Swatanter Kumar, J.:— The learned Additional District Judge, Delhi vide his common judgment dated 21.1.2004 dismissed all the six suits filed by the plaintiff for want of cause of action, thus, giving rise to the above six appeals. It is not necessary for us to refer to the facts of each of these cases as common questions of fact and law arise for consideration based on similar facts except the amounts claimed in the respective suits. It would suffice to refer to the facts of Suit No. 819/2001 out of which RFA No. 291/2004 has arisen. The plaintiff, a deaf and dumb person, filed a suit through his next friend for recovery of Rs. 4,83,852/- under the provisions of Order 37 of the Code of Civil Procedure. According to the appellant, he was inter alia engaged in the business of discounting of cheques in respect of freight or hire of lorries/trucks of the parties concerned on discounting charge basis. The defendant was engaged in the business of transportation of goods inter alia Ex-Bombay to Delhi, Bombay to Amritsar and other stations. As per the understanding between the parties, the discounting of cheques were being carried in the manner that cheques were issued by the respondent towards his liability of freight/hire of the goods so transported by them in favour of the trucks/lorries drivers/owners etc. The cheques so issued were only with the amount and date written on them. However, the area earmarked for the name on cheques (in favour of or pay to) used to be kept blank for the purposes of discounting of the cheques. Thereafter, the truck/lorry owners used to approach the appellants through his father and representative of the respondent and the name of the appellant Was filled in for encashing of the said cheques in favour of the appellant. The appellant in turn used to pay/give cash to the concerned truck owners or drivers, through his father and representative of the respondent, deducting discounting charges thereon from the amount of the cheques being the profit or margin for holding the said cheques of the appellant. After the above transaction used to take place, on the due dates of the cheques, the appellant used to deposit those cheques in his bank account for encashment of the same and get the credits in his bank account. The respondent inter alia issued 22 cheques, the details thereof were given in Annexure P1 to the plaint. 22 cheques were issued initially in the year 1996 and as the respondents were facing financial difficulties, the respondent requested the father of the appellant not to present the cheques for encashment in the bank. However, the period of limitation was expiring in the year 1999. The respondent instead of making the payment of the said cheques, offered to the plaintiff/appellant, through his father to revalidiate the said cheques with the current date but with the request not to deposit the same in his bank account for encashment.
The cheques were revalidiated and as per the understanding between the parties they were not presented for encashment. Despite number of oral requests, the respondents did not agree to presentation of the cheques, but at the same time failed and neglected to make the payment. This resulted in issuance of a legal notice dated 28.11.2001 by the appellant to the respondents. The appellant claimed a sum of Rs. 4,83,852/- along with interest @ 24% per annum till payment. Despite legal notice no payment was received and the appellant on the basis of the cheques filed the present suit under the provisions of Order 37 of the Code of Civil Procedure (for short ‘the Code’). It was specifically stated in the plaint that no part of ‘cause of action’ claimed in the plaint falls outside the ambit of the provisions of Order 37 of the Code.
2. Upon service, the respondents in the appeal filed an application for leave to defend under Order 37 Rule 3 (5) to contest the suit. In this application, it was stated that the appellant had not disclosed correct facts. It was stated that the suit was not maintainable under the provisions of Order 37 of the Code and no cause of action arises in favour of the appellant and against the respondent for recovery of the amount. It was further stated that there was no privity of contract between the parties and there was no reason for the respondents to issue blank cheques in favour of cargo vehicle owners. The appellants cannot carry on a banking activity and be permitted to circumvent the law without a licence issued by the appropriate authorities. These transactions are stated to be barred under Section 23 of the Indian Contract Act. The fact is admitted that the cheques in question were drawn in the year 1995 but the change of date on the cheques is not in the hands of any of the employees of the defendants, much less in the hands of the signatory of the cheques. The cheques were stale, time-barred and no cause of action arises in favour of the appellant. It is also stated that the cheques were also never presented for payments, either before or after revalidiation, as such the suit is not maintainable. The respondents also asked for the proof of consideration and the amounts claimed.
