1. The plaintiff herein is the mother of the
defendant no.1. The defendant no.2 is the wife and the
defendants 3 and 4 are children of the defendant no.1.
This Suit is filed by the plaintiff for permanent and
mandatory injunction and consequential relief under
Section 6 of the Special Relief Act. It is the
allegation of the plaintiff that she is the owner of
the Suit premises namely, B-8, Anand Niketan, New Delhi
(hereinafter referred to as Suit property, for short)
which is a 2-1/2 storeyed house and that the
defendant-1 have usurped and possessed the first floor
of the Suit property. Prayer made in the Suit which is
filed under Section 6 of the Specific Relief Act as
mentioned above, is for passing a decree of mandatory
injunction, removing/evicting the defendants from the
Suit premises and restoring the vacant possession
thereof to the plaintiff. The decree for permanent
injunction is also prayed for restraining the
defendants, their servants, agents, employees, etc.
from interfering with the possession of the property in
the ground floor and second floor of the said house.
2. IA.268/2001 is filed by the plaintiff seeking
ad interim relief to the effect that the plaintiff be
permitted to repair/rectify the leakage and water
seepage coming from the bathroom of the first floor of
the Suit premises with the assistance of labour
forthwith and the defendants be restrained from
creating any obstruction/hindrance from carrying out
these repairs.
3. IA.4970/2000 is an application under Order
XXXIX Rules 1 and 2 read with Section 151 of the Code
of Civil Procedure (hereinafter referred to as CPC, for
short) praying as under:-
a. That the defendants be directed to vacate
the first floor premises the suit premises
of the suit property - B-8, Anand Niketan,
New Delhi, forthwith;
b. Pass an ad interim exparte temporary
injunction restrain the defendants their
agents, servants, employees, assignees or
their family members or anyone else acting
on their behalf from entering and/or
interfering with the peaceful use and
possession of the plaintiff in the suit
property - B-8, Anand Niketan, New Delhi;
c. For constructing/alteration/renovation/
white washing/ the first floor of the B-8,
Anand Niketan, New Delhi.
d. Restrain the defendants/agent/etc to part
with possession to any third party.
e. Pass such order/orders that this Hon'ble
Court may deem fit and proper in the facts
and circumstances of the case.
4. IA.4971/2000 is an application under Order
XLIII Rule 1 read with Section 151, CPC for appointment
of Receiver. All these IAs were heard together and I
propose to dispose them by this common Order.
5. Before proceeding to deal with these
applications, it would be appropriate to notice some
more facts. As already mentioned above, the plaintiff
claims herself to be the exclusive owner of the entire
Suit premises and also claims that the superstructure
was erected thereon by her own funds. She states that
for this purpose she had raised loans. She was working
as Manager in United Bank of India. It is also alleged
in the plaint that the defendants 1-4 were living
separately from the plaintiff at 8740, Block-XI, Vasant
Kunj, New Delhi. Apart from the defendants the
plaintiff has two more children. One is the younger
son who lives in Munirka, New Delhi and is an officer
in a Bank. The third child is her daughter who lives
in U.S.A. The plaintiff frequently goes to U.S.A. and
spends six months in a year with her daughter. When
she comes back to India she stays at a flat in Gurgaon
which belongs to her daughter. Incidentally the
defendant no.1 is also working in United Bank of India
where the plaintiff served.
6. The entire Suit premises were let out to
Embassy of Zimbabwe since 1989 and the plaintiff was
appropriating the entire rent as exclusive owner of the
Suit property. The Embassy ultimately vacated the Suit
premises on 15th April, 2000 but kept the possession
till 17th April, 2000. The plaintiff went to the Suit
premises to take possession thereof on 17th April,
2000. On reaching there, she found that the defendants
had reached the site at about 3.00 p.m., the time fixed
by the Embassy for handing over of the keys of the
premises. The keys of the entire house of all the
floors were kept on the table. The plaintiff asked the
defendant no.1 to climb up and inspect the rooms of the
first floor/ground floor and the second floor as she is
unable to claim due to her age. The keys were given to
the defendant no.1 for this purpose. The defendant
no.1 took all the keys of the house and went to the
floors to inspect and sort out the keys and came after
a little while and left the keys on the said table.
