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  • provision of Section 115 of the CPC (hereinafter called the Code)
  • provisions of Section 115 of the Code.
  • provision of Section 10 of the Code
  • Section 115 of the Code
  • Section 10 of the Code
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  • provision of Section 115 of the CPC (hereinafter called the Code)
  • provisions of Section 115 of the Code.
  • provision of Section 10 of the Code
  • Section 115 of the Code
  • Section 10 of the Code
Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

The petition challenges an order dated 4-12-1974 of Sub‑Judge II, Simla (Miss Kiran Bansal) which rejected an application made by Shri Gurdial Singh under Section 151 of the Civil Procedure Code (CPC). The petitioner (plaintiff in the subordinate Court) had filed Suit No. 20 of 1970 in the Court of the Senior Sub‑Judge, Simla against Auckland House School, Simla (through its Principal) claiming approximately Rs. 3,303.20 for building, sanitary and electrical works carried out for the school.

The factual matrix as pleaded in the plaint: in December 1965 the plaintiff provided estimates for sanitary works in Belvedere Cottage (Rs. 6,300) and Belvedere Main Building (Rs. 3,000). Advances of Rs. 5,000 (27‑1‑1966) and Rs. 5,000 (14‑2‑1966) — totalling Rs. 10,000 — were paid against estimated work of Rs. 9,300. The work (with subsequent additions) was substantially completed in early 1966 except the sewerage connection, which was completed on 20‑2‑1967 after disputes with a subcontractor. Additional electrical and sanitary work for an extra storey was undertaken in August 1966 for which Rs. 3,000 was advanced (cheque dated 20‑8‑1966) and connection was given on 23‑3‑1967. Some materials brought by the plaintiff were removed and/or appropriated by the defendant; the plaintiff claimed unpaid value for works and materials.

The plaint alleged aggregate values of various items (Rs. 15,924 for one set of items), adjustments for advances (Rs. 13,000), interest and a deduction for school fees leading to the claimed amount of Rs. 3,303.20 in the subordinate Court suit.

Separately, the plaintiff had earlier filed a suit (Suit No. 13 of 1968) relating to other works worth Rs. 53,855.54, out of which Rs. 31,000 had been paid and Rs. 22,855.54 remained claimed; that suit was decided by the Himachal High Court on 7‑9‑1971 with a decree for Rs. 5,975.20 (and future interest and proportionate costs). The single Judge in that matter observed that the petitioner should have adjusted Rs. 13,000 against Suit No. 13 of 1968. The plaintiff appealed that decision in R.F.A. No. 4 of 1972 (then pending).

During pendency of the subordinate Court suit (filed in 1970) the plaintiff sought a stay of proceedings under Section 151 CPC until the disposal of R.F.A. No. 4 of 1972; the Sub‑Judge dismissed that application on 4‑12‑1974. The present revision under Section 115 CPC challenges that dismissal.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether an order refusing a stay sought under the inherent power of the trial Court (Section 151 CPC) is susceptible to revision by the High Court under Section 115 CPC where it is alleged that the subordinate Court failed to exercise its inherent jurisdiction properly.
  2. Whether Section 10 CPC (stay/prohibition of subsequent suit where the matter in issue is the same) applied to the competing suits between the parties, or whether the inherent jurisdiction under Section 151 CPC could legitimately be invoked to stay the subordinate Court suit.
  3. Whether, in the particular circumstances (notably the alleged adjustment of Rs. 13,000 in one suit and the single Judge's direction that it should have been adjusted in another), the trial Court ought to have stayed proceedings to prevent adjustment of the same amount in both suits and thereby prevent an abuse of process.

Arguments of the Parties

Respondent's Arguments (appearance opposing the Section 151 application)

  • The revision petition is not maintainable under Section 115 CPC because the impugned order was made on an application under Section 151 CPC and there is no allegation of wrongful exercise of jurisdiction.
  • Section 115 is not applicable where the subordinate Court has not acted with a wrong exercise of jurisdiction.
  • The petitioner should not have resorted to Section 151 for a stay because Section 10 CPC provides a special provision for staying suits; thus the Section 151 application was inappropriate.
  • Lengthy arguments and multiple authorities were relied on to demonstrate that no ground of wrongful exercise of jurisdiction had been shown and therefore the revision was not maintainable.