3. The application for leave to defend filed by the respondent was contested by the appellant, who filed a detailed reply. While denying all these averments it was stated that the appellant was holder of the cheque and was entitled to the monies prayed for.
3a. This application for leave to defend was accepted by the learned Trial Court stating that the respondent had substantial defence to raise issues like privity of contract between the parties, want of consideration and even the maintainability of the suit, as such the respondents were entitled to leave to defend. While granting leave to the respondent to contest the suit, the Trial Court dismissed the suit of the plaintiff while observing as under:—
“This issue is whether the plaintiff has no cause of action. Onus of proof of this issue is on the defendant. It is an admitted case of the plaintiff that the cheques in question have no been deposited with bank for encashment. They have not been dishonoured by the bank. In view of this admitted position of the case, I am of the considered view that plaintiff Has no cause of action in his favour. Accordingly, this issue No. 3 is decided against the plaintiff arid in favour of the defendant.
Hence, all the six suits are dismissed for want of cause of action. However, in the facts & circumstances of the case there is no order as to costs. Decree-sheet be prepared accordingly. File be consigned to Record Room.’’
4. Challenge to the above findings of the Trial Court is raised by the appellant in the present appeal on the ground that having granted unconditional leave to defend to the defendants in the suit and there being no application for rejection and/or dismissal of the suit under Order 7 Rule 11 of the Code, the Court had no jurisdiction to dismiss the suit of the appellant. Further, it is contended that before the suit could be dismissed for the reasons stated in the impugned judgment, the court was obliged to grant opportunity to the appellant to prove their case particularly when the averments made in the plaint would be deemed to be correct and in any case they were partially admitted by the respondents, even in their written statement. For rejection of a plaint or dismissal of a suit for non-disclosure of cause of action, the court has to take averments made in the plaint as correct. Thus, the trial court has fallen in error of law. In support of his submissions, he has relied upon a judgment of this court in the case of Suri and Suri Private Ltd. v. Ram Swarup Arora & Co. 24 (1983) Delhi Law Times (SN) 3.
5. The learned counsel appearing for the appellant, at the very outset stated that he is not questioning the correctness of the impugned order in so far as it grants leave to the respondents to defend the suit unconditionally. He is only challenging the later part of the order wherein the court has dismissed the suits for non-disclosure of cause of action.
6. Even otherwise, as per the averments male in the application for leave to defend, the view of the court in granting leave to the respondents to contest the suit hardly calls for arty interference. Though, the court in the impugned order has not made any reference to the provisions of Order 7 Rule 11 (A to D) of the Code, but a suit could be dismissed for non-disclosure of cause of action only if the plaint read in its entirety does not give rise to an actionable cause in law. For deciding such an objection, the averments made in the plaint are germane. They have to be considered without reference to the written statement. In fact, such an objection would normally be considered without even requiring the defendant in a suit to file a written statement. The cause of action has to be culled out on a conjoint reading of all the paragraphs of the plaint and in conjunction with the documents filed by the plaintiff (Saleem Bhai and Others v. State of Maharashtra and others AIR 2003 Supreme Court 759, Raptakos Brett & Co. Ltd. v. Ganesh Property AIR 1998 Supreme Court 3085 and Exphar SA and another v. Eupharma Laboratories Ltd. And mother AIR 2004 Supreme Court 1682 : 2004 (73) DRJ 663 : 2004 (28) FTC 251).
