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Smart Summary

Structured Summary of the Opinion — Manmohan, J.

Factual and Procedural Background

The present petition was filed under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 seeking to set aside an arbitral award dated 30 January 2009 rendered by the Sole Arbitrator, Mr. Justice C.L. Chaudhry (Retd.). The central contractual dispute concerns the proper basis for levying liquidated damages (LD): whether LD should be calculated on the total value of the Purchase Order inclusive of duties and taxes, or whether duties and taxes must be excluded and LD calculated only on the basic value.

The learned Arbitrator rejected the petitioner-objector's contention that LD should be levied inclusive of duties and taxes, holding that Clause 11 of the Purchase Order prescribed LD on the basic value excluding duties and taxes, except in a specified contingency where delayed portions materially hamper commissioning. The award also referred to a similar arbitration (Continental Telepower Ltd. v. Union of India) and the confirmation of that award by the Delhi High Court (OMP No. 83/2002).

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether levy of liquidated damages by the petitioner-objector is to be calculated on the total value of the Purchase Order inclusive of duties and taxes, or whether duties and taxes must be excluded (i.e., LD on basic value excluding duties and taxes).

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner-Objector's Arguments

  • The petitioner-objector (through Mr. Lalit Bhardwaj) submitted that Clause 15.2 of Section III of the General Conditions of Contract (GCC) entitles the purchaser to levy liquidated damages on the total value of the Purchase Order, which the petitioner contended includes excise and sales tax components.
  • He relied on Clauses 1 and 15 of Section III of the GCC and on the definition of "The Purchase Order" in Section II of the Contract to argue that the Purchase Order incorporates Clause 15 of the GCC (the general condition) and thus Clause 11 of the Purchase Order must be read together with Clause 15 of the GCC.
  • Although he admitted that Clause 11 of the Purchase Order, on its face, provides for levy of liquidated damages exclusive of duties and taxes, he argued the definition of Purchase Order (as including all attachments and documents incorporated by reference) meant Clause 15 of the GCC applied.

The opinion does not contain a detailed account of any specific arguments advanced by the respondent in these proceedings.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Delhi Development Authority v. U.S. Sharma & Company, New Delhi, (2008) 13 SCC 80 Scope of judicial interference under Section 34(2) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 — award open to interference if contrary to substantive law or contractual provisions and/or opposed to public policy. The court relied on this authority to state that interference with an arbitral award under Section 34(2) is limited and permissible only where the award is contrary to law, contract, or public policy.
Oil & Natural Gas Corporation Ltd. v. Saw Pipes Ltd., (2003) 5 SCC 705 Part of the body of authorities limiting interference with arbitral awards under Section 34. Referred to as part of the catena of cases supporting the limited scope of interference under Section 34(2).
McDermott International Inc. v. Burn Standard Co. Ltd., (2006) 11 SCC 181 Arbitrators' primacy in interpretation of contract — interpretation of contract falls within arbitrators' jurisdiction even if it raises a question of law. The court applied this principle to emphasize deference to the arbitrator's interpretation of contractual clauses (Clauses 11 and 20 of the Purchase Order read with Clause 15 of the GCC), concluding the interpretation did not merit interference.
Sahebzada Mohd. Kamgarh Shah v. Jagdish Chandra Deb Dhabal Deb, AIR 1980 SC 953 Contra proferentem — where words of a document are ambiguous they are construed against the party who prepared the document; interpretive principle to ascertain parties' intention and construe ambiguity strictly against grantor/preparer. The court invoked this settled rule of interpretation to support construing ambiguous contractual language against the drafting party where applicable.
Continental Telepower Ltd. v. Union of India (Department of Telecom) — Arbitration award and subsequent Delhi High Court order in OMP No. 83/2002 In that arbitration, held that LD must be recovered on basic value excluding duties and taxes where the Purchase Order clause so provided; purchaser cannot levy LD on duties and taxes contrary to specific Purchase Order clause. The court noted a similar arbitrator's view in that case, and that the award was upheld by the Delhi High Court, using this parallel to reinforce that the impugned award (which reached an identical conclusion) did not warrant interference.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court's analysis proceeds in a series of legal steps grounded in statutory and precedential constraints on interference with arbitral awards:

