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Smart Summary

Judgment Summary — Sanjiv Khanna, J.

Factual and Procedural Background

The appellants, Express Towers Pvt. Ltd. and its Director Mr. R.C. Goel, sought a decree for specific performance against respondent nos. 1 and 2 (Mr. Mohan Singh and Smt. Jit Kaur) on the basis of admissions. The parties had executed an Agreement to Sell dated 21 May 1987 for property No. B-7/118, Safdarjung Enclave, New Delhi, for Rs. 23.50 lakhs, with Rs. 1 lakh paid in advance and the balance of Rs. 22.50 lakhs payable on execution of the sale deed by bank drafts; possession was to be given after encashment of drafts and execution.

The Income Tax Department (Appropriate Authority) issued an order dated 10 July 1987 exercising pre-emptive purchase under Chapter XX-C of the Income Tax Act, 1961. That order led to Writ Petition No. 2275/1987 by the appellants; interim directions kept possession with the Income Tax Department. During the writ proceedings the Income Tax Department paid Rs. 22.50 lakhs to respondents on 29 July 1992 and a later order (1 March 1993) directed the Department to reconsider its pre-emptive purchase decision in view of the Supreme Court decision in C.B. Gautam. The Department again issued an order for pre-emptive purchase on 5 November 1993, which prompted Writ Petition (Civil) No. 4357/1993 that succeeded in quashing the pre-emptive order by judgment dated 17 December 1997; that judgment was affirmed by the Supreme Court.

The appellants later filed Writ Petition (Civil) No. 5654/2001, disposed of on 12 December 2001 directing the appellants to deposit Rs. 22.50 lakhs with the Income Tax Department to obtain a no-objection certificate (Form 37-1) and possession; the Department's claim for interest from appellants was rejected. Respondents filed a review application RA No. 2299/2002 which was disposed of on 16 March 2002 with observations that any inter se disputes relating to the Agreement to Sell should be litigated in the appropriate forum.

In the principal civil suit for specific performance the appellants alleged that respondents executed three sale deeds in favour of third parties (defendants 3–5), which appellants claim are forged and void. Respondents denied executing those sale deeds, asserted their signatures were forged, and raised several defenses including that the Agreement had expired, that appellants had taken possession from the Income Tax Department without respondents' consent, and that respondents were abroad (U.S.A.) during key periods. Defendants 3–5 were proceeded against ex parte. The appellants applied under Order XII, Rule 6 read with Section 151 CPC for decree based on alleged admissions; that application was dismissed by the learned Single Judge on 22 August 2006, and the present appeal challenges that dismissal.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether a decree for specific performance can be granted under Order XII, Rule 6 of the Code of Civil Procedure on the basis of alleged admissions made by the respondents in their pleadings.
  2. Whether, in the specific factual matrix (including pre-emptive actions by the Income Tax Department, allegations of forged sale deeds, alleged change of possession and other contested facts), it is appropriate for the court to exercise its discretion to decree specific performance without a full trial and evidence.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellants' Arguments

  • The appellants sought a decree of specific performance based on admissions made by respondent nos. 1 and 2, invoking Order XII, Rule 6 CPC (i.e., to obtain judgment on admissions where pleadings admit essential facts).
  • The appellants alleged that three sale deeds executed in favour of defendants 3–5 were forged, fictitious, null and void, and could not prevent the appellants from obtaining title deeds and a decree of specific performance.
  • The appellants relied on the Agreement to Sell dated 21 May 1987 and asserted their entitlement to specific performance under its terms.

