1. The petitioner-detenu has filed the present petition for a writ of habeas corpus and for quashing and setting aside the order of detention dated 28-5-1987 (Annexure-A to the petition) and also for directing the respondents to set the detenu at liberty forthwith.

2. Order Annexure-A is passed by the District Magistrate, Panchmahals at Godhra, under the provisions of Section 3(2) of the Gujarat Prevention of Anti-Social Activities Act, 1985 (hereinafter referred to as 'the PASA Act') on his being satisfied that with a view to preventing the detenu from acting in any manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order it was necessary to pass an order directing the petitioner to be detained. The detenu was also supplied with the grounds of detention (copy at Annexure-B to the petition). On perusal of the grounds it appears that the petitioner is dealing in the business of transporting and selling of liquor and thereby carrying on anti-social activities. It is also mentioned in the said grounds that three cases have been filed against the petitioner-detenu, being Limbdi Prohibition C.R. No. 154 of 1986, Godhra Town Prohibition C.R. No. 303 of 1982 and Godhra Town Prohibition C.R. No. 150 of 1986. It is also mentioned in the said grounds that the petitioner was doing the business as broker and that inspite of the above proceedings the detenu could not be prevented from doing the above activities and that he was not likely to stop such activities. It is also mentioned in the said grounds that in Gujarat State the Bombay Prohibition Act is in force and for health of the public with a view to preventing him from acting in any manner prejudicial to the public health the detaining authority was constrained to pass the detention order.

3. Mr. C.K. Thakkar, the learned Advocate appearing for the petitioner raised the following points before us:

(1) That the detaining authority has not recorded the required satisfaction on the point that with a view to preventing the petitioner-detenu from acting in any manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order it was necessary to pass an order of detention against the petitioner and, therefore, the order is bad.

(2) That there is no material on the record to arrive at the satisfaction on the above point and therefore, also the order of detention require to be quashed and set aside.

4. Mr. D.K. Trivedi, the learned Addl. P.P. appearing for the respondents submits that the detaining authority has arrived at the necessary subjective required for the purpose of passing the order of detention and that the contention that there was no material on record to arrive at the subjective satisfaction is contrary to the record of the case.

5. With a view to supporting his contention Mr. Thakkar, the learned Advocate for the petitioner further submit that the detaining authority can not supplement by affidavit in Court what is not stated in the grounds for detention and Mr. Thakkar has relied on certain decision of the Supreme Court in this connection and the last being the decision in the case of Ramveer Jatav v. State of U.P. and Ors. reported in 1987 Cri.Lr (SC) page 109. In the said case the ground for detention was that the petitioner-detenu had committed murder joined with other persons, causing panic in the ear. That ground was held to be irrelevant. However, in the counter affidavit filed by the District Magistrate other circumstances had been set out which might go to suggest that the petitioner was habitually indulging in criminal activity, but none of these circumstances found place in the ground for detention. In the facts and circumstances of the said case it was observed in the said case by the Supreme Court that 'it is well settled that the detaining authority cannot by an affidavit filed in Court supplement what is stated in the grounds of detention or add to it'. In the present case no such attempt is made in the affidavit-in-reply to introduce material which is not mentioned in the grounds of detention as also the material supplied to the petitioner-detenu. In that view of the matter the auto rites cited by Mr. Thakkar on this point are no avail to the present petitioner.

6. On the point of arriving at a subjective satisfaction, it may be stated that the detaining authority has clearly stated in the impugned order as under:

And whereas, I am satisfied with respect to person known as Shri Rajenderakumar Natvarlal Shah, R/o. 26 Prabha Kunj Society, Godhra, that with a view to preventing him from acting in any manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order, it is necessary tko make an order directing that the said Shri Rajendrakumar Natvarlal Shah be detained.