  1. Limited scope of interference: The court began by emphasizing that interference under Section 34(2) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 is extremely limited. It relied on the decision in Delhi Development Authority v. U.S. Sharma and the earlier Saw Pipes decision to frame this principle: an award is open to set-aside only if contrary to substantive law, contractual provisions, or public policy.
  2. Deference to arbitrator's contractual interpretation: The court explained that, particularly in contractual interpretation, arbitrators are accorded primacy. It cited McDermott to underline that arbitrators' construction of contract terms — including taking into account parties' conduct and exchanges — is within their domain and should not be lightly disturbed by courts in Section 34 proceedings.
  3. Application to the present clauses: The Arbitrator had interpreted Clause 11 of the Purchase Order (a specific clause dealing with liquidated damages) read with Clause 15 of the GCC (a general clause). The court agreed that this interpretation falls within the arbitrator's province and does not, on the materials, attract interference under Section 34.
  4. Specific vs. general clause principle: On first principles of contract interpretation the court observed that a specific contractual provision (Clause 11 of the Purchase Order regarding LD) prevails over a general provision (Clause 15 of the GCC). The court accepted the Arbitrator's conclusion that Clause 11 — being the Purchase Order's special clause — must be given effect over the more general tender condition.
  5. Interpretive aid — contra proferentem: The court further relied on the well-established rule that any ambiguity in a document is construed against the party who prepared it (contra proferentem). This supported reading the Purchase Order's LD clause strictly and against any party contending for a broader tax-inclusive basis where the clause indicated exclusion of duties and taxes.
  6. Supporting authority from a parallel arbitration: The court noted that in a similar contract and arbitration, an identical view was taken and that the award was confirmed by the Delhi High Court (OMP No. 83/2002). The existence of that prior, consistent decision reinforced the court's view that the impugned Award did not warrant interference.

Based on these legal principles and the arbitrator's interpretation of the specific contract clauses, the court found no ground to set aside the arbitral award under Section 34.

Holding and Implications

Holding:

DISMISSED — The petition under Section 34 to set aside the arbitral award dated 30 January 2009 is dismissed.

Direct consequences and implications:

  • The arbitral award upholding the view that liquidated damages are to be levied on the basic value excluding duties and taxes (as per Clause 11 of the Purchase Order and consistent interpretation) stands affirmed by this court.
  • The petition is dismissed with no order as to costs.
  • The opinion does not purport to lay down any novel legal principle; rather, it applies established doctrines — limited judicial interference under Section 34, deference to arbitrators on contract interpretation, supremacy of specific contract clauses over general clauses, and the contra proferentem rule — to the contractual facts before it. The court therefore did not indicate any broader change in law or new precedent beyond applying settled authorities to the facts.

This summary is strictly based on the content of the provided opinion. No information has been added beyond what appears in the opinion text.

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    Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited v. Haryana Telecom Limited & Anr.

    Manmohan, J. (Oral):— Present petition has been filed under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (hereinafter referred to as “Act, 1996”) for setting aside the arbitral Award dated 30th. January, 2009 passed by the Sole Arbitrator, Mr. Justice C.L Chaudhry (Retd.).

    2. The only issue that arises for consideration in the present proceedings is whether levy of liquidated damages by petitioner-objector is to be on the total value of the Purchase Order inclusive of duties and taxes or whether duties or taxes have to be excluded. Learned Arbitrator in the impugned Award has rejected the petitioner-objector's argument for levy of liquidated damages on the Purchase Order inclusive of duties and taxes. The relevant portion of the impugned Award reads as under:—

    “5….Clause 11 of P.O is reproduced herein below for the sake of convenience:—

    Clause 11 — “Liquidated Damages: should the firm fail to deliver the stores or any consignment thereof within the period prescribed for delivery, the purchaser shall be entitled to recover % of the value of the delayed supply for each week of delay or part thereof subject to maximum of 5% of the value of delayed supply (on basic value excluding duties and taxes) provided that the delayed portion of the supply does not in any way hamper the commissioning of the systems. Where the delayed portions of supply materially hampers commissioning of the system, LD charges shall be levied as above on the total value of the purchase order (Basic value excluding duties and taxes)” Value of cables as given in LOI and P.Os is the basic value and rates were exclusive of excise duty and sales tax which shall be paid extra.

