1. Mr. M.I. Hava waives service of rule on behalf of the respondents. At the request and by consent of the parties, the matter is ordered to be heard today.

2. The petitioner holds vacant land in Urban Agglomeration area of Vadodara. Against the order passed by the Competent Authority declaring that the petitioner holds certain area of land-in excess of the ceiling limit, the petitioner preferred an appeal before the Appellate Tribunal. The appeal was filed beyond the prescribed period of limitation and hence an application for condonation of delay was also filed. The Appellate Tribunal has rejected the appeal on the ground that appeal was filed beyond the prescribed period of limitation. It is also held that the appeal was f filed after the publication of Notification under S. 10 of the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act') and, therefore, the appeal is not maintainable.

3. As far as the condonation of delay is concerned, the facts may be examined. The Competent Authority passed the order on Feb. 17, 1984 and held that an area of 8490 Sq. Nits. of land was in excess of the ceiling limit. According to the petitioner, he came to know about the same only when the Notification dated Nov. 11, 1984 under S. (100) of the Act was served upon him. Thereafter on Jan. 23, 1985, the petitioner filed the appeal before the Appellate Tribunal. Thus the appeal is filed after a period of about 10 months. The Tribunal held that a copy of the order passed by the Competent Authority was collected by the advocate of the petitioner on Feb, 20, 1984. The Appellate Tribunal observed that "it can be safely presumed that his advocate must have conveyed the order orally to the appellant." It is not understood as to on what basis the Tribunal thought it fit to raise such presumption. Even if there be any such presumption of facts, the same stands rebutted when the petitioner states that the impugned order passed by the Competent Authority was never communicated to him. In this connection the Tribunal ought to have followed the principles laid down by the Supreme Court in the case of Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag v. Katiji, reported in AIR 1987 SC 1353. The relevant portion of the said decision reads as follows : -

"The expression "sufficient cause" employed by the legislature is adequately elastic to enable the Courts to apply the law in a meaningful manner which sub serve the ends of justice that being the life purpose f or the existence of the institution of Courts. It is common knowledge that this Court has been making a justifiably liberal approach in matters instituted in this Court. But the message does not appear to have percolated down to all the other Courts in the hierarchy. And such a liberal approach is adopted on principle as it is realized that: -

1. Ordinarily a litigant does not stand to benefit by lodging an appeal late.

2. Refusing to condone delay can result in a meritorious matter being thrown out at the very threshold and cause of justice being defeated. As against this when delay is condoned the highest that can happen is that a cause would be decided, on merits after hearing the parties.

3. "Every day's delay must be explained does not mean that a pedantic approach should be made. Why not every hour's delay, every second's delay? The doctrine must be applied in a rational common sense pragmatic manner.

4. When substantial justice and technical considerations are pitted against each other, cause of substantial justice deserves to be preferred for the other side cannot claim to have vested right in injustice being done because of a non-deliberate delay.

5. There is no presumption that delay is occasioned deliberately, or on account of culpable negligence, or on account of mala fides. A litigant does not stand to benefit by resorting to delay. In fact he runs a serious risk.

6. It must be grasped that judiciary is respected not on account of its power to legalize injustice, on technical grounds but because it is capable of removing injustice and is expected to do so."

In view of the aforesaid principles laid down by the Supreme Court, the Tribunal ought to have considered that there was no deliberate delay and it could never have been the intention of the petitioner not to challenge the legality and validity of the order passed by the competent authority by which the land admeasuring 8490 Sq. Mts. has been declared to be in excess of the ceiling limit. Thus, there is an obvious error committed by the Tribunal in not following the principles laid down by the Supreme Court. The Tribunal ought to have condoned the delay and ought not to have rejected the appeal on that ground.

4. The Tribunal held that because notifications under S. 10(3) and 10(5) of the Act were issued, before the appeal was filed, the appeal was not maintainable. In this connection the Tribunal has observed to the effect that till the notification under S. 10(3) of the Act is published in the Government Gazette the situation is one of suspense. Once the notification is issued and published in the Government Gazette, the land absolutely vests in the State Government free from all encumbrances. The Tribunal observed that in the instant case notification under S. 10(3) of the Act was published on October 11, 1984 and thereafter notice of 30 days for handing over possession as required under S. 10(5) of the Act has been served upon the petitioner.