7. In view of these judgments of the Supreme Court, the court has to consider what would constitute the cause of action as per the averments made in the plaint. The ‘cause of action’ is a bundle of facts which is to be inferred from the plaint and documents filed by the plaintiff and the defence of the defendant is irrelevant at this stage of the proceedings. Even if the court is to frame a preliminary issue in that regard, the right of the plaintiff in a suit to lead evidence cannot be taken away, unless and until the plaint, taken to be correct on its face value, really leads to a conclusion that it discloses no cause of action. The observations of the Supreme Court and this Court in various cases in this regard were considered at some length by this Court in the case of Space Vision Impex Pvt. Ltd. v. J.S Overseas Pvt. Ltd., in Arb.P No. 66/2005 decided on September 08, 2005, where the Court while examining the above two concepts in light of the judgments of the Court held as under:—
“The onus to show that despite this presumption of prima facie correctness, still the petition is not maintainable, is upon the respondent-applicant. Reference can be made to a recent judgment of this Court in the case of Arunesh Punetha v. Boston Scientific Corporation {CS(OS) 951/2004} decided on 25th August, 2005, where the Court after considering the various judgments of the Supreme Court held, in relation to the above, as under:—
“The ambit and scope of Order VII Rule 11 has always been a subject of detailed discussion by the courts. Before the facts of the present case are stated, reference to the general principles of these provisions could usefully be referred. These principles were discussed in some elaboration by the Punjab & Haryana High Court in the case of ABN-AMRE Bank v. the Punjab Urban Planning and Development Authority 1999 (3) PLR 479, where the court held as under:—
“6. The first controversy that arises from the aforestated complex facts is whether the court is to look into the plaint alone for determining the merit of an application under Order 7 Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure or it has to examine the pleadings of the respective parties and the documents along therewith.
7. It is a settled rule of law that the plea of rejection of plaint is founded on the “PLEA OF DEMURRER”. A person raising such plea in law has to take the facts as stated by the opponent as correct. Despite tentative admission of such correctness, the plaint does not disclose a complete or even partial cause of action or the relief claimed is barred by law and thus, the plaint is liable to be rejected within the provisions of Order 7 Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Plain language of this rule shows that for determination of an application under this provision, the Court has to look into the plaint. This concept has been extended by judicial pronouncement of various courts so as to take within its ambit even the documents filed by the plaintiff alongwith plaint or subsequent thereto but prior to the hearing of such application. It would be more so where the documents have been referred to in the plaint itself. But the defence raised by the defendants in his written statement or the documents filed along therewith certainly falls beyond the zone of consideration, where an application for rejection of a plaint is being considered by the Court. The language of the rules does not admit any scope for doubt that the written statement filed by the defendant cannot be referred or relied upon by the applicants for decision of such application. Whether the plaint discloses any cause of action or not, is a question found on the basic cause of action pleaded by the plaintiff in his plaint. It must thus necessarily be construed that language of Rule 1 is circumscribed by the limitation or reading the plaint at best with its supporting documents. A Full Bench of this Court in the case of Harnath Singh v. Surjit Singh, AIR 1984 Punjab and Haryana 126, held as under:—
“It is well settled that a cause of action means every fact which, if traversed, would be necessary for the plaintiff to prove in order to support the right to a judgment in his favour. In other words; it is a bundle of facts which taken with this law applicable to him gives the plaintiff a right to relief against the tenant. Negatively it does not comprise the evidence necessary to prove the bundle of facts and equally has ho relation whatsoever to the defence, which may be set up by the defendant nor does it depend on the character of the relief prayed for by the plaintiff.”
8. The above view has been accepted by all the courts. Reference in this regard can be made to cases Mrs. Pramilla Khosla…Petitioner v. Captain Rajnish Kumar Khosla…, AIR 1979 Delhi 78, Bhagwan Das v. Goswami Brijesh Kumarji and others, AIR 1983 Rajasthan 3, Dosal Private Limited and another v. Narmada Seaways Limited and others, AIR 1989 Bombay 96 and (1986-2) 89 PLR 219. Thus, I have no hesitation in coming to the conclusion that this Court must look into the plaint and the documents filed on record and more particulary the documents; which have been referred in the plaint to determine the merits of the application filed by the defendant-applicant petitioner under Order 7 Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
3. The Supreme Court in a very recent judgment titled as Liverpool & London S.P & I. Association Ltd. v. M.V Sea Success I and another (2004) 9 SCC 512, discussed at great length not only the ambit and scope of these provisions but also commented upon certain vital issues in relation to maintainability and adjudication of an application under Order VII Rule 11 of the Code. This judgment in fact has been heavily relied upon by the learned counsel appearing for the non-applicant/plaintiff in support of his submissions. While describing the meaning of cause of action, the court held as under:—
“128. As by reason of an order passed under Order 7 Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the rights conferred upon the parties are determined one way or the other, stricto senso it would not be an interlocutory order but having regard to its traits and trappings would be a preliminary judgment.