Respondent nos. 1 & 2 (Defendants') Arguments

  • The Agreement to Sell had already expired; therefore, the suit for specific performance is not maintainable.
  • The appellants had taken possession of the property from the Income Tax Department without involving or obtaining consent of the respondents, and the Income Tax Department was not competent to transfer possession to the appellants; ownership rights still vest with respondents.
  • Respondents denied executing the sale deeds in favour of defendants 3–5, asserting that those documents were forged (respondents alleged they were in the U.S.A. between 29 August 1987 and 10 September 1991 and could not have executed documents in Delhi in 1988).
  • There was substantial delay and irregularity in payment of consideration; respondents did not receive Rs. 22.50 lakhs from appellants but from the Income Tax Department.
  • Procedural irregularities were alleged — e.g., orders obtained by appellants without proper service — and respondents contended they were entitled to have those inter se issues adjudicated in an appropriate forum.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
C.B. Gautam v. Union of India (Supreme Court) (referred in Writ Petition No. 2275/1987) Used as the legal basis prompting reconsideration of the Income Tax Department's pre-emptive purchase order. The High Court's disposal of the writ petition on 1 March 1993 directed the Income Tax Department to reconsider its decision in view of this Supreme Court authority; the opinion records this procedural impact on the litigation history.
Jai Narain Parasrampuria v. Pushpa Devi Saraf, (2006) 7 SCC 756 Principle that conduct of both parties must be examined before awarding specific performance or compensation; courts may award compensation instead of specific performance where misconduct exists. The court relied on this authority to emphasize that conduct of the parties must be considered and that discretionary refusal of specific performance is appropriate in cases of misconduct; it supports the conclusion that a full trial is required to examine conduct and equities.
Nirmala Anand v. Advent Corporation (P) Limited, (2002) 8 SCC 146 Affirms that granting a decree for specific performance is discretionary and does not follow merely because it is lawful; the court must balance equities and consider factors like conduct, hardship and overall circumstances. The court cited this authority to reinforce that specific performance is discretionary and that many factors (including who defaulted, hardship, and changes during litigation) must be balanced before granting relief; used to justify requiring a trial rather than granting judgment on admissions.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court examined the Agreement to Sell and noted that it did not state that possession had been handed over to the appellants; possession was expressly to be handed over only after encashment of drafts and execution of a sale deed. The Agreement also provided for forfeiture of earnest money if the appellants failed to pay within 60 days after obtaining permission from the Income Tax Department.

The court reviewed the extensive procedural history involving the Income Tax Department's pre-emptive purchase orders, subsequent writ proceedings, payments made by the Department, and the final direction in 2001 that required appellants to deposit Rs. 22.50 lakhs to obtain a no-objection certificate and possession. The court noted respondents were not present when the 2001 order was passed, and that the review application observed inter se disputes should be agitated before the appropriate forum.

The court analyzed pleadings and evidentiary posture. It highlighted that respondents had denied executing the sale deeds in favour of defendants 3–5 and asserted forgery; the defendants 3–5 had been proceeded against ex parte. The Single Judge had not proceeded under Order VIII CPC to treat denials as admissions or entered judgment; instead the appellants were required to lead evidence on contested pleas.

Applying the standard under Order XII, Rule 6 CPC, the court explained that a decree may be passed on admissions only where admissions are clear and unambiguous and no other interpretation is possible. The court stressed that this provision is discretionary, not mandatory, and that independent corroboration may be required even where denials are not specific.

The court further applied Section 20 of the Specific Relief Act, which makes specific performance a discretionary remedy and enumerates circumstances where courts may appropriately refuse specific performance (including unfair advantage, unforeseen hardship to defendant, inequitable circumstances) and also recognizes cases where specific performance may be decreed when the plaintiff has done substantial acts or suffered losses. The court relied on Supreme Court authorities (including Jai Narain Parasrampuria and Nirmala Anand) emphasizing that conduct of parties and equitable considerations must be examined before granting specific performance or substituting compensation.

On the factual matrix—contentions of forgery, disputed possession, contested entitlement to consideration, the Income Tax Department's actions (including an auction in 1993), and the respondents' asserted absence abroad and alleged mis-service—the court concluded there exist disputed questions of fact and law requiring adjudication at trial. Given these disputes and the discretionary nature of both Order XII, Rule 6 CPC and Section 20 of the Specific Relief Act, the court held it would not be safe or correct to pass a decree on the basis of alleged admissions at this interlocutory stage.

Holding and Implications

DISMISSED.

Holding: The appeal from the order dismissing the application under Order XII, Rule 6 read with Section 151 CPC seeking decree of specific performance on the basis of admissions is dismissed. The court held that a decree should not be passed on the basis of alleged admissions because material issues of fact and law (including allegations of forged sale deeds, disputed possession, and the effects of Income Tax Department actions) require adjudication after a regular trial.

Implications:

  • The appellants are required to lead evidence and establish their case at trial; the suit remains to be decided on merits after full adjudication.
  • The respondents will have the opportunity for a fair trial on contested issues, including the genuineness of the sale deeds and questions about possession and payment.
  • The court explicitly clarified that the observations made are for the limited purpose of deciding the appeal against an Order XII, Rule 6 application; the final suit will be disposed of on merits without being influenced by these observations.
  • No costs were awarded. The opinion does not indicate that any new legal precedent was laid down; the decision applies existing discretionary principles under Order XII, Rule 6 CPC and Section 20 of the Specific Relief Act to the facts of the case.

