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  • Section 25B(8) of the Delhi Rent Control Act (for short the Act)
  • Section 25-B(8),
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  • Section 25B(8) of the Delhi Rent Control Act (for short the Act)
  • Section 25-B(8),
Smart Summary

Judicial Opinion Summary — M.L. Mehta, J.

Factual and Procedural Background

This consolidated summary relates to two revision petitions under Section 25-B(8) of the Delhi Rent Control Act challenging two separate orders of the Additional Rent Controller dated 10.02.2012.

The petitioners, Kishore and Trilok Singh, are tenants of Shop No. 33-E and Shop No. 33-D respectively in South Patel Nagar Market, New Delhi. Respondent No. 1, Prabodh Kumar, occupies the adjoining Shop No. 33-C and runs a confectionary business there. The respondents sought the eviction of the petitioners on the ground of bona fide requirement of the tenanted shops for commercial purposes: (a) to expand the confectionary business because the existing space is said to be insufficient, and (b) to set up an eating joint for the respondent’s son. It was asserted by the respondents that they had no other suitable commercial space.

The petitioners filed leave to defend applications denying the respondents' claimed requirements. They contended that the present shop of respondent No. 1 was sufficiently spacious for his business and that his son was a school-going boy (returning from school not before 3:00 p.m.) and not expected to abandon studies to engage in full-time business.

The learned Additional Rent Controller (ARC) declined leave to defend in separate impugned orders, and the petitioners challenged those orders by filing the present revision petitions.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether, in exercising revisional power under Section 25-B(8) of the Delhi Rent Control Act, this Court should examine if the ARC committed any illegality in declining leave to defend.
  2. Whether the landlord’s assertion of bona fide requirement (for expansion of business and for setting up a business for his son) is conclusive, or whether the Court must objectively assess the truth and bonafides of that claim before declining leave to defend.
  3. Whether the facts pleaded by the petitioners raise triable issues sufficient to justify granting leave to contest rather than dismissing the petitions at the threshold.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioners' Arguments

  • Denied that respondent No. 1 genuinely required the tenanted shops for expansion of the confectionary business.
  • Asserted that the respondent’s existing shop (33-C) is sufficiently spacious for his business purposes.
  • Contended that the respondent’s son is school-going (returns only after 3:00 p.m.), and there is no case that he would stop studying and engage in full-time business; thus the claim of setting up an eating joint for the son is not bona fide.

Respondents' (Landlord's) Case

  • Alleged that respondent No. 1 requires Shops No. 33-D and 33-E to expand his confectionary business because his present space is not sufficient.
  • Claimed an intention to set up an eating joint for his son and stated there is no other suitable commercial space available.
  • Implicitly submitted that the landlord is the best judge of his requirement and choice of accommodation.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Shiv Sarup Gupta v. Dr. Mahesh Chand Gupta, (1999) 6 SCC 222 Explication of "bona fide requirement" — (a) bona fide refers to a genuine state of mind and a requirement is more than mere desire; (b) the Court must apply objective standards to determine whether the landlord's need is natural, real, sincere and honest; (c) a landlord's subjective choice of accommodation will be respected if bona fides are proved; (d) a claim arising from whim, fancy or pretext is not protected. The Court relied on this precedent to emphasize that (i) a landlord's mere assertion of requirement is not decisive; (ii) the Controller and this Court must objectively assess the genuineness and reasonableness of the landlord's claimed need before denying leave to defend; and (iii) only if the need is proved bona fide will the landlord’s subjective choice be respected.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court began by noting the scope of revisional power under Section 25-B(8) of the Act: where the material on record raises questions about whether the Controller acted according to law, this Court may peruse the records to ascertain any illegality in the Controller's order under Section 25-B.

The Court accepted the general principle (advanced by the landlord) that a landlord is ordinarily best placed to decide his requirements and the choice of accommodation. However, it stressed the established limitation: mere assertion by the landlord of a requirement for occupation does not automatically conclude the matter. The Court must determine the truth of the claim and its bona fides; in doing so the Court must apply objective standards and consider whether the claimed need is reasonable and genuine rather than the product of whim, fancy or pretext.

Relying on the Supreme Court’s guidance in Shiv Sarup Gupta (supra), the Court reiterated that "bona fide" is a state of mind involving a felt need greater than mere desire, and that the Court should, in the shoes of a landlord, ask whether the pleaded need is natural, real and sincere.

