High Court has power to quash that determination and restrain the Tribunal from proceeding. The Court acknowledged the principle relied on by petitioners but observed that the case does not decide that a writ of mandamus may issue to compel a Tribunal to decide a mixed question of law and fact as a preliminary issue. The decision was therefore treated as supportive of the general justiciability of incorrect jurisdictional determinations but not as establishing the broader compulsion sought by petitioners.
Bunbury v. Fuller, (1853) 9 Ex. 111 at p. 140 Observation that a court/tribunal of limited jurisdiction must inquire into collateral questions on which its jurisdiction depends and that such preliminary decisions remain open to inquiry by a superior court; that mandamus or prohibition may correct an improper forbearance or erroneous proceeding. The Court noted that the observation may lend some support to petitioners' argument that a tribunal has a duty to inquire into an objection to jurisdiction even when it involves collateral factual enquiry. Nonetheless, the Court refrained from expressing a definitive opinion on whether a tribunal is bound in every case to decide such collateral jurisdictional facts first.
Halsbury's Laws of England, Simonds Edition, Vol. 11, para 214 Statement of the rule governing prohibition: prohibition issues as of right only where the defect of jurisdiction is apparent on the face of proceedings; otherwise issuance is discretionary and depends on whether the defect is clear and obvious. The Court invoked this authoritative statement to explain that prohibition is not available as of right unless the defect of jurisdiction is clear on the face of the proceedings; concluded that, because the question of whether the dispute was an industrial dispute required factual inquiry, the petitioners were not entitled to prohibition at this stage.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court proceeded in a stepwise manner, applying established principles to the facts disclosed by the record:

  1. Failure to seize the earlier opportunity: The Tribunal had posted the matter for the hearing of pure questions of law on August 20, 1960. The petitioners (or their representative) were absent on that date and thereby failed to press the request that Issue 4 be decided as a preliminary question. The Court held that the petitioners had thus neglected an opportunity which they should have availed themselves of and that, in consequence, the Tribunal was not bound to accede to a belated request on October 8, 1960 to treat Issue 4 as preliminary.
  2. Character of Issue 4: The Tribunal had concluded, and the petitioners had to admit, that Issue 4 raised a mixed question of law and fact rather than a pure question of law. The Court agreed with the Tribunal's characterisation and observed that a mere mixed question is not automatically a matter the Tribunal must decide as a preliminary issue merely because the question touches upon its jurisdiction.
  3. Availability of writs: The Court explained established law: a tribunal may, in an appropriate case, try jurisdictional facts and if it decides them wrongly a superior court can intervene (e.g., by prohibition). However, prohibition will issue as of right only where the defect of jurisdiction is plain and obvious on the face of the proceedings (Halsbury). More generally, prohibition is available where the tribunal has usurped jurisdiction by an incorrect finding on a jurisdictional fact.
  4. Discretion and stage of intervention: The Court emphasised that if a tribunal declines to decide a jurisdictional fact at the earliest stage and announces its intention to decide it along with other facts, there is no usurpation of jurisdiction and, therefore, no immediate ground for prohibition; improper assumption of jurisdiction by a tribunal is the point at which a superior court will normally intervene.
  5. Special practical consideration (Section 33A complaints): After the Tribunal's October 8 order, some employees lodged complaints under Section 33A of the Industrial Disputes Act alleging wrongful dismissal contrary to Section 33. The Court identified a procedural and substantive consequence: adjudication under Section 33A is possible only if a proceeding in respect of an industrial dispute is pending before the Tribunal — thus the Tribunal's competence to entertain such Section 33A complaints depends on the prior determination that the reference before it concerns an industrial dispute.
  6. Preventing undue delay to Section 33A complaints: Because the Tribunal announced it would decide Issue 4 only together with other issues, it would be unable to adjudicate the Section 33A complaints until the Tribunal finally disposed of the entire reference. The Court considered that this procedural consequence — delay in adjudicating statutory complaints under Section 33A — ought not to be allowed to arise.
  7. Discretion exercised in favour of a preliminary determination: Although normally the petition might have been dismissed on the ground of the petitioners' earlier neglect, the Court exercised its discretion to direct the Tribunal to decide Issue 4 as a preliminary issue. The Court made this direction not because it accepted a general rule that the petitioners were entitled to such a determination as of right, but because the particular circumstances (the necessity for the Tribunal's competence to entertain Section 33A complaints and the potential for undue delay) warranted such a direction.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The Court directed that the fourth issue be tried and decided in the first instance by the Tribunal. The petitioners' contention for a writ of prohibition at this stage was rejected and the Court declined to hold that petitioners had an absolute right to have a mixed jurisdictional question decided first in all cases.