7. The aforesaid three prohibition cases which were filed against the petitioner-detenu were referred to in the grounds of detention. It is also mentioned in the ground that the petitioner was doing the business of illegally importing and/or bringing foreign liquor from other States on commission basis and was bringing such liquor to State of Gujarat; that he was also storing foreign liquor in his residential house; that three is prohibition in the State of Gujarat and, therefore it is an offence to import liquor from other State without permission; and that such activities are anti-social and they are likely to effect the health of the people residing in the Gujarat State. It is further mentioned in the said ground that there were certain cases filed against the petitioner detenu and that he was acquitted on account of the witnesses turning hostile. The fact of two pending cases filed against the petitioner was also considered by the detaining authority. After referring to the factual aspect it was also mentioned in the said grounds that though the cases under the provisions of Bombay Prohibition Act were filed against the petitioner still however, he did not stop his activity nor was it likely that he would stop such activity. It was therefore, stated that the petitioner's activities were likely to affect the public health and therefore, in the interest of the health of the persons residing in the State of Gujarat it was necessary to detain him under the provisions of Section 3(2) of the PASA Act. Alongwith these grounds the petitioner was also supplied with the copies of the statements of certain persons and the statements and other documents which are supplied to the petitioner are 16 in number as referred to in the index, which included the statement of Om Prakash Agarwal, who was supplying the liquor from Vasvada of Rajasthan to the present petitioner-detenu also. There is also statement of Ahmedsahid Abdul Majid, who was the driver of the truck which was intercepted at village Limbdi of Panchmahals district. There is also the statement of the present petitioner-detenu himself. In addition to the aforesaid statements there are statements of Raghunathsinh Motisinh, Gafarkhan Abbaskhan and Bhavanishankar Labhshankar copies of which were also supplied to the petitioner along with other materials. On perusal of the said statements/documents it is clear that the detaining authority had with him sufficient material for holding that the petitioner-detenu was a 'bootlegger' as defined in Section 2(6) of the PASA Act.

8. On the point that the petitioner's activities were prejudicial to public order Mr. D.K. Trivedi the learned Addl. P.P. has placed reliance on the statements of the aforesaid three persons namely, Raghunathsinh, Gafarkhan and Bhavanishankar wherein it is inter alia mentioned that as the liquor was imported from the said State namely, Rajasthan it was harmful to the health of the persons residing in Gujarat State and that the detenu was carrying on such activity and that if he was not prevented from continuing such activity the said activity would have been continued. On the basis of these materials it is submitted by Mr. Trivedi that the argument on behalf of the petitioner that there was no material to arrive at the subjective satisfaction that the petitioner's activity was prejudicial to the maintenance of public order, is not correct.

9. It is true that when 'public order' is mentioned in the order of detention it is mentioned with the meaning assigned to it in Sub-section (4) of Section 3 of the PASA Act. On perusal of Sub-section (4) of Section 3 of the PASA Act alongwith its explanation, it would be clear that if a person is carrying on his activity as "bootlegger" which activity adversely affected or is likely to adversely affect the maintenance of public order it would be deemed to be an act in the manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order. On further reading of explanation to Sub-section (4) of Section 3 of the Act, it is clear that if any such activity of a person referred to in Sub-section (4) of Section 3 directly or indirectly, is causing or is likely to cause any grave or widespread danger to public health the deeming fiction of "adversely affecting the public health" would be attracted.

10. The fact that the Bombay Prohibition Act is in force in the State of Gujarat presumes that liquor adversely affects the health of the public. Further, looking to the statements of the aforesaid persons as also looking to the quantity of the liquor which was seized when the truck was interested at Limbdi (2.040 bottles of liquor) it cannot be said that the detaining authority had no material before him for arriving at the subjective satisfaction on the point that the activities of the present petitioner-detenu were likely to create widespread danger to public health. In that view of the matter we do not agree with any of the contentions raised by Mr. Thakkar, the learned Advocate appearing for the petitioner.

11. After the judgment on the aforesaid points was over Mr. Thakkar sought our permission to raise an additional point and he was permitted to do so. Mr. Thakkar further submitted that the family members of the detenu were not informed in writing about the detention order passed against the petitioner and, therefore order of detention is bad and illegal. Mr. Thakkar has raised this point in para 24 of the petition and on this point Shri G.H. Patel, Police Inspector, Godhra Town, who has served the detention order on the petitioner has filed his affidavit-in-reply wherein he has stated that he had gone to serve the order of detention on the detenu and the detenu and his wife were found moving in the main Bazar of Godhra Town and on seeing them he requested the detenu to come to the police station so that the order of detention can be served on him and he can be detained pursuant to the said order. Mr. Patel has also pointed out in his affidavit that at that time alongwith the detenu his wife Ramilaben was also there and she had also accompanied her husband i.e. the detenu to the police station. He has specifically averred in the affidavit that he had served the detention order on the detenu and that at the same time he had informed Ramilaben that her husband was being detained under the provision of the PASA Act and that he would be taken to Sabarmati Central Prison, Ahmedabad, for the purpose of detention. Mr. Patel had also stated that he had informed orally Ramilaben that the petitioner-detenu is entitled to wear private apparels and that Ramilaben thereafter went to her residence and brought clothes and other things for the detenu. According to Mr. Patel the family members of the detenu were informed about the fact of the order of detention passed under the PASA Act and that the petitioner was to be taken to Sabarmati Central Prison for the purpose of detention. It is therefore, clear that though the family member namely, the wife was not informed in writing about the detention order still however, she was orally informed.