5. Thereafter the Tribunal has relied upon. the Full Bench decision of this High Court in the case of Jitendra Nanalal Shah v. Patel Lallubhai Ishwarbhai, 1984 (2) 25 Guj LR 1001 : (AIR 1984 Guj 145). In that case two questions were referred to the Full Bench by the Division Bench of this High Court. The first question pertained to as to whether there was substantial distinction between the provisions of S. 7(2) of the Gujarat Vacant Lands in Urban Areas (Prohibition of Alienation) Act, 1972 (since repealed) and S. 20(1)(b) of the Urban Land (Ceiling & Regulation) Act, 1976. The second question was as to whether a conditional decree for specific performance subject to-the condition of the plaintiff obtaining exemption from the State Government under S. 20 of the Act can or cannot be passed. While answering the second question, the Full Bench observed in para 18 of the judgment as follows:

"The possibility of obtaining exemption survives till the notification under S. 10(3) of the Act is issued. That being the situation, until then, a plaintiff seeking specific performance cannot be told that the terms of the contract Cannot be fulfilled. Once it is said so, the plaintiff loses his right to get a decree for specific performance, though, invoking the provisions of the very Act, based on which the plaintiff was told that he could not get conveyance of the property agreed to be sold to him, the owner of excess land obtains exemption and continues in possession of property and perhaps even alienates it later. We see no, reason either in law or in logic to countenance such a situation. There is nothing prohibiting a decree being passed for specific performance with, of course, such alternative remedies as may be called for in a situation where that decree may become inoperative. The decree for specific performance may be made conditional on the exemption under S. 20(1)(a) or (b) operating. Of course, it is not for us in this reference to envisage how safeguards should be built in such a decree. Resourcefulness, of course, must necessarily find answer to possible situations."

Thus it should be clear that there was no question before the Full Bench as to whether an appeal would be maintainable against the order passed by the competent authority even after notifications u rider S. 10(3) and 10(5) of the Act are issued and published. The observations made in the Full Bench decision of the High Court are not at all relevant for deciding the question as to whether appeal is maintainable even after issuance and publication of notifications under S. 10(3) and 10(5) of the Act.

6. The Tribunal also relied upon the decision of this High Court rendered in Special Civil Appln. No. 120 of 1984 decided on Jan. 25, 19N4 (coram : G. T. Nanavati. J.). It is an unreported decision. In that case a very short order has been passed by the Court. Therein the petitioner had challenged the legality and validity of the notice issued under S. 10(5) of the Act inter alia on the ground that the petitioner's application under S. 20(1) Of the Act was pending. While disposing of the petition the Court observed that under S. 10(3) of the Act notification was issued and the land had vested in the Government. Therefore, the Government was entitled to take over possession. In that decision also, the question as to whether the appeal is maintainable or not after issuance and publication of notification under S. 10(3) of the Act never arose. In above, view of the matter, reliance placed by the Tribunal on this decision is also out of context and of no help to the respondents.

7. The Urban Land Tribunal has read the provisions of S. 10(3) of the Act in isolation. Reading the provisions of S. 10(3) and S. 10(5) of the Act in isolation one is likely to reach to the conclusion that after the land is vested absolutely in the State Government free from all encumbrances with effect from the date so specified in the notification an appeal cannot be entertained because if appeal is entertained. how the land which is absolutely vested in the Government can be divested? But such an isolated reading of a particular provision of the statute thereafter giving interpretation to the same is not permissible. In the case of Darshan Singh, Son Of Balwant Singh v. State Of Punjab., AIR 1953 SC 83, in para 10 of the lie judgment the supreme Court has observed as follows:

"It is a cardinal rule of interpretation that the language used by the Legislature is the true depositor, of the legislative intent and that words and phrases occurring in a statute are to be taken not in an isolated or detached manner dissociated from the context but are to be read together and construed in the light of the purpose and object of file Act itself.

In above view of the matter Provisions of S. 10 and particularly that of Sub-ss. (3) and (5) cannot be read without reference to the provisions of S. 33 of the Act which confers right of appeal on an aggrieved person.