Note: This summary is confined strictly to information contained in the provided opinion and does not add or infer facts beyond that text.

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    Express Towers P.Td & Anr v. Mohan Singh & Ors

    Sanjiv Khanna, J.— The appellants, Express Towers Pvt. Ltd. and its Director - Mr. R.C Goel, have filed the present Appeal against the Order dated 22nd August, 2006 dismissing their application under Order XII, Rule 6 read with Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (hereinafter referred to as the Code, for short) for passing a decree of specific performance on the basis of admissions made by Mr. Mohan Singh and Smt. Jit Kaur, the respondent nos. 1 and 2 herein.

    2. The appellants had entered into an “agreement to sell” dated 21st May, 1987 with the respondent nos. 1 and 2 for purchase of property No. B-7/118, Safdurjung Enclave, New Delhi for sale consideration of Rs. 23.50 lakhs. Rs. 1 lakh was paid in advance to the respondent nos. 1 and 2 out of the total sale consideration and the balance sum of Rs. 22.50 lakhs remained payable. The said amount was payable by bank drafts at the time of execution of the sale deed and possession was to be given to the appellants after full payment and encashment of the bank drafts.

    3. The Appropriate Authority-Income Tax Department by Order dated 10th July, 1987, decided to exercise its pre-emptive right to purchase the said property under Chapter XX-C of the Income Tax Act, 1961 (hereinafter referred to as the Act, for short). The Order passed by the Income Tax Department was made subject matter of Writ Petition No. 2275/1987 filed by the appellants. By an interim Order dated 26th August, 1987 it was directed that the possession of the property will be with the Income Tax Department and the same should not be disturbed. During the pendency of this Writ Petition, by an another interim Order dated 29th July, 1992, Rs. 22.50 lakhs was paid to the respondent nos. 1 and 2 by the Income Tax Department. The Court while passing the said Order noticed that Rs. 1 lakh was payable to the appellants herein and the said amount would be paid whenever the appellants appear in the said proceedings.

    4. Writ Petition No. 2275/1987 was disposed of vide Order dated 1st March, 1993 with a direction to the Income Tax Department to reconsider their decision for pre-emptive purchase of the property in view of the decision of the Supreme Court in C.B Gautam v. Union of India, JT 1992 (6) SC 678. In this Order, the Court noted the submission of the learned counsel for the respondent nos. 1 and 2 that they were entitled to interest in case of pre-emptive purchase.

    5. By Order dated 5th November, 1993, the Income Tax Department again reiterated its earlier order and passed an order for pre-emptive purchase of the property.

    6. Aggrieved, the appellants herein filed Writ Petition (Civil) No. 4357/1993 which was allowed vide Judgment dated 17th December, 1997. By the said Judgment, pre-emptive purchase Order dated 5th November, 1993 passed by the Appropriate Authority was quashed. The Judgment dated 17th December, 1997 was affirmed by the Supreme Court.

    7. The appellants herein thereafter filed another Writ Petition (Civil) No. 5654/2001 against the Income Tax Department. This Writ Petition was disposed of on 12th December, 2001 with the direction that the appellants herein will deposit Rs. 22.50 lakhs with the Income Tax Department and thereupon the said Department will issue ‘no objection certificate’ in Form No. 37-1 and thereupon possession of the property will be handed over by the said Department to the appellants herein. The claim of the Income Tax Department that interest on Rs. 22.50 lakhs should be paid by the appellants was rejected. It may be noted here that the respondent nos. 1 and 2 were not present in the Court when Judgment dated 12th December, 2001 was passed. The said respondents thereafter filed an application, RA No. 2299/2002, for review of the said judgment. The said application was disposed of vide Order dated 16th March, 2002 with the following observations:—

    “Even in the writ petition, the applicant herein had not sought to be impleaded as a party. It was never contended that the Agreement to Sell for one reason or the other has become unenforceable.

    This Court while passing the said Order dated 12.12.2001 was not concerned with any inter-se disputes between the parties. If the applicant has any grievance(s) against the writ petitioner in relation to the said agreement for sale, it can agitate the same before the appropriate forum.”