Immediate consequences and implications:

  • The Tribunal is ordered to hear Issue 4 as a preliminary issue so that it may pronounce on whether the reference before it is an industrial dispute. The competence of the Tribunal to adjudicate complaints presented under Section 33A depends on that determination.
  • The Court limited its relief to the specific circumstances of this case and expressly refrained from laying down a broad rule that a tribunal is always bound to decide a mixed jurisdictional question as a preliminary matter. The direction was given to avoid undue delay in adjudication of statutory complaints (Section 33A) rather than to create a general precedent compeling preliminary trial of all mixed jurisdictional questions.
  • Other writ remedies: The Court explained that prohibition would not issue as of right here because the question of jurisdiction depends on factual inquiry; only if a tribunal wrongly decides a jurisdictional fact and thereby usurps jurisdiction would prohibition be appropriate. Thus, no automatic or general entitlement to mandamus or prohibition was recognised beyond the narrow relief granted in this matter.

The concurrence of Kalagate J. is recorded in the opinion and the order was made accordingly.

    A.K Appanna Setty And Sons Rice And Oil Mills, Sira Road, Tumkur And Others, v. S.S Malimath, Presiding Officer, Industrial Tribunal, Tumkur And Others,

    Somnath Iyer, J.:— By a Notification made by the Government on November 25, 1959 under the provisions of Section 10(1)(d) of the Industrial Disputes Act, what the Government thought was an industrial dispute, was referred by it to the Industrial Tribunal over which Mr. D.H Chandrasekharaiah was then presiding. The term of office of Mr. Chandrasekharaiah expired on July 4, 1960, according to the petitioners. By a Notification issued under S. 7A of the Act, Mr. Malimath, a retired Judge of this Court was appointed to preside over that Tribunal. The hearing of the reference which was pending before Mr. Chandrasekharaian was continued by Mr. Malimath.

    2. On behalf of the ten employers who constituted the second party in that reference, a request was made that certain issues, which according to the petitioners were issues of law, should in the first instance, be decided. One Mr. Hanumantiah who is a Legal Practitioner at Tumkur, was permitted with the consent of the employees to represent the employers. This request which was made on behalf of the employers appears to have been granted with the result that the reference was posted to August 20, 1960. On that date, Mr. Hanumanthaiah appearing on behalf of the employers was absent. The Tribunal held issues 2 and 3 to be the only issues of law and decided those issues against the employers whose representative was absent. When the case again came up before the Tribunal on October 8, 1960, Mr. Hanumanthaiah made a representation to the Tribunal that the fourth issue was also an issue of law and that the Tribunal should hear that issue and decide if before proceeding to decide the other issues in the case. The Tribunal refused to accede to that request. He declined to try issue No. 4 as an issue of law on two grounds.

    3. The first was that on the date to which the matter was posted, for the trial of issues of law, Mr. Hanumanthaiah, the representative of the employers, was absent. The Tribunal obviously thought that it was the duty of Mr. Hanumanthaiah to be present on August 20, 1960 and make a re-presentation to the Tribunal that the fourth issue was also an issue of law and should be tried and decided in the first instance. The neglect on the part of Mr. Hanumanthaiah to do so disentitled, in the opinion of the Tribunal, as we read its order, to again ask the Tribunal on October 8, 1960 to try the fourth issue and decide it in the first instance.

    4. The other ground on which the Tribunal declined to decide the fourth issue in the first instance was that issue did not raise a pure question of law but raised a mixed question of law and fact.

