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Smart Summary

Structured Summary of the Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

The Plaintiff instituted a suit for specific performance of an agreement of sale dated 19 April 1993 concerning the Rear Duplex Flat (50% of ground floor and 50% of basement) in property No. E-7/14, Vasant Vihar, New Delhi. There were five defendants. Defendant No. 1 died during the pendency of the suit and her daughters appeared as legal representatives; several defendants were proceeded against ex parte. Defendant No. 5, after being served, filed multiple criminal miscellaneous applications under Section 340 Cr.P.C. (Cr.Misc. Nos. 1759/2000 and 2537/2000) alleging forgery of a document (Receipt-cum-Agreement dated 29 June 1994). Defendant No. 5 indicated the intention to invoke the arbitration clause and initially did not file a written statement. After several years, Defendant No. 5 filed interlocutory applications under Section 8 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (I.A. No. 8213/2005 — withdrawn as it was signed by the wife on an inapplicable power of attorney; and I.A. No. 2049/2007). The Plaintiff filed I.A. No. 13200/2007 under Order 8 Rule 10 CPC seeking to strike off the defence of Defendant No. 5 for not filing a written statement. The present order disposes of I.A. No. 2049/2007 (Section 8 application by Defendant No. 5) and I.A. No. 13200/2007 (striking of defence).

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the Agreement of sale alleged by the Plaintiff is part and parcel of the Collaboration agreement (which contains an arbitration clause) or is a separate and independent agreement?
  2. Whether Defendant No. 5, while denying the Agreement of sale, can invoke the arbitration clause?
  3. Whether the filing of applications under Section 340 Cr.P.C. constitutes a "first statement on the substance of the dispute" within the meaning of Section 8 of the Arbitration Act and thereby debar the Defendant from subsequently applying for reference to arbitration?
  4. Whether Defendant No. 5 has waived the right to apply under Section 8 by not invoking it for nearly five years after service of summons?
  5. Whether Defendant No. 5, having earlier filed and withdrawn an application under Section 8, is debarred from filing a second application under Section 8?

Arguments of the Parties

Plaintiff's Arguments

  • The Plaintiff relied on a Receipt-cum-Agreement dated 29 June 1994 as evidence of a sale of the Rear Duplex Flat to the Plaintiff for Rs. 52 lakhs.
  • The Plaintiff contended that the Agreement of sale is separate and distinct from the earlier Collaboration agreement and therefore not covered by its arbitration clause.
  • The Plaintiff objected to Defendant No. 5 invoking Section 8 of the Arbitration Act on the ground that Defendant No. 5 had already sought court intervention under Section 340 Cr.P.C. (seeking prosecution for alleged forgery), and thus was not entitled to invoke arbitration.
  • The Plaintiff sought striking off the defence of Defendant No. 5 under Order 8 Rule 10 CPC for not filing a written statement.

Defendant No. 5's Arguments

  • Defendant No. 5 denied execution of the Receipt-cum-Agreement of 29 June 1994 and alleged that the document was forged and fabricated; he said that on that date he and Defendant No. 1 were posted at Palampur (Defendant No. 5 retired on 30 June 1994) and therefore could not have signed the document.
  • Defendant No. 5 indicated intention to invoke the arbitration clause in the Collaboration agreement, contending that the Agreement of sale was a change of allocation under the Collaboration agreement (i.e., part of the same transaction) and hence subject to the arbitration clause.
  • Defendant No. 5 initially filed an application under Section 8 (I.A. No. 8213/2005) which was found to have been signed by his wife on an invalid power of attorney and was withdrawn; later he filed I.A. No. 2049/2007 under Section 8.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Everest Electric Works v. Himachal Futuristic Communications Ltd., 113 (2004) DLT 304 : 2004 (76) DRJ 337 Establishes that an application under Section 8 of the Arbitration Act filed not later than the "first statement on the substance of the dispute" cannot be dismissed merely for delay. The court relied on this principle to observe that delay per se (i.e., filing Section 8 after several years) is not necessarily fatal provided the application is filed not later than the first statement on the substance of the dispute; also used to view the earlier withdrawn application (signed by the wife on an invalid POA) as not constituting an effective Section 8 application by Defendant No. 5.
Rashtriya Ispat Nigam Ltd. v. Verma Transport Company, AIR 2006 SC 2800 Holds that filing opposition to an interlocutory application (e.g., an interim injunction) does not necessarily preclude a party from subsequently applying under Section 8; the key consideration is whether steps taken were compelled and confined to obtaining relief in the proceeding, not an unambiguous intention to surrender arbitration rights. The court distinguished that precedent: unlike an opponent forced to reply to an interlocutory application for interim relief, Defendant No. 5 was not under compulsion to file Section 340 Cr.P.C. applications and instead voluntarily invited the court to adjudicate on the forgery allegation; thus Rashtriya Ispat Nigam did not protect Defendant No. 5's later invocation of Section 8 in the present facts.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court's analysis proceeded in two main strands: (A) procedural/temporal rules under Section 8 of the Arbitration Act, 1996 and (B) substantive determination whether the Agreement of sale fell within the arbitration clause of the Collaboration agreement.