The plaintiff failed to realize that the defendant no.1
surreptitiously removed the keys to the first floor of
the house from the said bunch of keys given by the
Embassy of Zimbabwe. The defendant no.1 left in the
evening. The plaintiff had decided to stay in the
house for renovating the house which need repairs
before the said premises could be let out to some other
embassies as tenants. The plaintiff stayed at the
house alone for this purpose. The plaintiff was
resting in the ground floor at night. To her utter
surprise, when she woke up in the morning, she learned
that the defendant no.1 in a clandestine manner,
without her permission/consent, had illegally
traspassed and forcibly occupied the first floor
premises by bringing a bed and other household items at
night. The plaintiff learnt that these things were
brought in a tempo. The defendant no.1 along with his
family (i.e. the defendants 2-4) occupied the first
floor of the Suit premises which comrpises of four bed
rooms, drawing, dining and toilet, etc.
7. Thereafter, the plaintiff narrates as to how
the defendant no.1 inspite of resistance on the part of
the plaintiff occupied the first floor of the Suit
premises and that the plaintiff did not call the police
as she always thought that the matter would be amicably
settled, keeping in view the relationship between the
parties and the hope that the son would withdraw. It
is not necessary to mention these facts in detail at
this stage. Suffice is to state that it is the case of
the plaintiff that as the defendant did not vacate the
first floor of the Suit premises the plaintiff was
forced to file the present Suit.
8. In the written statement filed on behalf of
the defendants various allegations made in the plaint
are denied. Certain preliminary objections are also
taken. It is inter alia stated that the plaintiff has
not approached this Court with clean hands and is
guilty of suppression of material facts. It is further
stated that the Suit premises were allotted by the
Delhi Development Authority on 8th February, 1968 to
the father of the defendant no.1/husband of the
plaintiff. At that time since the defendant no.1 was
minor, his father had nominated the plaintiff herein as
his nominee. The property was purchased by the father
of the defendant no.1. He passed away on 16th January,
1970 leaving behind the plaintiff and three children
who, by law, inherited the property in equal share.
Therefore, the plaintiff has 1/4th share in the
property so has the defendant no.1. It is also stated
that the plaintiff got the mutation done in her name,
committing fraud and depriving other co-owners and the
defendant no.1 is separately challenging the same. It
is further claimed that the loans which were raised by
the defendant no.1, the defendant no.1 along with his
younger brother stood surety for the same. Even the
repayment schedule was made from the salary of the
plaintiff as well as the defendant no.1 and his younger
brother who were working in the same Bank. It is also
stated that the defendant no.1 along with his family
resided in the Suit premises from 1969 to 14th March,
1989 when the premises were given on rent to the
Embassy of Zimbabwe. It was also agreed that the rent
of the said premises be given to the plaintiff as she
insisted upon the same to enable her to repay the
debts. It is in these circumstances, the defendant
no.1 and his younger brother let out the Suit premises
and started staying independently and when the Embassy
of Zimbabwe vacated the premises the plaintiff asked
the defendant no.1 to come and take possession of the
said premises from the Embassy officials. At that time
the plaintiff and the defendant no.1 arrived at mutual
understanding that the defendant no.1 with his family
would reside in the first floor of the Suit premises
and the plaintiff and younger brother of the defendant
no.1 chose to stay on the ground floor and the second
floor of the premises on rent since they did not chose
to reside there. Therefore, there is no dispossession
of the plaintiff or fraud committed by the defendant
no.1 as alleged in the plaint. It is also stated that
although the plaintiff had received the rent from the
Embassy, she in turn gave the defendant no.1 a sum of
Rs.2,40,000/- in the year 1993 and Rs.1,50,000/- to the
defendant no.2 in December, 1999 as an understanding
from the share of rental receipts and similar payments
were also made to younger brother of the defendant
no.1.
9. These allegations made by the defendants in
the written statement are forcefully denied by the
plaintiff in her replication. In addition to
reiterating what is stated in the plaint, it is
mentioned that the allegation now made in the written
statement are after-thought and that on the death of
the plaintiff's husband the property was mutated in
favor of the plaintiff way back in the year 1970 that
too after the defendant no.1 as well as his younger
brother had given no objection and executed documents
to this effect. The plaintiff was enrolled as a full
member of the cooperative society and fresh sub-lease
for the plot in question was executed in her name. On
the basis of this ownership, she raised loans in her
name. The fact that the defendant no.1 stood surety
shows that the defendant no.1 knew fully well that it
was the plaintiff who became owner of the property and
therefore it was not open for him to challenge the said
mutation or ownership of the property in the name of
the plaintiff after a lapse of 30 years. It is also
stated by the plaintiff that admittedly for over 10
years there is no document to show that the defendants
1-4 were living in the Suit premises. They lived in
their own flats which has been purchased, with the
financial help of the plaintiff, at Vasant Kunj, New
Delhi.
