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  • provisions of the Code. In Rule 17 of Order 5
  • provisions of the Code in Order 5
  • Order XXXVII, Rule 3(2)
  • Order V, Rule 17
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Cites
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Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Attorney(S)
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  • provisions of the Code. In Rule 17 of Order 5
  • provisions of the Code in Order 5
  • Order XXXVII, Rule 3(2)
  • Order V, Rule 17
Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

This is an application filed by the defendant for condonation of delay in filing its "Leave to Defend" (I.A. 3402/99 in S. No. 1553/98). Summons for judgment were attempted to be served on the defendants on 5.3.1999 at the defendant's Delhi office; the service report records a refusal. In its Memorandum of Appearance the defendant had furnished three addresses: (i) the Delhi office, (ii) the registered office at Pune, and (iii) the address of the defendant's counsel. The process server went to the Delhi office and attempted service on Ms. Shakila, who stated she dealt only with personnel records and was not authorised to accept summons. The defendant alleged (para 7 of the application) that the process server did not leave any copy of the summons with Ms. Shakila, did not affix the documents at that address, and did not make any subsequent attempt to serve the authorised person (Mr. S.M. Khanna), who was said to return to Delhi on 20.3.1999. Counsel for the defendant accepted the summons in court on the next date of hearing and thereafter filed the present application.

The plaintiff did not deny the specific averments in para 7 that the summons were not left with Ms. Shakila and were not affixed at the address; the plaintiff only stated those averments were part of the court record. The court treated this as a non-traverse and accepted the defendant's version as correct.

The summons for judgment were accepted in court on 16.3.1999 and the Leave to Defend was filed on 26.3.1999. By the impugned order the court addressed whether the period of limitation for the Leave to Defend should be treated as commencing from the date of the attempted service at the Delhi office or from 16.3.1999 (the date the summons were accepted in court). The application was ultimately disposed of on 22.11.1999. A separate order disposed of I.A. 4923/99; the matter was renotified for consideration on 10.3.2000.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the attempted service of summons for judgment at the Delhi office on 5.3.1999 amounted to proper service when the process server did not leave a copy, did not affix a copy at a conspicuous place, and did not make further attempts after being informed the authorised person would return on 20.3.1999.
  2. Whether a defendant may, under Order XXXVII, furnish more than one address in the Memorandum of Appearance for subsequent service of summons for judgment.
  3. Whether the period of limitation for filing Leave to Defend commences from the date of the attempted service (as reported) or from the date on which the summons were accepted in court.

Arguments of the Parties

Plaintiff's Arguments

  • Order XXXVII contemplates a single address for subsequent service of the summons for judgment; because three addresses were given by the defendant, the plaintiff was not obliged to serve the defendant at all three addresses. The plaintiff relied on the singular language of the provision to argue that a defendant should not give more than one such address.
  • The plaintiff did not expressly deny the defendant's specific averments (para 7) that the process server did not leave or affix copies at the Delhi address; instead the plaintiff stated those averments were part of the court records.

Defendant's Arguments

  • The attempted service at the Delhi office was not proper because the process server did not leave a copy of the summons with Ms. Shakila, did not affix a copy at a conspicuous place, and did not make a further attempt to serve the authorised person after his return on 20.3.1999.
  • Counsel relied on the decision in Shalimar Rope Works v. Abdul Hussain, AIR 1980 SC 1163, and the procedure in Order V, Rule 17, to argue that the word "left" in service provisions requires compliance with the procedure of leaving/affixing and reporting; by analogy that meaning applies to Order XXXVII service.
  • Counsel accepted the summons in court on the next hearing date and then filed the application; thus, the defendant treated the date of acceptance in court as the operative date for limitation purposes.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Shalimar Rope Works v. Abdul Hussain, AIR 1980 SC 1163 The meaning of "leaving" or "left" in service provisions; the background and procedure in Order V (specifically Rule 17) for leaving/affixing summons where personal service cannot be effected. The court relied on this Apex Court decision to hold that the procedure in Order V, Rule 17 (leaving copies, affixing at a conspicuous place, reporting the act and making reasonable further efforts to serve an authorised person) informs the correct interpretation of "left" in Order XXXVII service; because the process server did not follow that procedure, service at the Delhi address was held not to be proper.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court's analysis proceeded in these steps, based strictly on the material in the opinion:

  1. Non-traverse and acceptance of defendant's pleaded facts: The plaintiff did not deny the specific averments in para 7 that the summons were not left with Ms. Shakila and were not affixed at the Delhi address; the court treated this as a non-traverse and accepted the defendant's version as correct.
  2. Interpretation of Order XXXVII memoranda: The court accepted the plaintiff's argument that Order XXXVII contemplates a single address in the Memorandum of Appearance for subsequent service; the court held that it is not open to a defendant to give more than one such address. However, since the plaintiff had not attempted service at the advocate's address in any event, that particular objection was of no significance in this case.
  3. Application of Order V, Rule 17 and precedent to service under Order XXXVII: Drawing on the decision in Shalimar Rope Works v. Abdul Hussain and the text of Order V, Rule 17, the court held that the meaning of the word "left" in service provisions must be understood against the general procedure prescribed by the Code. Specifically, if the process server cannot effect personal service, he is required to leave a copy, affix it at a conspicuous place, and report the circumstances; he must also use due and reasonable diligence to serve an authorised person and, if informed of the authorised person's return date, must make further attempts thereafter.
  4. Assessment of the process server's conduct: The court found that the process server did not leave a copy of the summons at the Delhi address, did not affix a copy at a conspicuous place, and did not attempt further service after being told that the authorised person (Mr. S.M. Khanna) would return on 20.3.1999. On that basis the court concluded that service at the Delhi address was not properly effected.
  5. Effect on limitation: Because the summons were accepted in court on 16.3.1999, and the Leave to Defend was filed on 26.3.1999, the court held that the period of limitation should commence from 16.3.1999 (the date of acceptance in court) rather than from the earlier attempted but improper service. As a result, there was no delay requiring condonation.

Holding and Implications

The application for condonation of delay is accepted; the court held that there was no delay requiring condonation because the period of limitation commences from 16.3.1999 (the date the summons were accepted in court), and the Leave to Defend filed on 26.3.1999 was within that period.

Direct consequences for the parties: the defendant's application for condonation succeeds and the Leave to Defend filed on 26.3.1999 is treated as timely. The court disposed of I.A. 3402/99 in these terms and noted that a separate order had been passed disposing of I.A. 4923/99; the matter was renotified for consideration on 10.3.2000.

Broader implications: The opinion applies and follows the precedent in Shalimar Rope Works v. Abdul Hussain and interprets the word "left" in service provisions in light of Order V, Rule 17; the opinion does not elaborate further on establishing any new legal principle beyond this application of existing law.

    Klg Systel Ltd. v. Fujitsu Icim Ltd.

    Vikramajit Sen, J.— This is an application filed by the defendant for condonation of delay in filing its ‘Leave to Defend’. The relevant facts are that summons for judgment were attempted to be served on the defendants on 5.3.1999 at its Delhi office; the service report records a refusal. The defendant in its ‘Memorandum of Appearance’ for service had given three addresses viz. (i) the Delhi office, (ii) Registered Office at Pune, and (iii) address of the Counsel for the defendant-Company. It appears that the Process Server went to the Delhi office and tried to serve the summons for judgment on Ms. Shakila who informed him that she only dealt with maintenance of record in the Personnel Department and was not authorised to accept summons. It is the defendant/applicant's contention as contained in para 7 of the application that the Process Server did not leave any copy of the summons for judgment with Ms. Shakila and also did not affix these documents at the said address. It is further alleged that the Process Server did not make any attempt to serve the process again even though he was specifically told that the authorised person, Mr. S.M Khanna, would return to Delhi on 20.3.1999 Counsel for the defendant accepted the summons for judgment in Court on the next date of hearing and thereafter filed the present application. The plaintiff has not denied the averments contained in para 7 to the effect that the summons were not left with Ms. Shakila and were not affixed at the said address. The averments in this application are not admitted. But the plaintiff has merely mentioned that they are part of the records of this Court. On this material issue, therefore, in my opinion, there is non-traverse, with the consequence that the version put forward by the defendant would have to be accepted as correct.