A. Section 8 timing and effect of prior steps taken by Defendant No. 5

  • The court observed that Section 8 prescribes that the application for reference to arbitration must be filed not later than the "first statement on the substance of the dispute." The Legislature consciously used the phrase "first statement on the substance of the dispute" rather than "written statement."
  • Relying on Everest Electric Works, the court noted that delay in filing a Section 8 application is not necessarily fatal if the application is made not later than the first substantive statement of the dispute.
  • The court considered whether Defendant No. 5's previous Section 8 application (I.A. No. 8213/2005) or its withdrawal operated to debar him from filing another application. That earlier application was withdrawn because it had been signed by Defendant No. 5's wife based on a power of attorney not covering the property; the court treated that as not an effective application by Defendant No. 5.
  • However, the court found that Defendant No. 5's applications under Section 340 Cr.P.C. constituted his "first statement on the substance of the dispute." By filing those applications, accompanied by documents aiming to prove his presence in Palampur on the date of the alleged Agreement and seeking prosecution for alleged forgery, Defendant No. 5 had invited the court to adjudicate the very question (existence/authenticity of the Agreement to sell) which would otherwise be referable to arbitration.
  • Section 340 (and specifically Section 340(1)(a) Cr.P.C.) requires the court to record a prima facie finding before directing prosecution for forgery; by seeking that court process, Defendant No. 5 voluntarily invoked judicial determination of the forgery allegation and thereby took a position inconsistent with subsequently claiming the matter should be referred to arbitration.
  • Rashtriya Ispat Nigam was distinguished: there, the Supreme Court held that opposition to an interlocutory application did not necessarily mean waiver of arbitration rights because the party was compelled to respond to vacate an ex parte injunction; in the present case, Defendant No. 5 was not under compulsion to file Section 340 Cr.P.C. applications and instead affirmatively sought judicial determination on the same substantive dispute.

B. Whether the Agreement of sale is part of the Collaboration agreement (arbitrable)

  • The court examined the nature of the Collaboration agreement and the subsequent Receipt-cum-Agreement (Agreement of sale). It concluded that the Agreement of sale was separate and independent from the Collaboration agreement and that there was no arbitration agreement covering the Agreement of sale.
  • The court explained that a Collaboration agreement is generally not assignable and is an exchange-based contract entered into with reliance on the builder's personal skill and reputation; by contrast, an agreement of sale of immovable property is typically assignable and, unless the parties provide otherwise, is a distinct contractual species.
  • Mere fact that the property would come into existence pursuant to the Collaboration agreement did not make a later Agreement of sale part of the Collaboration agreement. The Receipt-cum-Agreement did not demonstrate an intention by the parties to make the sale agreement a part of the Collaboration agreement or to subject it to the Collaboration agreement's arbitration clause.
  • The court noted that there was a MoU (14 December 1996) and a notice (20 March 1997) suggesting a possible proposal to prepare a composite agreement, but no composite agreement was executed; therefore the unexecuted proposal could not be taken as evidence that the Agreement of sale was intended to be part of the Collaboration agreement.
  • The Defendant No. 5 failed to show how disputes under the two agreements (Collaboration agreement and Agreement of sale) were interlinked such that adjudication of the present suit would necessarily entail adjudication of claims under the Collaboration agreement. Moreover, no claims under the Collaboration agreement had been pressed in the nine years the suit had been pending.