129. It is true that in Shah Babulal Khimji (1981) 4 SCC 8 it it stated that an order rejecting the plaint would be appealable but it does not expressly state that an order refusing to reject would not be appealable. Therein this Court gave 15 instances where an order would be appealable which are only illustrative in nature.
130. Such observations have to be understood having regard to the concept of finality which is of three types:—
(1) a final judgment
(2) a preliminary judgment
(3) intermediary or interlocutory judgment.
131 In our opinion an order refusing to reject the plaint falls in the category of a preliminary judgment and is covered by the second category carved out by this court.
135. Yet again in Samar Singh v. Kedar Nath 1987 Supp SCC 563 it has been held:—(SCC p.665 para 4)
“In substance, the argument is that the court must proceed with the trial, record the evidence, and only after the trial of the election petition in concluded that the powers under the Code of Civil Procedure for dealing appropriately with the defective petition which does not disclose cause of action should be exercised. With respect to the learned counsel, it is an argument which it is difficult to comprehend. The whole purpose of conferment of such powers is to ensure that the litigation which is meaningless and bound to prove abortive should not be permitted to occupy the time of the court and exercise the mind of the respondent.”
Rejection of plaint
139. Whether a plaint discloses a cause of action or not is essentially a question of act. But whether it does or does not must be found out from reading the plaint itself. For the said purpose the averments made in the plaint in their entirety must be held to be correct. The test is as to whether if the averments made in the plaint are taken to be correct in their entirety, a decree would be passed.
Cause of action
140. A cause of action is a bundle of acts which are required to be pleaded and proved for the purpose of obtaining relief claimed in the suit, For the aforementioned purpose, the material facts are required to be stated but not the evidence except in certain cases where the pleading relies on any misrepresentation, fraud, breach of trust, wilful default or undue influence.
149. In D. Ramachahdran v. R.V Janakiraman (1999) 3 SCC 267 it has been held that the court cannot dissect the pleading into several parts and consider whether each one of them discloses a cause of action.
152. So long as the claim discloses some cause of action or raises some questions fit to be decided by a judge, the mere fact that the case is weak and not likely to succeed is no ground for striking it out. The purported failure of the pleadings to disclose a cause of action is distinct from the absence of full particulars. (See Mohan Rawale (1994) 2 SCC 392.)
155. The reason for the aforementioned conclusion is that if a legal question is raised by the defendant in the written statement, it does not mean that the same has to be decided only by way of an application under Order 7 Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure which may amount to prejudging the matter.”
8. Reference in this regard can also be made to a judgment of this Court in the case in IA NO. 7437/05 in CS(OS) NO. 2020/2003 titled as Golden Peacock Overseas Limited v. Ranjit Industries decided on September 29, 2005, where the court held as under:—
“I have already noticed that there are no specific averments made in the plaint which can be construed at least prima facie to support the fact that any transaction between the parties had been completed or even happened within the territorial jurisdiction of this court. Though the letter dated 2nd April, 2003 has been denied by the defendants and it is stated that it is a forged letter, but even thereafter the parties have been transacting business and supplying goods abroad, as is evident from the documents filed by the defendants on record, from April'03 to August'03. But even if for the purposes of argument this plea of the defendant is taken to be not correct, even then the letter would be of no help to the plaintiff. Parties can vest jurisdiction in a court only if the court otherwise has the jurisdiction. It is a settled principle of law that no jurisdiction can be vested in a court by consent of parties if the court otherwise has no jurisdiction. The averments in the plaint itself are clear that nothing happened so as to give rise to a substantial or integral cause of action to provide territorial jurisdiction to this court. The mere fact that the plaintiff has its registered office at New Delhi, would not clothe this Court with the territorial jurisdiction and the case of Raunaq Int. Ltd. (supra) in face of the judgments of the Supreme Court, which are subsequent in point of time and are binding on this court, cannot be stated to be a correct enunciation of law. With respect, I am unable to follow the view expressed in this case.