    5. It is against the order made by the Tribunal in that way that this Writ petition is directed. The petitioners ask that the order made by the Tribunal should be quashed by certiorari and that a writ of prohibition should issue restraining the Tribunal from proceeding with the case. The petitioners also ask for an order directing the Tribunal to decide the fourth issue in the first instance before proceeding to try the other issues in the case.

    6. Mr. Ullal appearing on behalf of the petitioners urges that the fourth issue raised a question of jurisdiction which the Tribunal was bound to decide in the first instance. He has urged that issue raises the question whether the dispute referred by the Government under S. 10(1)(d) was or was not an industrial dispute.

    7. The ground on which the petitioners contend that the dispute is not an industrial dispute is that it is a dispute referred to the Tribunal by the Government at the instance of workmen who had not the support of a substantial section of employees. Mr. Ullal had to admit that this question as to whether the dispute was or was not an industrial dispute is not a pure question of law, but is a mixed question of law and fact, as rightly held by the Tribunal. But what he contends is that question, although a mixed question of law and fact, being a jurisdictional question, the Tribunal was bound to decide it first although it was necessary for it to decide a question of fact for that purpose. The question of fact, it is Urged, which the Tribunal had, to decide was a jurisdictional fact and was therefore one which the Tribunal could not decline to decide in the first instance.

    8. It seems to me that the application for a writ of prohibition cannot succeed. Firstly, the petitioners neglected to avail themselves of the opportunity which was afforded to them. On 20-8-1960 on which date it was open to them to urge that the fourth issue also should be decided in the first instance as a preliminary issue. The matter was posted to that date to decide the issues of law which arose in the case. It was so posted by Mr. Chandrasekharaiah when he was presiding over the Tribunal. It is admitted that Mr. Chandrasekharaiah did not state when he posted the matter to August 20, 1960, that the fourth issue was an issue of law and would therefore be decided in the first instance. It is clear that the order made by Mr. Chandrasekharaiah was only to the effect that pure questions of law should be decided in the first instance. It has not been made out that he also directed that the fourth issue, although it raised a mixed question of law and fact, should also be decided in the first instance.

    9. However that may be, if the petitioners wanted the Tribunal to decide the fourth issue as a preliminary issue, it was their clear duty to be present in Court on August 20, 1960 either by themselves or through their representatives and to request the Tribunal to decide the fourth issue also in the first instance, if they were entitled to the grant of that request. On that date of hearing, petitioners and their representatives were both absent. The Tribunal took the view that the only issues which were issues of law were issues 2 and 3 and the finding of the Tribunal on those issues was against the petitioners. The Tribunal did not consider that the fourth issue was also an issue which had to be decided in the first instance. It accordingly posted the matter for further proceedings, to the next date of hearing.

    10. If the petitioners threw away the opportunity which they had on August 20, 1960 to insist upon the fourth issue also being tried as a preliminary issue, it seems to me that if on a subsequent date the petitioner's representative again approached Tribunal for a decision on the fourth issue as a preliminary issue, the Tribunal, it is clear, was not bound to accede to that request. The petitioners cannot, therefore, properly represent that they have any grievance in respect of the order now made by the Tribunal that the fourth issue would be tried along with the other issues in the case since it was their own indiligence in the prosecution of the matter that was responsible for the Tribunal to come to the conclusion on August 20, 1960 that only issues 2 and 3 were the issues that should be decided in the first instance.

    11. However that may be, I am not also satisfied that the petitioners have any absolute right to insist upon the Tribunal deciding in the first instance a mixed question, although that question is one which relates to its own jurisdiction, and to proceed with the matter entrusted to it under Section 10(1)(d) of the Act.

    12. It is true that a Tribunal before whom the jurisdiction to proceed with the matter is challenged, has the discretion in an appropriate case to try a jurisdictional fact on which its jurisdiction depends. It is well settled law that if it decides a jurisdictional fact in that way and decides it wrongly, that decision is justiciable in a superior Court which has the power to issue a writ of prohibition restraining the Tribunal from further proceeding with the matter.