Applying these principles to the facts, the Court observed that respondent No. 1's shop (33-C) measured 13 ft × 9 ft and the tenanted shops were of similar measurement; acquiring both tenanted shops would triple respondent No. 1's accommodation. Given that magnitude of the proposed expansion, and the undisputed fact that the respondent's son is a school-going child returning after 3:00 p.m., the Court held that triable issues arise on the question of bona fides which the ARC should have considered.

The Court found that the learned ARC declined leave to defend seemingly by relying too readily on the proposition that the landlord is the best judge of his needs, without first ensuring that the landlord had substantiated the asserted requirement as genuine and not merely a desire or pretext. The Court concluded that the ARC overlooked material triable issues and thus committed an error in declining leave to defend.

Holding and Implications

The petitions are allowed and leave to contest is granted to the petitioners.

Consequences and immediate effects:

  • The impugned orders of the Additional Rent Controller dated 10.02.2012 declining leave to defend are set aside as suffering from infirmity.
  • The petitioners are permitted to contest the eviction proceedings; the parties were directed to appear before the learned ARC on 30.10.2012 for further proceedings.

The opinion does not purport to lay down any novel or broader precedent beyond applying established principles (as reiterated from the cited Supreme Court authority). The decision's practical effect is limited to allowing the petitioners to contest the eviction petitions and remitting the matter for factual and objective assessment by the Controller.

    Kishore & Anr. v. Prabodh Kumar & Ors.

    M.L Mehta, J.:— By this common order the aforementioned two revision petitions under Section 25B(8) of the Delhi Rent Control Act (for short ‘the Act’) are being disposed as common questions of law and fact are arising out of two separate orders, both dated 10.02.2012, of Additional Rent Controller.

    2. The petitioners are tenants under the respondents. Petitioner Kishore is a tenant in respect of Shop No. 33-E, whereas petitioner Trilok Singh is a tenant in respect of Shop No. 33-D, South Patel Nagar Market, New Delhi. Their evictions are sought from the tenanted shops on the ground of bonafide requirement thereof by the respondents for their commercial requirements. Respondent No. 1 Prabodh Kumar is stated to be running a confectionary business at Shop No. 33-C, which is adjoining the tenanted shops. The case as set up by the respondents is that the tenanted shops are required for expanding the confectionary business as the space available with the respondent No. 1 is not sufficient. It is also their case that he wants to set up an eating joint for his grown up son, and that they have no other suitable commercial space.

    3. The petitioners filed leave to defend application on various grounds. They denied the respondent No. 1 to be requiring the tenanted shops for expanding his confectionary business or for his son to set up business of eating joint. It is alleged that the present shop available with the respondent No. 1 is quite spacious for his business and that his son is a school going boy, and not grown up enough to set up his own business.

    4. The learned ARC vide his separate impugned orders declined leave to defend to the petitioners. These orders are challenged by the petitioners in the instant petitions.

    5. Being mindful of the nature and scope of the revisional power of this court under Section 25-B(8), it may be reiterated that when, from the averments as set up in the leave to defend application, as also the reply filed by the landlord thereto, there appears something on record, requiring to see as to whether the Controller passed the order according to law, this court may peruse the records to ascertain whether any illegality has been committed by the Controller in Passing the order under Section 25-B of the Act. There is no dispute to the submissions, which are made by the learned counsel for the respondent/landlord that the landlord is the best judge to decide about his requirement and choice of the place, and neither the tenant nor this Court can dictate to him as to how else he can adjust himself, without getting possession of the tenanted premises. But, at the same time, it is also settled law that mere assertion that landlord requires the premises, occupied by the tenant, for his personal occupation, is not decisive and it is for the Court to determine the truth of the claim and also to see as to whether the claim is bonafide. Further, in determining as to whether the claim is bonafide or not, the Court is entitled and indeed bound to consider whether it is reasonable. A claim founded on abnormal predilections of the landlord may not be regarded as bonafide.