In the case of Oil & Natural Gas Commission v. Utpal Kumar Basu & Ors. JT 1994 (5) S.C 1, the Supreme Court held as under:—
“……Therefore, broadly speaking, NICCO claims that a part of the cause of action arose within the jurisdiction of the advertisement in Calcutta and made representations demanding justice from Calcutta on learning about the rejection of its offer. The advertisements itself mentioned that the tenders should be submitted at New Delhi and that a final decision whether or not to award the contract to the tenderer would be taken at New Delhi. Of course, the execution of the contract work was to be carried out at Hazira in Gujarat. Therefore, merely because it read the advertisement at Calcutta and submitted the offer from Calcutta and made representations from Calcutta would not, in our opinion, constitute facts forming an integral part of the cause of action. So also the mere fact that it sent fax messages from Calcutta and received a reply thereto at Calcutta would not constitute an integral part of the cause of action. Besides the fax message of January 15, 1993, cannot be constructed as conveying rejections of the offer as that fact occurred on January 27, 1993. We are, therefore, of the opinion that even if the averments in the writ petition are taken as true, it cannot be said that a part of the cause of action arose within the jurisdiction of the Calcutta High Court…..
The submission of the learned counsel for INCCO based on Section 21 of the Code of Civil Procedure that even if this Court comes to the conclusion that the High Court of Calcutta had no jurisdiction, this Court should, in the absence of proof of prejudice, refuse to interfere with the decision of the High Court unless it is otherwise found to be erroneous. While the spirit ??? Section 21 of the Code of Civil Procedure may support such a submission, we are afraid, the discretion cannot be used in favour of a party which deliberately invokes the jurisdiction of a Court which has no jurisdiction whatsoever for ulterior motives. That would only encourage such type of litigation. The object underlying the provisions in section 21 is not to encourage; such litigants but to avoid harassment to litigants who had bonafide and in good faith commenced proceedings in a court which is later found to be wanting in jurisdiction. In the instant ease, we are convinced, beyond doubt, that NICCO did not act bona fide in moving the Calcutta High Court and, therefore, the submission based on Section 21 must fail.”
Even in the case of Rajasthan High Court Advocates Association v. Union of India and others AIR 2001 Supreme Court 416, the Supreme Court held as under:—
“The expression ‘cause of action’ has acquired a judicially settled meaning. In the restricted sense cause of action means the circumstances forming the infraction of the right of the immediate occasion for the action. In the wider sense it means the necessary conditions for the maintenance of the right, but the infraction coupled with the right itself. Compendiously the expression means every fact which it would be necessary for the plaintiff to prove, if traversed, in order to support his right to the judgment of the Court. Every fact which is necessary to be proved, as distinguished from every piece of evidence which is necessary to prove each fact, comprises in ‘cause of action.’ It has to be let to be determined in each individual case as to where the cause of action arises.”
