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Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Attorney(S)
Judges
Acts
  • Order VII Rule 11(d) of the Code of Civil Procedure (in short CPC) and Section 114 of the Delhi Police Act
  • Sections 3, 4 and 5 of the Explosive Substances Act read with Section 120(b) of the Indian Penal Code
  • Section 197 of the Code as well as Section 64(3) of the K.P Act.
  • provisions of Section 64(3) of the Kerala Police Act
  • SECTION 140 DELHI POLICE ACT
  • Section 161(1) of the Bombay Police Act.11.
  • Section 64(b) of the Bombay Police Act.
  • Section 64(3) of Kerala Police Act
  • sub-section (2) of Section 140
  • Order VII Rule 11 of the CPC
  • sub-section (1) of Section 140
  • Section 64(3) of the K.P Act
  • Section 197(1) of the Code
  • Order VII Rule 11 CPC.
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Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Attorney(S)
Judges
Acts
  • Order VII Rule 11(d) of the Code of Civil Procedure (in short CPC) and Section 114 of the Delhi Police Act
  • Sections 3, 4 and 5 of the Explosive Substances Act read with Section 120(b) of the Indian Penal Code
  • Section 197 of the Code as well as Section 64(3) of the K.P Act.
  • provisions of Section 64(3) of the Kerala Police Act
  • SECTION 140 DELHI POLICE ACT
  • Section 161(1) of the Bombay Police Act.11.
  • Section 64(b) of the Bombay Police Act.
  • Section 64(3) of Kerala Police Act
  • sub-section (2) of Section 140
  • Order VII Rule 11 of the CPC
  • sub-section (1) of Section 140
  • Section 64(3) of the K.P Act
  • Section 197(1) of the Code
  • Order VII Rule 11 CPC.
Smart Summary

Structured Summary of the Opinion (A.K. Sikri, J.)

Factual and Procedural Background

The plaintiff, a non-resident Indian settled in England, filed a civil suit seeking damages of Rs. 1.50 crores with 12% p.a. interest for malicious prosecution. According to the plaint, the plaintiff arrived at Indira Gandhi International Airport from London on the night of 23/24 June 1999. He alleges that soon after leaving the airport he was intercepted by plain-clothed police, subjected to inhuman treatment, had his belongings searched, and was taken to Lodhi Colony Special Staff (where Defendants No. 3–7 were posted). The plaint alleges illegal detention beginning in the early morning of 24 June 1999, with a formal arrest recorded only on 29 June 1999, at which time charges under Sections 3, 4 and 5 of the Explosive Substances Act read with Section 120(b) IPC were shown, allegedly by planting RDX. The plaintiff was produced before the Magistrate on 30 June 1999, remanded, tried and ultimately acquitted by the trial court on 27 March 2002. The plaintiff remained in jail during the trial because no interim bail was granted.

Defendant No. 2 (Union of India) filed an application under Order VII Rule 11(d) CPC and Section 114 of the Delhi Police Act seeking rejection of the plaint. The defendant argued that Section 140 of the Delhi Police Act barred the suit as it was filed beyond the statutory outer limit (one year) applicable to suits against police officers, and that the limitation period began from the date of the alleged arrest (29 June 1999). The defendant also relied on the effect of pre-suit notice periods and certain local precedents to support the contention that the plaint should be rejected as barred by law.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the plaint is barred by Section 140 of the Delhi Police Act because it was instituted beyond the time-limits set out therein (three months without sanction; up to one year with prior sanction), so as to warrant rejection under Order VII Rule 11(d) CPC.
  2. Whether the alleged acts complained of in the plaint (illegal detention, inhuman treatment, planting of RDX, false arrest) fall within the expression "under the colour of duty or authority or in excess of any such duty or authority" so as to attract the bar in Section 140.