Combining both strands, the court concluded that (i) by initiating court proceedings under Section 340 Cr.P.C. and thereby making the first substantive statement challenging existence/authenticity of the sale agreement, Defendant No. 5 lost the right to have that specific dispute referred to arbitration, and (ii) independently, the Agreement of sale is not covered by the arbitration clause in the Collaboration agreement because it is a separate contract and no arbitration agreement was shown to exist with respect to it.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The court dismissed I.A. No. 2049/2007 (the application under Section 8 of the Arbitration Act filed by Defendant No. 5) and imposed costs of Rs. 5,000 on Defendant No. 5 payable to the Delhi Legal Services Authority. The court disposed of I.A. No. 13200/2007 (the Plaintiff's application to strike off the defence) by granting Defendant No. 5 a final opportunity: two weeks' time to file a written statement, subject to payment of the costs already imposed; failure to do so will close Defendant No. 5's right to file a written statement.

Implications:

  • Direct effect on the parties: Defendant No. 5's application to refer the dispute to arbitration (I.A. No. 2049/2007) is dismissed; Defendant No. 5 must pay Rs. 5,000 to the Delhi Legal Services Authority and must file his written statement within two weeks (subject to that cost); otherwise his right to file a written statement will be closed.
  • The court held that the Agreement of sale is a separate agreement and not covered by the arbitration clause in the Collaboration agreement; therefore the contention that the dispute must proceed by arbitration was rejected on substantive grounds.
  • The decision is rooted in application of existing legal principles (particularly the interpretation of "first statement on the substance of the dispute" under Section 8 and the precedents cited). The opinion does not purport to lay down a new legal precedent beyond applying and distinguishing previously decided authorities to the facts of this case.

Costs and directions as ordered in the opinion have been reported above exactly as stated in the provided text.

    Kaiser Lands v. Ethel Robinson

    Rajiv Sahai Endlaw, J.:— The Plaintiff has instituted the suit for specific performance of an agreement of sale dated 19th April, 1993 by the Defendants in favour of the Plaintiff of the Rear Duplex Flat comprising of 50% of the ground floor and 50% of the basement in property No. E-7/14, Vasant Vihar, New Delhi. Though there are 5 Defendants, the Defendant No. 1 died during the pendency of the suit leaving, besides the Defendants No. 2 to 5, her daughters also as her legal representatives. Neither the other legal representatives of the Defendant No. 1 nor the Defendants No. 2 to 4 have chosen to appear in the suit and have been proceeded ex parte. The Defendant No. 5 on being served, filed Criminal Misc. No. 1759/2000 which was put up before the court first on 23rd May, 2000 and is still pending. The counsel for the Defendant No. 5 thereafter on 12th September, 2000 stated that an application invoking the arbitration clause will be filed and the Defendant No. 5 will not be filing the written statement. The counsel for the Plaintiff on that date itself stated that the Defendant No. 5 having already moved the application under Section 340 of the Cr.P.C (Cr.Misc No. 1759/2000), was not entitled to invoke the arbitration clause. The matter thereafter remained pending for the service of the other Defendants. The Defendant No. 5 moved another application under Section 340 of the Cr.P.C being Cr.Misc No. 2537/2000 notice whereof was also issued and which is also still pending. The Defendant No. 5 after 5 years filed I.A No. 8213/2005 under Section 8 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 notice whereof was issued and reply was filed by the Plaintiff. However, on 8th February, 2007, it was found that I.A No. 8213/2005 was signed by the wife of the Defendant No. 5 on the basis of a Power of Attorney which did not pertain to the property, subject matter of the present suit. The counsel for the Defendant No. 5 thus sought permission to withdraw the application which was dismissed as withdrawn. It was thereafter that the I.A No. 2049/2007 also under Section 8 of the Arbitration Act came to be filed by the Defendant No. 5. The Plaintiff on the other hand filed I.A No. 13200/2007 under Order 8 Rule 10 of the CPC for striking off the defence of the Defendant No. 5 for having not filed the written statement. This order disposes of the said two applications.

