Translate
Text Highlighter

Bookmark

PDF

Share

Report a problem
AMICUS AI
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Attorney(S)
Judges
Acts
Are you a practicing lawyer?
Enhance your digital presence and reach by creating a Casemine profile.
Upload pleading to use the new AI search
Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Attorney(S)
Judges
Acts
Smart Summary

Structured Summary of the Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

This appeal arises under section 10 of the Delhi High Court Act, 1966, from an order of a learned Single Judge dated 17 September 1999 that dismissed the appellants' application (I.A. No. 1328/97 in Suit No. 562/75) under Order 23 Rule 3 read with section 151 CPC for redetermination of their shares in specified ancestral properties (No. 727-737, Church Mission Road, Fatehpuri, Delhi). The preliminary consent decree in Suit No. 562/75 was passed on 19 April 1989 following statements and affidavits by parties and their counsel. The suit for partition was instituted on 20 August 1975 by Lt. Col. Gaj Singh for properties claimed as ancestral of the parties' ancestor Shib Sahai.

Relevant family background and procedural steps in the record include: admissions in affidavits that the properties were ancestral and inherited in undivided shares from Shib Sahai; a registered General Power of Attorney (GPA) dated 16 August 1984 executed by some daughters in favour of Wg. Cdr. M.P. Yadav empowering him to act and settle disputes, and his affidavit of 9 February 1988 and statement on 4 April 1989 before the learned Single Judge admitting ancestral character and consenting to specified shares; a preliminary decree of 19 April 1989 recording shares (notably 285/3600 to each of certain daughter-defendants); a subsequent registered GPA dated 18 October 1989 reflecting that a preliminary consent decree had determined appellants' shares as 285/3600 each; cancellations of earlier GPAs by the appellants in 1993–1994; appointment of a Commissioner (Justice D.R. Khanna) who reported on division and whose report attracted objections by the appellants; and an application by the appellants on 25 July 1995 seeking redetermination of their shares to 300/3600 each, which the Single Judge dismissed on 17 September 1999.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the preliminary consent decree of 19 April 1989 should be reopened because Wg. Cdr. M.P. Yadav, who made a consent statement on behalf of the appellants, lacked authority or colluded with the first respondent.
  2. Whether the preliminary consent decree amounted to creating, for the first time, a right, title or interest in immovable property in favour of the first respondent such that it required registration under section 17 of the Registration Act, 1908 (and would be inadmissible under section 49).
  3. Whether a compromise or family settlement based preliminary decree operates as an estoppel binding on parties and therefore can be impeached only on grounds such as fraud, misrepresentation, coercion or undue influence.
  4. Whether the appellants were entitled to a redetermination of their shares from 285/3600 each to 300/3600 each under the circumstances narrated in the record.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellants' Arguments

  • The statement made by Wg. Cdr. M.P. Yadav on 4 April 1989 on their behalf lacked authority and was the result of collusion with the first respondent, thereby justifying reopening the preliminary decree.
  • The preliminary decree purportedly created for the first time a 300/3600th share in favour of the first respondent (Lt. Col. Gaj Singh Yadav) in immovable properties of value over Rs.100, so the decree required registration under section 17 of the Registration Act, 1908; relying on the decision in Bhoop Singh Vs. Ram Singh Major and Others.
  • Implicitly, the appellants sought redetermination of shares and alleged that their entitlement should be increased to 300/3600 each instead of 285/3600 each as declared by the decree.

Respondent(s) and Other Parties' Position (as reflected in the record)