12. Mr. C.K. Thakkar, the learned Advocate appearing for the petitioner has placed reliance in this connection on the observations made by the Supreme Court in para 75 of the judgment in the case of A.K. Roy v. Union of India and Anr. (relevant page 740). In the said case vires of certain provisions of the National Security Act was challenged. While dealing with the objections raised by the petitioner in the said case in para 74 of the said judgment the Supreme Court observed as under:

.... Besides, keeping a parson in detention in a place other than the one where he habitually resides makes it impossible for his friends and relatives to meet him or for the deteun to claim the advantage of facilities like having his own food. The requirements of administrative convenience, safety and security may justify in a given case the transfer of a detenu to a place other than that where he ordinarily reside, but that can only be by way of an exception and not as a matter of general rule. Even when a detenu is required to be kept in or transferred to a place which is other than his usual place of residence, he ought not to be sent to any far off place which, by the very reason is of its distance, is likely to deprive him of the facilities to which he is entitled. Whatever smacks of punishment must be scrupulously avoided in matters of preventive detention.

After making the aforesaid observations the Supreme Court has made the following observation in para 75 which according to it is of great importance in matters of preventive detention:

.... In order that the procedure attendant upon detentions should conform to the mandate of Article 21 in the matter of fairness, justness and reasonableness, we consider it imperative that immediately after a person is taken in custody in pursuance of an order of detention, the members of his household, preferably the parent, the child or the spouse, must be informed in writing of the passing of the order of detention and of the fact that the detenu has been taken ill custody. Intimation must also be given as to the place of detention, including the place where the detenu is transferred from time to time....

Further, the Supreme Court has observed as under for clarifying the intention for making the aforesaid observation:

.... This Court has stated time and again that the person who is taken in custody does not forfeit, by reason of his arrest, all and every one of his fundamental rights. It is, therefore, necessary to treat the detenu consistently with human dignity and civilized norms of behaviour.

13. The Supreme Court has observed in the case of General Electric Co. v. Renusagar Power Co.. as under:

.... As often enough pointed out by us, words and expressions used in a judgment are not to be construed in the same manner as statutes or as words and expressions defined in the statutes.

14. Reading the Supreme Court decisions in the light of the aforesaid observation, the underlying principle in the case of A.K. Roy (supra) is that a citizen, even while in detention, under preventive detention law, continues to enjoy all other fundamental rights. His right to liberty and essentially that of free movement, is curtailed. The deprivation of liberty also should be in accordance with law. The procedure followed cannot be unjust, unfair or unreasonable. The expression judging the 'just, fair and reasonable' procedure is that it should be consistent with human dignity and civilized norms of behaviours. In this context, it should be evident that 'written information' about the arrest of the detenu to his family members is merely an index of civilized norm of behaviour. The emphasis is not on written information. The emphasis is on civilized and humans treatment of the detenu. The treatment of the detenu must be dignified and civilized. He is not to be treated as a subject of a monarch. He is to be treated as a citizen of democratic, secular Socialist Republic. Examined from this angle, there is no particular virtue in written information to family members. In a given case, even when there is a written information to family members of the detenu, regarding his arrest and detention, it can be shown that he has not been provided with just, fair and reasonable procedure. Similarly, in absence of written information, it can be shown otherwise also. Ultimately, this depends upon facts of each case. Thus, the correct ratio of the judgment of the Supreme Court is that procedure should be fair, just and reasonable which should conform to the mandate of Article 21 of the Constitution of India. That is of prime importance with a view to achieving that objective the observation is made by the Supreme Court that family members of the detenu should be informed of the passing of the order of detention. Whether in writing or orally, if the family members of the detenu are informed the procedure that has been followed is just fair and reasonable. Hence, it cannot be said that it would not conform to the mandate of Article 21 of the Constitution of India merely because intimation is given orally and not in writing. In the present case as stated above, the Police Officer, who served the order of detention on the detenu has clearly stated in his affidavit which fact has not been controverted by the petitioner that at the time when the order of detention was served, the petitioner's wife was present and subsequently she went to her home and brought the clothes and other things belonging to the detenu. In that view of the matter we are of the view that the mandate of just, fair and reasonable procedure of Article 21 of the Constitution of India has been duly complied with in the case on hand. In that view of the matter we do not agree with the additional contention raised by Mr. Thakkar. No other point is raised.

In result all the contentions raised by Mr. C.K. Thakkar, learned Advocate appearing for the petitioner-detenu, fail. The petition therefore, deserves to be dismissed and is hereby dismissed. Rule is discharged.