    2. It is the admitted case of the Plaintiff and the Defendant No. 5 that the Agreement dated 19th April, 1993 was executed between the deceased Defendant No. 1, predecessor of the Defendants No. 2 to 4 and the Defendant No. 5 on the one hand as owners of property No. E-7/14, Vasant Vihar, New Delhi and the Plaintiff. Under the said Agreement, the Plaintiff agreed to demolish the then existing single-storeyed construction on the said property and to, at the cost and expense of the Plaintiff, construct a basement, ground, 1st and 2nd floor thereon, in consideration of the Plaintiff on completion of the said construction acquiring rights with respect to 50% of the basement and ground floor and in the 2nd floor. This is what in common parlance is referred to as a collaboration agreement. The said Agreement contains an arbitration clause as under:

    “19. That in the event of any question or dispute arising in connection with or incidental to or in respect of interpretation or scope of this Agreement of any part thereof, then the same shall be referred to the sole Arbitration of an Arbitrator mutually decided by the two parties for decision. The sole Arbitrator shall give a speaking order/Award.”

    3. It is the case of the Plaintiff that the Defendants had subsequently agreed to sell to the Plaintiff, the ground floor Rear Duplex Flat for a consideration of Rs. 52 lacs. The Plaintiff in this regard relies upon a document titled Receipt-cum-Agreement and which the Plaintiff in the plaint has stated was executed on 29th June, 1994. The said document is purportedly signed by the deceased Defendant No. 1, the Defendant No. 5 and the predecessor of the Defendants No. 2 to 4 as well as on behalf of the Plaintiff. The two applications aforesaid under Section 340 of the Cr.P.C came to be filed by the Defendant No. 5 with respect to the said document. It is the case of the Defendant No. 5 in the said applications under Section 340 of the Cr.P.C that he was posted by the Indian Army at Palampur and retired on 30th June, 1994 and on 29th June, 1994, the Defendant No. 5 as well as the Defendant No. 1 were at Palampur and as such could not have signed Receipt-cum-Agreement and the document has been forged and fabricated by the Plaintiff.

    4. In the aforesaid facts, the following questions have a bearing on the disposal of the application of the Defendant No. 5 under Section 8 of the Arbitration Act.

    (a) Whether the Agreement alleged by the Plaintiff of sale is part and parcel of the Collaboration agreement containing the arbitration clause or is a separate and independent agreement?

    (b) Whether the Defendant No. 5 while denying the Agreement of sale can invoke the arbitration clause?

    (c) Whether the filing of the applications under Section 340 of the Cr.P.C constitutes a first statement on the substance of the dispute within the meaning of Section 8 the Arbitration Act and debars the Defendant No. 5 from subsequently applying for reference to arbitration?

    (d) Whether the Defendant No. 5 by not invoking Section 8 of the Arbitration Act for nearly 5 years after service of summons has waived the right to apply thereunder?

    (e) Whether the Defendant No. 5 by reason of having earlier filed an application under Section 8 of the Arbitration Act and having withdrawn the same, is debarred from filing the second application?

    5. In my opinion, the Defendant No. 5 merely for the reason of having applied under Section 8 of the Arbitration Act after 5 years from the service of the summons and for the reason of having earlier filed an application and withdrawn the same, is not debarred from now invoking the said provision. Section 8 itself lays down the time and manner of applying. Under Section 8, the application is to be filed not later than while submitting the first statement on the substance of the dispute. Thus as long as the application is filed not later than while submitting the first statement on the substance of the dispute, the same cannot be dismissed for the reason of delay. See Everest Electric Works v. Himachal Futuristic Communications Ltd., 113 (2004) DLT 304 : 2004 (76) DRJ 337. Similarly, the earlier application was withdrawn for the reason of the same having been signed by the wife of the Defendant No. 5 who was found to be not authorized to do so. Thus, the same cannot be considered as an application filed by the Defendant No. 5. Even otherwise there was no adjudication at that stage as to whether the provisions of Section 8 of the Act are attracted or not.