    6. It is also repeatedly reiterated by the Supreme Court and reference can be have to the case of Shiv Sarup Gupta v. Dr. Mahesh Chand Gupta, (1999) 6 SCC 222 wherein the Apex Court held thus:

    “Thus the term bonafide genuinely refers to a state of mind. Requirement is not a mere desire. The degree of intensity contemplated by ‘requires’ is much more, higher than in mere desire. The phrase ‘required bonafide’ is suggestive of legislative intent that a mere desire which is outcome of whim or fancy is not taken note of by the Rent Control Legislation. A requirement in the sense of felt need which is an outcome of a sincere, honest desire, in contra-distinction with a mere pretence or pretext to evict a tenant, on the part of the landlord claiming to occupy the premises for himself or for any member of the family would entitle him to seek ejectment of the tenant. Looked at from this angle, any setting of the facts and circumstances protruding the need of landlord and its bonafides would be capable of successfully withstanding the test of objective determination by the Court. The Judge of facts should place himself in the arm chair of the landlord and then ask the question to himself-whether in the given facts substantiated by the landlord the need to occupy the premises can be said to be natural, real, sincere, honest. If the answer be in the positive, the need is bonafide. The failure on the part of the landlord to substantiate the pleaded need, or, in a given case, positive material brought on record by the tenant enabling the court drawing an inference that the reality was to the contrary and the landlord was merely attempting at finding out a pretence or pretext for getting rid of the tenant, would be enough to persuade the Court certainly to deny its judicial assistance to the landlord. Once the court is satisfied of the bonafides of the need of the landlord for premises or additional premises by applying objective standards then in the matter of choosing out of more than one accommodation available to the landlord his subjective choice shall be respected by the court. The court would permit the landlord to satisfy the proven need by choosing the accommodation which the landlord feels would be most suited for the purpose; the court would not in such a case thrust its own wisdom upon the choice of the landlord by holding that not one, but the other accommodation must be accepted by the landlord to satisfy his such need. In short, the concept of bonafide need or genuine requirement needs a practical approach instructed by realities of life. An approach either too liberal or two conservative or pedantic must be guarded against.”

    7. In the backdrop of the above legal propositions, it could be seen that the petitioners have been able to raise triable issues, which seem to have been overlooked by the learned ARC. Undisputedly, the respondent No. 1 which is in possession of Shop No. 33-C, measures 13 ft. × 9 ft. and the tenanted shops are also of the similar measurement. The respondent No. 1 is running confectionary business in his Shop No. 33-C for the last several years. There is no dispute that a landlord is entitled to seek eviction of the tenanted shop for the expansion of his business as also for his additional requirement or for the requirement of his dependent family members, but, that could not be on the mere asking of the landlord. In the given facts and circumstances, it may be that projected requirement of the landlord be found to be genuine and authentic, but that would all depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case. A mere wish or desire of the landlord to have the tenanted shops for expansion of his business or for additional accommodation or even for setting up a business for his son may not in every case be taken to be his bonafide requirement. The decisive factor is not the wish or desire of the landlord, but the objective assessment of the Controller.

    8. With the acquisition of both the tenanted shops the size of the accommodation available with the respondent No. 1 would be three times of his present accommodation. Certainly, it requires to be tested as to whether the respondent No. 1 does bonafidely require tenanted shops for expanding his confectionary business of that magnitude. Further, it is undisputed that his son is school going and come back from the school not before 3.00 pm. It is not their case that son would stop studying and engage himself in full time business. It would thus require to be tested as to whether the projected requirement of the respondents for setting up business of eating joint for his school going son, is bonafide or is only made out for the purpose of seeking eviction of the petitioners. From the averments of the eviction petitions, relating to the requirement of the tenanted shops by the respondents, triable issues are prima facie, seen to have been made out calling upon the Court to objectively assess the requirement of the respondents. In such a situation, the petitioners cannot be thrown out of the tenanted premises at the threshold. The learned ARC seems to have overlooked all these issues and simply got swayed by the proposition that the landlord is the best judge of his decisions and neither the tenant nor the Court can dictate terms to him. The applicability of this proposition is only after the landlord is able to demonstrate that his assertion of requirement of the tenanted premises is not a mere wish or desire, but, authentic and genuine. If he is able to show and demonstrate, then certainly neither the tenant nor this Court could dictate terms upon him as to how and in what manner he should utilize his premises.

    9. In view of my above discussion, I strongly feel the impugned orders suffering from infirmity which have resulted in miscarriage of justice to the petitioners. Thus, the impugned orders are liable to be set aside. Consequently, the petitions are allowed and the leave to contest is granted to the petitioners. The parties shall appear before the learned ARC on 30.10.2012

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    Kishore & Anr. v. Prabodh Kumar & Ors.
    (Oct 5, 2012)