Arguments of the Parties

Defendant (Union of India) — Applicant

  • The defendant sought rejection of the plaint under Order VII Rule 11(d) CPC on the ground that Section 140 of the Delhi Police Act imposes a bar on suits/prosecutions against police officers if instituted more than three months after the act complained of, and (subject to prior sanction) not later than one year; thus the outer limit is one year.
  • The defendant contended the cause of action began with the arrest on 29 June 1999, so limitation began to run from that date and the suit filed on 26 May 2003 (after service of a notice dated 25 March 2003) was well beyond the one-year outer limit of Section 140.
  • The defendant relied on Section 140(2) (one month's notice) and the Supreme Court decision in Sri Amar Chand Inani v. Union of India to submit that pre-suit notice rules affect computation of limitation and that the plaintiff could at best obtain the benefit of one month. The defendant also submitted that Section 140 is a special provision governing suits against police officers and displaces ordinary CPC/limitation rules (relying on S.I. Manoj Pant v. State of Delhi).

Plaintiff / Non-Applicant

  • The plaintiff's counsel contended that Section 140 of the Delhi Police Act would not apply to the acts alleged because that provision covers only acts done "under the colour of duty or authority or in excess of any such duty or authority" and does not extend to acts that are outside the officer's authority and have no flavour of "colour of duty".
  • To support that distinction, the plaintiff relied on several authorities (K. Kalimuthu v. State by D.S.P.; Manoj Pant v. State; P.P. Unnikrishnan v. Puttiyottil Alikutty; State of Maharashtra v. Atma Ram) that interpret analogous protective bars and the limits of protection for police/public servants when the act is not in the discharge of official duty.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Sri Amar Chand Inani v. Union of India, (1973) 1 SCC 115 Relied upon for the proposition regarding pre-suit notice and computation of limitation (one month's notice under certain statutory provisions). Identified by the applicant as authority for computing limitation when a pre-suit notice period is statutorily prescribed; cited by defendant in support of limitation computation but not held decisive by the court for dismissal.
S.I. Manoj Pant v. State Of Delhi, 1999 (1) JCC (Del.) 1 : 1999 (48) DRJ 39 Interprets Section 140 of the Delhi Police Act (protective bar) — treated as a special provision governing suits against police officers. Recited by the parties; court considered the decision but distinguished the present allegations as falling outside acts done "under colour of duty".
Manoj Pant v. State, 1996 RLR 197 Interprets Section 140 of the Delhi Police Act and holds that taking bribe is not part of official duty and therefore Section 140 would not be attracted. Cited to support the proposition that Section 140 does not cover acts outside the discharge of official duty; court used the interpretive principle from this line of authority in concluding prima facie inapplicability.
K. Kalimuthu v. State by D.S.P, JT 2005 (11) SC 48 While dealing with Section 197 Cr.P.C., sets out the test that the act must fall within the scope and range of official duties to obtain protection; introduces the "safe and sure" test comparing the act to dereliction of official duty. The court summarized the test from this authority (quality of the act and its connection with official duty) and applied the same reasoning by analogy to the construction of Section 140 for deciding prima facie applicability.
P.P. Unnikrishnan & Anr. v. Puttiyottil Alikutty & Anr., 2000 (3) Crimes 209 SC Interpreted a provision pari materia with Section 140 (Section 64(3) of the Kerala Police Act) and discussed the narrower scope of that protective provision compared to Section 197 Cr.P.C. Cited to show that statutory bars similar to Section 140 have a restricted scope and do not protect acts that are outside the discharge of official duty; court relied on the comparative reasoning in assessing applicability.
State of Maharashtra v. Atma Ram and Ors., AIR 1966 SC 1786 Held that Section 64(b) of the Bombay Police Act did not protect police officers who beat a complainant because such acts could not be said to be committed "under the colour of their duty or authority". Referred to by the court as analogous authority supporting the view that violent or wrongful acts unconnected to lawful duty fall outside the protective bar; helped shape the court's prima facie conclusion on Section 140.
P. Arutswami v. State of Madras, AIR 1957 SC 776 Example used to illustrate that a police officer may have to use force in discharge of duty and that such force may be an offence requiring sanction; distinguishes between acts in discharge of duty and acts outside duty. Invoked in the discussion to clarify the contours of "colour of duty" and to illustrate that not all acts by a police officer in service fall within protective statutes.
Matakpg Dpneu v. H.C Bhari, 1955 (2) SCR 925 Summarised for the scope of Section 197(1) Cr.P.C. — the requirement of a reasonable connection between the act and discharge of official duty. Cited in the comparative analysis of protective statutory bars to show the necessary connection between act and official duty; used to reinforce the interpretive standard applied to Section 140.
Gill's case, 1948 Law Reports 75 Historical authority referenced in the context of judicial approaches to protection of public servants; cited in the line of authorities about Section 197 scope. Referred to as part of the jurisprudential background on protection of public servants; informed the court's understanding of the threshold for statutory protection.
Pukhraj v. State of Rajasthan & Anr., 1974 (1) SCR 559 Authority which held that a superior officer who assaulted his subordinate for defying orders could not be said to have acted in the course of performance of his duty. Used to illustrate that certain violent or abusive acts by police/supervisors fall outside official duty and therefore outside statutory protective shields; assisted the court's prima facie finding.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court's analysis proceeded from the pleadings in the plaint and focused on the narrow threshold for rejection of a plaint under Order VII Rule 11(d) CPC — namely, whether the plaint is barred by law on its face. The defendant's primary contention was that Section 140 of the Delhi Police Act operates as a time bar for suits or prosecutions against police officers and that on the dates pleaded the suit was filed well beyond the statutory outer limit of one year.

