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Structured Summary of the Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

For the assessment years 1971-72 to 1974-75 the Income-tax Officer (ITO) concluded that the assessee, Shri Bharkate Saifiyash Society, Rajkot, was not entitled to exemption under section 11 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 because it was hit by the provisions of section 13(1)(b). The trust deed listed objects including (i) to help the poor and needy, (ii) medical relief, (iii) provision for education, and (iv) to carry out religious activities.

The ITO held that the trustees had not carried out religious activities, the trust deed did not specify that a portion of income or corpus would be spent on any object, and therefore the trust was essentially charitable only and could not obtain the section 11 benefit merely by being labelled "charitable and religious."

The Appellate Assistant Commissioner (AAC), by order dated November 28, 1977, set aside that part of the ITO's order, concluding that the trust was both charitable and religious and that trustees were empowered by the deed to spend funds on religious activities independently of other activities; hence section 13(1)(b) did not apply.

The Revenue appealed to the Tribunal. The Tribunal held that section 11 exempts income from property held by charitable or religious trusts, while section 13(1)(b) removes that exemption only in the case of a trust for charitable purposes only if it is for the benefit of any particular religious community or caste. The Tribunal found that where a trust is both charitable and religious it cannot be described as a trust for charitable purposes only even if the religious element is comparatively small, and dismissed the Revenue's appeal (order dated August 4, 1979).

The Revenue filed a reference under section 256(1). Two questions were referred to the court for opinion (set out below in the Legal Issues Presented section). The High Court analyzed section 11, the definitions and scope of "charitable" and "religious" purposes, considered authorities and precedent, and answered the reference in favour of the assessee.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the Appellate Tribunal was justified in law in holding that the provisions of section 13(1)(b) applied only to trusts which were purely for charitable purposes and since the assessee-trust was found to be charitable as well as religious in nature the assessee entitled to exemption under section 11 of the Income-tax Act, 1961?
  2. Whether the assessee-trust which was mainly for charitable purposes and as it was created for the benefit of a particular religious community, it was not entitled to exemption under section 11 by virtue of section 13(1)(b) of the Income-tax Act, 1961?

Arguments of the Parties

Revenue's Arguments (as recorded)

  • Mr. Shelat, learned counsel for the Revenue, submitted that reading clause (b) of section 13(1) as limited to trusts "purely for charitable purposes" would render clause (b) nugatory because a trust deed could simply recite that the trust was for religious and charitable purposes to avoid clause (b). Accordingly, he urged that the authority is required to determine the predominant purpose of the trust and, if the predominant purpose is charitable, the trust should fall within section 13(1)(b) where the trust benefits a particular religious community or caste.
  • He argued that the grammatical and textual differences in phraseology among clauses (a), (b) and (c) (clause (a) dealing with private religious trusts, clause (b) with trusts for charitable purposes, and clauses (c)/(d) with trusts for charitable or religious purposes) imply that clause (b) was intended to cover only trusts for charitable purposes; the Revenue contended the authorities should look to the predominant character of the trust.

Assessee's Position (as reflected in orders below and accepted by the court)

  • The trust was both charitable and religious. The Appellate Assistant Commissioner and the Tribunal treated the trust as having independent powers to spend funds on religious activities; consequently, section 13(1)(b) did not apply and exemption under section 11 was available.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Ramchandra Shukla v. Shree Mahadeoji, AIR 1970 SC 458 There is no line of demarcation in the Hindu system between religion and charity; charity is regarded as part of religion; religious purposes may also be charitable depending on Hindu law and notions. The court relied on this authority to show that religious and charitable purposes can overlap and that a trust may legitimately be both religious and charitable under Indian (Hindu) concepts.
Fazlul Rabbi Pradhan v. State of West Bengal, AIR 1965 SC 1722 Consideration of a definition of "charitable purpose" (including relief of poor, medical relief, advancement of education or other objects of public utility) and the limiting effect of the word "exclusively" in an exemption provision. Used to illustrate that the statutory definition of charitable purpose is similar and to show how "exclusively" restricts exemption to trusts solely within charitable or religious purposes; assisted the court's understanding of scope of charitable purpose.
Income-tax Commissioners for Special Purposes v. John Frederick Pemsel, [1891] AC 531 (HL) Classic (English law) classification of charity into four principal divisions (relief of poverty; advancement of education; advancement of religion; other purposes beneficial to the community) and discussion of the legal vs popular meaning of "charity." Referenced as the well-known exposition of "charity" in English law; the court used it to contextualize the Indian statutory definition and to underscore that Indian definition goes further in specifically including medical relief and objects of general public utility.
Advocate-General of Bombay v. Yusuf Ali, AIR 1921 Bom 338 Described "Dawat purposes" and the limited discretion of trustees within the religious/dawat context (used in discussion of wakf/dawat trusts). Referred (through the Bibijiwala decision) to show that apparently wide discretions in trust instruments may be confined within defined religious/charitable purposes and so qualify for exemption under section 11.
Addl. CIT v. A. A. Bibijiwala Trust, [1975] 100 ITR 516 (Bombay High Court) Held that even if trusts are partly religious and partly charitable, so long as no part of income or corpus can be utilised for a purpose which is not either charitable or religious, exemption under section 11(1)(a) will be available. The court relied on this Division Bench decision to support the proposition that composite trusts (religious + charitable) remain entitled to section 11 exemption if income/corpus is confined to charitable or religious purposes; it was applied to the facts to support the assessee's entitlement.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court's analysis proceeded in a structured way: it first set out the relevant statutory provisions (section 11 and the definition of "charitable purpose" in section 2(15)), then examined the overlap between "religious" and "charitable" purposes, and finally interpreted section 13(1)(b) in the context of the statutory scheme and linguistic differences among clauses.