  • The respondents and counsel for various parties accepted the statements made in court on 4 April 1989 and consented to the passing of the preliminary decree in the terms recorded.
  • It was maintained (and accepted by the court) that the properties were ancestral/HUF properties and that the first respondent had a pre-existing undivided share by virtue of birth—therefore the decree recognized antecedent rights rather than creating a new right that would attract registration requirements.
  • Wg. Cdr. M.P. Yadav acted on instructions and under authority conferred by the General Power of Attorney dated 16 August 1984 (and the subsequent GPA of 18 October 1989 corroborated that the appellants accepted the decree determining their shares as 285/3600 each).
  • The respondents relied on the bona fides of the consent decree and the doctrine that family settlement-based decrees operate as estoppel unless vitiated by fraud, misrepresentation, coercion or undue influence.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Bhoop Singh Vs. Ram Singh Major and Others (as relied upon by appellants) The principle that if a compromise decree creates for the first time a right, title or interest in immovable property of value Rs.100 or upward in favour of a party, the decree requires registration under section 17 of the Registration Act and must be examined by the court to see whether it created such a right or merely recognised pre-existing rights. The court applied the principle to conclude that here the properties were ancestral and the first respondent had a pre-existing share; consequently the consent decree recognized antecedent rights and did not create a new registrable right, so section 17(1) did not apply.
V.N. Sreedharan Vs. Bhaskaran Support for the proposition that a compromise decree or family settlement operates as an estoppel and is binding unless obtained by fraud, misrepresentation, coercion or undue influence. The court cited this principle to hold that the preliminary family settlement-based decree was binding and the appellants had not proved any fraud, misrepresentation, coercion or undue influence to impeach it.
Kale and Others Vs. Deputy Director of Consolidation and others Also cited for the proposition that family settlements/compromise decrees operate as estoppel and bind the parties except where vitiated by fraud, undue influence, etc. The court relied on this authority to reinforce that the decree should stand unless the appellants established vitiating factors; finding none, the court refused redetermination of shares.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court proceeded through a structured factual and legal analysis, confined to the record before it:

  1. Authority and Content of Statements: The court examined the statement made by Wg. Cdr. M.P. Yadav on 4 April 1989 which stated that, on instructions of defendants 13 to 16 (the appellants and other sisters), 1/60th of their share be given to the plaintiff (first respondent). The court found this statement to be on instructions of the appellants and consistent with the General Power of Attorney dated 16 August 1984 which authorized Wg. Cdr. M.P. Yadav to settle and compound matters, withdraw or compromise the matter, and otherwise conduct litigation concerning the ancestral properties.
  2. Corroborative Documentary Evidence: The court relied on the subsequent registered Power of Attorney dated 18 October 1989 executed by the four daughters (including the appellants) in favour of Wg. Cdr. M.P. Yadav, which contained a recital stating that a preliminary consent decree had determined their shares at 285/3600 each. The court treated this recital as corroborative that the April 4, 1989 statement was made with the appellants' authority.
  3. Conduct of the Parties and Delay: The court observed that the appellants had accepted and acted in accordance with the preliminary decree for about six years before seeking redetermination; they participated in Commissioner hearings (about 26 sittings) and did not challenge the decree earlier, except to seek demarcation of their portions. The court inferred that the delay and conduct indicated acquiescence and that the challenge was an afterthought.
  4. Registration Act Argument: Addressing the contention that the decree created for the first time a registrable right in favour of the first respondent, the court noted that the properties had been consistently described in affidavits, pleadings, GPAs and objections as ancestral/HUF properties deriving from Shib Sahai, and that the first respondent had an undivided share by birth. Applying the principle from Bhoop Singh, the court concluded the decree did not create a new right requiring registration but rather recognized antecedent rights; therefore section 17(1) of the Registration Act did not apply.
  5. Bona Fides and Estoppel: The court treated the consent decree as a bona fide family settlement. It applied the established principle (as in V.N. Sreedharan and Kale) that family settlement based compromise decrees operate as estoppel and are binding unless procured by fraud, misrepresentation, coercion or undue influence. Finding no evidence or pleading of such vitiating factors, the court held the appellants had not discharged the burden of proving that the decree was obtained improperly.
  6. Conclusion on Redetermination: Considering authority of the attorney, corroborating documents, acceptance by counsel, the appellants' own conduct and delay, the court concluded there was no substance in the appellants' plea for redetermination of shares; the requested increase from 285/3600 to 300/3600 was not justified and thus the Single Judge's order dismissing the application was correct.

Holding and Implications

Holding:

APPEAL DISMISSED.