    6. I, however, find the application filed by the Defendant No. 5 under Section 340 of the Cr.P.C, the first statement of the Defendant No. 5 on the substance of the dispute. It is significant that the Arbitration Act of 1996 has made a departure from the earlier law. The Legislature has not used the word ‘written statement’ but has chosen the words “first statement on the substance of the dispute.” Thus, it has to be determined as to what was the substance of the dispute.

    7. Substance of the dispute in the present case is an agreement of sale of Rear Duplex Flat in the property. The Plaintiff is claiming specific performance of the said Agreement. The Defendant No. 5 by filing the applications has denied the Agreement to Sell itself and has called the documents filed by the Plaintiff evidencing the Agreement to Sell to be a forged and fabricated document. Even though the Defendant No. 5 did not file the written statement but the Defendant No. 5 in the said application accompanied by the documents to show his presence on the date of the Agreement at Palampur, has sought prosecution of the Plaintiff and its partners. A suit for specific performance can be contested by the Defendant either by denying the Agreement to Sell itself or its terms or challenging the readiness or willingness of the Plaintiff or the entitlement of the Plaintiff to the relief of specific performance. In the present case, the Defendant No. 5 in response to the suit has denied the existence of the Agreement to Sell. The Defendant No. 5 was satisfied for nearly 5 years after knowledge of the suit to deny the existence of the Agreement and to call the Agreement to Sell forged and fabricated. The Defendant No. 5, by filing the applications under Section 340 Cr.P.C called upon the court to adjudicate upon the existence of the Agreement to sell. The court under Section 340 Cr.P.C is to direct prosecution only after prima facie recording a finding on the allegation of forgery and fabrication. The Defendant No. 5 having called upon the court to adjudicate his defence to the claim of the Plaintiff, in my view, cannot subsequently be permitted to reprobate and seek arbitration.

    8. While holding so, I am conscious of Rashtriya Ispat Nigam Ltd. v. Verma Transport Company, AIR 2006 SC 2800 where the Apex court held the filing of an opposition to interim injunction to be not precluding subsequent filing of an application under Section 8. The reasoning therefor was that in the reply to injunction application itself it was stated that the suit was not maintainable because of the arbitration clause. It was further reasoned that when ex parte injunction has been granted, the other party is forced to reply to have the same vacated and such compulsion cannot disclose an unambiguous intention to give up the benefit of arbitration agreement. The Apex court thus held that taking step in the proceeding must be confined to taking steps in the proceedings for resolution of the dispute and not to taking steps for contesting applications for interlocutory reliefs. However, in the present case the Defendant No. 5 was not under any compulsion for filing applications under Section 340 Cr.P.C He, by calling upon the court to adjudicate the said application, invited the court to under Section 340 (1)(a) Cr.P.C to hold a preliminary inquiry and record a finding to the effect that the document evidencing Agreement to sell of which specific performance was claimed was forged and fabricated. That is the very dispute which the arbitrator would be required to adjudicate. The Defendant No. 5 having called upon the court to return a finding on existence of Agreement to Sell, lost his right to have the said question referred to arbitrator.

    9. Even otherwise, I do not find the existence of any arbitration agreement in the Agreement of sale of Rear Duplex Flat in the property. The counsel for the Defendant No. 5 contended that the Agreement of sale alleged by the Plaintiff was a change of allocation of built-up areas from that provided in the Collaboration agreement. I do not find so. The built-up areas were allocated under the Collaboration agreement in lieu of the expense to be incurred by the Plaintiff in executing the works of demolition and reconstruction of the property. On the other hand, the subsequent Agreement was for the sale by the owners of a part of their allocation of built-up area under the Collaboration agreement, to the Plaintiff or its nominee.