Key steps in the reasoning:

  1. The court reproduced section 11, which exempts income from property held under trust wholly or in part for charitable or religious purposes, subject to specified conditions.
  2. It noted that "religious purpose" includes relief of the poor, education, medical relief and advancement (as indicated in the statute), and quoted the inclusive definition of "charitable purpose" under section 2(15) which expressly includes relief of the poor, education, medical relief and advancement of any other object of general public utility not involving profit.
  3. Observing the textual breadth of "charitable purpose" (inclusive definition) the court explained that charitable purpose covers a wider field than "religious purpose" and that in many cases the two may overlap; the court gave examples (supply of fodder to animals, khairat) drawn from the text to show that activities may be religious in one sense and charitable in another.
  4. The court relied on Ramchandra Shukla to support the proposition (coming from Hindu law traditions) that there is no rigid line of demarcation between religion and charity, and that charity is often regarded as part of religion in the Hindu system.
  5. The court reviewed the Fazlul Rabbi Pradhan and Pemsel authorities to show the established understandings of "charity" and to emphasize that the Indian statutory definition extends beyond the English categories by expressly including medical relief and objects of general public utility (subject to the non-profit restriction).
  6. Turning to section 13(1), the court set out its text and noted that it carves out exceptions to section 11/12 across several sub-clauses. The court observed that clause (b) deals with "a trust for charitable purposes or a charitable institution" while clauses (c) and (d) explicitly contemplate "a trust for charitable or religious purposes." Clause (a) deals separately with private religious trusts.
  7. The court considered the Revenue's submission that a predominant-purpose test should be applied to prevent clause (b) being evaded by drafting and acknowledged the concern that labeling could be used to avoid clause (b). However, it observed that the statutory language uses different phrases in different clauses and that clause (b) appears intended to apply to trusts that are for charitable purposes (or charitable institutions), not to composite trusts that are both charitable and religious.
  8. On that basis, and having regard to the authorities and the statutory text, the court concluded that section 13(1)(b) applies where the trust is exclusively or primarily a trust for charitable purposes established for the benefit of a particular religious community or caste; where a trust is both charitable and religious, clause (b) does not apply merely because the trust benefits a particular religious community.
  9. Applying that construction to the facts and to the Tribunal's findings (that the trust was both charitable and religious and trustees had power to spend on religious activities), the court upheld the Tribunal's conclusion and ruled in favour of the assessee.

The court therefore answered Question No. 1 in the affirmative for the assessee and against the Revenue. Question No. 2 was also answered in favour of the assessee and against the Revenue (the court observed that certain subsidiary issues were not necessary to decide once the primary interpretation was adopted).

Holding and Implications

Holding:

The court held that section 13(1)(b) applies only to trusts which are purely for charitable purposes; where a trust is both charitable and religious in nature the trust is entitled to exemption under section 11 of the Income-tax Act. The reference is answered in favour of the assessee and against the Revenue.