Implications:

  • The order of the learned Single Judge dated 17 September 1999, which dismissed the appellants' application for redetermination of shares (I.A. No. 1328/97 in Suit No. 562/75), is upheld.
  • The preliminary consent decree dated 19 April 1989, declaring the appellants' share as 285/3600 each, remains operative and is binding on the parties; the appellants are not entitled to the redetermination to 300/3600 each they sought in their application.
  • The court treated the consent decree as recognizing pre-existing ancestral rights rather than creating a new registrable right; accordingly it did not require registration under section 17 of the Registration Act, 1908.
  • No new legal precedent was declared by the court; the decision applied established principles regarding authority of attorneys, validity of family settlement based decrees, the estoppel effect of compromise decrees, and the registration requirement only where a decree creates a new right for the first time. The opinion states that the appellants did not demonstrate the kind of fraud, misrepresentation, coercion or undue influence that would vitiate the family settlement-based decree, and therefore the decree stands.

This summary is limited to and derived exclusively from the information contained in the provided opinion. No additional facts or inferences beyond the opinion were added.

    Uma Devi Yadav & Anr. v. Lt. Col. Gaj Singh Yadav Retd. & Ors.

    1. This is an appeal under section 10 of the Delhi High Court Act, 1966 against the order of the learned Single Judge dated September 17, 1999 whereby the application of the appellants being I.A.No. 1328/97 in Suit No. 562/75, under Order 23 Rule 3 read with section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure for redetermination of the shares of the appellants in property No. 727-737, Church Mission Road, Fatehpuri, Delhi, filed after passing of the Preliminary consent decree dated April 19, 1989, was dismissed. The facts giving rise to the appeal are as follows :-

    2. Late Shib Sahai, the ancestor of the parties, had three sons, namely, Surat Singh, Nawal Singh and Narain Singh. Shib Sahai died in the year 1938. Naval Singh predeceased him in the 1937. Shib Sahai had only one son Jaswant Singh who married Kamla Devi Yadav. They had a son Tarun Yadav. Jaswant Singh is also not alive and died in the year 1965. Narain Singh died on December 18, 1961. He had four daughters - Rajni Yadav, Uma Devi Yadav, Bina Kumari Yadav and Usha Rani. Surat Singh, the only remaining son of Shib Sahai, died on August 22, 1963. Surat Singh, who had married twice, was survived by a son, Lt. Col. Gaj Singh Yadav, from the first wife and four children from the second wife - three daughters and a son. At this stage it will be convenient to set out the genealogical table of the family :-

    Sh. Shib Sahai

    -----------------------------------------------------------------------

    3. Lt. Col. Gaj Singh filed a suit (Suit No. 562/75) on August 20,1975 in this Court for partition claiming that the properties forming subject matter of the suit listed in Schedules A and B to the plaint belonged to Shib Sahai. Consequently it was claimed that the properties were ancestral roperties. The appellants Uma Devi and Usha Devi and their mother Umrao Kaur, widow of Ch. Narain Singh, executed a registered General Power of Attorney on August 16, 1984 in favour of Wg. Cdr. M.P. Yadav (Retd), who was married to Rajni Yadav, eldest daughter of Ch. Narain Singh, authoris-

    ing him to act and plead on their behalf in any civil, criminal and taxation matters in India. By virtue of this Power of Attorney, Wg.Cdr. M.P. Yadav was also empowered to settle the disputes pertaining to ancestral properties situated at Delhi and Kasoli.

    4. On April 19, 1989, a preliminary decree was passed by the learned Single Judge of this Court on the basis of settlement arrived at between the parties. It is significant to note that before the passing of the preliminary decree the parties were asked to adduce evidence by way of affidavits. Wg.Cdr. M.P. Yadav, attorney of the appellants, filed an affidavit dated February 9, 1988 in which it was admitted that the properties forming subject-matter of the suit belonged to Shib Sahai and were ancestral properties. It was also admitted that Shib Sahai died intestate and his sons inherited 1/3 undivided share each in the properties.