Petitioner's Arguments (applicant for stay)

  • The petitioner contends that Section 10 CPC strictly may not apply because the causes of action in the two suits are different, but Section 151 CPC (the inherent powers of the Court) is applicable and properly invoked to stay the subordinate Court proceedings pending resolution of R.F.A. No. 4 of 1972.
  • The petitioner relied on the position that adjustment of the same Rs. 13,000 cannot be permitted in both suits and thus a stay under inherent jurisdiction was necessary in the interest of justice to avoid abuse of process and unnecessary harassment.

Table of Precedents Cited

No precedents were cited in the provided opinion.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court proceeded by first analysing the applicability of Section 10 CPC. It noted the statutory object of Section 10: to prevent courts of concurrent jurisdiction from trying two parallel suits in respect of the same matter in issue, and that a subsequent Court is prohibited from proceeding with the trial of a suit that raises the same matter in issue as a prior suit.

The Court then found that Section 10 CPC did not apply on the facts because the causes of action in the two suits were different even though the parties and the general subject‑matter (building contracts and repairs) were the same. The claims related to different contracts and different occasions (distinct sets of work and advances). Therefore Section 10 did not automatically bar proceedings in the subordinate Court.

Having excluded Section 10, the Court considered whether the trial Court could still stay its proceedings under its inherent power in Section 151 CPC. The Court emphasised the established limitation on that power: it is to be exercised only for the ends of justice or to prevent abuse of the processes of the Court. A stay under Section 151 is permissible where the Court considers it necessary in the interest of justice to avoid unnecessary harassment or multiplicity of proceedings.

The Court then turned to the specific factual conflict: the single Judge in Suit No. 13 of 1968 had observed that Rs. 13,000 advanced by the defendant should have been adjusted in that High Court suit. In the subordinate Court suit (the present suit giving rise to this revision), the plaintiff had given effect to that adjustment instead. The High Court observed that the same monetary advance could not be given adjustment in both suits because it had been advanced only once.

In light of that conflict, the Court concluded that a stay of the subordinate Court proceedings until the disposal of R.F.A. No. 4 of 1972 would be necessary to secure substantial and equitable justice between the parties and to prevent a potential abuse of process (i.e., the same Rs. 13,000 being adjusted twice). The High Court further reasoned that when no appeal lies from an order passed by a subordinate Court in the exercise of its inherent jurisdiction under Section 151, the remedy for an aggrieved party is to move the High Court under Section 115 CPC.

The Court held that the learned Sub‑Judge failed to exercise the jurisdiction legally vested in that Court by refusing to stay the subordinate Court suit in the special circumstances of the case. The High Court therefore found that the impugned order was susceptible to revision under Section 115 CPC on the ground that the trial Court did not properly exercise its inherent jurisdiction in these circumstances.

Holding and Implications

Holding: Petition allowed; the impugned order of 4‑12‑1974 is set aside, and the subordinate Court suit shall remain pending (i.e., stayed) until the decision of R.F.A. No. 4 of 1972.

Implications:

  • Direct consequence: The order refusing to stay the subordinate Court proceedings was quashed and, in effect, the trial Court suit is to remain pending (stayed) until the appeal R.F.A. No. 4 of 1972 is decided. This prevents the defendant from obtaining an adjustment of the same Rs. 13,000 in both suits.
  • The decision was rendered to secure substantial and equitable justice between the parties and to avoid potential abuse of the Court's process; the High Court exercised revisionary jurisdiction under Section 115 CPC because the subordinate Court declined to exercise its inherent power when, in the High Court's view, it should have.
  • The opinion does not announce or rely on any separately cited case precedents in the provided text; the ruling applies to the specific facts and procedural posture presented and the immediate practical effect is limited to the parties in this litigation.

Outcome recorded in the opinion: "Petition allowed." The High Court set aside the Sub‑Judge's order and directed that the suit remain pending until the resolution of R.F.A. No. 4 of 1972.

    Gurdial Singh v. Auckland House School .

    1. This petition purports in have been filed under the provision of Section 115 of the CPC (hereinafter called the Code) against the order of Sub-Judge II, Simla dated 4-12-1974 whereby the application of Shri Gurdial Singh under Section 151 of the CPC has been rejected. The petitioner had filed the suit in January 1970, in the Court of the Senior Sub-Judge, Simla against Auckland House School, Simla through its Principal for a money decree of Rs. 3,300/- on the allegations that the plaintiff who is a building contractor had taken the contract for the repairs and construction of several buildings of the defendant and had also received payments on the completion of the works and had also received advance payments. That in the month of December, 1965, the plaintiff was called by the Principal of the defendant school to give estimate for the sanitary work in Belvedere cottage and sanitary work in Belvedere main building. He gave the estimates as under:—

