The inherent jurisdiction of this Court under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C has been invoked by the petitioner for quashing the entire criminal proceeding including the order dated 20.09.2004 passed by SDJM, Jamshedpur in C-1 Case No. 710 of 2004 whereby and whereunder he came to the conclusion that prima facie offence under Sections 498(A) and 406 of the Indian Penal Code read with Section 4 of Dowry Prohibition Act is made out against the petitioner and other accused persons. Accordingly, he directed for issuance of summon against them.
2. Aforesaid complaint case has been instituted against the petitioner and six others on the basis of a complaint filed by complainant/opposite party no. 2, Harbinder Kaur @ Baban. It is alleged that on 05.12.1993 opposite party no. 2 married to accused Dalwinder Singh (son of petitioner) in accordance with Sikh rites and customs at Jamshedpur. It is further alleged that in course of marriage, the parents of opposite party no. 2 had given ornaments and other articles as gift/presentation. It is further alleged that after the marriage, opposite party no. 2 went to her matrimonial house situated at Gurudwara Road, Benochiti, Durgapur in the district of Burdwan, West Bengal. It is further alleged that she spent peaceful life in her matrimonial home for about one month. Thereafter, her husband Dalbinder Singh and other accused persons asked the complainant/opposite party no. 2 to demand one lakh rupees and a motorcycle from her father. It is alleged that on her refusal to do so, the accused persons tortured her in various way on different occasions. It is stated that on 27.08.1995 opposite party no. 2 delivered a male child but inspite of same, she was ill-treated and tortured for demand of dowry. It is stated that ultimately on 14.09.2000, she has been driven out from her matrimonial house and thereafter she came to Jamshedpur and started living with her parents. It is further alleged that the accused persons had forced her to leave her matrimonial house without her son on the pretext that the son will be sent to her parents house later on, but the accused persons did not returned her son, thereby she has been mentally tortured by the accused persons including the petitioner. It is further alleged that on 11.07.2004 accused nos. 1, 4 and 5 made a telephonic call to the complainant and threatened that if the complainant will try to visit their home she will be burnt alive. It is also alleged that the accused persons had not returned her gift/presentation received by them during her marriage and the same has been misappropriated by the accused person.
3. It appears that the complaint petition filed by opposite party no. 2 has been transferred in the court of SDJM, Jamshedpur under Section 192 Cr.P.C for inquiry. It then appears that learned SDJM, Jamshedpur took statement of opposite party no. 2 on solemn affirmation and had also examined two witnesses in support of complaint case. The record further reveals that vide order dated 20.09.2004, learned SDJM, Jamshedpur after considering the materials available on record concluded that prima facie case is made out and there are sufficient grounds to proceed against the accused person including the petitioner under Section 498(A), 406 I.P.C and Section 4 of Dowry Prohibition Act. Accordingly, SDJM, Jamshedpur directed for issuance of summons against the petitioner and other accused person under Section 204(1) of the Cr.P.C Against this order, the present application has been filed.
4. It is submitted by Sri Indrajit Sinha, learned counsel for the petitioner that from perusal of the complaint petition as well as the statement of complainant and other witnesses examined on her behalf, it is manifestly cleared that the entire acts of cruelty committed in Durgapur in the district of Burdwan, West Bengal. It is further submitted that there is no allegation in the entire complaint petition that any part of cruelty committed in Jamshedpur. Thus, learned SDJM, Jamshedpur has no territorial jurisdiction to try the case and/or make inquiry at Jamshedpur. Accordingly, it is submitted that the entire proceeding in relation to complaint case no. 710 of 2004 is without jurisdiction. Therefore, the impugned order is an abuse of the process of Court.
5. On the other hand, Sri Ananda Sen, learned counsel for the opposite party no. 2, submits that accused nos. 1, 4 and 5 had given telephonic threatening to the complainant on 11.07.2004 that if she will try to go to their house, she will be burnt alive. The aforesaid threatening caused mental worry to the complainant because she has been deprived to see her son. It is submitted that since the aforesaid telephonic threatening has been received by the complainant at Jamshedpur, therefore, Jamshedpur court had jurisdiction to make inquiry and try the case. Accordingly, it is submitted that the contention of learned counsel for the petitioner is ill-founded and against the facts of this case. It is submitted that there is no illegality and/or irregularity in the impugned order, therefore, the same does not require any interference by this Court.