The court examined the language of Section 140 and the line of authorities relied upon by the parties. It distilled from the cited authorities (notably K. Kalimuthu, Manoj Pant, P.P. Unnikrishnan and State of Maharashtra v. Atma Ram) the legal test that statutory protection or bars of this character apply only when the act complained of is done "under the colour of duty or authority or in excess of any such duty or authority." The court emphasized the qualitative enquiry: it is the nature and quality of the act and its nexus with the official duty that matters, not merely that the accused was a police officer.

Applying that test to the averments in the plaint, the court noted the following pleaded facts: (a) alleged illegal detention from early morning of 24 June 1999 with no arrest shown until 29 June 1999, (b) inhuman treatment during detention, (c) planting of RDX and foisting of charges, and (d) a false case shown to have been registered on 29 June 1999. The court concluded that these allegations, if taken at face value for the limited purpose of an Order VII Rule 11(d) application, prima facie describe acts that are outside the colour of official duty.

The court also referred to the trial court's observations in the acquittal judgment of 27 March 2002 (quoted in the instant opinion), which highlighted documentary inconsistencies in the prosecution's case and the failure to produce public witnesses — observations which the court treated as supportive of a prima facie conclusion that the allegations in the plaint described acts outside the scope of lawful official duties.

On that basis — and recognizing that an Order VII Rule 11(d) application requires a threshold showing that the plaint is barred by law on its face — the court held that the defendant had not established, at this preliminary stage, that Section 140 applied to bar the suit. The protective text of Section 140 was, therefore, not attracted prima facie by the pleaded facts.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The application filed by Defendant No. 2 under Order VII Rule 11(d) CPC and Section 114 of the Delhi Police Act for rejection of the plaint is dismissed.

Implications:

  • The direct effect of the decision is that the plaint is not rejected at the preliminary stage on the ground that it is barred by Section 140 of the Delhi Police Act; accordingly, the suit is not dismissed on that ground and can proceed in accordance with law.
  • The court's conclusion is expressed as a prima facie view based on the pleadings; the opinion does not purport to decide the ultimate merits of the allegations (such as whether the alleged acts actually occurred or whether they were done outside the colour of duty) beyond the threshold inquiry required for an Order VII Rule 11(d) application.
  • No new general precedent altering the law on Section 140 or statutory protection of police officers is laid down; the court applied existing doctrine and authorities to the facts pleaded and found that the bar did not, on the face of the plaint, apply.

