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  • provisions of Section 18 of the Industrial Disputes Act. 21. Section 2(p) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947
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Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Judges
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  • provisions of Section 18 of the Industrial Disputes Act. 21. Section 2(p) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947
  • Sub-sections (1) and (3) of Section 18
  • Section 18 of the I.D. Act. 22.
Smart Summary

Structured Summary of the Opinion — Compassionate Appointment Cases (CCL)

Factual and Procedural Background

This consolidated order disposes of several writ petitions raising common questions of law and fact concerning applications made by dependents of deceased employees of Central Coalfields Ltd. (CCL) for compassionate appointment and/or monetary compensation under the National Coal Wage Agreement (NCWA-V).

Representative facts (as set out in the opinion):

  • WPS No. 1721 of 2004: The petitioner’s father died in service on 6.11.1999. The petitioner filed for compassionate appointment on 17.2.2000. The application was forwarded and recommended through departmental channels, with a note that the petitioner was 17 and the mother should receive monetary compensation pending consideration. In 2002 the petitioner was informed (by letter dated 29/30.4.2002) that the Committee decided not to consider the case on the ground that the deceased died on 6.11.1999 and the application was submitted on 27.6.2000.
  • WPS No. 1955 of 2004: The petitioner’s father died on 22.1.1999. The petitioner filed on 22.9.1999. About three years later the application was considered and rejected by letter dated 13.9.2002 on the ground that it was submitted beyond six months.
  • WPS No. 1696 of 2004: The petitioner’s father died on 14.1.1998; an application was filed on 14.8.1998 but rejected about six years later on the ground that it had been filed after seven months instead of six months.
  • WPS No. 1767 of 2004: The petitioner (widow) filed on 9.8.2000 after the deceased died on 2.11.1999; the application was rejected by letter dated 10.2.2003 as filed after six months.
  • WPS No. 1652 of 2003: The petitioner’s father died on 23.11.1999. The petitioner filed on 7.6.2000 and produced documents. Respondents called for further documents on 8.8.2000; after the petitioner complied, about three years later the application was rejected by letter dated 8.2.2002 on the ground of delay beyond six months.

Procedural posture: The petitions were heard together. Respondents filed a common counter affidavit (specifically in WPS No. 1721 of 2004) explaining departmental time-limits and subsequent relaxations, and asserting applications filed beyond prescribed periods were properly rejected. The Court heard counsel for petitioners and for respondents and issued this consolidated judgment quashing the impugned orders and remitting matters for fresh decision.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether an employer (here, CCL) can lawfully reject applications for compassionate appointment on the ground of limitation when the applications were kept pending or not processed by the employer's officers for an extended period (in some cases more than three years) before any rejection was communicated.
  2. How the NCWA (National Coal Wage Agreement) provisions governing compassionate appointment (in particular Clause 9.5.0 and the live-roster/monetary compensation provisions) interact with departmental circulars prescribing time-limits for filing applications and subsequent relaxations of those time-limits.
  3. Whether the respondents’ rejection of such applications for being filed beyond the prescribed period was arbitrary, mala fide, or otherwise unsustainable where departmental laches or negligence contributed to the delay in disposal.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioners' Position

  • The petitioners (dependents) had submitted applications for compassionate appointment and/or monetary compensation under provisions of NCWA-V after the death of the breadwinner and had followed departmental procedures (filing applications, supplying documents, attending calls for interview/production of documents).
  • The petitions challenged the subsequent rejections communicated after long delays, asserting that departmental laches or failure to process applications timely rendered a limitation-based rejection unjust and impermissible.