Immediate consequences and implications:

  • The Revenue's reference was disposed of in favour of the assessee; the assessee (Shri Bharkate Saifiyash Society) is entitled to exemption under section 11 for the assessment years in question on the basis that the trust is both charitable and religious.
  • The court endorsed the Tribunal's interpretation that clause (b) of section 13(1) is directed at trusts which are for charitable purposes (or charitable institutions) and does not catch trusts that are both charitable and religious, thereby limiting the application of section 13(1)(b) in that manner.
  • The reference was disposed of with no order as to costs (final procedural outcome recorded in the opinion).

This summary is confined to the matters expressly set out in the provided opinion and does not add facts or inferences beyond the text.

    Commissioner Of Income-Tax v. Barkate Saifiyah Society.

    1. For the assessment years 1971-72 to 1974-75, the Income-tax Officer arrived at the conclusion that the assessee, Shri Bharkate Saifiyash Society, Rajkot, was not entitled to get the benefit under section 11 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 ("the Act"), as it was hit by the provisions of section 13(1)(b) of the Act. For this purpose, he has referred to the objects of the trust which are as under :

    (i) To help the poor and needy.

    (ii) Medical relief.

    (iii) Provision for education.

    (iv) To carry out the religious activities.

    2. He observed that the provisions of section 13(1)(b) are not applicable in the cases of charitable and religious trusts. However, he held that the trustees have not carried out any religious activities and it was not provided in the trust deed that a specified portion of the income or corpus would be spent on any of the objects. The trustees are carrying on activities of charitable nature only and simply by labelling the trust to be charitable and religious, it does not become so.

    3. The Appellate Assistant Commissioner, by his order dated November 28, 1977, set aside the said part of the order. He arrived at the conclusion that the trust was charitable and religious and if the objects of the trust are independent and the trustees are given powers to spend the trust funds towards any of the objects of the trust within the framework of the trust deed, the nature of the trust would be decided by taking into consideration the objects of the trust. He further held that in the present case the trustees were empowered to spend the trust funds on religious activities which were independent of other activities. Therefore, the provisions of section 13(1)(b) were not applicable.

    4. Against that the order, the Revenue preferred an appeal before the Tribunal. The Tribunal arrived at the conclusion that section 11 exempts income from property held by charitable or religious trusts while section 13(1)(b) takes away such exemption in the case of a trust for charitable purposes only, in case it is for the benefit of any particular religious community or caste; the assessee is no doubt a trust created for a religious community or caste and if it was for charitable purposes only, it would come within the mischief of section 13(1)(b); however, if a trust is for charitable purposes and also for religious purposes and even if the element of religious purposes is comparatively smaller or even insignificant, it cannot be said that the trust is a trust for charitable purposes. The Tribunal, therefore, dismissed the appeal filed by the Revenue by its order dated August 4, 1979.

    5. Feeling aggrieved by the said order, the Revenue filed a reference application and the Tribunal referred the following questions for our opinion under section 256(1) of the Act :

    "1. Whether, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the Appellate Tribunal was justified in law in holding that the provisions of section 13(1)(b) applied only to trusts which were purely for charitable purposes and since the assessee-trust was found to the charitable as well as religious in nature the assessee entitled to exemption under section 11 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 ?

    2. Whether, the assessee-trust which was mainly for charitable purposes and as it was created for the benefit of a particular religious community, it was not entitled to exemption under section 11 by virtue of section 13(1)(b) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 ?"

    6. For determining the controversy, first we would refer to the relevant part of the provision of section 11 which reads as under :

    "Income from property held for charitable or religious purposes. - (1) Subject to the provisions of sections 60 to 63, the following income shall not be included in the total income of the previous year of the person in receipt of the income -

    (a) income derived from property held under trust wholly for charitable or religious purposes, to the extent to which such income is applied to such purposes in India; and, where any such income is accumulated or set apart for application to such purposes in India, to the extent to which the income so accumulated to set apart is not in excess of twenty-five per cent. of the income from such property;

    (b) income derived from property held under trust in part only for such purposes, the trust having been created before the commencement of this Act, to the extent to which such income is applied to such purposes in India; and, where any such income is finally set apart for application to such purposes in India, to the extent to which the income so set apart is not is excess of twenty-five per cent. of the income from such property."

    7. The phrase "religious purpose" includes relief of the poor, education, medical relief, and the advancement (sic).

    8. However, the phrase charitable purpose is defined under section 2(15) of the Act which reads as under :

    "(15) 'charitable purpose' includes relief of the poor, education, medical relief, and the advancement of any other object of general public utility not involving the carrying on of any activity for profit;"

    9. It is to be noted that definition of the phrase "charitable purpose" is inclusive and it covers a wider field than the field covered by the words "religious purpose". Further, in some cases, even a religious activity by a particular sect would be a charitable activity; for some, supply of fodder to animals and cattle is a religious object, while to others it may be a charitable purposes, according to Hindu religious activity. Similarly, Khairat under the Mohamedan law would be considered to be a religious activity. The said activities may be for a charitable purpose to some. Hence, in many cases, both the purposes may be overlapping. The purposes may have both the elements, charity as well as religious.