    8. We have examined the copy of the Agreement to Sell dated 21st May, 1987 between the appellants and the respondents. The said Agreement nowhere states that possession of the property has been handed over to the appellants. It is further provided in the said Agreement to Sell that possession of the property would be handed over after encashment of the draft paid towards total sale consideration on execution of the sale deed. The Agreement also records that the sale deed would be executed within 60 days after obtaining permission from the Income Tax Department and on failure of the appellants to pay the said amount, earnest money of Rs. 1 lakh paid by the appellants would be forfeited.

    9. It may be relevant to reproduce here some of the averments made in the plaint and the written statement. In paragraph 9 of the plaint, the appellants have stated that the respondent nos. 1 and 2 herein did not ask for possession of the property and the only request before the Writ Court was that they were entitled to interest on the delayed payment. The Court in its Order dated 1st March, 1993 allowed the respondents to raise this issue before the Appropriate Authority. In paragraph 20 onwards of the plaint, it is stated that the respondent nos. 1 and 2 herein have executed three separate sale deeds in favour of third persons who have been arrayed as defendants 3-5. It is alleged that the said sale deeds are forged and fictitious documents and part of a fraud played by the respondent nos. 1 and 2. It is further claimed that the same are null and void and unenforceable. Para 26 of the plaint reads as under:—

    “That the property grabbers like Defendants No. 3 to 5 would have got made some fraudulent and fictitious documents may be in collusion with the Defendants No. 1 & 2 and hence the Sale Deeds dated 30.9.1988, 18.9.2000 and 22.9.2000 are liable to be declared as null and void; illegal; not enforceable; not binding on Plaintiffs and are liable to be ignored and set-a-side. The aforesaid Sale Deeds are also invalid and illegal. If the defendants No. 1 and 2 have executed this Sale Deed dated 30.9.1988 than also they could not have dare and they had no authority to execute such Sale Deed and are barred by Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act and that is by the principle of lis pendens.

    The Sale Deeds dated 30.9.1988; 18.9.2000 and 22.9.2000 cannot prevent Plaintiffs from getting the Title Deeds executed from Defendants No. 1 and such Defendants as this Hon'ble Court deems fit and proper.”

    10. In the written statement, respondent Nos. 1 and 2 have stated as under:—

    “That the defendant No. 1 and 2 were in USA in the year 1988 and they could not had signed or executed any sale deed at Delhi in respect of their property No. B.7/118, Safdarjung Enclave Extension, New Delhi on 30.9.1988 If there is any such document, the same is nothing but has been prepared by some miscreants after forging signatures of the defendant No. 1 and 2. These persons need to be brought to book and proseucted for the crime they have committed to sell the property of the defendants No. 1 and 2 in their absence from India. This Hon'ble Court may like to order detailed and discrete enquiry into the whole episode so that the culprits should not go scold free.

    That in view of the facts as stated on behalf of Defendant No. 1 and 2, the suit for Specific Performance, Declaration, Perpetual and Mandatory Injunction and also in Aid of Specific Performance filed by the plaintiffs against the answering defendants is not maintainable as the agreement to seel made between the defendants and the plaintiffs has already expired and that there is no new agreement between the parties which now can be enforced. In fact the possession of the property in dispute which was taken over to the defendants No. 1 and 2 and not to the plaintiffs. Since the plaintiffs have taken over the property directly from the Income Tax Department, without involving the defendants, no suit for specific performance against the answering defendants lies.

    That the contents of para 4 of the suit are not denied. The Appropriate Authority of the Income Tax Department asked the Defendant No. 1 and 2 to hand over the property under the same terms and conditions of the agreement dated 21.5.1987 and the defendatns were compelled to hand over the vacant possession of the suit propety under pressure and dures on 20.8.1987 alongwith original documents such as sale deed, sanctioned plans, completion certificate of the building and other necessary documents. The Income Tax Department, however, did not pay the amount of consideration money of Rs. 23,50,000/- at that time. The defendants visited the Income Tax Office to collect the cheque for the promised consideration money on 21.8.1987, 22.8.1987 and 28.8.1987 but could fnot get the same. On 28.8.1987, the defendants were told that the plaintiffs M/s. Express Tower Pvt. Ltd. Had gone into litigation and the Hon'ble High Court had stoppd the payment. The defendants then left for USA on 29.8.1987 and came back to India only on 10.9.1991 Necesssary entries to this effect have been made of their departure from Delhi and arrived at USA are made in their passports (Passport No. L960044 on page 8 and 17 of Smt. Jeet Kaur and Passport No. M-165538 on pages 10 and 21 of Shri Mohan Singh). Copies of these passport are enclosed and marked as Annexure-D/1 Colly.”