    Balbir Singh v. Government Of Nct Of Delhi

    A.K Sikri, J. (Oral):— Defendant No. 2 has filed this application under Order VII Rule 11(d) of the Code of Civil Procedure (in short ‘CPC’) and Section 114 of the Delhi Police Act for rejection of the plaint. Before setting up the grounds on which the applicant wants plaint to be rejected under the aforesaid provisions, it would be necessary to take note of the averments made in the plaint on the basis of which, claimed raised therein is founded.

    2. The plaintiff is a non-resident Indian settled in England since 1974. He has filed this suit for compensation/recovery of damages to the tune of Rs. 1.50 crores with interest @ 12% per annum for his malicious prosecution. It is alleged that the plaintiff boarded the flight of Lufthansa Airlines from Heathrow Airport, London on 23rd June 1999 for New Delhi. At that time he was working/employed with the British Railways, i.e Thames Trains, London, UK. After boarding the said flight, he landed at Indira Gandhi International Airport in the intervening night of 23rd/24th June 1999. On his arrival, his relative from Punjab, namely, Sukhmander Singh came to receive him at the airport. He was to go back to London on 3rd July 1999 and for this he was carrying return ticket from Delhi to London. When he came out and hired a taxi for going to Chandini Chowk Gurudwara for darshan, the time was 1.45 a.m The taxi was intercepted by the police officials in plain clothes at the exit of the airport itself by putting a barricade. He was dealt with inhumanly and his belonging were searched. The police personnel took him away to Lodhi Colony Special Staff where defendants No. 3 to 7 were posted. None of his family members were informed. No arrest was shown either. When he did not reach home, his relations got worried and reported the matter to various authorities. After keeping him in illegal detention from early morning of 24th June 1999, ultimately case was registered against him on 29th June 1999 when formal arrest was shown under Sections 3, 4 and 5 of the Explosive Substances Act read with Section 120(b) of the Indian Penal Code by planting RDX upon the plaintiff and his relations. He was produced before the Magistrate, Tis Hazari Court, Delhi, on 30th June 1999 and was remanded to custody charges were framed and he was put to trial. Ultimately he was acquitted by the trial court vide judgment dated 27th March 2002. Since no interim bail was granted to the plaintiff, he remained in jail during this period of trial. On the basis of these averments, brief note whereof is taken, he states that the prosecution launched against him was malicious and, therefore, he has prayed for damages for Rs. 1.50 crores with interest as aforesaid.

    3. Defendant No. 2, i.e Union of India wants rejection of this plaint under Order VII Rule 11 CPC. In the application filed in this behalf the provisions of Section 140 of the Delhi Police Act are pressed into service. Section 140 of the Delhi Police Act reads as under:—

    “Bar to suits and prosecution:—(I) In any case of alleged offence by a police officer or other persons, or of a wrong alleged to have been done by such police officer or other person, by any act done under colour of duty or authority or in excess of any such duty or authority, or wherein it shall appear to the court that the offence or wrong if committed or done was of the character aforesaid, the prosecution or suit shall not be entertained and if entertained shall be dismissed if it is instituted, more than three months after the date of the act complained of.

    Provided that any such prosecution against a police officer or other person may be entertained by the court, if instituted with the previous sanction of the Administrator, within one year from the date of the offence…..”

