1. The appellant-Tata Iron and Steel Company Ltd. (TISCO for short) earlier moved before this Court in C.W.J.C No. 01/84(R) seeking a declaration that it was liable to pay royalty on the tonnage of the washed coal when it is removed from the coal washery. The case was heard by the learned single Judge who taking into consideration Section 9(2) of the Mines and Minerals (Regulation and Development) Act, 1957, held that the royalty is payable on the coal removed from the leased area and so long it is not removed, no royalty is payable. The writ petitioner is liable to pay royalty on the weightage of coal.
2. As per the decision aforesaid in C.W.J.C No. 01/84 (R) the appellant-TISCO paid royalty on the weightage of washed coal. Subsequently similar is sue fell for consideration before the Supreme Court in the case of ‘State of Orissa v. Steel Authority of India Ltd.’, reported in (1998) 5 JT (SC) 348 : ((1998) 6 SCC 476 : AIR 1998 SC 3052). In the said case, the issue raised was whether upon the quantity of mineral extracted or upon the quantity arrived at after processing the royalty is to be paid. The Supreme Court held that processing amounts to consumption and hence royalty is to be paid on the quantity extracted. After the aforesaid decision of the Supreme Court, the appellant-TISCO represented before the District Mining Officer, Hazaribagh vide letter dated 23rd September, 1998 and informed that it intends to pay royalty on raw coal extracted w.e.f 10th August, 1998, i.e the day the Supreme Court delivered the judgment. It was rejected by Assistant Mining Officer. Hazaribagh vide letter No. 1477 dated 27th September, 1998 on the ground that the issue between the parties stood settled by this Court's decision in C.W.J.C No. 01/84(R), the appellant cannot drive any advantage of subsequent decision of the Supreme Court. Such stand taken by the Assistant Mining Officer has been upheld by learned single Judge vide order dated 1st March, 2000 passed in C.W.J.C No. 3040 of 1998 (R).
3. The question arises as to whether the appellant — TISCO can derive advantage of the Supreme Court's decision in ‘State of Orissa v. Steel Authority of India Ltd.’ (supra) or not, a decision having already pronounced in its case, C.W.J.C No. 01/84 (R).
4. Somewhat similar question fell for consideration before the Supreme Court in the case of ‘U.P Pollution Control Board v. Kanoria Industrial Ltd.’ reported in (2001) 2 SCC 549 : AIR 2001 SC 787. That was a case in which Kanoria Industrial Ltd. paid levy and cess with protest and moved before the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India which was dismissed. Subsequently, the provision of law relating to levy and collection of cess was declared unconstitutional by the Supreme Court but such benefit was denied to M/s. Kanoria Industrial Ltd. on the ground that it lost the earlier case. In the circumstance the Supreme Court observed and held as follows (Para 18):
Another reason to defeat the claim for refund put forth is that the respondents have filed writ petitions challenging unsuccessfully the validity of “levy in question and those orders have become final inasmuch as no appeal against the same has been filed. The contention is put forth either on the basis of res judicata or estoppel. It is no doubt true that these principles would be applicable when a decision of a Court has become final, But in matters arising under public law when the validity of a particular provision of levy is under challenge, this Court has explained the legal position in Shenoy and Co. v. Commercial Tax Officer, Circle II Bangalore, (1985) 2 SCC 512 : AIR 1985 SC 621 that when the Supreme Court declares a law and holds either a particular levy as valid or invalid it is idle to contend that the law laid down by this Court in that judgment would bind only those parties who are before the Court and not others in respect of whom appeal had not been filed. To do so is to ignore the binding nature of a judgment of this Court under Article 141 of the Constitution. To contend that the conclusion reached in such a case as to the validity of a levy would apply only to the parties before the Court is to destroy the efficacy and integrity of the judgment and to make the mandate of Article 141 illusory. When the main judgment of the High Court has been rendered ineffective, it would be applicable even in other cases, for exercise to bring those decisions in conformity with the decisions of the Supreme Court will be absolutely necessary. Viewed from that angle, we find this contention to be futile and deserves to be rejected.
5. Similar issue also fell for consideration before this Court in the case of ‘M.A Refractories v. Jharkhand State Electricity Board,’ reported in 2001 (2) JLJR 358. In the said case, the Electricity Board rejected the benefit of exemption in spite of law laid down by the Supreme Court on the ground that the earlier writ petition of M/s. M.A Refractories was dismissed. This Court noticed the Supreme Court decision in ‘U.P Pollution Control Board v. Kanoria Industrial Ltd.’ ((2001) 2 SCC 549 : AIR 2001 SC 787) (supra) and held that there being continuity of cause of action, the subsequent writ petition was maintainable.
6. In the present case it is not in dispute that the Supreme Court in the case of ‘State of Orissa v. Steel Authority of India Ltd.’ ((1998) 6 SCC 476 : AIR 1998 SC 3052) (supra) while interpreting the Section 9(1) of the Act held that the royalty is payable on the quantity extracted and not upon the quantity arrived at after processing.
7. The judgment aforesaid is not only bringing upon the parties before the Supreme Court but a law having laid down is also binding on all being a nature of judgment under Article 141 of the Constitution of India.
8. In the aforesaid background, and in view of subsequent decision rendered by the Supreme Court, the respondents cannot interpret or give any other meaning of Section 9(1) of the Act than the interpretation made by the Supreme Court, Lifting and extract of coal being continuous process on the basis of which as the royalty is being paid every year, there is a continuity of cause of action and as such the appellant can claim for benefit as per the decision of the Supreme Court.
9. The Assistant Mining Officer. Hazaribagh and learned single Judge having taken contrary view vide letter No. 1477 dated 27th September, 1998 and order dated 1st March, 2000 in CWJC No. 3040 of 1998 (R). They are set aside.
10. The appellant-TISCO henceforth shall be liable to pay royalty as per the decision of the Supreme Court, as referred above.
11. However, in view of the fact that the State has been reorganized since 15th November, 2000, now in place of ‘State of Bihar’. ‘State of Jharkhand’ will be charging royalty, the appellant-TISCO shall not ask for refund of excess royalty, if deposited.
12. This appeal is allowed with aforesaid observations. However, there will be no order, as to costs.
13. Appeal allowed.