    5. Earlier to the passing of the preliminary decree, on April 4, 1989 Wg. Cdr. M.P. Yadav made a statement on behalf of the appellants and Smt. Umrao Kaur that out of the share to which the appellants and Umrao Kaur are entitled to, 1/60th may be given to the first respondent herein, Lt. Col. Gaj Singh Yadav. On the same day Lt. Col. Gaj Singh made the following statement before the learned Single Judge:-

    "A preliminary decree declaring that the plaintiff is entitled to 300/3600th share in and that Satish Chandra Yadav, defendant No.2 - 432/3600, Km. Sushila Yadav, defendant No.3 - 48/3600, Km. Saroj Nalini Yadav, defendant No.4 - 48/3600, Smt. Nirmala Yadav, defendant No.5 - 72/3600, Smt. Anuradha Chaudhary, defendant No.6 - 16/3600, Smt. Hemangini Dar, defendant No.7 - 16/3600, Smt. Mirnalini Chaudhary, defendant No. 8 - 16/3600, Major Atul Chaudhary, defendant No.9 - 312/3600, Smt. Kamla Yadav, defendant No. 10 - 600/3600, Ms. Taruna Yadav, defendant No.11 - 600/3600, Smt. Rajni Yadav, defendant No.13 - 285/3600, Smt. Uma Devi Yadav, defendant No. 14 - 285/3600, Miss Bina Kumari, defendant No.15 -

    285/3600, Smt. Usha Rani Yadav, defendant No.16 - 285/3600 of the properties mentioned in Schedules A and B, may be passed. I give up my 1/9 share which comes to me out of the share of my father."

    6. Learned counsel for all the parties including Shri N.N. Aggarwal, ounsel for the appellants and respondents 12 and 13 herein (defendants 13 to 16 in the suit) accepted his statement and made statements consenting to the passing of the preliminary decree in terms thereof. The statements of the learned counsel for the parties recorded by the trial Court are as under :-

    "Statement of Mr. Ishwar Sahai, counsel for defendants 2, 3 and 4 :
    " I have heard the statement of the plain-tiff. I accept the same and a decree in terms thereof be passed."
    " 7. After recording the statements of Wg. Cdr. M.P. Yadav and Lt. Col. Gaj Singh Yadav and the learned counsel for the parties, G.C. Jain, J. passed a preliminary decree in the suit on April 19, 1989 declaring that the parties to the suit were entitled to the following shares in the properties mentioned in Schedules A and B to the plaint :-"
    " 8. After the passing of the preliminary decree, the four daughters of Ch. Narain Singh including the appellants, again executed a registered power of attorney dated October 18, 1989 in favour of Wg. Cdr. M.P. Yadav wherein it was, inter alia, stated as follows :-"
    "XX XX XX "AND WHEREAS family litigation for partition and separate possession of our interest in the ancestral properties partly came to an end to the extent of passing of a Preliminary Consent Decree by Hon'ble Mr. Justice G.C. Jain of the High Court of Delhi in Suit No. 562/1975, determining our share in all the said properties forming subject-matter of the said suit, equally to the extent of 285/3600 each, i.e. 1140/3600 in all, and we succeeded as the absolute owners to that extent;
    " AND WHEREAS family litigation for partition by metes and bounds and separate possession of our interest and all incidental matters, including rendition of accounts, is continuing at Delhi;"
    " NOW KNOW ALL MEN BY THESE PRESENTS that we, Rajni Yadav, Uma Devi Yadav, Bina Yadav and Usha Yadav, of our own free will HEREBY NOMI-NATE, CONSTITUTE AND APPOINT Wing commander Mahender Pal Yadav (retired), son of Late Chaudhary Daya Ram Yadav, presently residing at House No. B-17, Sector No.21, Jalvayu Vihar, NOIDA- 201301, District Ghaziabad (U.P) as our GENERAL ATTORNEY, to do all or any of the acts, deeds and things for and on our behalf in terms of this Irrevocable Power of Attorney executed by us, that is to say :-"
    " 1. To act, appear and plead for us in any Civil, Criminal, Taxation Court and any other Court in India."
    2. To file and defend action on our behalf, to sign pleadings, to appoint and discharge Advocates, to sign and file affidavits, to make applications, appeals/revisions/review petitions upto the highest Court, to file execution petitions, to settle and compound matters, disputes and actions, and to take all legal steps that may be deemed necessary by the said Attorney for prosecu tion, with regard to the conduct of the cases pertaining to our ancestral property situate at Delhi and Kosli in the revenue jurisdiction of District Rohtak in Haryana State."
    XX XX XX
    "9. Subsequently Smt. Usha Rani Yadav, appellant No.2, cancelled the power of attorneys executed in favour of Wg. Cdr. M.P. Yadav vide cancellation deeds dated August 12, 1993 and August 31, 1994. Similarly, appellant No.1, Smt. Uma Devi Yadav, cancelled the power of attorneys executed in favour of Wg. Cdr. M.P. Yadav vide cancellation deeds dated August 16, 1994 and October 17, 1994. After cancellation of the power of attorneys executed earlier in favour of Wg. Cdr. M.P. Yadav, the appellants appointed Dr. R.S. Yadav as their attorney."