Respondents' Arguments

  • The respondents (CCL) explained that the prescribed internal time limit for filing applications for compassionate appointment was six months from the date of death (circular dated 12.12.1995).
  • They outlined that the six-month period was subsequently relaxed by one year by a circular dated 1.1.2002 (retrospectively effective from February 2000) and later extended to eighteen months by a circular dated 19.6.2003 (retrospectively effective from 27.11.2002).
  • The respondents maintained that applications filed beyond the time prescribed under the relevant circulars were rightly rejected.
  • In respect of WPS No. 1721 of 2004, respondents' counsel (Mr. Mehta) stated that the petitioner's application had been reconsidered and processed and that a decision to give employment would be taken at the earliest; for other petitions he maintained that applications filed beyond the prescribed period were rightly rejected.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Mohan Mahto v. Central Coalfields Ltd. and Ors., 2003 (4) JCR 612 : 2003 (4) JLJR 658 Illustrates that where a male dependant satisfied the age criterion and an application was filed but the employer failed to keep him on live roster or pay monetary compensation, the employer’s inaction cannot be used to deny the claimant's rights; criticizes mechanical rejections on limitation grounds after departmental processing and interviews had been held. The Court relied on the Mohan Mahto decision as a factual and legal precedent showing similar administrative lapses at CCL and to support the conclusion that delay caused by the employer cannot justify rejecting claims on limitation grounds.
Umesh Kumar Nagpal v. State of Haryana and Ors., 1994 (4) SCC 138 Compassionate employment cannot be granted after the lapse of a reasonable period; compassionate appointment is not a vested right and is meant to meet immediate financial crisis around the time of death. The Court cited this principle but distinguished it on the facts: while the principle limits grants after long delay, where the employer's own laches caused the delay in processing, the employer cannot take advantage of that laches to deny the claim.
Haryana State Electricity Board v. Naresh Tanwar and Anr., 1996 (8) SCC 23 Reiterates that compassionate appointment is intended for immediate relief and cannot be claimed after a long lapse of a reasonable period; follows Umesh Kumar Nagpal. The Court noted the principle from this case but distinguished the present facts (presence of NCWA provisions and employer delay). The precedent was used to frame the general rule which the Court then applied contextually.
Jagdish Prasad v. State of Bihar, 1996 (1) SCC 301 Confirms that compassionate appointment aims to relieve immediate hardship and cannot be converted into a general mode of recruitment years after the death; rejection of post-majority claims was upheld in that case. The Court cited Jagdish Prasad for the established principle limiting retrospective claims for compassionate appointment, and then distinguished the factual matrix where employer negligence caused undue delay in processing applications.
Barauni Refinery Pragatisheel Shramik Parishad v. General Secretary, Barauni Telshodhak Mazdoor Union, AIR 1990 SC 1801 Explains the binding nature of settlements under Section 18 of the Industrial Disputes Act: settlements arrived at in conciliation proceedings bind all parties/employees to an industrial dispute and have extended application akin to awards. The Court relied on this authority to treat the NCWA (a bipartite settlement under Section 18) as binding on the parties and hence to give effect to its provisions relating to compassionate appointment, live roster and monetary compensation.
National Engineering Industries Ltd. v. State of Rajasthan and Ors., AIR 2000 SC 469 Reinforces the binding effect and legal sanctity of settlements under Section 18 of the I.D. Act. The Court cited this case to support the legal status and enforceability of the NCWA settlement provisions relied upon in the petitions.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court's analysis proceeds from the specific terms of the NCWA and the departmental conduct recorded in the cases:

  1. Identification of the governing statutory/contractual framework:
    • The NCWA contains clause(s) (quoted as Clause 9.5.0 in the opinion) providing for either monetary compensation to female dependants or employment, and for male dependants aged 15 years and above to be kept on a live roster and provided employment on attaining 18 years while monetary compensation is payable to the female dependant during the intervening period (paras 10–13).
    • The NCWA is a bipartite settlement arrived at under Section 18 of the Industrial Disputes Act and thus has binding force on the parties (paras 20–23, and citation of Barauni Refinery and National Engineering Industries authorities to confirm the binding nature of such settlements).
  2. Recognition of the competing legal principle:
    • It is well-settled (per Umesh Kumar Nagpal, Jagdish Prasad, Haryana State Electricity Board cases) that compassionate appointment is intended for immediate relief and is not a vested long-term right; generally it cannot be granted after a long lapse of a reasonable period (paras 16, 23–28).
  3. Application to the present facts and the key legal question:
    • The crucial issue was whether the employer may lawfully reject applications as time-barred where the employer's own officers kept applications pending and failed to process them for years (para 15).
    • The Court reviewed the departmental practice: although the CMD gave directions to dispose of pending applications (following a court hearing where the CMD appeared and gave assurances), concerned authorities thereafter issued mechanical rejections on limitation grounds even where applications had been processed and dependents had been called for interview or to produce documents (paras 13–18, 19).
  4. Balancing the general rule against the employer's conduct:
    • The Court acknowledged the general legal position that compassionate appointments cannot be granted after an unreasonable lapse, but held that where the employer's own laches and negligence caused the long delay in processing, the employer cannot take advantage of that laches to defeat legitimate claims (paras 15, 21).
    • The Court explained that to allow a limitation-based rejection in such circumstances would amount to giving a premium to the employer for its negligence and would deprive dependents of their legitimate claims under NCWA (para 15).
  5. Conclusion from the analysis:
    • Given the NCWA entitlements, the binding nature of the settlement, the recorded departmental inertia and the CMD's assurances, and the cited precedents illustrating both the general rule and the impropriety of mechanical rejections where processing had occurred, the Court found the respondents' actions in rejecting the compassionate appointment applications to be illegal, arbitrary and mala fide (paras 24–25).

Holding and Implications

Holding: The writ petitions are allowed and the impugned orders rejecting the applications for compassionate appointment/compensation are quashed. The matters are remitted to the concerned authority of the respondents for passing fresh orders in accordance with law within two months from the production of a copy of this order (para 25).

Implications:

  • Direct effect on the parties: The respondents must reconsider the previously rejected applications and pass fresh orders in accordance with law within the two-month time period specified by the Court. The impugned rejections are set aside as illegal, arbitrary and mala fide.
  • On the law: The Court applied established precedents concerning the limited, immediate-relief nature of compassionate appointments but held that an employer cannot rely on limitation where the employer's own laches in processing applications caused the delay; the NCWA settlement's provisions (including live-roster and compensation rules) are binding and must be given effect.
  • The opinion does not purport to lay down a novel legal principle beyond applying established authorities; its primary practical consequence is to require fresh consideration of the affected applications by the respondents in light of the NCWA and the Court's findings about departmental laches.

Note: This summary is strictly based on the facts, arguments, citations and reasoning contained in the provided opinion. No information has been added beyond what appears in the judgment text.

    Central Coal Fields Ltd. Through ... v. Central Coal Fields Ltd Through

    1. In all these writ petitions since common question of law and facts are involved the same have been heard together and are disposed of by this common order.

    2. IN WPS No. 1721 of 2004 the petitioner's father while in service of the respondent died in harness on 6.11.1999. As per the provision of National Coal Wage Agreement -V (NCWA-V) the petitioner filed application on 17.2.2000 for compassionate appointment. The said application was forwarded by respondent Nos. 6 and 7 namely, the Project Officer and the Chief General Manager of CCL. While recommending the case, the Deputy Chief Personnel Manager informed his higher authority that the petitioner is 17 years old and, therefore, mother should get compensation of Rs. 3000/- per month and the name of the petitioner be kept in live roster. A copy of the said representation has been annexed as Annexure-4 to the writ petition. Curiously enough in 2002 the petitioner was informed by the impugned letter dated 29/30.4.02 that the Committee decided not to consider the case of the petitioner on the ground that the deceased employee died on 6.11.1999 and the application was submitted on 27.6.2000.