    4. Submission is that suit or prosecution could be filed, as per sub-section (1) of Section 140 within three months from the date of the act complained of. As per proviso to sub-section (1), beyond three months and within one year from the date of the offence allegedly committed by the police officer, suit could be instituted with previous sanction of the Administrator. Thus, outer limit is one year. In the present case, it is contended, the suit is filed well beyond one year and, therefore, the bar contained in Section 140 shall apply. To buttress this submission that suit is filed beyond one year, the applicant submits that period of limitation would start from 29th June 1999 when the plaintiff was arrested as it is that act of arrest which is complained of and sub-section (1) prescribes period of three months after “date of act complained of”. It is also pointed out that before filing the suit legal notice under section 80 of the cpc was sent to the defendant on 25th March 2003 and the suit filed on 26th May 2003. It is submitted that sub-section (2) of Section 140 prescribes one month's notice to be given before filing such a suit and the plaintiff could get benefit of month only, for computation of limitation period for having served the said notice as per the law laid down by the Supreme Court in the case of Sri Amar Chand Inani v. Union of India, (1973) 1 SCC 115. It is also submitted that Section 140 of the Delhi Police Act is a special provision and any suit filed by any person against a police officer is to be governed by these provisions and not the Code of Civil Procedure or the limitation prescribed therein. In support of this proposition reliance is placed on the judgment of this Court in S.I Manoj Pant v. State Of Delhi., 1999 (1) JCC (Del.) 1 : 1999 (48) DRJ 39.

    5. Learned counsel for the plaintiff/non-applicant, on the other hand, submits that provisions of Section 140 of the Delhi Police Act would not be applicable in the instant case. His submission is that only those acts which are done by the police officer under “the colour of duty or authority or in excess of any such duty or authority” would be covered by the said provision and not the acts which are outside the authority and which have no flavour of “colour of duty”. In support he has relied upon following judgments:—

    (1) K. Kalimuthu v. State by D.S.P, JT 2005 (11) SC 48.

    (2) Manoj Pant v. State, 1996 RLR 197.

    (3) P.P Unnikrishnan & Anr. v. Puttiyottil Alikutty & Anr., 2000 (3) Crimes 209 SC.

    (4) State of Maharashtra v. Atma Ram and Ors., AIR 1966 SC 1786

    6. In K. Kalimuthu v. State by D.S.P (supra), while interpreting section 197 of the cpc which grants a protection to public servants against the institution of vexatious criminal proceedings for offences alleged to have been committed by them while they are acting or purporting to act as public servant, held that before Section 197 can be invoked, it must be shown that the official concerned was accused of an offence alleged to have been committed by him while acting or purporting to act in discharge of his official duties. It further observed that it is the duty which requires examination so much as the act, because the official act can be performed both in the discharge of the official duty as well as in dereliction of it. The act must fall within the scope and range of the official duties of the public servant concerned. It is the quality of the act which is important and the protection of this section is available if the act falls within the scope and range of his official duty. The test to be applied to determine whether the act falls within the scope and range of the official duty is stated by the Court in the following manner:—

    “Safe and sure test in this regard would be to consider if the omission or neglect on the part of the public servant to commit the act complained of could have made him answerable for a charge of dereliction of his official duty. If the answer to his question is in the affirmative, it may be said that such act was committed by the public servant while acting in the discharge of his official duty and there was every connection with the act complained of and the official duty of the public servant.”

    7. The Court also clarified that the use of expression “official duty” implies that the act or omission must have been done by the public in the course of his service and that it should have been in discharge of his duty. The Section does not extend its protective cover to every act or omission done by a public servant in service but restricts its scope of operation to only those acts or omissions which are done by a public servant in the discharge of official duty. Once it is established that act or omission was done by the public servant while discharging his duty then the scope of its being official should be construed so as to advance the objective of this Section in favour of public servant. Otherwise the entire purpose of affording protection to a public servant without sanction shall stand frustrated. The allegation in that case against police officer was that he had taken bribe. The Court opined that such an act would not come under the protective umbrella of Section 197 of the Cr.P.C

