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Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Attorney(S)
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Acts
  • Sections 30 and 33 of the Arbitration Act, 1940.
  • Sections 14 and 17 of the Arbitration Act
  • SECTION 30 ARBITRATION ACT
  • Clause (b) of Sub-section (1) of Section 3
  • Section 3(1)(b) of the Interest Act, 1978
  • provisions of the Interest Act, 1978.9.
  • Section 3(1) of the Interest Act, 1978.
  • provisions of Section 3(1)(b)
  • Section 35;(c)
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Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Attorney(S)
Judges
Acts
  • Sections 30 and 33 of the Arbitration Act, 1940.
  • Sections 14 and 17 of the Arbitration Act
  • SECTION 30 ARBITRATION ACT
  • Clause (b) of Sub-section (1) of Section 3
  • Section 3(1)(b) of the Interest Act, 1978
  • provisions of the Interest Act, 1978.9.
  • Section 3(1) of the Interest Act, 1978.
  • provisions of Section 3(1)(b)
  • Section 35;(c)
Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

This suit arises from a petition under Sections 14 and 17 of the Arbitration Act filed by Naresh Kumar against the Union of India and Mr. V. Nainai (the Arbitrator). The petitioner sought an order directing respondent No. 2 to file the award dated 26.7.1991 and the proceedings, and that the award of Rs. 49,242.51 with pendente lite and future interest at 18% from 26.7.1991 be made a Rule of the Court. Notice was issued to the Arbitrator and the award and proceedings were filed.

The petitioner (Naresh Kumar) and the Union of India filed objections to the award (I.As 9742/92 and 2635/94) under Sections 30 and 33 of the Arbitration Act, 1940. The petitioner challenged the award only in respect of the amounts awarded in claim No. 3 and claim No. 11; the Union challenged the award in respect of all claims (claim Nos. 1 to 12). The Court heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the award.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the award is vulnerable to being set aside under Section 30(c) of the Arbitration Act as "improperly procured or otherwise invalid."
  2. Whether the Arbitrator erred in not awarding pendente lite interest in item No. 11 and whether this Court should grant pendente lite interest despite the Arbitrator's omission (issue raised by the petitioner, with reference to AIR 1992 SC 732).
  3. Whether the learned Arbitrator could lawfully award pre-suit interest for the period 5.10.1988 to 12.8.1990 on amounts found payable (claims 1, 3, 7 and 9), having regard to Section 3(1)(b) of the Interest Act, 1978 (issue raised by the Union of India).

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner (Naresh Kumar)

  • Argued that in item No. 11 the Arbitrator erred by not awarding pendente lite interest.
  • Relied on the Supreme Court decision AIR 1992 SC 732 to contend that an Arbitrator can award pendente lite interest.
  • Submitted that if the Arbitrator felt at the time of the award that he was not legally competent to grant pendente lite interest (due to the law then prevailing), this Court might nonetheless grant pendente lite interest for the period during which arbitration proceedings were pending before the Arbitrator.

Respondent (Union of India)

  • Challenged the award in respect of all claims (1–12).
  • Asserted that the Arbitrator could not lawfully award pre-suit interest for the period 5.10.1988 to 12.8.1990 because, under Section 3(1)(b) of the Interest Act, 1978, pre-suit interest (where the claim does not relate to a debt payable by a written instrument) can be awarded only from the date mentioned in a written notice given by the person entitled to the person liable; no such written notice was given by the claimant.
  • Relied on Section 3(1) of the Interest Act, 1978 to show that the statutory preconditions for awarding pre-suit interest were not satisfied.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
AIR 1992 SC 732 Authority for the proposition that an Arbitrator can award pendente lite interest (as relied on by petitioner). The Court noted the petitioner's reliance on this decision but observed that at the time the award was made the prevailing Supreme Court law was that an Arbitrator was not competent to award pendente lite interest; therefore the Arbitrator's omission was not an error of law and the Court refused to grant pendente lite interest itself.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court began by setting out Section 30 of the Arbitration Act, which lists three grounds on which an award may be set aside: (a) misconduct by the Arbitrator or proceedings, (b) award made after court supersession or invalid arbitration, and (c) award improperly procured or otherwise invalid. The parties conceded that grounds (a) and (b) were not relied on, leaving only ground (c) for consideration.

On the question whether the award was improperly procured, the Court examined the award and the objections and concluded that the objections amounted only to parties' differing factual perceptions. The Court declined to re-adjudicate factual merits because counsel had not established apparent factual errors or conclusions in the award that were absurd.