    3. In WPS No. 1955 of 2004 the petitioner's father died on 22.1.1999 while in the service of the respondent. The petitioner submitted application on 22.9.1999. Only after about three years the petitioner was informed by letter dated 13.9.2002 that his application was considered and rejected on the ground that the application was submitted beyond the period of six months.

    4. Similarly in WPS No. 1696 of 2004 the petitioner's father while in the service of the respondent as Pump Khalasi died in harness on 14.1.1998 and on 14.8.1998 application was filed for compassionate appointment. After about six years application was rejected on the ground that it was filed after the lapse of seven months instead of six months.

    5. In WPS No. 1767 of 2004 the petitioner is the widow of Late Raman Manjhi who died in harness on 2.11.1999 while working in Kuju Colliery. The petitioner submitted her application on 9.8.2000 for compassionate appointment and for payment of compensation as per NCWA-V. The said application was rejected after about four years and communicated vide letter dated 10.2.2003 on the ground that it was filed after the lapse of six months.

    6. Similar is the case of writ petitioner in WPS No. 1652 of 2003. In this case the petitioner's father died in harness on 23.11.1999 while working in Sayal-D colliery. The petitioner submitted application on 7.6.2000. The petitioner also submitted relevant documents including death certificate. The respondents vide letter dated 8.8.2000 called upon the petitioner to appear in the office of General Manager on 18.8.2000 and submit identity card, pay slip etc. The petitioner submitted all the papers. Curiously enough after about three years the petitioner was informed vide letter dated 8.2.2002 that his application was rejected on the same ground that application was filed after a lapse of six months.

    7. A common defence has been taken by the respondents by filing counter affidavit in WPS No. 1721 of 2004. It is stated that the Chairman-cum-Managing Director of the respondent-CCL appeared before this Court on 3.3.2004 in WPC No. 1052 of 2004 and assured this Court to take appropriate steps in the matter so that applications for compassionate appointment are disposed of with utmost expedition. The CMD thereafter reviewed the entire matter and by his letter dated 5.3.2004 addressed to all Area Chief General Managers and Head of Departments directed to dispose of such applications within three months time. The respondents further case is that by circular dated 12.12.1995 the time limit prescribed for filing application for compassionate appointment was six months from the date of death of deceased employee. By another circular dated 1.1.2002 the period for filing application of six months was relaxed by twelve months giving retrospective effect from February 2000. By another circular dated 19.6.2003 the period for filing application by the dependant of the deceased was further extended from twelve months to eighteen months and the circular was given retrospective effect i.e. from 27.11.2002. Further case of the respondents is that such applications which were filed beyond the time prescribed under the circular have been rightly rejected by the respondents.

    8. I have heard learned counsel appearing for the petitioners and Mr. A.K. Mehta, learned counsel appearing for the respondents-CCL.

    9. So far WPS No. 1721 of 2004 is concerned Mr. Mehta submitted that the application of the petitioner has been reconsidered and processed and decision shall be taken for giving employment to the petitioner at an earliest. So far other writ petitions are concerned Mr. Mehta submitted that since applications were filed for compassionate appointment beyond the period prescribed by the circular the same have been rightly rejected by the respondents.

    10. It is not in dispute that the workmen of CCL are entitled to get benefits under the settlement (award) time to time arrived at by and between the Management of CCL and the Union representing the workmen. These settlements are called National Coal Wage Agreement. Clause 9.3.2 of the NCWA lays down the provision with regard to employment to the dependent of the worker who dies while in service. Clause 9.5.0 is worth to be quoted hereinbelow :

    "(i) In case of death due to mine accident, the female dependant would have the option to either accept the monetary compensation of Rs. 3000/-per month or employment irrespective of her age.

    (ii) In case of death/total permanent disablement due to causes other than mine accident and medical unfitness under Clause 9.4.0 if the female dependant is below the age of 45 years she will have the option either to accept the monetary compensation of Rs. 2000/-per month or employment.