    In view of the above said clause, the deductions in the form of liquidated damages on the excise and sales tax component is impermissible under the terms of the agreement and contract between the parties.

    xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx

    9. In a similar case of arbitration between Continental Telepower Ltd. v. Union of India (Department of Telecom), where Rajasthan Circle has deducted liquidated damages from them on excise and sales tax component of the value of cables, in a arbitration proceedings it was held that “Claimant indicated that Rajasthan Circle in P.O dated 30.7.1996 in Clause 11 of LD has provided that LD would be recovered on basic value excluding duties and taxes.

    P.O is the essence of the contract. Therefore in view of the aforesaid specific agreement Rajasthan Circle cannot be allowed to levy LD on the duties and taxes.”

    The aforesaid award passed by Shri N.K Gupta, Sole Arbitrator, was upheld by Hon'ble Delhi High Court by Hon'ble Justice J.D Kapoor vide order dated 20.3.2002 passed in OMP No. 83/2002. The copy of the award as well as the order passed by Hon'ble High Court is already part of the present Arbitration proceedings.

    xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx

    15.2…In my opinion, the purchase order is the essence of the contract. The cables were to be supplied to the respondent in terms of the purchase order and the price of the material was to be paid in terms of the purchase order. Regarding levy of liquidated damages, clause 11 was inserted in the purchase order. Extension for delivering the cables were given by the respondent in terms of Clause 11 of the purchase order. Clause 15 of the tender document regarding levy of liquidated damages fall in Section 111 of the tender document which prescribes General Conditions. Clause 11 of the Purchase order regarding levy of liquidated damages was inserted in place of Clause 15 Section 111 of the tender document in a modified form. Clause 11 of the Purchase Order is a special clause which will prevail over Clause 15 of the tender document which falls under Section 111 of the tender document prescribing General Conditions. In the absence of any clause regarding levy of liquidated damages in the purchase order, the respondent could rely upon Clause 15 of the tender document as part of General Conditions. But in the presence of a clause regarding levy of liquidated damages in the purchase order, Clause 15 of the tender document cannot be given any effect…”

    (emphasis supplied)

    3. Mr. Lalit Bhardwaj, learned counsel for petitioner-objector submits that the impugned Award is contrary to the contract executed between the parties inasmuch as in accordance with Clause 15.2 of Section III of General Conditions of Contract (in short “GCC”), the petitioner-objector is entitled to levy liquidated damages on total value of the Purchase Order, which according to him includes both excise and sales tax component. In this connection, Mr. Bhardwaj relies upon Clauses 1 and 15 of Section III of GCC, which read as under:—

    SECTION III

    GENERAL CONDITIONS OF CONTRACT

    1. APPLICATION:

    The General Conditions shall apply in contracts made by the Purchaser for the procurement of Goods.

    xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx

    15 LIQUIDATED DAMAGES

    15.1 The date of delivery of the stores stipulated in the acceptance of Purchase Order should be deemed to be the essence of the contract and delivery must be completed not later than the dates specified therein. Extension will not be given except in exceptional circumstances. Should, however, deliveries be made after expiry of the contract delivery period, without prior concurrence of the Purchaser, and be accepted by the consignee, such deliveries will not deprive the Purchaser of his right to recover liquidated damages under clause 15.2 below.

    15.2 Should the tenderer fail to deliver the stores or any consignment thereof as per the prescribed schedule for delivery the Purchaser shall be entitled to recover % of the value of the delayed supply for each week of delay or part thereof, subject to maximum of 5% of the value of the delayed supply; provided that delayed portion of the supply does not in any way hamper the commissioning of the other systems. Where the delayed portion of the supply materially hampers installation and commissioning of the other systems, L/D charges shall be levied as above on the total value of the Purchase Order. Quantum of liquidated damages assessed and levied by the purchaser shall be final and not challengable by the supplier.