The Court then addressed the legal objections. First, regarding the petitioner's contention about pendente lite interest in item No. 11, the Court observed that the Arbitrator expressly declined to award pendente lite interest on the basis of the Supreme Court judgment then prevailing. The Court held that the Arbitrator did not commit legal error in failing to award pendente lite interest because he applied the law as it stood when the award was made; the Arbitrator could not have foreseen any later change in Supreme Court law. Further, the Court held that it should not exercise inherent jurisdiction to grant pendente lite interest where the Arbitrator had not done so; accordingly the petitioner's objection on this point was rejected.

Second, dealing with the Union of India's objection, the Court considered the Arbitrator's award of pre-suit interest (at 12% per annum) for amounts payable under claim Nos. 1, 3, 7 and 9 for the period 5.10.1988 to 12.8.1990. The Union's attack rested on Section 3(1)(b) of the Interest Act, 1978, which permits pre-suit interest (where not relating to a written-instrument debt) only from the date specified in a written notice given by the claimant to the person liable. The petitioner's counsel, when asked, stated (on instructions) that perhaps no such written notice had been given. Given that absence of proof of the statutory written notice, the Court found that the Arbitrator could not lawfully have awarded pre-suit interest under Section 3(1)(b). The Court therefore held that the award was partly invalid insofar as it granted pre-suit interest for those amounts and that period.

On that basis the Court limited its interference to the illegality identified and otherwise declined to disturb the award.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The Court allowed the petition in part and disallowed it in part. The award was made a Rule of the Court except insofar as it granted pre-suit interest for the amounts held payable against claim Nos. 1, 3, 7 and 9 for the period 5.10.1988 to 12.8.1990 at 12% per annum, which the Court declared partly invalid. The petitioner's objection seeking pendente lite interest was rejected.

Implications:

  • The award is confirmed and to be made a Rule of Court except for the specified illegality concerning pre-suit interest; the parties are to have a decree prepared for the sum admissible as a consequence of this order.
  • The Court declined to exercise inherent jurisdiction to grant pendente lite interest where the Arbitrator, applying the law as then understood, did not award it.
  • No broader new precedent is announced by this decision beyond the Court's application of existing law to the facts: the decision directly affects only the parties by upholding the award largely and excising the pre-suit interest component found unlawful.

Disposition: Suit and objections disposed of; decree to be prepared; award made Rule of Court (subject to the qualification stated above).

    Naresh Kumar v. Union Of India.

    A.K Srivastava, J.— This suit relates to a petition under Sections 14 and 17 of the Arbitration Act moved by one Naresh Kumar against Union of India and Mr. V. Nainai, the Arbitrator. In this petition it was prayed that respondent No. 2, the Arbitrator, be directed to file award, dated 26.7.1991 and the proceedings relating thereto in this Court and that the award of Rs. 49,242.51 paise alongwith pendente lite and future interest at a rate of 18 per cent from 26.7.1991 be made a Rule of the Court. On filing of this petition, notice was issued to respondent No. 2 with a direction to file the award alongwith the proceedings. The same were filed. Therefore petitioner Naresh Kumar as well as respondent Union of India filed objections against the award which are I.As 9742/92 and 2635/94 respectively. Both the objections are under Sections 30 and 33 of the Arbitration Act, 1940. Petitioner Naresh Kumar challenged the award in respect of the awarded amount in claim No. 3 and claim No. 11 only. On the other hand, the respondent Union of India challenged the award in respect of all the claims, that is to say, claim No. 1 to claim No. 12.

    2. Heard the learned Counsels for the parties and perused the award.

    3. Section 30 of the Arbitration Act provides the grounds on which the award may be set aside. The grounds are as follows:

    “(a) that an Arbitrator or Umpire has misconducted himself or the proceedings;

    (b) that an award has been made after the issue of an order by the Court superseding the arbitration or after arbitration proceedings have become invalid under Section 35;

    (c) that an award has been improperly procured or is otherwise invalid.”

    4. Learned Counsel for the parties concede that grounds (a) and (b) above are not the grounds in their objections. Therefore, the only thing to be seen is whether the award has been improperly procured or is otherwise invalid.

    5. I have gone through the award and the objections. By no stretch of imagination it can be said that the award has been improperly procured. The objections are only on the grounds of the individual perceptions of the petitioner and the respondent Union of India so far as the factual position is concerned. I do not wish to enter into the factual merits of the award because the learned Counsel for the parties could not make out a case that there have been apparent factual errors in the award amount or that the conclusions arrived at by the learned Arbitrator are in absurdity.

    6. There are some legal objections raised by the petitioner as well as by respondent No. 1. I am inclined to consider those legal objections and to give findings.