    10. It is significant that a Collaboration agreement is not assignable. The same is entered into by the owner of a property with a builder/contractor relying upon the personal skills and reputation of the said builder or contractor. On the contrary, an agreement of sale of immovable property is by its very nature, unless provides otherwise, assignable by the purchaser. A perusal of the Receipt-cum-Agreement relied upon by the Plaintiff also does not lead one to hold that the parties intended the Agreement to Sell to be a part and parcel of the earlier Agreement. Merely because the property, subject matter of the said Agreement was to come into existence in pursuance to the Collaboration agreement, would not make the Agreement to Sell a part and parcel of the Collaboration agreement. The counsel for the Defendant No. 5 has argued that on the date of the Agreement to Sell, the property subject matter thereof, was not even in existence and was to come into existence under the Collaboration agreement and thus, the Agreement to Sell should be deemed to be a change in allocation under the Collaboration agreement itself. I, however, do not find so. Under the law it is possible to enter into an Agreement to Sell with respect to a property, under construction. Under the Collaboration agreement, the Plaintiff was to acquire rights with respect to certain portions of the built-up property in consideration of incurring expense on the construction. There was to be no sale by the owners of the said portions of the property to the Plaintiff. The Collaboration agreement is an agreement of exchange. Upon the completion of reconstruction of the property, the owners were to be the owners of the land and the builder was to be the owner of the superstructure and the owners in exchange of a portion of the superstructure had agreed to create rights in a portion of the land in favour of the builder or its nominee. The position with respect to the built-up area of the owner's allocation was entirely different. The owners were the owner of the land as well as the superstructure thereof and for consideration had agreed to transfer the same to the Plaintiff or his nominee.

    11. The counsel for the Defendant has relied upon a notice dated 20th March, 1997 stated to be got issued by the Plaintiff/partner of the Plaintiff to the deceased Defendant No. 1 and the Defendant No. 5 and in which it is stated that they were to get prepared a combined agreement for the complete transaction including the transfer of the Rear Duplex Flat to the Plaintiff. The said notice has been given in reference to a MoU dated 14th December, 1996 stated to have been executed by the Plaintiff and the predecessor of the Defendants No. 2 to 4 and the Defendant No. 5. A perusal of the said MoU also shows that the parties have therein also treated the Collaboration agreement and the Agreement of sale of Rear Duplex Flat separately. The notice dated 20th March, 1997 definitely shows that according to the Plaintiff there was a proposal to have a composite agreement of collaboration and of sale of the Rear Duplex Flat but the fact remains that no such agreement was admittedly executed. The question of a composite agreement would arise only when the agreement for the two transactions i.e of collaboration and of sale were different. We do not know what may have been settled by the parties in the proposed composite agreement, whether the parties would have provided for arbitration therein or not. One can also take judicial notice of the fact that while Arbitration is generally the norm in Collaboration agreements which may entail technical disputes as to construction and its quality, the same is not the norm in Agreement of sale of immovable property.

    12. The Defendant No. 5 has in his application also not stated as to how the disputes and differences, if any, between the parties, subject matter of the present suit may be interlinked to the disputes and differences under the Collaboration agreement. It is significant that the present suit itself has remained pending for the last about 9 years and no claims under the Collaboration agreement are stated to have been made by either party till date.

    13. In the circumstances, I find the Agreement of sale, for specific performance of which the present suit has been filed, to be separate and distinct from the Collaboration agreement and I further find that there is no averment of the Defendant No. 5.Applicant that the adjudication of the present suit would, in any way, entail adjudication of any claims under the Collaboration agreement. Having found no arbitration agreement and having further found the application under Section 8 of the Act to have been filed after the Defendant No. 5.Applicant had filed his first statement on the substance of the dispute, I.A No. 2049/2007 is dismissed and in the circumstances aforesaid, with costs of Rs. 5,000/- payable by the Defendant No. 5 to Delhi Legal Services Authority.

    14. The Plaintiff has applied vide I.A No. 13200/2007 for striking of the defence of the Defendant No. 5. Undoubtedly, there is a long delay of 9 years in filing the written statement. The application under Section 8 of the Act itself owing to which the written statement is stated not to have been filed, was filed after 5 years of service of the Defendant No. 5. However, since the Defendant No. 5 was never put to terms, I deem it appropriate to, by way of last opportunity, give two weeks time to the Defendant No. 5 to file his written statement to the suit. This shall further be subject to payment of costs imposed on Defendant No. 5 while dismissing I.A No. 2049/2007. Upon the failure of the Defendant No. 5 to so file the written statement within two weeks, his right to file the written statement shall stand closed. I.A No. 13200/2007 is disposed of with these directions.

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    Kaiser Lands v. Ethel Robinson
    (Sep 26, 2008)