8. Section 33 provides that any person aggrieved by an order made by the competent authority under the Act may file appeal within it period 30 days lays from the date on which the order is communicated to the aggrieved person. Such an order should not be an order under S. 11 or sub-section (1) of S. 30 of the Act. The legislature has also conferred power upon the appellate authority to condone delay in filing an appeal if it is shown that the appellant was prevented by sufficient cause from filing the appeal within time. It is not provided under S. 33 of the Act that appeal shall be maintainable only if the same is filed before the publication of declaration under S. 10(3) of the Act. Thus that which has been conferred by an express provision of the Act cannot be taken away by an unusual process of interpretation of another provision of the same statute.

9. There is also a principle of harmonious construction. In any case where there is apparent conflict between two provisions of the same statute or between two provisions of different statutes, an attempt should be made to harmonise both the provisons. An endeavor should be made to see that no absurd result follows. In the case of Mannan Lai N. Mst. Chhotaka Bibi, (1970) 1 SCC769: AIR 1971 SC 1374), it so happened that initially the memo of appeal was filed on insufficient stamp. Later on deficiency was made good. The question for decision arose its to whether on the deficiency of Court fee being made good the appeal could be treated 'is one pending on Nov. 12, 196 i.e. the date immediately preceding the date of enforcement of U.P. High Court (Abolition of Letters Patent Appeals) Act. XIV of 1962 which provided for abolition (if appeals. The Supreme Court held that in considering the question as the maintainability of an appeal when the Court-fee paid was insufficient to start with but the deficiency is made good later on, the provisions of the Court-fees Act and the Code of Civil Procedure have to be read together to form a harmonious whole and no effort should be made to give precedence to provisions in one over those of the other unless the express words of a statute clearly override those of the other.

10. If one reads the provisions of Urban Land (Ceiling & Regulation) Act, 1976 in the aforesaid manner it is very clear that the legislature did provide for an appeal against an order passed by the competent authority under S. 9 of the Act. The right of appeal is not made conditional on the public on or non-publication of the notification under S. 10 of the Act. In a given case the Urban Land Appellate Tribunal may grant stay of further proceedings or may even grant conditional stay of further proceedings or may ever, refuse to grant stay. In cases where stay is not granted at all, the competent authority shall proceed further and notification as provided under S. 10 will be issued and published in the Government Gazette. In such cases it would be absurd to hold that even though the appeal is filled within time, but on account of the fact that during the pendency of the appeal notifications under S. 10(3) and 10(5) have been issued and therefore the appeal has become in fructuous. Such can never be the intention of the legislature. Therefore, the last part of the phrase occurring in S. 10(3) of the Act "such land shall deem to have vested absolutely in the State Government" cannot be read so as to defeat the provisions of the Act, i.e. the provisions of S. 33 of the Act, If this construction is not adopted the right of appeal can be frustrated by not granting stay of further proceedings or by not registering the appeal immediately.

11. Such an interpretation would be both absurd and unreasonable. Therefore it has to be avoided. The only reasonable interpretation that can be given to the provisions of Ss. 10(3) and 10(5) of the Act is that the vesting of the land in the Government would be subject to the result of the appeal under S. 33 of the Act. In cases where aggrieved party may succeed in appeal and the final order passed by the competent authority under S. 9 is set aside (or varied or modified), the further consequential steps under S. 10 also will have to be taken by the Government so as to bring the same in conformity with the final order under S. 9 of the Act. Just as the order under S. 9 is set aside (or varied or modified) by the Urban Land Appellate Tribunal, similarly the subsequent steps under S. 10 of the Act will have to be taken by the Government and it will have either to set aside (or vary or modify) its earlier actions.

12. Reading both the provisions in the aforesaid manner, the reasoning of the Appellate Tribunal that because notification under S. 10(3) of the Act was issued and therefore the appeal was not maintainable cannot be sustained. The learned counsel for the respondents has not been able to see any provision of law on the basis of which, can be held that, once the declaration under S. 10(3) of the Act is published in the official gazette, right to challenge the final order u/s. 9 of the Act passed by the competent authority conferred upon an aggrieved party u/s. 33 of the Act gets extinguished. As stated hereinabove right conferred by statute cannot be extinguished by adopting an unreasonable and unusual manner of interpretation of statute.

13. In the result, the petition is allowed. The order dated December 28, 1985 passed by the Appellate Tribunal produced at Annexure-D to the petition is quashed and set aside. The matter is remanded back to the Appellate Tribunal with a direction that the appeal shall be entered in its register and shall be decided on merits in accordance with law. Rule made absolute accordingly with no order as to costs.

14. Petition allowed.