    10. While dealing with what is "religious" or "charitable purpose" it is observed by the Supreme Court in the case of Ramchandra Shukla v. Shree Mahadeoji, AIR 1970 SC 458, that there is no line of demarcation in the Hindu system between religion and charity. Indeed, charity is regarded as part of religion. While discussing this aspect, the Supreme Court has further observed as under (at page 464) :

    "Hindu piety found expression in gifts to idols to religious institutions and for all purposes considered meritorious in the Hindu social and religious system. Therefore, although courts in India have for a long time adopted the technical meaning of charitable trusts and charitable purposes which the courts in England have placed upon the term 'charity' in the Statute of Elizabeth, and, therefore, all purposes which according to English law are charitable will be charitable under Hindu law, the Hindu concept of charity is so comprehensive that there are other purposes in addition which are recognised as charitable purposes. Hence, what are purely religious purposes and what religious purposes will be charitable purposes must be decided according to Hindu notions and Hindu law.

    As observed by Mukherjea in Hindu Law and Religious and Charitable Trusts, Second Edn., page 11, there is no line of demarcation in the Hindu system between religion and charity. Indeed, charity is regarded as part of religion, for, gifts both for religious and charitable purposes are impelled by the desire to acquire religious merit. According to Pandit Prannath Saraswati, these fell under two heads, Istha and Purta. The former meant sacrifices, and sacrificial gifts and the latter meant charities. Among the Istha acts are Vedic sacrifices, gifts to the priests at the time of such sacrifices, preservations of vedas, religious austerity, rectitude, vaisvadev sacrifices and hospitality. Among the Purta acts are construction and maintenance of temples, tanks, wells, planting of groves, gifts of food, dharamshalas, places for drinking water, relief of the sick, and promotion of education and hearing. (cf. Pandit Prannath Saraswati's Hindu Law of Endowments, 1897, pages 26-27). Istha and Purta are in fact registered as the common duties of the twice born class. (cf. Pandit Saraswati, page 27)."

    11. In view of the aforesaid discussions, it can be said that a trust can be either for religious purposes or for charitable purposes or it can be for both charitable and religious purposes.

    12. An identical definition of the phrase "charitable purpose" was considered by the Supreme Court in the case of Fazlul Rabbi Pradhan v. State of West Bengal, AIR 1965 SC 1722, in the context of the West Bengal Estates Acquisition Act, 1953. Under section 2(c) of the Act, "charitable purpose" was defined to mean as including the relief of poor, medical relief of the advancement of education or of any other object of general public utility. The definition of "religious purpose" under section 2(n) is as under :

    "2(n) 'religious purpose' means a purpose connected religious worship, teaching or service or any performance of religious rites;"
    (page 1724).

    13. Under Section 6 of the said Act, exemption is given to corporations and institutions established exclusively for religious or a charitable purpose or both. The court observed that the word "exclusively" limits the exemption to trusts, endowments or other legal obligations which come solely within charitable or religious purposes. With regard to the definition of "charitable purposes", the court observed that it follows, though not quite, the well-known of charity given by Lord Macnaghten in Commissioners for Special Purposes of the Income-tax v. John Frederick Pemsel [1891] AC 531 (HL) who held as under :

    "No doubt the popular meaning of the words 'charity' and 'charitable' does not coincide with their legal meaning; and no doubt it is easy enough to collect from the books a few decisions which seems to push the doctrine of the court to the extreme, and to present a contrast between the two meanings in an aspect almost ludicrous. But still it is difficult to fix a point of divergence, and no one as yet has succeeded in defining the popular meaning of the word 'charity'. The learned counsel for the Crown did not attempt the task. Even the paraphrase of the Master of the Rolls is not quite satisfactory"
    (page 583)

    14. It is further held as under (at page 583) :

    "I think they would be surprised to learn that the substantial cause of their missionary zeal was in intention to assist the poverty of heathen tribes. How far then, it may be asked, does the popular meaning of the word 'charity' correspond with its legal meaning ? 'Charity' in its legal sense comprises four principal divisions; trusts for the relief of poverty; trusts for the advancement of education; trusts for the advancement of religion; and trusts for other purposes beneficial to the community, not falling under any of the preceding heads."