    10. On May 6, 1983, the learned Single Judge appointed Mr. Justice D.R. Khanna, a retired Judge of this Court, as Commissioner to suggest the mode of partition of the suit properties mentioned as Annexure I to the decree sheet. About twenty-six hearings took place before the Commissioner and on several hearings the second appellant was present. On February 10, 1994 the Commissioner submitted his report suggesting the mode of partition with respect to the properties located at Delhi. He also submitted another report dated April 4, 1994 with respect to the properties situate in Kaso-

    li, Haryana. After the submission of the report, the learned Single Judge invited objections of the parties to the report of the Commissioner. Both the appellants filed objections to the reports of the Commissioner on November 17, 1994. In the objections the appellants did not raise any controversy with regard to the declaration of the shares of the parties in the ancestral properties including their shares and that of the first respondent under the preliminary decree passed with their consent. They, however, wanted that their portions in the ancestral properties should be separately demarcated in the block of 40% allotted to respondent No.1 herein and the appellants and their sisters by the Commissioner. At this stage it will be convenient to extract the main objections of the appellants to the report of the Commissioner :-

    "XX XX XX

    7. That before the Lt. Commissioner it was not disputed that the objectors may be included in the block of 40% allotted to the plaintiff and defendants No. 13 to 16, but an application was moved before the Lt. Commissioner by defendant No.16, the present objector and the oral request was made before the Ld. Local Commissioner by Objector No. 14 to the effect that their portions hould be separately demarcated in the block of 40% as mentioned above.

    8. That the Ld. Local Commissioner ignored the same and did not demarcate the separate portions of the applicants in the report as well as in the plan annexed with the report.

    XX XX XX"

    11. On July 25, 1995, after about six years of the passing of the preliminary decree and after about eight months of the filing of the objections to the report of the Commissioner, the appellants filed an application seeking redetermination of their shares in the property with a view to securing 300/3600th share each in the property instead of 285/3600th share each therein. That means they were claiming 1/40th share more in the property than what had been declared qua them under the preliminary decree. This application was dismissed by te learned Single Judge by a detailed order dated September 17, 1999. The appellants being aggrieved of this order of the learned Single Judge have preferred the instant appeal.

    12. We have heard learned counsel for the parties. Learned counsel for the appellants contended that the preliminary decree based on the concession of Wg. Cdr. M.P. Yadav, needs to be reopened as he had no authority to make the statement which he made on their behalf on April 4, 1989 before the learned Single Judge. According to him, Wg. Cdr. M.P. Yadav colluded with the first respondent. We have given our anxious consideration to the submission of the learned counsel for the appellant, but we do not find any substance in the same. It needs to be noted that Wg. Cdr. M.P. Yadav (Retd) is the husband of respondent No.13, Smt. Rajni Yadav, who is the elder sister of the appellants. Obviously, Wg. Cdr. M.P. Yadav is more closely related to the appellants than the first respondent. Therefore, he will be interested in the appellants rather than the first respondent. There is nothing on record to show that Wg. Cdr. M.P. Yadav exceeded his brief in making the following statement before the learned Single Judge on April 4, 1989 :-

    "Out of the free will and instructions from defendants 13 to 16, I make this statement that out of the share to which defendants 13 to 16 are entitled, 1/60 may be given to the plaintiff Lt. Col. Gaj Singh Yadav (Retd)."