10. From the pleadings on record, the following
admitted factual position emerges:-
|
1. The husband of the plaintiff and father of the
defendant no.1 was the Member of the Society
who had been allotted the plot in question.
He had made the plaintiff his nominee. He
died in the year 1970.
2. The plaintiff, as per the said nomination,
became Member of the Society. At that time
the Suit property was in the form of plot only
and no construction had been raised. The
perpetual lease deed was executed by the
Government in favor of the plaintiff. As per
this perpetual lease deed the plaintiff is the
exclusive owner of the Suit property.
3. At the time of the mutation and execution of
the lease deed in the year 1970, the defendant
no.1 had become major. He executed necessary
documents along with his brother to enable the
plaintiff to get the mutation in her name.
The share certificate issued by the
Cooperative Society is also in the exclusive
name of the plaintiff.
4. The construction was raised thereafter.
Admittedly the plaintiff had raised loan for
this purpose. This loan was granted in favor
of the plaintiff who had mortgaged the title
deeds of the property to the Bank. The
defendant no.1 had the knowledge about this
transaction as he even stood surety/guarantor
for such a loan.
5. In the written statement, although the
defendant no.1 has alleged that the mutation
is done by fraud, he does not deny that his
knowledge of all the aforesaid facts since
1970 and also of the subsequent events as and
when when occurred i.e. when the loan was
raised and when the permission for mortgaging
the property was sought from the Delhi
Development Authority which was granted on 8th
January, 1998. Further, although the
defendant nos.1-4 has stated in their written
statement that they are separately challenging
the mutation, no such proceedings are taken
out by the defendant no.1 till date.
6. Admittedly in the year 1989, when the Suit
premises were let out to the Embassy of
Zimbabwe, the letting was by the plaintiff as
owner and land-lady/Lesser of the Suit
premises. It is she who received the rent of
the premises from the tenant throughout i.e.
till 17th April, 2000.
7. The defendant no.1 did not till filing of his
written statement, claim himself to be the
co-owner of the said Suit property in any
proceedings or even before any authorities
i.e. his employer, his income-tax returns,
etc.
11. The prayers made in this application are to be
examined on the basis of aforesaid admitted position.
Of course, it may be stated at this stage, that there is
a dispute as to how the possession was taken from the
Embassy of Zimbabwe on 17th April, 2000. Whereas the
plaintiff claims that it is she who has taken the
possession and the defendants fraudulently trespassed
into the first floor of the Suit premises, it is the
case of the defendants that this was done by the
parties pursuant to mutual understanding between them
as per which the defendant no.1 and his family were
allowed to stay in the premises. The present Suit is
one under Section 6 of the Specific Relief Act. For
the maintainability of such a Suit what is to be seen
is as to whether the plaintiff has been dispossessed
without her consent or in a manner otherwise than in
due course of law. Once these two ingredients are
established, the Court can put back the plaintiff and
restore the possession from where the plaintiff had
been dispossessed without her consent or in a manner
otherwise than in due course of law.
12. Even if it may be treated that there was some
family arrangement, the family arrangement was to the
effect that the plaintiff would be owner of the
property and would receive the rent thereof as is clear
from the long course of dealing. Therefore, the manner
in which the parties acted over a period of time is the
reflection of the arrangement of a family settlement
which the parties had arrived at. One may lawfully
refer to the case of Taraknath and another versus
Sushil Chandra Dey by lrs. and others and the following observation made by the
Apex Court in this regard:-
"As regards the family settlement of the
brothers, it would be open to the
brothers to resolve the prospective
dispute by way of family settlement. The
brothers having agreed for the
settlement, though they have been
imp leaded as party respondents to the
suit, they have not challenged the family
settlement nor have they contested the
validity thereof. It is not necessary,
in the circumstances, that all the
brothers be present at the settlement.