    15. Thereafter, the court held that for satisfying the test for charitable purpose, there must always be some element of public benefit.

    16. Hence the words "trust for charitable purpose" would include even trust for advancement of religion. At this stage, we would note that the definition of charitable purpose under the Income-tax Act goes much further than the definition of charity to be derived from the English cases because it specifically includes medical relief and embraces all objects of general public utility subject to the condition imposed by the restrictive words "not involving the carrying on of any activity for profit". While dealing with section 11, a Division Bench of this court in the case of Addl. CIT v. A. A. Bibijiwala Trust [1975] 100 ITR 516, has observed as follows (at page 523) :

    "Similarly, in the case before us also, the property is settled upon wakf, that is, for purposes which are considered to be religious, pious or charitable according to the notions of members of the Dawoodi Bohra community and further the income in the corpus of these properties settled upon trust must be used for Dawat purposes, that is, for the benefit of the Dawoodi Bohra community. Though the words of clauses 6, 7 and 8 are very wide in terms, in fact, that apparently wide discretion of the Mullaji Saheb is bound down by the two factors, namely, that this is a wakf, a dedication by a Mussalman of property for purposes which, according to the notion of Mussalmans, are pious, religious or charitable, and, secondly, it must be used for Dawat purposes, that is, for purposes which go to benefit the Dawoodi Bohra community. With these two limitations operating on him, even the apparently wide discretion conferred upon the Mullaji Saheb as Dai-ul-Mutlak for the time being is confined within the four corners of these two overriding factors and in view of these two overriding factors it must be held that the properties in question settled by the two deeds of January 12, 1937, were settled upon trust for charitable or religious objects and were, therefore, entitled to exemption under section 11(1)(a) of the Act of 1961. We must take it clear that the real controversy between the parties is regarding exemption under section 11(1)(a) of the Act of 1961 and not whether the trusts are wholly religious or wholly charitable. Even if the trusts are partly religious and partly charitable, so long as no part of the income or corpus can be utilised for a purpose which is not either charitable or religious, there is no doubt that the exemption under section 11(1)(a) will be available to the assessee. In the instant case, we find that, in spite of the apparently wide language of the clauses of the dead of trust, in fact reading the trust deed as a whole, it transpires, particularly in the light of the decision of the Bombay High Court in Advocate-General of Bombay v. Yusuf Ali, AIR 1921 Bom 338, that the apparently wide discretion has to be exercised within the four corners of the wakf and for Dawat purposes. What are Dawat purposes, have been described by Marten, J., at page 1102, in Advocate-General of Bombay v. Yusuf Ali, AIR 1921 Bom 338, and, in our opinion, it is only within the four corners of Dawat purposes as recognised by the Dawoodi Bohra community that the Mullaji Saheb can use the corpus or the income of this fund"
    .

    17. From the aforesaid decision it can be held that if the trusts are partly religious and partly charitable, so long as no part of the income or corpus can be utilised for a purpose which is not either charitable or religious, exemption under section 11(1)(a) will be applicable to the assessee.

    18. Keeping in mind the aforesaid discussion, now we will refer to the relevant portion of section 13 which carves out an exception to the aforesaid provisions. It reads as under :

    "Section 11 not to apply in certain cases. - (1) Nothing contained in section 11 and section 12 shall operate so as to exclude from the total income of the previous year of the person in receipt thereof :-

    (a) any part of the income from the property held under a trust for private religious purposes which does not enure for the benefit of the public;

    (b) in the case of a trust for charitable purposes or a charitable institution created or established after the commencement of this Act, any income thereof if the trust or institution is created or established for the benefit of any particular religious community or caste;

    (c) in the case of a trust for charitable or religious purposes or a charitable or religious institution, any income thereof -

    (i) if such trust or institution has been created or established after the commencement of this Act and under the terms of the trust or the rules governing the institution, any part of such income enures, or

    (ii) if any part of such income or any property of the trust or institution (whenever created or established) is during the previous year used or applied, directly or indirectly for the benefit of any person referred to in sub-section (3); ..........