    (iii) In case of death either in mine accident or for other reasons or medical unfitness under Clause 9.4.0, if no employment has been offered and the male dependant of the concerned worker is 15 years and above in age he will be kept on a live roster and would be provided employment commensurate with his skill and qualification when he attains the age of 18 years. During the period the male dependant is on live roster, the female dependant will be paid monetary compensation as per rates at paras (i) & (ii) above."

    11. From the aforesaid clause it is manifest that if on the date of death of the deceased employee the male dependent is fifteen years old or above in age then he will be kept on a live roster and would be provided employment commensurate with his skill and qualification when he attains the age of eighteen years. During the period the male dependent will be on live roster, the female dependent will be paid monetary compensation.

    12. I am fully conscious of the law that the object of compassionate appointment is to give immediate relief to the dependents and save them from starvation on account of death of a bread earner. I am equally conscious of the law that the very object of compassionate appointment is frustrated by the lapse of time and after a long gap, if applications for compassionate appointment is made, the same cannot be entertained. But the moot question which falls for consideration in these writ petitions is whether an employer can deprive the dependents from their legitimate right to get compassionate appointment by keeping such applications pending without being processed and without taking any decision and then rejecting the same on the ground of limitation. In other words, whether the action of the respondents in rejecting the applications for compassionate appointment after the lapse of more than three years on the ground that such applications were not filed within the time prescribed by the management, is sustainable in law?

    13. This Court came across several cases where the respondents- CCL, because of the laches and negligence of their officers, kept all such applications pending even for more than five years. Taking notice of the serious lapses from the side of the officers of the respondents the Chairman-cum-Managing Director was called in Court in one of the writ petitions being WPS No. 1052 of 2004 and in response thereto the Chairman-cum- Managing Director appeared in Court and assured that all applications pending for a long time shall be disposed of. For better appreciation the order dated 3.3.2004 passed in WPS No. 1052 of 2004 is quoted here in below :--

    "Pursuant to order dated 25.2.2004 the Chairman-cum- Managing Director and the Director (Personnel) has appeared in person. This Court again apprised them about the serious latches and negligence of their officers specially in disposing of application filed by the dependent for compassionate appointment. It is unfortunate that the widow or the dependent file their application immediately after the death of the employee but those applications are considered and disposed of after 3-4 years and appointment is refused merely on the ground of delay. In series of cases this Court deprecated such an action of the officers but for the reasons best known to them they are repeating the same thing.

    The CMD assures this Court that he will issue instructions to those officers to immediately take up all those applications and dispose of the same at an earliest. The CMD has also assured to take appropriate action, against those officers for whose negligence applications are kept pending for a long time. I hope and trust that the CMD will take appropriate action against the erring officers."

    14. It appears that the CMD issued instructions to the concerned authorities and after receiving the instructions the concerned authorities disposed of all those applications by passing a mechanical order that the applications were barred by one month or two months and without, considering that, the applications were processed and the dependents were called for interview and for production of certificates. In similar facts of the case this Court in the case of Mohan Mahto v. Central Coalfields Ltd. and Ors., 2003 (4) JCR 612 : 2003 (4) JLJR 658 observed (JCR page 614 para 12) :--

    "From the scheme quoted herein above, it is clear that if on the date of death of the deceased employee, the male dependant is 15 years and above in age then he will be kept on a live roster and would be provided employment commensurate with his skill and qualification when he attains the age of 18 years. During the period the male dependant is on live roster, the female dependant will be paid monetary compensation. Admittedly, in 1997 petitioner was more than 15 years of age and an application was filed by the petitioner in 1997 but neither the petitioner was kept in live roster nor the widow of the deceased employee was paid monetary compensation. After attaining 18 years of age petitioner as per the aforesaid clause applied for compassionate appointment in 1999 which has been arbitrarily rejected by the respondents on the ground of delay. While the petitioner approached this Court by filing instant writ application third case has been made out by the respondents that petitioner's appointment was refused on the ground of his elder brother, having been in employment of the subsidiary company. This fact was subsequently falsified in the manner discussed herein above."