    13. The aforesaid statement shows that the same was made on instructions of defendants 13 to 16 (the appellants and respondents No.12 & 13 herein), all daughters of Ch. Narain Singh. In any event the statement draws its sustenance from the General Power of attorney executed by the appellants on August 16, 1984. According to clause 1(b) of the General Power of Attorney, Wg. Cdr. M.P. Yadav had the authority to settle and compound matters and to take such legal steps that may be necessary by him with regard to the conduct of the cases pertaining to the ancestral property situate at Delhi and Kasoli. According to clause 1(c) of the aforesaid General Power of Attorney, he even had the authority to withdraw or compromise the matter. The subsequent power of attorney dated October 18, 1989, which they executed after the passing of the preliminary decree, clearly reflects that the statement made by Wg. Cdr. M.P. Yadav on April 4, 1989 before the learned Single Judge was on the instructions of the appellants. The Power of Attorney dated October 18, 1989 contains a recital to the effect that family litigation for partition and separate possession of the interests of the appellants in the ancestral properties partly came to an end by passing of the preliminary consent decree by Hon'ble Mr. Justice G.C. Jain n Suit No. 562/75 whereby the share of the appellants in the ancestral properties was determined to the extent of 285/3600 each, i.e., 1140/3600 in all. If the appellants had not given the authority to Wg. Cdr. M.P. Yadav to make the statement which he made on April 4, 1989 before the learned Single Judge, there would not have been any recital to the aforesaid effect in the subsequent power of attorney executed by them in favour of Wg. Cdr. M.P. Yadav. That apart, Shri N.N. Aggarwal, who was appearing for the appellants and their sisters, respondents 12 and 13, by his statement dated April 4, 1989 accepted the statement of the first respondent, plaintiff in the suit, and agreed to the decree being passed in terms thereof. In case the appellants had not consented to take 285/3600 share each in the ancestral properties, the learned counsel would not have accepted the statement of the first respondent Lt. Col. Gaj Singh Yadav dated April 4, 1989. A perusal of record shows that about 26 sittings were held by the Commissioner. On several dates appellant No.2, Smt. Usha, was present before the Commissioner. Neither the counsel for the appellants nor Smt. Usha expressed any misgivings about the preliminary consent decree passed by the learned Single Judge. Even in the objections which were filed to the report of the Commissioner no dispute was raised with regard to the share of the appellants. The only grievance of the appellants appeared to be that the Commissioner had not proposed a separate portion in the ancestral properties for the said appellants. The appellants remained satisfied with the preliminary decree for a period of about six years & did not accuse Wg. Cdr. M.P. Yadav of having colluded with the first respondent. In case Wg. Cdr. M.P. Yadav did not have the authority under the power of attorney dated August 16, 1984 or under the instructions of the appellants to make the aforesaid statement before the learned Single Judge in favour of the first respondent, the appellants would have challenged the preliminary decree immediately without wasting any time and would not have waited for five years to mount an attack against the same. The con-duct of the appellants reflects that the challenge to the preliminary decree is an after thought. The only controversy which seems to have hurt the appellants is that instead of 300/3600th share each in the ancestral properties, they have been given 285/3600th share each in the same. The difference is negligible. On this ground a twenty-one years old litigation cannot be allowed to be prolonged as it must acquire quietus at some point of time. The plea of the appellants therefore, must fail and is hereby rejected.