    13. The decision in Kaleswari Handloom Factory v. State of Madras, AIR 1958 Mad 108 on which Mr. Ullal depends in support of this writ petition is a case in which that principle was enunciated. It does not decide that if a Tribunal declines to go into a mixed question of law and fact although it is a decision on that question on which its jurisdiction depends, a writ of mandamus which is in effect the writ for which the petitioners have prayed for in this case could issue compelling the Tribunal to decide that mixed question of law and fact in the instance.

    14. The ordinary rule which is well settled is that a prohibition will not issue unless the defect of jurisdiction is apparent and it is clear that the Tribunal which is proceeding with the matter before it has no jurisdiction to do so. It is only in a case where the defect of jurisdiction is clear and obvious that a prohibition will issue as of right. In all other cases, the issue of prohibition is discretionary.

    15. The authoritative enunciation of this principle is to be found in Halsbury's Laws of England, Simonds Edition, Volume 11, paragraph 214 which reads:

    214. “When prohibition of right. Where the defect of jurisdiction is apparent on the face of the proceedings and the application is made by a party, the order goes as of right and is not a matter of discretion. Smallness of the matter in dispute and delay on the part of the applicant are not in themselves grounds for a refusal. The order, however, cannot be claimed as of right unless the defect of jurisdiction is clear, nor will it, as a rule, be granted where an amendment in a plea will cure the alleged defect. It will not be granted where a specific remedy is given by a statute which in effect substitutes the statutory remedy for the remedy by prohibition”.

    16. That being the principle governing the issue of writ of prohibition, the petitioners are not, in this case, entitled to a writ of prohibition although they have prayed for one, since, admittedly the question as to whether the Tribunal has, or, has not jurisdiction to proceed with the reference before it, depends upon an investigation into a question of fact, namely, whether the dispute referred by the Government is or is not an industrial dispute.

    17. Now, there is another principle which incorporates an equally well settled rule. That rule is that if a proceeding is pending before a Tribunal and its jurisdiction to proceed with that proceeding is challenged, the only stage at which prohibition will issue is the stage when the Tribunal decides a jurisdictional fact wrongly and usurps jurisdiction in that way. It is only when the Tribunal steps outside its jurisdiction that a writ of prohibition may issue; but, if on the contrary, a Tribunal declined to go into a jurisdictional fact at the earliest stage although called upon to do so and proclaims its intention to try that jurisdictional fact along with the other facts in the case, since it would not be possible for any one to suggest that there has been any wrong assumption of jurisdiction by an incorrect determination of a jurisdictional fact, no occasion for the issue of prohibition can properly arise.

    18. Since the Tribunal in this case has merely announced its intention to try the jurisdictional fact along with the other facts the case, the petitioners cannot properly ask for a writ of prohibition at this stage and their application for that relief must, therefore, fail.

    19. But, what has been urged very strenuously by Mr. Ullal is that although the petitioners may not be entitled to a writ of prohibition from this Court at this stage, they are nevertheless, entitled to a writ of mandamus directing the Tribunal to decide the fourth issue involving a jurisdictional fact as a preliminary issue.

    20. I am not disposed to agree with the proposition submitted before us by Mr. Ullal that if the jurisdiction of a Tribunal is challenged before it and the question as to whether the Tribunal has jurisdiction or not, depends upon a decision on a question of fact, the Tribunal is bound to decide that jurisdictional fact in the first instance before proceeding to try the other facts involved in the case. Although it was the endeavour of Mr. Ullal to convince us that the effect of the decision in AIR 1958 Mad 108 was that it was obligatory for the Tribunal in such circumstances to try such jurisdictional fact in the first instance, I have not found it possible to read that decision in the way in which Mr. Ullal wants us to read it. The only question which was decided in that case was, that if by an incorrect determination on a jurisdictional fact a Tribunal wrongly assumed jurisdiction, as for example, by deciding that what was not really an industrial dispute was one, the High Court had the power to quash that incorrect determination and to restrain the Tribunal from proceeding with the reference relating to such dispute.