    (d) in the case of a trust for charitable or religious purposes or a charitable or religious institution, any income thereof, if for any period during the previous year -

    (i) any funds of the trust or institution are invested or deposited after the 28th day of February, 1983, otherwise than in any one or more of the forms or modes specified in sub-section (5) of section 11; or

    (ii) any funds of the trust or institution invested or deposited before the 1st day of March, 1983, otherwise than in any one or more of the forms or modes specified in sub-section (5) of section 11 continue to remain so invested or deposited after the 30th day of November, 1983;

    (iii) any shares in a company (not being a Government company as defined in section 617 of the Companies Act, 1956 (1 of 1956), or a corporation established by or under a Central, State or Provincial Act) are held by the trust or institution after the 30th day of November, 1983."

    19. By reading the aforesaid section, it is clear that it carves out an exception to section 11 or 12 by providing that in those cases which are covered by clauses (a), (b), (c) and (d), the provisions of section 11 or 12 shall not operate. Broadly speaking, it is divided into three categories and exception is carved out in the case of private religious trusts, charitable trusts and charitable or religious trusts if the conditions mentioned in clauses (a), (b), (c) and (d) are satisfied. Firstly, any part of the income from the property held under a trust for private religious purposes which does not enure for the benefit of the public is not to be excluded as provided under section 11. That means the benefit of section 11 would not be given to a trust which is a private religious trust which does not enure for the benefit of the public (as per clause (5)). Secondly, any income of a trust for charitable institution is created or established after the commencement of Income-tax Act (sic). In each case the authority is required to find out whether the trust for charitable purposes is established for the benefit of a particular religious community or caste. If it is so established, then the provisions of section 11 would not be applicable. Thirdly, clauses (c) and (d) carve out an exception in the case of a trust for charitable or religious purposes or a charitable or religious institution. It provides for certain cases in which any income thereof enures, or is used or applied, directly or indirectly, for the benefit of any person referred to in sub-section (3). In clauses (c) and (d) the Legislature wanted to include trusts for charitable and religious purposes, and this is specifically provided by using the phrase "trust for charitable or religious purposes." In clauses (c) and (d), the Legislation has used the phrase trust for charitable purposes or religious institution. It does not deal with a trust for religious purposes. It only deals with a trust for charitable or charitable institutions which are established for giving relief to the poor or medical relief or for education of any particular religious community or caste. Clauses (c) and (d) would be applicable to a trust which is either for charitable purposes or religious purposes or partly charitable purposes and partly religious. Hence it can be stated that if a charitable trust is established only for the benefit of any particular religious community, then the provisions of section 11 would not be applicable. But in the case of a trust or an institution for religious purposes wherein certain activities can be termed as charitable activities for the benefit of any particular religious community or caste, clause (b) would not be applicable.

    20. Mr. Shelat, learned counsel for the Revenue, vehemently submitted that by giving this interpretation to clause (b) of section 13(1), the said clause (b) can be made nugatory by merely using the words in trust deeds that the trust was established for religious and charitable purposes. He, therefore, submitted that the authority is required to determine the predominant purpose of the trust and if the predominant purpose is a charitable purpose it is difficult to accept the said contention mainly because it is nowhere provided in the section that in each case the authority shall find out the predominant purpose of the trust. Further, as stated earlier, in the three different clauses, namely, (a), (b) and (c) of sub-section (1) of section 13, the Legislature has used different phrases. Clause (a) as, stated earlier, deals with a trust for private religious purposes. Clause (b) deals with a trust for charitable purposes or a charitable institution, clauses (c) and (d) deal with a trust for charitable or religious purposes or a charitable or religious institution. From this different phraseology used by the Legislature in clauses (a), (b) and (c), it can be inferred that the Legislature in tended to cover only trusts for charitable purposes under clause (b). That means, if a trust is composite, that is, for religious and charitable purposes, then it would not be covered. It is also apparent that if the trust is only for religious purposes, clause (b) would not be applicable.

    21. In view of the aforesaid discussion, in our view, the Tribunal has rightly held that section 13(1)(b) applies only to trusts which were purely for charitable purposes and the assessee trust was charitable as well as religious in nature and the assessee was entitled to exemption under section 11. Hence, question No. 1 is answered in the affirmative in favour of the assessee and against the Revenue.

    22. With regard to question No. 2 once it is held that section 13(1)(b) would be applicable in a case where the trust is exclusively for charitable institution are not required to be decided for arriving at a conclusion, whether section 13(1)(b) is applicable or not (sic). Hence, question No. 2 is answered in favour of the assessee and against the Revenue.

    23. In the result, the reference stands disposed of accordingly with no order as to costs.

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    Commissioner Of Income-Tax v. Barkate Saifiyah Society.
    (Nov 3, 1993)