    4. Though Mr. Bhardwaj admits that Clause 11 of the Purchase Order provides for levy of liquidated damages exclusive of duties and taxes, he submits that in view of definition of the Purchase Order in Section II of the Contract executed between the parties, the Purchase Order includes not only its Clause 11, but also clause 15 of section iii of gcc. The definition of Purchase Order in Section II of the Contract reads as under:—

    SECTION II

    A. INTRODUCTION

    1. DEFINITIONS

    xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx

    (f) “The Purchase Order” means the order placed by the Purchaser on the Supplier signed by the purchaser including all attachments and appendices thereto and all documents incorporated by reference therein. The purchase order shall be deemed as “contract” appearing in the document.

    5. Having heard the parties, I am of the view that the scope of interference by this Court with an arbitral award under Section 34(2) of Act, 1996 is extremely limited. The Supreme Court in Delhi Development Authority v. U.S Sharma and Company, New Delhi, (2008) 13 SCC 80, after referring to a catena of judgments including Oil & Natural Gas Corporation Ltd. v. Saw Pipes Ltd., (2003) 5 SCC 705 has held that an arbitral award is open to interference by a Court under Section 34(2) of the Act, 1996 if it is contrary to either the substantive provisions of law or the contractual provisions and/or is opposed to public policy.

    6. In fact, the Supreme Court in a catena of cases has held that in the realm of interpretation of a contract, the arbitrators are supreme. One such judgment under Act, 1996 is Mcdermott International Inc. v. Burn Standard Co. Ltd., (2006) 11 SCC 181 wherein it has been held as under:

    “112. It is trite that the terms of the contract can be express or implied. The conduct of the parties would also be a relevant factor in the matter of construction of a contract. The construction of the contract agreement is within the jurisdiction of the arbitrators having regard to the wide nature, scope and ambit of the arbitration agreement and they cannot be said to have misdirected themselves in passing the award by taking into consideration the conduct of the parties. It is also trite that correspondences exchanged by the parties are required to be taken into consideration for the purpose of construction of a contract. Interpretation of a contract is a matter for the arbitrator to determine, even if it gives rise to determination of a question of law.”

    (emphasis supplied)

    7. Consequently, in the present case as the Arbitrator has interpreted Clauses 11 and 20 of the Purchase Order read with Clause 15 of GCC, I am of the view that the said interpretation calls for no interference by this Court in Section 34 proceedings.

    8. Even on first principles, I am of the view that Clause 11 of the Purchase Order being a specific clause with regard to liquidated damages must prevail over the general clause, that is, Clause 15 of general conditions of the tender.

    9. Moreover, it is a settled principle of interpretation that where the words of a document are ambiguous, they shall be construed against the party who prepared the document. This rule of Contra Proferentum has been adopted and followed by the Supreme Court in various judgments. In Sahebzada Mohd. Kamgarh Shah v. Jagdish Chandra Deb Dhabal Deb, AIR 1980 SC 953 the Supreme Court has held as under:—

    12. The correctness of these principles is too well established by authorities to justify any detailed discussion. The task being to ascertain the intention of the parties, the cases have laid down that intention has to be gathered by the words used by the parties themselves. In doing so the parties must be presumed to have used the words in their strict grammatical sense. If and when the parties have first expressed themselves in one way and then go on saying something, which is irreconcilable with what has gone before, the courts have evolved the principle on the theory that what once had been granted cannot next be taken away, that the clear disposition by an earlier clause will not be allowed to be cut down by a later clause. Where there is ambiguity it is the duty of the Court to look at all the parts of the document to ascertain what was really intended by the parties. But even here the rule has to be borne in mind that the document being the grantor's document it has to be interpreted strictly against him and in favour of the grantee.

    (emphasis supplied)

    10. In any event, since in a similar contract executed between the petitioner-objector and a third party, another arbitrator has taken an identical view and the said view has been confirmed by this Court in OMP No. 83/2002, I am of the opinion that the impugned Award calls for no interference in the present proceedings. Accordingly, present petition is dismissed but with no order as to costs.

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    Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited v. Haryana Telecom Limited & Anr.
    (Mar 10, 2010)