    1. Sanitary work in Belve-dere Cottage Rs. 6,300/-

    2. Sanitary work in Belve-dere Main Building Rs. 3,000/-

    2. The estimates were accepted by the Principal and the plaintiff took the work in hand. He was given a sum of Rs. 5,000.as advance on 27-1-1966 for the completion of the work, a further sum of Rupees 5,000/- on 14-2-1966 and in all Rupees 10,000/- were advanced towards the estimated work of Rs. 9,300/-. The work which was originally entrusted had been increased because of some changes and alterations in the original estimated work. He completed the work in the first week of March, 1966, excepting the sewerage line. A dispute arose between the plaintiff and one Shamboo Ram to whom the plaintiff had entrusted the work on labour rates as he was a registered plumber and was also doing work for the plaintiff. He refused to give the completion report to the Municipal Committee for the connection. The plaintiff requested the Principal to apply to the Municipal authorities for change of the Municipal sanction to some other licensed plumber but the same was also refused. However, the plaintiff got the sewerage line connected on 20-2-1967. The work was checked by mutual agreement between the parties on 4-9-1969 through the Commissioners S/Shri Mohan Singh, S.L Raheja and H.D Sardana appointed by the High Court in Suit No. 13 of 1968 between the parties pending in the High Court. In August, 1966, the Principal of the defendant School gave electrical work and sanitary work to the plaintiff to be done in the additional storey of Belvedere Cottage, through verbal orders. For this the defendant agreed to give the market rates and advanced Rs. 3,000/- by a cheque on 20-8-1966. This work was also completed. The defendant pointed out some minor defects which too were removed. The connection of the electricity in the additional storey of the Belvedere Cottage was given on 23-3-1967. Besides this on verbal orders of the Principal of the defendant school, the plaintiff also provided and erected poles for carrying electric mains to the Belevedere Cottage. Despite repeated demands the defendant had not allowed the plaintiff to get the work measured. The work was also got measured and report submitted by the Commissioner appointed by the High Court. In so far as the remaining sanitary work was concerned, the plaintiff had brought the material but the defendant did not cooperate in getting the same carried out with the result that the plaintiff had to remove the material. He also suffered a loss on that account. The defendant also took the material for the use of their building repairs that is, sand, bricks cement, corrugated sheets, bajree etc. The price thereof had not been paid so far and the Principal of the defendant school had admitted this fact. That the value of the work done for the several items detailed under para. 8 amounted to Rupees 15,924.00. Out of this the advance was of Rs. 13,000/- and the balance due was Rs. 2,942.00 and an amount of Rs. 700.by way of interest @ Rs. 12% per annum the total amounted to Rs. 3,642.00 and out of this amount Rs. 338.80 P. was deducted from the plaintiff on account of his daughter's fee who was reading in the school, and that way the plaintiff claimed a sum of Rs. 3,303.20 P. from the defendant.

    3. In para. 9 of the plaint it had been pleaded that besides the works stated above the plaintiff also carried out other building works for the defendant School in the year 1965-66 which work was measured and was worth Rupees 53,855.54 P. and out of which Rs. 31,000/- had been paid on different dates and for the recovery of the balance of Rupees 22,855.54 P. and interest thereon a separate suit after adjusting the school dues of his daughter had been filed by the plaintiff in the High Court, Himachal Bench at Simla.

    4. The aforesaid suit as mentioned in para-9 of the plaint had been decided by the Himachal High Court an 7-9-1971 and a decree for Rs. 5,975.20p. along with the future interest and proportionate cost was passed in favour of the plaintiff, Against the dismissal of the part of the claim the plaintiff filed R.F.A No. 4 of 1972 before the Division Bench of the High Court.

    5. In the decree passed by the single Judge, it had been observed that the petitioner (plaintiff) should have adjusted Rs. 13,000/- towards the suit No. 13 of 1968 against which finding the plaintiff had filed the appeal before the Division Bench. Whereas the petitioner had given adjustments of this amount of Rs. 13,000.in the suit out of which this revision petition has arisen.

    6. During the pendency of the suit before the trial Court, the plaintiff filed an application purporting to be one under Section 151 of the Code for the stay of the proceedings in the suit till the disposal of the R.F.A 4 of 1974 titled Sardar Gurdial Singh v. The Auckland High School, Simla pending before the High Court. This application was opposed by the defendant. The Sub-Judge, (Miss Kiran Bansal) dismissed this application by her impugned order on December 4, 1974.