In the light of the above enunciated principles it is clear that merely because some incidental correspondence was sent to Delhi, which has no material or substantial bearing and integral cause of action in favour of the plaintiff, would not vest this court with the territorial jurisdiction to entertain and decide the present suit. The plaint of the plaintiff is silent in regard to all material and required averments. The letter dated 2nd April, 2003 besides being a matter of substantial controversy is inconsequential, for helping the court in determining such an issue. As no cause of action, much less a substantial or integral cause of action had arisen within the territorial jurisdiction of this court, the parties by consent cannot confer jurisdiction, as otherwise this court has no jurisdiction to entertain and decide the present suit. The attempt of the plaintiff to invoke the jurisdiction of this court apparently is a deliberate attempt to invoke the jurisdiction of the court where none was vested in the court. The provisions of Section 20 of the Code of Civil Procedure can be invoked where the defendant or defendants reside or carries on the business. The residence or carrying on of business by the plaintiff per se would not vest territorial jurisdiction in the court, as residence of the plaintiff could not be a determining factor in this regard. The Supreme Court in the case of New Moga Transport Co., through its Proprietor Krishanlal Jhanwar v. United India Insurance Co. Ltd. and Others (2004) 4 Supreme Court Cases 677, while rejecting such a plea raised by the plaintiff held as under:—
“By a long series of decisions it has been held that where two courts or more have jurisdiction under CPC to try a suit or proceedings, an agreement between the parties that the dispute between them shall be tried in any one of such courts is not contrary to public policy and in no way contravenes Section 28 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872. Therefore, if on the facts of a given case more than one court has jurisdiction, parties by their consent may limit the jurisdiction to one of the two courts. But by an agreement parties cannot confer jurisdiction on a court which otherwise does not have jurisdiction to deal with a matter.”
Still in another case titled as Patel Roadways Limited, Bombay v. Prasad Trading Company. (1991) 4 Supreme Court Cases 270, the Supreme Court while, commenting upon Section 20(a) Explanation held that where the defendant company has a principal office as well as a subordinate office at different places and the cause of action had arisen at the subordinate office, that Court alone will have the jurisdiction and not where the principal office of the defendant is situated.
In the case of Union of India v. Adani Exports Ltd. AIR 2002 Supreme Court 126, the Supreme Court while explaining the principle laid down by that Court in the case of Union of India & Ors. v. Oswal Woollen Mills Ltd. 1984 (2) Supreme Court Cases 646 explained the scope of territorial jurisdiction and held as under:—
“We are unable to accept this finding of the High Court. The view of the High Court that this Court in the case of Oswal Woollen (supra) had held that the existence of the registered office of a Company would ipso facto give a cause of action to the High Court within whose jurisdiction the registered office of such a Company is situated, is not correct. As a matter of fact, in the case of Oswal Woollen (supra), the question of territorial jurisdiction in the sense with which we are concerned now, did not arise at all. In that case, the observations of the Court were as follows:
“Having regard to the fact that the registered office of the Company is at Ludhiana and the principal respondents against whom the primary relief is sought are at New Delhi, one would have expected the writ petition to be filed either in the High Court of Punjab and Haryana or in the Delhi High Court. The writ petitioners, however, have chosen the Calcutta High Court as the forum perhaps because one of the interlocutory relief which is sought is in respect of a consignment of beef tallow which has arrived at the Calcutta Port. …We do not desire to probe further into the question whether the writ petition was filed by design or accident in the Calcutta High Court when the office of the Company is in the State of Punjab and all the principal respondents are in Delhi.”
It is in that context of noticing the motive of the parties concerned in that case in choosing a forum, the above observation as to the place of the registered office of the Company was incidentally made in the judgment. Having perused the judgment in Oswal's case (supra), we are of the opinion that judgment is no authority to decide as to the requirement of law in regard to establishing the territorial jurisdiction of a court. We must say in all fairness, Mr. Desai, learned senior counsel, has not placed any reliance on this judgment nor on the basis of the finding of the High Court in this case in regard to its territorial jurisdiction. He, however, contends that from the facts narrated in the civil applications, more so in Paragraph 16 of the application, it is crystal clear that a substantial part of the cause of action has arisen within the jurisdiction of the High Court of Ahamedabad.”