    11. The respondent nos. 1 and 2 have not specifically disputed some facts in their written statement but have raised various pleas including the defence that the suit is not maintainable as Agreement to Sell between the parties has already expired and the appellants had taken possession of the property from the Income Tax Department without either involving or getting consent of the said respondents. It is further stated that the said respondents were residing in U.S.A and various orders were obtained by the appellants without proper service of notice on the respondents. It is pointed out that there was substantial delay in payment of the sale consideration even by the Income Tax Department and the respondent nos. 1 and 2 have not received Rs. 22.50 lakhs from the appellants but from the Income Tax Department. It is also stated that the Income Tax Department was not competent to transfer possession of the property to the appellants and the ownership rights still vests with the respondent nos. 1 and 2.

    12. It may be interesting to note here that the appellants have also made Mr. Bijender Kumar, Mr. Niranjan Vasishtha and Mr. Shafiqur Rehman, as parties to the said Suit and impleaded them as defendants Nos. 3, 4 and 5. It is alleged in the plaint that the respondent nos. 1 and 2 have sold the property to the said persons by executing three registered sale deeds on different dates and mutation has been carried out in the records of the MCD. Allegations of fraud have been made. The respondent nos. 1 and 2 have denied executing any document in favour of the said persons and it is stated that the respondent nos. 1 and 2 were in U.S.A during the period between 29th August, 1987 to 10th September, 1991. The appellants, on the other hand, claim that these documents have been executed by the respondent nos. 1 and 2. The said defendants have been proceeded ex-parte and evidence has to be led by the parties. It is also the case of the appellants that execution of the said documents does not prevent the appellants from getting decree of specific performance.

    13. It is well settled that pleadings including written statement have to be read as a whole to decide whether there is unequivocal and clear admission by a party. The respondent nos. 1 and 2 have denied executing any documents or sale deeds in favour of the defendant nos. 3-5 in the plaint. It is claimed that their signatures have been forged and the persons responsible must be brought to book and prosecuted. The defendants Nos. 3-5 have not appeared in the Suit and have been proceeded ex-parte. As noticed by the learned Single Judge, the Court has not proceeded under Order VIII and passed any decree. The appellants herein being the plaintiffs have been asked to lead evidence on the pleas and contentions raised. It is only after evidence is led and the respective claims and stands are adjudicated that it can be decided whether the alleged sale deeds are forged, fabricated and fictitious documents. The Court will also examine whether the appellants or the respondent nos. 1 and 2 were responsible for executing the said documents. Another contention raised by the respondent nos. 1 and 2 is that the Income Tax Department could not have handed over possession to the appellants. The Income Tax Department had taken possession of the property from the respondent nos. 1 and 2 and once the order passed under Chapter XX-C of the Act was set aside and status quo ante was restored, possession should have been handed over to the said respondents. Another plea taken by the said respondents is that the Agreement which was entered into between the appellants and the respondent nos. 1 and 2 has already expired and there is no agreement between the parties which can be enforced. What is the effect of orders being passed by the Income Tax Department under Chapter XX-C of the Act on the said Agreement; whether the said Agreement can still be enforced as per clauses of the Agreement and understanding between the parties, are all matters which require adjudication. Parties must be given full opportunity to plead their case and establish it by leading evidence. Their right to have a fair trial should not be curtailed and scuttled. It cannot be said that the respondent nos. 1 and 2 have made unequivocal and unambiguous admission of facts which entitles the appellants to a decree on the basis of admissions. The respondent nos. 1 and 2 have also made claim for interest which fact is admitted in the plaint itself.

    14. Under Order XII, Rule 6 of the Code, a decree can be passed or a suit can be dismissed when admissions are clear and unambiguous and no other interpretation is possible. The Court also is vested with a right to ask for independent corroboration of facts, even when denial in the pleadings is not specific. Right to pass a judgment or order under Order XII, Rule 6 of the Code is discretionary and not mandatory. It may not be safe and correct to pass a judgment under Order XII, Rule 6 of the Code when a case involves disputed questions of fact and law which require adjudication and decision. Even when a party has made an admission, the Court need not dismiss or allow the suit. Judgment on the basis of admissions is not a matter of right but a matter of discretion for the Court. Similarly relief of specific performance is a discretionary relief. The discretion, whether or not a decree for specific performance of an immovable property should be passed, is to be exercised or rejected by taking into account several factors and circumstances. Conduct of the parties is also to be examined. In this regard it may be stated that the appellants have taken possession of the property from the Income Tax Department and the respondent nos. 1 and 2 had not given possession of the property to the appellants. Section 20 of the Specific Relief Act reads as under:—

    20. Discretion as to decreeing specific performance.—(1) The jurisdiction to decree specific performance is discretionary, and the court is not bound to grant such relief merely because it is lawful to do so; but the discretion of the court is not arbitrary but sound and reasonable, guided by judicial principles and capable of correction by a court of appeal.