    7. The learned counsel for the respondent has submitted that this revision petition is not maintainable inasmuch as the order was passed in an application under Section 151 of the Code unless the petitioner had raised a question that it was a case of wrong exercise of jurisdiction. Since the case does not involve any wrong exercise of jurisdiction so Section 115 of the Code will not be applicable. Further that by this application under Section 151 of the Code filed by the petitioner, before the trial Court its very object was to get the suit filed in the subordinate Court stayed till the decision of R.F.A No. 4 of 1972, but the petitioner chose to file the application under Section 151 of the Code despite the fact that there was a special provision as contained in Section 10 of the Code for the stay of the suit. Lengthy arguments have been advanced and several authorities have been quoted to show that there was no ground of wrongful exercise of the jurisdiction raised by the petitioner and as such the petition was not maintainable.

    8. The learned counsel for the petitioner has also submitted that strictly speaking Section 10 of the Code may not be applicable but the pleadings in both the suit are almost the same and as such it is Section 151 of the Code which would be applicable in the present case.

    9. The object of Section 10 is to prevent Courts of concurrent jurisdiction from trying two parallel suits in respect of same matter in issue. According to this section a Court in which subsequent suit is filed in respect of the same matter in issue is prohibited from proceeding with the trial of that suit. Therefore, it is true that Section 10 will not apply to the present case because the cause of action as also the matter in both the suits is different because the claims as put in the suit are for two different occasions although the contract may be similar. The dues are in respect of two separate contracts given by the defendant to the plaintiff for the repairs and construction of the buildings as also to carry out the electrical works and sewerage connection. The parties in both the cases though are the same, but the causes of action are different therefore, in these circumstances Section 10 in term will not be applicable. Therefore, the only provision which would be attracted to the present case would be Section 151 of the Code. In this case the plaintiff has given credit of Rs. 13,000/- which he had received as an advance on three different periods from the defendant towards the costs of construction and repair works given to the plaintiff by the defendant. In the Suit No. 13 of 1968 and which has now been decided and appealed against and is registered as R.F.A No. 4 of 1972 and is pending, the learned single Judge of this High Court while disposing of the suit observed that the plaintiff should have adjusted Rs. 13,000/- advanced by the defendant towards the amount in Suit No. 13 of 1968. But on the contrary the plaintiff has given the adjustment of this amount in the other suit out of which this revision has arisen and which suit was filed in the year 1970 before the Senior Subordinate Judge. Therefore, substantially it is the question of adjustment of this money which cannot be adjusted in both the suits. The appeal is still pending against the decree in which the single Judge had decreed the suit only for a sum of Rs. 5,000/- and odd and had dismissed the suit for the balance and had also ordered the deduction of Rs. 13,000/- from the claim of the plaintiff against the defendant. But on the contrary the plaintiff has given a deduction of Rs. 13,000/- in the amount of the second claim made by him through his Suit No. 20 of 1970. Therefore, in these circumstances, even if Section 10 of the Code is not applicable then in these peculiar circumstances the suit can be stayed under the inherent power of the Court. This jurisdiction to stay an otherwise competent suit is to be exercised only for the ends of justice or to prevent the abuse of the process of the Court. It is well settled that in a case not covered by Section 10 of the Code stay can be ordered under Section 151 if the Court considers that it is necessary in the interest of justice and in order to avoid unnecessary harassment to any of the parties. Therefore, in these circumstances an application under Section 151, in my opinion was not barred where the suit could not be stayed under the provision of Section 10 of the Code in a case like the present one.

    10. The second submission was that a revision is not competent and it has been specifically mentioned that there was no wrong exercise of jurisdiction. But in my opinion when no appeal lies from an order passed by a Court in the exercise of ifs inherent jurisdiction under Section 151 the remedy to an aggrieved party is to move the High Court direct under the provisions of Section 115 of the Code. The learned Sub-Judge, when it had been pointed out to her that the High Court has held in Suit No. 13 of 1968 that this amount which had been adjusted by the plaintiff in the suit pending before the subordinate Court was ordered to be adjusted in the suit before the High Court, in these circumstances, in order to do substantial an equitable justice between the parties, should have stayed the suit. The defendant could not be given adjustment in both the suits of the same amount which had been advanced to the plaintiff only once. Therefore, the learned Sub-Judge has failed to exercise the jurisdiction legally vested in that Court. Therefore, on this score the petition succeeds and the order is set aside with the result that the suit in the trial Court shall remain pending till the decision of the R.F.A No. 4 of 1972.

    11. Petition allowed.

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    Comments

    Gurdial Singh v. Auckland House School .
    (Aug 17, 1976)