    21. There is, however, an observation of the Exchequer Chamber in Bunbury v. Fuller, (1853) 9 Ex. 111 at p. 140 which may afford some assistance to the argument advanced before us by Mr. Ullal and that observation reads:

    “It is a general rule, that no Court of limited jurisdiction can give itself jurisdiction by a wrong decision on a point collateral to the merits of the case upon which the limit to its jurisdiction depends; and however its decision may be final on all particulars, making up together that subject matter which if true is within its jurisdiction, and however, necessary in many cases it may be for it to make a preliminary inquiry, whether some collateral matter be or be not within the limits, yet upon this preliminary question its decision must always be open to inquiry in the superior Court. Then to take the simplest case — suppose a Judge with jurisdiction limited to a particular hundred, and a matter is brought before him as having arisen within it, but the party charged contends that it arose in another hundred, his is clearly a collateral matter independant of the merits, on its being presented, the judge must not immediately forbear to proceed but must inquire into its truth, or false-hood and for the time decide it, and either proceed or not on the principal subject matter according as he finds on that point; but this decision must be open to question, and if he has improperly either forborne or proceeded on the main question in consequence of an error, on this the Court of Queen's Bench will issue its mandamus or prohibition to correct his mistake”

    22. The enunciation of the principle in this way may lend some support to the contention urged by Mr. Ullal that the Tribunal in this case was under a duty to enquire into the objection relating to jurisdiction although it involved an enquiry into a collateral question of fact independent of the merits. But, on the question whether if a Tribunal's jurisdiction is challenged and a decision on the question whether the Tribunal has jurisdiction involved an enquiry into a collateral question of fact, the Tribunal is bound, in the first instance to enquire into that collateral question and decide the jurisdictional fact before it proceeds to enquire into the merits of the case, it does not appear to me that we should express any opinion in this case.

    23. Normally we would have been justified in dismissing this writ petition on the ground that the petitioners did not, on August 20, 1960 avail themselves of the opportunity to have the fourth issue decided as a preliminary issue. Their conduct in absenting themselves on that date of hearing would have normally precluded them from agitating that matter on a subsequent date of hearing. The mandamus sought by the petitioners could have been ordinarily refused by us on that ground.

    24. But in my opinion, we should, however, in this case issue a direction to the Tribunal to dispose of the fourth issue in the first instance not on the ground, that the petitioners have a right to have the issue disposed of in that way, but for reasons which I shall state presently.

    25. It appears, after the impugned order was made by the Tribunal on October 8, 1960 some of the employees presented complaints under Sec. 33A of the Industrial Disputes Act that their services had been dispensed with in contravention of the provisions of Section 33 of the Act. Now, an enquiry into those complaints by the Tribunal is possible only if a proceeding in respect of an industrial dispute is pending before the Tribunal. The indispensable condition precedent for the exercise of jurisdiction under S. 33A is the pendency of a proceeding in respect of an industrial dispute before the Tribunal. By reason of the announcement of the Tribunal in its order dated October 8, 1960 that it will try the fourth issue only along with the other issues in the case, it has become now incompetent for the Tribunal to adjudicate upon the complaints presented under Section 33A until after the fourth issue is decided along with other issuer in the case. The inevitable result would be that no adjudication on the complaints presented under Section 33A would be possible until the Tribunal makes its award. A situation like that, in my opinion, should not be allowed to come into existence. It is in order that there may be no undue delay in the adjudication upon the complaint presented, by the employees under Section 33A, that it seems to me that we would be justified in directing the Tribunal to decide the fourth issue in the first instance. The peculiar circumstances of this case, in my opinion, justify the issue of that direction and a direction should accordingly issue to the Tribunal that the fourth issue shall be tried in the first instance so that it might pronounce on the question whether the dispute referred to it is or is not an industrial dispute. On the decision on that issue as a preliminary issue would depend the competence of the Tribunal to adjudicate upon the complaints preferred under Section 33A. It is that weighty consideration which impels me to come to the conclusion that the direction which in my opinion should issue, should be made in this case and it is so ordered.

    26. Kalagate J.:— I agree.

    KE/R.C.D
    Order accordingly.

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