    Mr. J.K. Seth, learned Senior Advocate for the appellants, contended that the first respondent Lt. Col. Gaj Singh Yadav did not have any existing right in the immovable properties in question on April 4, 1989 when the preliminary decree with the consent of Wg. Cdr. M.P. Yadav was passed by the learned Single Judge. According to him, the preliminary decree for the first time purported to create a share to the extent of 300/3600 in the immovable properties of the value of more than Rs.100/- in favour of the first respondent. Learned counsel submitted that in such a situation the preliminary decree required registration under section 17 of the Registration Act, 1908 and it cannot affect immovable property comprised therein,or be received of in evidence of any transaction affecting such property under section 49 of the Registration Act, 1908. Learned counsel for the appellants in support of his submission mainly relied on Bhoop Singh Vs. Ram Singh Major and Others, . We have considered the submission of the learned counsel, but we have not been able to persuade ourselves to accept the same. The learned counsel for the appellants is not justified in urging that the right in the immovable properties in question in favour of the first respondent was created for the first time by means of the compromise decree. It appears to us that the properties were ancestral properties and the first respondent acquired a share in the same by virtue of his birth. An attempt was made by the appellants to contest this position on the ground that Ch. Narain Singh had made a Will under which the first respondent was not given any share in the properties. It is interesting to note that in the power of attorneys executed by the appellants in favour of Wg. Cdr. M.P. Yadav, the properties have been referred as ancestral properties. Even in the objections filed to the report of the Commissioner, the properties have been alluded to as "suit properties". Obvi-ously, these properties in the suit have been described as ancestral properties. In the written statement filed by the appellants the properties have been admitted to be HUF properties and coming from their ancestor Shib Singh. Therefore, the learned Single Judge while passing the preliminary decree rightly proceeded on the basis that the properties listed in Schedules A and B to the plaint were ancestral properties. The statement dated April 4, 1989 of the first respondent which was heard and accepted by Shri N.N. Aggarwal, learned counsel for the appellants and respondents 12 and 13, referred to the properties as ancestral properties. Since the properties were HUF properties, respondent No.1 had undoubtedly an undivided share in them. By virtue of the statement of the first respondent and the acceptance of the same by the other parties, the first respondent gave up 1/90th share in the properties thereby acting to his detriment. We have no manner of doubt that the consent decree was a bona fide one. It is well settled that a compromise decree, if found to be bona fide in the sense that the compromise is not a device to obviate payment of stamp duty and frustrate the law relating to registration, would not require registration. It seems to us that the preliminary decree has genesis in the unwritten family arrangement or understanding between the parties. It also appears to us that the preliminary decree passed with the consent of the parties has the effect of recognising the antecedent rights of the parties in the immovable property and therefore it would not attract any of the clauses of sub-section (1) of section 17 of the Registration Act, 1908. In Bhoop Singh Vs. Ram Singh (supra) the Supreme Court held that if the compromise decree were to create for the first time right, title or interest in immovable property of the value of Rs.100/- or upward in favour of any party to the suit, the decree or order would require registration. The Supreme Court observed that it was the duty of the court to examine in each case whether the parties have pre-existing right to the immovable property or whether under the order or decree of the Court one party having right, title or interest agreed or suffered to extinguish the same and created right, title or interest in praesanti in immovable property of the value of Rs.100/- or upwards in favour of other party for the first time, either by compromise or pretended sort. If latter be the position the document, according to the Supreme Court, is compulsorily registrable. In view of the principle laid down by the Supreme Court in Bhoop Singh Vs. Ram Singh (supra) since the parties had pre-existing rights in the immovable properties in question, being the ancestral properties, consent decree by declaring such rights will not attract the provisions of Section 17(1) of the Registration Act, 1908.

    14. Before parting with the matter another aspect needs to be noticed. A compromise decree or a decree based on family [settlement operates as an estoppel. Such a decree is binding on the parties and must be given effect to unless it is proved that the same was obtained by fraud, misrepresentation, coercion, or undue influence (see V.N. Sreedharan Vs. Bhaskaran, , and Kale and Others Vs. Deputy Director of Consolidation and others, ). The appellants have not been able to show that the arrangement between the family members, which is the basis of preliminary decree, was induced by fraud misrepresentation, coercion or undue influence. Therefore, their request for redetermination of shares in the properties was rightly rejected by the learned Single Judge.

    15. In view of the aforesaid discussion, we endorse the views of the learned Single Judge. The appeal, therefore, fails and is hereby dismissed.

    Use AI to get other relevant cases.

    Comments

    Uma Devi Yadav & Anr. v. Lt. Col. Gaj Singh Yadav Retd. & Ors.
    (May 26, 2000)