As is clear in this very case, while explaining the principle that registered office of a company within the territorial jurisdiction of the court would not ipso facto give a cause of action to that Court, the Court also reiterated the principle that the entire facts pleaded would determine the cause of action and not merely the happening of an inconsequential event that would determine the cause of action, and held as under:—
“In order to confer jurisdiction on a High Court to entertain a writ petition or a special civil application, the High Court must be satisfied from the entire facts pleaded in support of the cause of action that those facts do constitute a cause so as to empower the Court to decide a dispute which has, at least in-part, arisen within its jurisdiction. It is clear that each and every fact pleaded in the application does not ipso facto lead to the conclusion that those facts give rise to a cause of action within the Court's territorial jurisdiction unless those facts pleaded are such which have a nexus or relevance with the lis that is involved in the case. Facts which have no bearing with the lis or the dispute involved in the case, do not give rise to a cause of action so as to confer territorial jurisdiction on the Court concerned.”
Even in the case of ONGC (supra), the Court emphasized the importance of determining the territorial jurisdiction of a court relatable to all the events giving rise to the said cause of action, and in forming of such an opinion it was held that it should constitute of the facts forming an integral part of the cause of action and merely that of facts so received would not clothe the court with territorial jurisdiction. The above principle of law was noticed in one of the recent judgment of this court in the case of The Federation of Motorsports Clubs of India v. Motorsports Association of India & Anr., in CS(OS) No. 804/2002 decided on August 25, held as under:—
“It is a settled principle of law that for determination of an application under Order 7 Rule 10 and 11 of the CPC, the applicant has to take the facts as stated in the plaint, to be correct and then alone argue that the plaint is liable to be returned or rejected, keeping in mind the provisions of Order 7 Rule 10 and 11 of the CPC. The case as averred in the plaint, can be concisely stated that the plaintiff is the only recognised federation by the Government of India and is entitled to hold such sports and shows and for that reason, resultantly the suit of the defendant for injunction should be decreed. The only two defendants in the plaint are Motorsports Association of India, 41-42, Marine Lines, Liberty Building, Mumbai and Mr. Nazir Hoosein, who is stated to be the office bearer of that association, sued at the same address. The entire plaint does not state any facts as to how and what cause of action or part thereof has arisen and how, within the territorial jurisdiction of this court? In the lengthy plaint, running into 25 pages, there is no pleading much less proper pleadings which in law could be termed as a plaint disclosing a cause of action of the events which happened within the territorial jurisdiction of this Court. Obviously, cause of action has to be construed on the basis of the bundle of facts as averred in the plaint. The plaintiff is claiming a relief against the two defendants who as per the own showing of the plaintiff, are residents of Mumbai, and having their registered office at Mumbai and are carrying on their activities from that office. Union of India is not a party to the suit and in fact, no relief is claimed against Union of India. The learned counsel appearing for the plaintiff fairly stated that they have no claim against the Union of India and they do not intend to claim any relief as they are already a recognised body by the concerned Department of the Government of India.
In terms of the provisions of Section 16, 17 and 20 of the Code, a suit shall be instituted in the Court within the local limits of whose jurisdiction the property, subject matter of the suit, the defendant/defendants reside or where a cause of action wholly or in part arises within the jurisdiction of that court. The cause of action necessarily must constitute of certain facts which in law would give rise to an actionable wrong. No facts have been averred in the plaint as to what activities were being carried out in Delhi by defendant No. 1 which directly or indirectly infringed the rights of the plaintiff, so as to give rise to a ‘cause of action as known in law’. The learned counsel appearing for the plaintiff made a reference to the averments made in paragraph 42 of the plaint to the effect that “the suit raises inter alia issues relating to recognition by Government of India which are activities taking place in Delhi. Consequently, the cause of action arises entirely and/or at least a substantial part thereof, at New Delhi in as much as defendant No. 1 while exercising the authority as the purported ASN in India has in fact written letters pertaining to granting and cancellation of permits in respect of Motor Sports in Delhi and providing its expertise pertaining to Motor sports to persons situated in and operating from Delhi.