One of the brothers living in London can
authorise his other brothers to settle
the dispute and he was a consenting party
to it. Under those circumstances, we are
of the view that the brothers obviously
had a settlement pursuant to which the
demised property has been allotted to the
share of Syed Baitul Alam who had sold
the property to the appellant under the
sale deed dated 6-8-1979. The sale deed
is a registered conveyance for valid
consideration. Under those
circumstances, by operation of Section 17
of the Registration Act, 1908, the
appellant gets valid title to the
property. The pre-existing right, title
and interest in the property of Syed
Baitul Alam and his brothers stood
extinguished by operation of the law.
Thereby, the appellants get valid title
to the property."
13. It would also be apposite to refer to another
judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Sahu
Madho Das and others versus Pandit Mukand Ram and
another reported in 1995 (2) SCR 22 in support of the
aforesaid proposition.
14. Even if the contention regarding the
arrangement arrived at in the year 1970 is accepted, it
would be difficult for the defendant no.1 to resile
from that position as it may amount to unqualified
relinquishement, surrender and disclaimer.
15. Moreover in the present case the admitted
facts, as highlighted above, would amply demonstrate
that the plaintiff is the registered owner of the Suit
property. In such circumstances it would not be open
to the defendants even to plea co-ownership for two
reasons :-
(1) Firstly, because no such claim has been
made for the last more than 30 years even after knowing
fully well that the property was mutated and lease deed
registered in the name of the plaintiff. The defendant
no.1 therefore acquiesced into this position allowing
the plaintiff to continue as the owner of the Suit
property for such a long period.
(2) Such a defense is legally impermissible
having regard to the provisions of Benami Transaction
Act.
16. Therefore, from whatever angle the matter is
to be looked into as of today while deciding these
applications the Court has to proceed, prima facie on
the basis that the plaintiff is the exclusive owner of
the Suit property.
17. In so far as the possession of the Suit
premises before 17th April, 2000 is concerned, actual
physical possession remained with Embassy of Zimbabwe.
However, it can safely be inferred that constructive
possession thereof was with the plaintiff as she
entered into lease agreement with the Embassy as
owner/land-lady of the Suit premises and it is she who
had admittedly received the rent for the entire period
i.e. from 1989 till 17th April, 2000 from the said
Embassy. Therefore, it is almost for 12 years prior
to 17th April, 2000 that the plaintiff had been
receiving the rent.
18. Having stated the aforesaid admitted factual
and legal position let us we proceed further. As
mentioned above, there is a dispute as to how the
defendants came to possess the first floor of the Suit
premises. One very relevant factor which will have to
be borne in mind in this connection is the date on
which the present Suit was filed. This Suit was filed
on 23rd May, 2000 i.e. after about a month from the
date when possession of the premises was handed over by
the Embassy. This factor militates against the story
put forth by the defendants regarding permissive
possession on the alleged understanding arrived at
between the parties. As per Section 8 of the Indian
Evidence Act contemporaneous conduct of the parties is
relevant. Had there been an understanding of this
nature between the parties as per which the plaintiff
had allegedly with her consent given possession of the
first floor of the premises to the defendant no.1, she
would not have filed the Suit within one month.
Therefore, while taking prima facie view, a further
premise on which the Court is proceeding is by
believing the version of the plaintiff at this stage,
namely, the defendant no.1 forcefully entered into and
took possession of the first floor of the Suit
premises.
19. This brings us to the question as to whether
the plaintiff can, by way of interim Order, be given
the relief prayed for in IA. 4970/2000. The
contention of the defendants here is that giving of
such a relief at an interim stage would amount to
decreeing the Suit itself and final order cannot be
passed in the IA.4970/2000 under Order XXXIX Rules 1
and 2, CPC. In support of this proposition, the
defendants have relied upon the case of M/s. Magnum
Films and another versus Golcha Properties Pvt. Letx.
reported in AIR 1983 Delhi 392, Boku Mahton and others
versus Most. name not known widow of Anathi Thakur and
others , Yashwant Singh
versus Jagdish Singh reported in AIR 1968 SC 620. On
the other hand, learned counsel for the plaintiff
submitted that mandatory injunction at interlocutory
stage so as to restore status quo ante can be granted
by the Courts and while doing so it is the balance of
convenience and irreparable injury which are
considerations that would govern the exercise of
jurisdiction. In support of this proposition learned
counsel for the plaintiff relied upon the case of Baban
Narayan Landge versus Mahadu Bhikaji Tonchar and others
, Dorab Cawasji Warden
versus Coomi Sorab Warden and others and Baldev Raj versus The Delhi Development
Authority and others reported in 1971 (7) DLT 4.