    15. Admittedly therefore, so far these writ petitions are concerned, the time limit for filing applications for compassionate appointment was six months from the date of the death of the employees and on the date when these applications were rejected by the Management the time limit prescribed for filing applications was eighteen months. In my considered opinion therefore, when admittedly because of the serious laches and negligence on the part of the officers of the management those applications were considered after more than three years then those applications could not have been rejected on the ground that at the time when the applications were filed the period prescribed was six months. If this Court holds otherwise then this will amount to giving premium to the respondents for their laches and negligence and depriving the dependents of their legitimate claim for compassionate appointments. The arbitrary and whimsical action and attitude of the respondents is evident from the fact that even such cases where the dependent was minor the widow was not even provided monetary compensation as per the aforesaid clause of "NCWA" quoted hereinabove.

    16. It is well settled that compassionate appointment cannot be granted after a long lapse of reasonable period and the very purpose of compassionate appointment, as an exception to the general rule of open recruitment, is intended to meet the immediate financial problem being suffered by the members of the family of the deceased employee. The very object of appointment of dependent of deceased employee who died in harness is to relieve immediate hardship and distress caused to the family by sudden demise of the earning member of the family and such consideration cannot be kept binding for years.

    17. In the case of Umesh Kumar Nagpal v. State of Haryana and Ors., reported in 1994 (4) SCC 138 the Apex Court laying down the provisions of compassionate appointment observed as follows :--

    "For these very reasons the compassionate employment cannot be granted after a lapse of a reasonable period which must be specified in the rules. The consideration for such employment is not a vested right which can be exercised at any time in future. The object being to enable the family to get over the financial crisis which it faces at the time of the death of the sole breadwinner, the compassionate employment cannot be claimed and offered whatever the lapse of time and after the crisis is over."

    18. In the case of Haryana State Electricity Board v. Naresh Tanwar and Anr., reported in 1996 (8) SCC 23 a similar question arose for consideration before the Supreme Court. In that case the ex-employee of Haryana State Electricity Board died in 1980. It is only after 12 years in 1992 a representation was made by the widow for employment of her son who attained majority by the time the representation was rejected by the Board. In that very case another ex-employee died in 1975 and after 13 years an application was made in 1988 for appointment of the son on the same ground. That application was also rejected by the Board. On these facts their Lordships following the earlier decision in Umesh Kumar Nagpal's case (supra) held :

    "It has been indicated in the decision of Umesh Kumar Nagpal that compassionate appointment cannot be granted after a long lapse of reasonable period and the very purpose of compassionate appointment, as an exception to the general rule of open recruitment, is intended to meet the immediate financial problem being suffered by the members of the family of the deceased employee. In the other decision of this Court in Jagdish Prasad case, it has been also indicated that the very object of appointment of dependent of deceased employee who died in harness is to relieve immediate hardship and distress caused to the family by sudden demise of the earning member of the family and such consideration cannot be kept binding for years."

    19. In the case of Jagdish Prasad v. State of Bihar, reported in 1996 (1) SCC 301, the ex-employee in the service of the State died in harness when his son was four years old. On attaining majority ah application was filed for appointment on compassionate ground contending that the compassionate circumstances having continued till the date he made an application for appointment, he was entitled to be appointed on compassionate ground. The Apex Court upholding the rejection of the claim for such appointment observed :

    "The very object of appointment of a dependant of the deceased employees who die in harness is to relieve unexpected immediate hardship and distress caused to the family by sudden demise of the earning member of the family. Since the death occurred way back in 1971, in which year the appellant was four years old, it cannot be said that he is entitled to be appointed after he attained majority long thereafter. In other words, if that contention is accepted, it amounts to another mode of recruitment of the dependent of a deceased government servant which cannot be encouraged de hors the recruitment rules."