    8. In Manoj Pant v. State 1996 RLR 197 decided by this Court, the Court was concerned with interpretation of Section 140 of the Delhi Police Act itself, the provision with which we are dealing in the present case. That was also a case of taking bribe by the police officer while performing his official duties and the Court concluded that taking of bribe is not part of official duty and, therefore, provisions of section 140 would not be attracted. The relevant discussion is found in para-11 of the judgment, which reads as under:—

    “11. One thing is certain and it is that in order to come under the protective umbrella of Section 140 of the Delhi Police Act the act must have been done under colour of duty or authority or in excess of any such duty or authority. In other words, the Section does not extend its protective cover to every act or omission done by a police officer in service but restricts its scope of operation to only those acts or omission which are done under colour of duty or authority or in excess of any such duty or authority. For instance, and I am borrowing is from P. Arutswami v. State of Madras AIR 1957 SC 776, a police officer in discharge of his duty may have to use force which may be an offence for the prosecution of which sanction may be necessary. But if the same officer commits an act in course of service but not in discharge of his duty then the bar is not attracted.”

    9. In other two cases also, cited by the learned counsel for the plaintiff, similar provisions as contained in Section 140 of the Delhi Police Act, came up for consideration. P.P Unnikrishnan v. Puttiyottil Alikutty (supra) was a case under Section 64(3) of Kerala Police Act which is pari-materia with Section 140 of the Delhi Police Act. The Court opined that the said provision contains words which are analogous to words employed in Section 171 of the Cr.P.C That was a case where complainant had complained of physical assault and locking up in police station for more than 24 hours and the provisions of Section 64(3) of the Kerala Police Act were pressed into service to dislodge the claim of the complainant. Negativing the contention of the police officials, it was held as under:—

    “14. The commission of an offence, while acting or purporting to act in the discharge of his official duty is of a wider radius when compared with an offence committed on account of an act done in pursuance of any duty or authority. In the latter, the act done itself should be an exercise in discharge of his duty or authority and that act should amount to an offence. It is not enough that the act complained of was only purported to be in exercise of his duty though it may be sufficient under the former. So the scope under Section 64(3) of the K.P Act is much narrower than the amplitude of Section 197(1) of the Code for a public servant to claim prosecution.

    15. Even under section 197 of the code no protection has been granted to public servants for the type of acts alleged in the case against the appellants. Decisions are a legion relating to the scope of the protection under Section 197(1) of the Code. In Matakpg Dpneu v. H.C Bhari, 1955 (2) SCR 925 this Court made a slight deviation from the vie adopted by the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in Gill's case, 1948 Law Reports 75. This Court after referring to earlier decisions summed up the scope of Section 197(1) of the Code thus:

    “There must be a reasonable connection between the act and the discharge of official duty; the act must bear such relation to the duty that the accused could lay a reasonable, but not a pretended or fanciful claim, that he did in the course of performance of his duty”

    While following the said decision this Court has found, one a subsequent occasion that a superior officer who assaulted his subordinate for defying his orders could not be said to have acted in the course of performance of his duty, (vide Pukhraj v. State of Rajasthan & Anr., 1974 (1) SCR 559).

    16. If a police officer dealing with law and order duty uses force against unruly persons, either in his own defence or in defence of others and exceeds such right it may amount to an offence. But such offence might fall within the amplitude of Section 197 of the Code as well as Section 64(3) of the K.P Act. But if a police officer assaults a prisoner inside a lock-up he cannot claim such act to be connected with the discharge of his authority or exercise of his duty unless he establishes that he did such acts in his defence or in defence of others or any property. Similarly, if a police officer wrongfully confines a person in the lock-up beyond a period of 24 hours without the sanction of a magistrate or an order of a court it would be an offence for which he cannot claim any protection in the normal course, nor can he claim that such act was done in exercise of his official duty. A policeman keeping a person in the lock-up for more than 24 hours without authority is not merely abusing his duty but his act would be quite outside the contours of his duty or authority.”