20. There is no dispute about the general
proposition of law namely, such a mandatory injunction
at interlocutory stage should not normally be granted
which has the effect of granting the final relief.
That is what is the law laid down in catena of cases
including the judgment relied upon by the defendants
and referred to above. However, it is not an absolute
principle of law. There is no such mandate by any law
that in all circumstances such a relief at an
interlocutory stage had to be refused. Of course,
normally such a relief is not to be granted. However
in exceptional circumstances mandatory injunction at
interlocutory stage, particularly to restore the status
quo ante, can be granted by the Courts. This is what
is propounded by the judgments referred to by the
learned counsel for the plaintiff. In Baban Narayan
Landge (supra) the Bombay High Court observed as
under:-
"Has a Civil Court jurisdiction to issue
at an interlocutory stage a mandatory
injunction so as to restore the status
quo anterior to the date of institution
of a suit, is a point that falls for
determination in this civil revision
application.
In my view, answer to this question has
to be recorded in the affirmative. Here
are my reasons : The subject of
temporary injunction is mainly covered by
O.39, Rr.1 and 2, CPC. In cases not
covered by those provisions, an
appropriate temporary injunction can be
granted also in exercise of inherent
power of a Court under S.151, CPC. After
all O.39, Rr.1 and 2 are not exhaustive
of the circumstances under which interim
injunctiion can be granted. The
controversy on that aspect of the matter
is set at rest by a majority decision of
the Supreme court in the leading case of
Manoharlal v. Seth Hiralal . But that apart the language
employed in those two Rules is clearly
wide enough to include an order in the
form of a mandatory injunction and admits
of no exception with reference to a point
of time to which it can be made.
Injunctions are a form of equitable
relief and they have to be adjusted or
moulded in aid of equity and justice to
the facts and circumstances of each
particular case. Jurisdiction is thus
undoubted even under O.39, Rr.1 and 2.
Even if it cannot be granted under the
said Rules, S.151 is the source of such
jurisdiction. I see no reason to lay
down an absolute proposition and forge
unnecessary and unjustified fetters on
the power of the equity Courts to grant
appropriate relief even in a well
deserving case and reduce its position
only to a willing but helpless spectator
- a siutation not warranted by our equity
jurisprudence.
Undoubtedly, power to issue mandatory
injunction at an interlocutory stage is
not to be exercised lightly or commonly.
Ordering maintenance of status quo as on
the date of the suit as an interim
measure is rare and rarer still is the
order of maintenance of status quo as on
the date anterior to the institution of
suit. But existence of jurisdiction and
its proper exercise are two distinct
topics."
21. Similarly in Dorab Cawasji Warden (supra)
after referring to various judgments the Court laid
down the principle in para 14 and 15 thereof in the
following terms:-
14. The relief of interlocutory
mandatory injunctions are thus granted
generally to preserve or restore the
status quo of the last non-contested
status which preceded the pending
controversy until the final hearing when
full relief may be granted or to compel
the undoing of those acts that have been
illegally done or the restoration of that
which was wrongfully taken from the party
complaining. But since the granting of
such an injunction to a party who fails
or would fail to establish his right at
the trial may cause great injustice or
irreparable harm to the party against
whom
it was granted or alternatively not
granting of it to a party who succeeds or
would succeed may equally cause great
injustice or irreparable harm, courts
have evolved certain guidelines.
Generally stated these guidelines are:
(1) The plaintiff has a strong case for
trial. That is, it shall be of a higher
standard than a prima facie case that is
normally required for a prohibitory
injunction.
(2) It is necessary to prevent
irreparable or serious injury which
normally cannot be compensated in terms
of money.
(3) The balance of convenience is in
favor of the one seeking such relief.
15. Being essentially an equitable
relief the grant or refusal of an
interlocutory mandatory injunction shall
ultimately rest in the sound judicial
discretion of the Court to be exercised
in the light of the facts and
circumstances in each case. Though the
above guidelines are neither exhaustive
or complete or absolute rules, and there
may be exceptional circumstances needing
action, applying them as pre-requisite
for the grant or refusal of such
injunctions would be a sound exercise of
a judicial discretion."