    7. One of the objections of the petitioner is that in item No. 11, the learned Arbitrator has committed a legal error in not awarding pendente lite interest. According to him as per the law laid down by the Supreme Court in AIR 1992 SC 732, the Arbitrator can award pendente lite interest. Learned Counsel further says that if the learned Arbitrator, in view of the law then prevailing when the award was made, did not consider himself legally competent to award pendente lite interest then now this Court may grant pendente lite interest for the period arbitration proceedings were pending before the learned Arbitrator. On perusal of the award at item No. 11, it is to be found that the, learned Arbitrator did not award pendente lite interest by nothing that in view of the Supreme Court judgment, no pendente lite interest could be awarded. He, however, awarded future interest at a rate of 12 per cent per annum from the date of the award to the date of payment or decree of the Court whichever was earlier. It is admitted by the learned Counsel for the parties that on the date when the award was made the legal position as laid down by the Supreme Court then was that the Arbitrator was not competent to award pendente lite interest. Therefore, it cannot be said that the learned Arbitrator committed an error in law in not awarding pendente lite interest. He, of course, could not have known that in future the Supreme Court would change the law. Therefore, the petitioner's ground of attack on this point is not legally sustainable. The objection of the petitioner in this ground is, therefore, rejected. Regarding grant of pendente lite interest by this Court is concerned, I am of the view, that when no pendente lite interest has been awarded by the Arbitrator this Court should not exercise inherent jurisdiction to grant pendente lite interest for the period while the proceedings were pending before the learned Arbitrator. As such, I do not intend to interfere with the award on this count.

    8. From the side of the Union of India, the one legal point raised was that the learned Arbitrator could not legally award pre-suit interest for the period from 5.10.1988 to 12.8.1990 On perusal of the award in claim No. 11, it transpires that the learned Arbitrator has awarded pre-suit interest for amounts held payable against claim Nos. 1, 3, 7 and 9 for the period from 5.10.1988 to 12.8.1990 at a rate of 12 per cent per annum. The ground of attack from the side of the Union of India is based on the provisions of the Interest Act, 1978.

    9. According to him, since the petitioner did not give a written notice to the respondent, Union of India that the Union of India would be liable to pay interest, the learned Arbitrator could not have awarded pre-suit interest. For that he invited attention of this Court to Section 3(1) of the Interest Act, 1978. It reads as follows:

    “3. Power of Court to allow interest:—(1) Any proceedings for the recovery of any debt or damages or in any proceedings in which a claim for interest in respect of any debt or damages already paid is made, the Court may, if it thinks fit, allow interest to the person entitled to the debt or damages or to the person making such claim, as the case may be, at a rate not exceeding the current rate of interest, for the whole or part of the following period, that is to say -

    (a) if the proceedings relate to a debt payable by virtue of a written instrument at a certain time, then, from the date when the debt is payable to the date of institution of the proceedings;

    (b) if the proceedings do not relate to any such debt, then from the date mentioned in this regard in a written notice given by the person entitled or the person making the claim to the person liable that interest will be claimed, to the date of institution of the proceedings:

    Provided that where the amount of the debt or damages has been repaid before the institution of the proceedings interest shall not be allowed under this section for the period after such repayment.”

    10. According to him, the aforesaid Clause (b) of Sub-section (1) of Section 3 is attracted to the issue under hand. The amount found to be due to the claimant is admittedly not a debt payable by virtue of the written statement and, therefore, when the arbitration proceedings did not relate to such debt, then the learned Arbitrator could award pre-suit interest only from the date mentioned in this regard in a written notice given by the person entitled or the person making the claim to the person liable. Learned Counsel for Union of India firmly asserted that no such notice was given by the claimant to the respondent, Union of India and, therefore, the learned Arbitrator was in legal error in awarding pre-suit interest.

    11. Learned Counsel for the petitioner was asked to make a categorical statement whether any notice as is contemplated under Section 3(1)(b) of the Interest Act, 1978 was ever given by the petitioner to the respondent and if so what was the proof of the same. Learned Counsel for petitioner, on instructions, gave a statement that perhaps no such notice was ever given. In these circumstances, it is clear that the learned Arbitrator could not have given pre-suit interest, if the provisions of Section 3(1)(b) were not complied with by the claimant. Accordingly, I hold that the award is partly invalid so far as it relates to grant of pre-suit interest for the amounts held payable against claim Nos. 1 3, 7 and 9 for the period from 5.10.1988 to 12.8.1990 at a rate of 12 per cent per annum. Except for that I do not interfere with the award.

    12. The award be made Rule of the Court except to the extent of the aforesaid illegality.

    13. Suit and the objections are disposed of, accordingly.

    Let a decree be prepared accordingly for such sum as is admissible as a consequence of this order.

    Award made Rule of Court

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    Comments

    Naresh Kumar v. Union Of India.
    (Dec 1, 1998)