    (2) The following are cases in which the court may properly exercise discretion not to decree specific performance

    (a) where the terms of the contract or the conduct of the parties at the time of entering into the contract or the other circumstances under which the contract was entered into are such that the contract, though not voidable, gives the plaintiff an unfair advantage over the defendant; or

    (b) where the performance of the contract would involve some hardship on the defendant which he did not foresee, whereas its non-performance would involve no such hardship on the plaintiff;

    (c) where the defendant entered into the contract under circumstances which though not rendering the contract voidable, makes it inequitable to enforce specific performance.

    Explanation 1.—Mere inadequacy of consideration, or the mere fact that the contract is onerous to the defendant or improvident in its nature, shall not be deemed to constitute an unfair advantage within the meaning of clause (a) or hardship within the meaning of clause (b).

    Explanation 2.—The question whether the performance of a contract would involve hardship on the defendant within the meaning of clause (b) shall, except in cases where the hardship has resulted from any act of the plaintiff subsequent to the contract, be determined with reference to the circumstances existing at the time of the contract.

    (3) The court may properly exercise discretion to decree specific performance in any case where the plaintiff has done substantial acts or suffered losses in consequence of a contract capable of specific performance.

    (4) The court shall not refuse to any party specific performance of a contract merely on the ground that the contract is not enforceable at the instance of the other party.”

    15. The above Section was referred to by the Supreme Court in Jai Narain Parasrampuria v. Pushpa Devi Saraf, (2006) 7 SCC 756 and it was held that conduct of both the parties has to be examined before passing a decree for specific performace or awarding compensation. Reference was made to several Texts on equity and equitable remedies and circumstances/cases where damages can be awarded in substitution for an order of specific performance. The court also examined the question what should be the quantum and measure of compensation. In the said case, as the parties were guilty of serious misconduct and both of them had abused process of law by filing frivolous litigations and had suppressed material facts, the Supreme Court declined to grant decree of specific performance and directed that compensation should be paid. In the said decision, several earlier decisions of the Supreme Court have been referred to. In the case of Nirmala Anand v. Advent Corportion (P) Limited, (2002) 8 SCC 146, the Supreme Court affirmed the principle that grant of decree of specific performance lies in the discretion of the court and decree will not follow as it is legal to do so. Several facts have to be taken into consideration including conduct of the parties, facts and circumstances of the case, though ordinarily a plaintiff would not be denied relief of specific performance only on account of abnormal increase in prices during the pendency of litigation. However, equities have to be balanced and the question, who is defaulting party and whether any party is trying to take undue advantage over the other as also question of hardship has to be gone into and examined. Totality of circumstances have to be considered and in a given case phenomenal increase in prices during the pendency of litigation can be one of the considerations besides many others for refusing a decree of specific performance.

    16. It may be also noted here that the Income Tax Department had sold the property in an open auction held on 17th September, 1993 for a sum of Rs. 78.10 lakhs.

    17. In view of the facts and circumstances stated above and the defence raised by the respondent’ nos. 1 and 2, we do not think that in the present case a decree on the basis of admissions under Order XII, Rule 6 of the Code should be passed. Various issues and contentions are raised and involved. We feel the present case requires adjudication of contentions which should be decided after regular trial. The respondent nos. 1 and 2 will suffer injustice and denied fair trail in case the suit is decreed at this stage. Keeping in view the facts mentioned above, we feel that the appellants should be asked to prove and establish their case in trial by leading evidence.

    18. In view of the above, we do not find any merit in the present Appeal and the same is accordingly dismissed. It is clarified that the observations and findings recorded above are for the purpose of deciding the present appeal against an Order passed on an application under Order XII, Rule 6 of the Code. The suit will be decided and disposed of on merits without being influenced by any observations made above. No Costs.

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    Express Towers P.Td & Anr v. Mohan Singh & Ors
    (Sep 7, 2007)