22. To the same effect is the judgment of this
Court in the case of Baldev Raj (supra).;
Therefore keeping the aforesaid principles of
law in mind, as pressed into service by the plaintiff
as well as the defendants, we have to examine as to
whether the plaintiff has made out a case for grant of
such an Order at interlocutory stage. As already
mentioned above, the plaintiff was in constructive
possession of the Suit premises till 17th April, 2000.
This possession was with her for almost 12 years as the
defendants had shifted to their Vasant Kunj house, way
back in the year 1989. For these 12 years the
plaintiff was receiving rent from the Embassy and also
maintaining the Suit premises. She has strong prima
facie case to the effect that she is the exclusive
owner of the property. Prima facie this Court is also
convinced that she has been dispossessed from the first
floor of the Suit premises without her consent or in a
manner otherwise than in due course of law. The
plaintiff being the exclusive owner of the property,
the defendants have otherwise no right in laws to stay
in these premises. Therefore, the plaintiff has a
strong prima facie case. Admittedly the plaintiff is a
widow and at the time of filing of this Suit she was 76
years old. From that reckoning she would be more than
77 years of age as of today. Therefore it cannot be
disputed that she is an infirm old widow. She has also
alleged that the defendants have not looked after her
and at this age she needs proper care and attention.
She has to survive on the rental income after letting
out the Suit property. Earlier the entire Suit
property was let out and her case is that she would not
get a good tenant and reasonably good rent by letting
out portion of the property with the defendant no.1
in possession of the first floor of the Suit property.
It is hard reality that it takes long time to decide
the main suits. In such circumstances, when balance of
convenience is also in favor of the plaintiff and the
plaintiff may suffer irreparable injury in case the
interim relief at this stage is not granted, whether
she should be denied this mandatory injunction at an
interlocutory stage - the answer would be NO and the
counclusion would be to hold that there are exceptional
circumstances in favor of the plaintiff warranting
such a relief at this stage. What would be the use if
the Suit is not decided in the lifetime of the
plaintiff and ultimately the decree for possession is
passed against the defendants at a time when the
plaintiff is no more. The plaintiff needs the premise
now. She has to let out the same in order to receive
rent and enable her to maintain herself. On the other
hand, the defendants are having their own property at
Vasant Kunj, where they were living for 12 years before
they shifted to the first floor of the Suit premises.
The defense raised by the defendants in the present
Suit does not inspire much confidence and gives the
impression that these grounds are taken for the sake of
raising defense, just to delay the proceedings and
remain in possession of the first floor of the Suit
premises unauthorisedly.
23. It may be observed at this stage that
principle of comparative strength of the case while
deciding such applications is also getting momentum.
This Court highlighted/stated this principle way back
in the year 1985 . Now even
English Courts have started propounding this theory.
Viewed from this angle also the case of the plaintiff
out-weighs the defense of the defendants. Being
exclusive owner of the property she has right to seek
possession of the first floor. There is likelihood of
her to succeed in the Suit. In such circumstances
while examining the case from the angle of comparative
strength and the peculiar circumstances in which old
and feeble widow is placed, it would be in the interest
of justice that the possession of the Suit premises is
restored to her at this stage itself. It would be only
restoring the status quo ante. After all she being the
land lady of the Suit property had every right to take
the complete possession thereof from the tenant. On
the other hand, the interest of the defendants can be
safeguarded, even if it is presumed that ultimately
they are likely to succeed, by giving a direction to
the effect that out of the rent which the plaintiff
would receive, she would deposit 1/4th thereof in this
Court representing the share of the defendants. In
view of the foregoing discussion IAs.4970-71/2000 is
allowed. Mandatory injunction is issued in favor of
the plaintiff and against the defendants by directing
the defendants to vacate the first floor of the
premises of Suit property namely, B-8, Anand Niketan,
New Delhi within four weeks from the date of this
Order. The plaintiff is appointed as Receiver with
regard to the first floor of the said premises. She
will have right to let out the entire Suit premises.
However, she shall file in this Court the copy Lease
Deed that may be arrived at with the intending lessee
and also deposit every month 3/4th of the rent received
from such a letting. The said amount shall be kept in
Fixed Deposit by the Registry to be taken in the name
of the Registrar General, High Court of Delhi.
24. Consequently, IA.268/2001 also stands allowed
and the plaintiff can carry out the repair/rectify the
leakage of water as stated in this application.
25. All these IAs stand disposed of in aforesaid
terms.