    10. In State of Maharashtra v. Atma Ram and Ors. (supra), the Apex Court was concerned with similar provision, namely, Section 64(b) of the Bombay Police Act. The act complained of in that case was also beating of the complainant by the police officer and the Court was again of the opinion that the protection of Section 64(b) of the Bombay Police Act would not be available for committing such an act as the act complained of could not be treated as the one committed “under the colour of their duty or authority”. It was held that there was no connection between the acts complained of and the office of the respondents and the duties and obligations imposed on them by law. Such acts would fall outside the scope of duties of the police officers as they are not entitled, therefore, to the mantle of protection conferred by Section 161(1) of the Bombay Police Act.

    11. Applying the aforesaid test in the present case, I am of the view that, prima facie, provisions of Section 140 of the Delhi Police Act would not be applicable if one has to take into consideration the allegations made in the plaint. Present application, it may be borne in mind, is one under Order VII Rule 11 of the CPC and the applicant wants rejection of the plaint as barred by law. I have already narrated the acts complained of. To briefly put again, allegations are that the plaintiff was illegally detained in the wee hours of 24th June 1999; that no arrest was shown till 29th June 1999 and he remained under illegal confinement; this period he was treated in an inhuman manner; that when relatives of the plaintiff complained to the authorities about disappearance of the plaintiff and his relatives, a false case was registered showing his arrest on 29th June 1999 from ISBT and foisting false charges under the Explosive Substances Act by planting RDX. These acts as complained of, if proved, by no stretch of imagination would be acts under the colour of duty if one has to apply the test laid down in the aforesaid judgments. At this stage, I would be apposite to refer to the following observations of the learned Addl. Sessions Judge in his judgment dated 27th March 2002 while acquitting the plaintiff:—

    “There can be no doubt that these telegrams were issued much prior to 7:25 P.M the alleged time when the accused Balbir Singh and accused Sukhmander Singh @ Sukhi @ Mander, were allegedly apprehended at the Inter Bus Terminal, Kashmere Gate. ACP Rajbir Singh, who is named in these telegrams has been referred to by PW-13 Inspr. Karam Chand in his testimony when he deposed that on 28.6.99, ACP Rajbir Singh of Operation Cell was having a secret information that two Sikhs who were activists of Babbar Khalsa International, were coming from Delhi by bus from Punjab and would be in possession of explosive material for committing “some big incident” in Delhi. It is also deposed by Sh. Karam Chand (PW-13) that ACP Rajbir Singh deputed him to develop this information on 28.6.99 when he alongwith SI Anil Kumar (PW-14) went to Inter State Bus Terminal, Kashmere Gate and kept a watch on buses coming from Punjab, meaning thereby that by 2.33 and 2.37 PM on 29.6.99, according to PW-13, Balbir Singh and accused Sukhmander Singh @ Sukhi @ Mander were yet to come from Punjab whereas the documents Ex. DW-5/1 and DW-5/2 clearly show that they were already detained by ACP Rajbir Singh against whom it was alleged that he was torturing and might involve them in some false and frivolous case. This apprehension proved true by the present case having been foisted upon the two accused, namely, Balbir Singh and accused Sukhmander Singh @ Sukhi @ Mander. It is well recognised maxim that man may tell lie but the record cannot. The accused persons by producing Ex. DW-5/1 and Ex. DW-5/2 have atleast succeeded in establishing their defence as probable and plausible. Failure of the prosecution in producing not even a single public witness in support of their case, especially when admittedly public persons were available atleast at the spot and efforts could have been made to join them to witness the recovery, creates a doubt in the mind of the court about the veracity of the prosecution story, had there been any grain of truth in their story. Prosecution story stands falsified by the Defence Evidence produced by the accused as briefly discussed above.” 12. Therefore, I do not find any merit in this application, which hereby dismissed.

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    Balbir Singh v. Government Of Nct Of Delhi
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