    20. In the cases in hand the legal as well as factual position is quite different. The deceased employees were doing hazardous nature of work in the coal mines, Because of hazardous nature of work a settlement was arrived at by and between the workmen and the Management wherein provision has been made for giving employment to the dependants of the workmen who die due to mine accident or permanent disablement or medical unfitness etc. It has been categorically provided in the settlement that in case of death either in mine accident or for other reasons or medical unfitness, if the male dependant of the concerned worker is 15 years or above in age he may be kept on a live roster and would be provided employment commensurate with his skill and qualification when he attains the age of 18 years and during that period the female dependant will be paid monetary compensation. In order to consider the demand of the employees working in the coal mining industry, time to time. Bipartite Committee of the coal industry was constituted under the recommendations of the Central Wage Board and accepted by the Government of India. The settlement arrived at is called as 'National Coal Wage Agreement' (in short NCWA). The said NCWA, I, II, III, IV and V came into effect from 1974. 1979, 1983. 1989 and 1996 respectively. After 1996 NCWA VI was arrived at and came into effect from 1.7.1996. The scope of the agreement covers the wage structure including dearness allowance, fitment in the revised scale of pay, pension, fringe benefit service condition and allied matters including welfare/safety measures. These settlements were arrived at under the provisions of Section 18 of the Industrial Disputes Act.

    21. Section 2(p) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 defines a settlement as a settlement arrived at in course of conciliation proceedings and includes a written agreement between the employer and the workmen arrived at otherwise than in course of conciliation proceeding. Where such agreement has been signed by the parties thereto then the same is binding on both the parties and has the sanctity of law as provided under Section 18 of the I.D. Act.

    22. In the case of Barauni Refinery Pragatisheel Shramik Parishad v. General Secretary, Barauni Telshodhak Mazdoor Union, reported in AIR 1990 SC 1801, the Supreme Court observed :

    "It may be seen on a plain reading of Sub-sections (1) and (3) of Section 18 that settlements are divided into two categories, namely, (i) those arrived at outside the conciliation proceedings and (ii) those arrived at in the course of conciliation proceedings, A settlement which belongs to the first category has limited application in that it merely binds the parties to the agreement but the settlement belonging to the second category has extended application since it is binding on all parties to the industrial dispute, to all others who were summoned to appear in the conciliation proceedings and to all persons employed in the establishment or part of the establishment, as the case may be, to which the dispute related on the date of the dispute and to all others who joined the establishment thereafter.

    Therefore, a settlement arrived at in the course of conciliation proceedings with a recognized majority union will be binding on all workmen of the establishment, even those who belong to the minority union which had objected to the same. To that extent it departs from the ordinary law of contract. The object obviously is to uphold the sanctity of settlements reached with the active assistance of the Conciliation Officer and to discourage an individual employee or a minority union from scuttling the settlement. There is an underlying assumption that a settlement reached with the help of the Conciliation Officer must be fair and reasonable and can, therefore, safely be made binding not only on the workmen belonging to the union signing the settlement but also on others. That is why a settlement arrived at in the course of conciliation proceedings is put on par with an award made by an adjudicatory authority. The High Court was, therefore, right in coming to the conclusion that the settlement dated 4th August, 1983 was binding on all the workmen of the Barauni Refinery including the members of Petroleum and Chemical Mazdoor Union."

    23. Similar view has been taken in the case of National Engineering Industries Ltd. v. State of Rajasthan and Ors., reported in AIR 2000 SC 469.

    24. For all these reasons I have no option but to hold that the action of the respondents in rejecting applications for compassionate appointment is illegal, arbitrary and mala fide and is liable to be quashed.

    25. These writ petitions are, there fore, allowed and the impugned orders are quashed. All these matters are remitted back to the concerned authority of the respondents for passing fresh order in accordance with law within a period of two months from the date of production of copy of this order.

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    Central Coal Fields Ltd. Through ... v. Central Coal Fields Ltd Through
    (Apr 23, 2004)