    2. Learned Counsel for the plaintiff argued that Order XXXVII contemplates the furnishing of a Single address for subsequent service of the summons for judgment, and the inasmuch as three addresses were given in this case, the plaintiff was not obligated to serve the defendant at the three addresses. A perusal of the language of the order makes it amply clear, by the use of the singular in the noun, “that it is not open to the defendant to give more than one such address”. This argument on behalf of the plaintiff is accepted. Only one address on the Memorandum of Appearance is proper. In the present case, no attempt was made to serve the defendants at the address of then Advocates; and hence this objection loses significance for this reason.

    3. Learned Counsel for the defendant, however, submits that even if this be the legal position, and only the Delhi office is taken into contemplation the service of the summons for judgment at that address is not proper and therefore not binding on the defendant. In support of the contention he relies on the judgment is Shalimar Rope Works v. Abdul Hussain, AIR 1980 SC 1163. The following observation are as follows:

    “The meaning of Clause (b) has got to be understood in the background of the provisions of the Code in Order 5 which is meant for issue and service of summons on natural persons. Sending a summons by post to the registered office of the Company, unless the contrary is shown, will be presumed to be service on the Company itself. But the first part of Clause (b) has got to be understood with reference to the other provisions of the Code. In Rule 17 of Order 5 it has been provided:

    “Where the defendant or his agent or such other person as aforesaid refuses to sign the acknowledgement or where the serving officer, after using all due and reasonable diligence, cannot find the defendant, and there is no agent empowered to accept service of the summons on his behalf, nor any other person on whom service can be made, the serving officer shall affix a copy of the summons on the outer door or some other conspicuous part of the house in which the defendant ordinarily resides or carried on business or personally works for gain, and shall then return the original to the Court from which it was issued, with a report endorsed thereon or annexed thereto stating that he has so affixed the copy, the circumstances under which he did so, and the name and address of the person (if any) by whom the house was identified and in whose presence the copy was affixed.”

    4. No doubt this case did not deal with a summary suit, but the meaning given to the word ‘leaving’ or ‘left’ would apply even to service contemplated under Order XXXVII. Had the Process Server followed the procedure set out in Order V, Rule 17 he ought to have left the summons at that particular address and made a report to that effect, simultaneously also affixing a copy of the summons on the outer door or some other conspicuous part of that office. It is also incumbent that the Process Server should make every effort to serve the authorised person. In this case, since he had been informed that Mr. S.M Khanna would return on 20.3.1999, he ought to have attempted of the service at Delhi office immediately after that date. This has admittedly not been done. Although Order XXXVII, Rule 3(2) is a deeming provision in regard with service, the word “left” must be given its true complexion the from the general procedure envisaged in the Court. Decision of the Apex Court in Shalimar Rope Works v. M/s. Abdul Hussain on a complete construction, categorically holds to this effect.

    5. Since the Process Server had not left a copy of the summons at the Delhi address furnished by the defendant in his Memorandum of Appearance, nor had made a further attempt to serve the authorise person after his return to Delhi, nor had affixed the summons at any conspicuous part of the Delhi office, I cannot but arrive at the conclusion that the defendant was not properly served with the summons for judgment.

    6. Summons for judgment were accepted in Court on 16.3.1999 and the Leave to Defend was filed on 26.3.1999, i.e within the period stipulated under the Code of Civil Procedure. The application is, therefore, accepted by holding that the period of limitation would commence from 16.3.1999 and not from the date on which service was allegedly sought to be affected on Ms. Shakila. Accordingly, there is no delay which requires to be condoned and the application is disposed of in these terms.

    22.11.1999

    I.A 3402/99 in S. No. 1553/98

    By a separate order passed today, I.A 4923/99 has been disposed of. I.A 3402/99 in S. No. 1553/98

    Renotify for consideration on 10.3.2000

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    Comments

    Klg Systel Ltd. v. Fujitsu Icim Ltd.
    (Nov 22, 1999)