These averments are obviously incapable of conferring any territorial jurisdiction on this court, ex facie. If the statement of the plaintiff as argued, though not pleaded, that defendant No. 1 has its registered office at Mumbai and carrying on activities all over India, then the court has to see where the substantial cause of action has arisen, and not merely an incidental activity of the other party. It will be too far-fetched to argue that on such averments court all over India would get jurisdiction, particularly in absence of any specific averment relating to an act infringing the rights of the plaintiff. The plaint in this regard, is certainly vague, indefinite and on its cumulative reading, is incapable of giving any territorial jurisdiction to this court. Whether the plaintiff is the only association recognised by the Government of India, is a fact which can be proved or disproved by leading cogent evidence from the concerned Department of the Government of India. The Government of India, as already noticed, is not a party to the present suit and in any case would neither be a proper nor a necessary party, as no relief is being claimed against Government of India in the present suit, and rightly so, in view of the judgment of the Bombay High Court and pendency of the writ petition between the parties before this Court. Mere averments of certain facts in relation to exercise of power by another authority or a Department of the State by itself would not make that Department a necessary or a proper party to the suit.”
While applying the above well accepted cannons controlling the application of the provisions of Order 7 Rule 11, which are paramateria applicable to an application under Order 7 Rule 10, the arguments raised on behalf of the plaintiff that the registered office of the company alone or even read with letter dated 2nd April, 2003 would give complete territorial jurisdiction to this Court on the basis of the judgment of this Court in the case of Raunaq Int. Ltd. (supra) is without merit and cannot be accepted.”
9. Having discussed the aspect of law applicable to the present case, we may now revert back to the facts of the present case. The plaint of the plaintiff, if read in its entirety states that he was giving discounting facility, the cheques were issued by the respondents in the year 1995, having failed to clear the liability and the fact that the claim of the plaintiff may get barred by time, the cheques were revalidiated but with a specific request that they should not be presented. Having failed to recover the said amount, the suit for recovery under the provisions of Order 37 of the Code was filed. It is pertinent to note that in the legal notice dated 28.11.2001 served by the appellant upon the respondent, the appellant had mentioned all these facts and categorically stated as under:—
“As would be evident from the cheques the same were initially issued in the year 1995; As you were facing financial difficulties, you requested my son through me not to present the same. However, as the period of limitation was expiring in the year 1998, you instead of making the payment offered to revalidate the cheques with the current date but with a request not to deposit the same for encashment. Accordingly, the cheques were revalidated by you and acceding to your request the same were not deposited for encashment by my son.”
10. Similar averments like the above have specifically been made in the plaint with a greater detail. It is the pleaded case of the plaintiff that the cause of action has arisen because the amounts were not paid, nor consent was given by the respondent to present the cheques in the year 1998. The transaction as such and issuance of the cheques have not even been disputed by the defendants in the written statement or during the course of hearing. To say that, in face of these undisputed facts, the plaint read in its entirety does not disclose a cause of action, is not a correct finding of fact and law. In terms of the notice served and the contents of the plaint, the cheques were not to be presented till agreed by the defendants. But as the period of revalidation was expiring, the plaintiff was left with no alternative but to file the present suit after serving a notice in accordance with law. May be the suit of the plaintiff was not maintainable under the provisions of Order 37 of the Code for the reason that the cheques were not presented for encashment and for other reasons stated in the application for leave to defend, but that by itself would be no reason to dismiss the suit of the plaintiff for want of cause of action. The plaint read in conjunction with the notice and the cheques placed on record at least prima facie does establish that a complete cause of action has been disclosed by the plaintiff in his plaint and the plaint of the plaintiff could not be rejected and suit dismissed for non-disclosure of cause of action. Non-disclosure of cause of action must mean and understood that the plaint does not disclose ‘any cause of action’. For the reasons aforestated, we are of the considered view that the appeal of the appellant is liable to be partially accepted. Resultantly, the judgment and decree of the learned Trial Court is set aside to the extent wherein it dismisses the suit filed by the appellant for want of cause of action. The leave granted to the respondents to contest the suit unconditionally is affirmed. All the six appeals are disposed of in the above terms.
11. Parties are directed to appear before the learned Trial Court on 10.7.2006, when the Trial Court shall proceed with the suits in accordance with law.
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