6. Having heard the submission, I have gone through the record of the case. Section 177 of the Code of Criminal Procedure runs as follows:
“177. Ordinary place of inquiry and trial - every offence shall ordinarily be inquired into and tried by a Court within whose jurisdiction it was committed.”
7. Section 178 of Code of Criminal Procedure provide some exception to the aforesaid general rule as provided under Section 177 of the Cr.P.C which runs as follows:
“178. Place of inquiry or trial. - (a) When it is uncertain in which of several local areas an offence was committed, or
(b) Where an offence is committed partly in one local area and partly in another, or
(c) where an offence is a continuing one, and continues to be committed in more local areas than one, or
(d) where it consists of several acts done in different local areas, it may be inquired into or tried by a Court having jurisdiction over any of such local areas.”
8. Thus, on perusal of aforesaid two provisions, it appears that as a general rule every offence shall ordinarily be inquired into and tried by a Court within whose jurisdiction it was committed. However, if the offence is committed at several places or the same is a continuing offence then Section 178 of Cr.P.C provides that any of the Court in whose jurisdiction any part of the said occurrence took place can inquire and try the case.
9. In the instant case, from the perusal of complaint petition (Annexure-1) as also the statement of complainant/opposite party no. 2 on solemn affirmation as well as the statement of complaint witnesses nos. 1 and 2 who were examined on behalf of complainant during the inquiry, I find that the entire act of cruelty has been committed in Durgapur, within district of Burdwan, West Bengal. It is stated in the complaint petition that she has been driven out from her matrimonial house on 14.09.2000 and thereafter, she resides in her parents house. There is nothing in the complaint petition to show that from 14.09.2000 to the date of filing of this complaint petition i.e 19.07.2004, petitioner as well as any other accused person came to Jamshedpur and tortured the complainant. It is alleged at paragraph no. 13 of the complaint petition that on 11.07.2004 accused nos. 1, 4 and 5 had given telephonic threatening to the complainant that if she will try to go to their house she will be burnt alive which causes mental worry to the complainant. In this respect, it is worth mentioning that the complainant/opposite party no. 2 in her statement on solemn affirmation and other witnesses examined on behalf of the complainant had not whispered about aforesaid allegation. It is also not made clear in the complaint petition as to why accused nos. 1, 4 and 5 had given a telephonic call to the complainant after the lapse of four years from the date she had been driven out from her matrimonial house. There is nothing on record to show that prior to 11.07.2004 accused persons used to talk with complainant on telephone. It appears that aforesaid statement has been made in the complaint petition only with a view to create jurisdiction at Jamshedpur which has not been supported by the complainant and/or her witnesses during inquiry. It has been held by this Court in Ajay Kumar Jain v. State of Jharkhand reported in 2007 (2) JLJR 282 that on the basis of vague cryptic telephonic conversation, the territorial jurisdiction cannot be vested in a Court.
10. Thus, in the instant case also only on the basis of vague allegations made at paragraph no. -13 of the complaint petition, it cannot be held that it confers territorial jurisdiction upon the SDJM, Jamshedpur to make inquiry and trial of the allegation of cruelty attributed on the complainant at Durgapur in the district of Burdwan, West Bengal.
11. It has been held by their lordships of Supreme Court in Y. Abraham Ajith v. Inspector of Police, Chennai reported in (2004) 8 SCC 100 that if a complaint filed under Section 498(A) and 406 of the I.P.C and Section 4 of Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 against husband and his relatives by the wife at place C where she came to stay after leaving her husband house at place N and when all the offences alleged to have taken place at place N and no part of cause of action arose at place C then, in view of Section 177 and 178 of Cr.P.C, the Magistrate at place C had no jurisdiction to deal with the matter. Thus, in view of aforesaid law laid down by their lordships of Supreme Court, as no part of act of cruelty took place in Jamshedpur, the learned SDJM, Jamshedpur has no jurisdiction to inquire into the allegations made in the complaint petition.
12. Accordingly, I conclude that in the facts and circumstances of this case, Jamshedpur court has no territorial jurisdiction. Therefore, the entire proceeding in relation to complaint case no. 710 of 2004 pending in the court of learned SDJM, Jamshedpur is without jurisdiction and is an abuse of the process of Court.
13. In the result, this application is allowed. The entire proceeding in connection with C-1 Case no. 710 of 2004 including order dated 20.09.2004 is hereby quashed.