Translate
Text Highlighter

Bookmark

PDF

Share

Report a problem
AMICUS AI
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Attorney(S)
Judges
Acts
  • provisions of Clause 4(d)
Are you a practicing lawyer?
Enhance your digital presence and reach by creating a Casemine profile.
Upload pleading to use the new AI search
Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Attorney(S)
Judges
Acts
  • provisions of Clause 4(d)
Smart Summary

Opinion Summary — Dr. M.K. Sharma, J.

Factual and Procedural Background

The plaintiffs instituted this suit against the defendants seeking declaration and partition of the property bearing No. 313, Faiz Road, Gali Nos. 10 and 11, Karol Bagh, New Delhi. The plaintiffs also sought declarations that three Agreements to Sale dated 15.1.1973, 18.12.1974 and 6.12.1978 relating to the suit property were not legal, valid or binding upon them.

On admissions by the plaintiffs and defendants Nos. 1 and 5, this Court passed a preliminary decree on 8.3.1996 declaring the plaintiffs and defendant No.1 to have half share and defendant No.5 to have the remaining half (in the light of the judgment in Sardar Singh v. Smt. Krishna Devi & Anr.). The Court appointed Mr. V.K. Seth, Advocate, as Local Commissioner to report whether the property could be partitioned by metes and bounds between defendant No.5 and defendant No.1 (with plaintiffs) according to the shares so determined. The Local Commissioner inspected the property and, by report dated 5.8.1996, opined the property could be divided by metes and bounds and suggested mutual agreement or draw of lots to fix respective portions.

The plaintiffs filed objections to the Local Commissioner's report contending inter alia that the property could not be divided by metes and bounds for stated reasons. The Court heard counsel for the plaintiffs and for defendant Nos. 5 and 6, considered the report and objections, and thereafter proceeded to determine the matter and pass a final decree.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the suit property is divisible by metes and bounds.
  2. Whether terms of the lease (Clause 4(d) and related clauses) prohibiting sub-division of land preclude partition of the property, including the superstructure.
  3. Whether proposed division would violate the Municipal Corporation of Delhi bye-laws (including minimum room area and requirements for approval for constructing dividing walls) or otherwise render the division impermissible.
  4. Whether practical issues such as separate water and electricity meters or potential structural damage from erecting a dividing wall prevent division.

Arguments of the Parties

Plaintiffs' Arguments

  • The Local Commissioner erred in holding that the property could be divided by metes and bounds; the property is not divisible.
  • The lease (Clause 4(d)) specifically prohibits subdivision of the land, and therefore the property cannot be divided by metes and bounds.
  • The proposed division would violate statutory rules / Municipal Corporation of Delhi bye-laws because it would reduce the area of rooms below the minimum standards in the bye-laws.
  • The division does not contemplate separate water and electricity meters and therefore cannot be effected.
  • Construction of a dividing wall would require sanction from the L. & D.O. and the Municipal Corporation under clauses 4 and 5 of the lease; erecting such a wall would substantially damage the roof and entail substantial repairs.

Defendant Nos. 5 and 6

The opinion does not contain a detailed account of defensive arguments; however, it records that defendant No.6, who has obtained a decree against defendant No.1 (execution pending), opted for the 'A' portion of the suit property during arguments before this Court and before the Executing Court.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Sardar Singh v. Smt. Krishna Devi & Anr. reported in Vol. 54 (1994) DLT 500 (Supreme Court) The Supreme Court specifically held that the present suit property is divisible and could be divided. The Court relied on this authority to reject the plaintiffs' primary contention that the property is not divisible by metes and bounds.
Sardar Singh v. Smt. Krishna Devi & Anr reported JT 1994(3) SC 465 Same holding as cited above regarding divisibility of the property. Repeated reference to the same authority to support the conclusion that the property is divisible and that the Local Commissioner's view was correct on divisibility.
Chiranjilal & Anr. v. Bhagwan Dass & Ors. reported in 1991(3), Delhi Lawyers 350 Held that a superstructure standing on land could be divided. The Court invoked this decision to reject the plaintiffs' submission that a lease prohibition on subdivision of land prevents partition of the superstructure; the Court held the superstructure could be divided notwithstanding prohibition on subdividing the land.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court proceeded step-by-step from the Local Commissioner's report and the plaintiffs' objections:

  1. The Court accepted the Local Commissioner's factual findings that the property could be divided by metes and bounds, after inspection and hearing of parties.
  2. On the legal question of divisibility, the Court relied on the Supreme Court decision in Sardar Singh (cited twice in the opinion) which had specifically held that the suit property is divisible; in view of that authority the Court rejected the plaintiffs' primary objection to divisibility.
  3. Regarding the lease prohibition (Clause 4(d)) on sub-division of the land, the Court distinguished between land and superstructure: even if the land beneath the superstructure could not be subdivided, there is no legal bar to dividing the superstructure. The Court cited Chiranjilal v. Bhagwan Dass to support the proposition that a superstructure can be divided, and therefore rejected the lease-based objection.
  4. The Court examined the plaintiffs' contention that the proposed division would violate Municipal Corporation of Delhi bye-laws (minimum room area). The Court reviewed the municipal bye-laws and concluded that a vertical division with a partition wall would not reduce areas below the standards. The Court recorded that counsel for the plaintiffs agreed with this conclusion during arguments.
  5. On practical objections: the Court held that separate water and electricity meters could be applied for and obtained if necessary, so lack of separate meters was not a bar to division.
  6. On the contention that erecting a dividing wall would require sanction of the L. & D.O and the Municipal Corporation (per clauses 4 and 5 of the lease) and would damage the roof, the Court referred to bye-laws 6.4.1(j) and 6.4.1.0 which, as read by the Court, permit partition walls to divide rooms without requiring permission from the Municipal Corporation. The Court therefore rejected the objections about permission and potential roof damage, finding instead that the dividing wall would lend extra support to the roof.
  7. The Court noted the Local Commissioner's map marking two portions ('A' and 'B') and observed both portions have separate entry points; accordingly, the Court found no difficulty in dividing the property vertically into 'A' and 'B'. It also recorded that defendant No.6 had opted for the 'A' portion.
  8. On this basis, the Court concluded that all objections raised by the plaintiffs were without merit and were overruled, and proceeded to pass a final decree confirming the earlier preliminary decree as between the plaintiffs and defendant No.1 on the one hand and defendant No.5 on the other.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The Court passed a final decree confirming the preliminary decree to the extent between the plaintiffs and defendant No.1 on the one hand and defendant No.5 on the other. The Court declared defendant No.5 to be the owner of the 'B' portion of the suit property and held that he shall be entitled to receive vacant physical possession of that part. The map showing the division into 'A' and 'B' shall form part of the decree.

Implications: The direct effect is that defendant No.5 is entitled to ownership and vacant possession of the 'B' portion and the suit stands decreed to that extent, confirming the earlier preliminary decree passed on agreement between the plaintiff, defendant No.1 and defendant No.5. The Court expressly clarified that this order does not decide the dispute, suit or execution case pending between the plaintiff, defendant No.1 and defendant No.6, and that observations made in this judgment are not to be interpreted as deciding matters among those parties. The opinion does not purport to lay down a broader legal precedent beyond application to the present parties.

    Mohinder Singhpetitioner v. Kartar Lal.S

    Dr. M.K Sharma, J.— The present suit was instituted by the plaintiffs against the defendants, seeking for declaration and partition in respect of the property bearing No. 313, Faiz Road, Gali Nos. 10 and 11, Karol Bagh, New Delhi. The plaintiffs also prayed for a declaration that the Agreement to Sale dated 15.1.1973, 18.12.1974 and 6.12.1978 pertaining to the aforesaid suit property are not legal and valid and not binding upon the plaintiffs.

    2. On the admission of the plaintiffs and the defendants No. 1 and 5, this Court by order dated 8.3.1996 passed a preliminary decree in the suit declaring the share of the plaintiffs and the defendant No. 1 in the suit property as half share and the share of the defendant No. 5 in the light of the judgment in the case of Sardar Singh v. Smt. Krishna Devi & Anr. reported in Vol. 54 (1994) DLT 500 (Supreme Court) as the remaining half in the suit property.

    3. By a further order, the Court appointed Mr. V.K Seth, Advocate, as a Local Commissioner to report as to whether the suit property could be partitioned/divided by metes and bounds between defendant No. 5 and defendant No. 1 (with plaintiffs) as per the share determined above. It was made clear that the aforesaid preliminary decree with regard to shares of defendants Nos. 1 and 5 as ordered would not effect the right of the defendant No. 1 and 6 in any manner either in the execution proceedings initiated by the defendant No. 6 which was pending before the Executing Court or in the present suit. It may be stated that the defendant No. 6 has been declared as the owner in respect of the share owned by the defendant No. 1 in the suit property and obtained a decree which is pending for execution.

    4. The Local Commissioner heard the parties, inspected the suit property and considered the documents filed by the parties. Thereafter, the Local Commissioner submitted his report to this Court on 5.8.1996 In the said report, the Local Commissioner has opined that the property could be divided by metes and bounds and the parties could mutually agree for the portion which they want to have or in case of differences, the respective portions could be decided by draw of lot.

    5. As against the aforesaid report filed by the Local Commissioner, the plaintiffs filed an objection, contending inter alia, that the Local Commissioner has erred in holding that the property could be divided by metes and bounds. In the objection filed by the plaintiffs, the ground for which the property could not be divided by metes and bounds have been set out.

    6. I have heard the learned counsel appbaring for the plaintiffs as also the counsel appearing for defendant Nos. 5 and 6.

    7. The first contention raised by the counsel for the plaintiffs that the property is not divisible by metes and bounds cannot be accepted in view of the specific observations of the Supreme Court in the case of Sardar Singh v. Smt. Krishna Devi & Anr. reported JT 1994(3) SC 465. The Supreme Court in the aforesaid case has specifically held that the present suit property is divisible and could be divided. In that view of the matter, the first objection of the plaintiffs stands rejected.

    8. The next submission of the learned counsel for the plaintiffs is that the terms of the lease specifically prohibits division of property and as such the property could not be divided by metes and bounds. In this connection, the counsel drew my attention to the provisions of Clause 4(d) of the Lease Deed wherein, it has been stipulated that there could be no sub-division of the land. However, it is to be noted that the suit property consists of not only land but also the superstructure standing thereon. Accordingly, even if it is held that the land beneath the superstructure may not be divisible, there is no bar under any law to make any division with regard to the superstructure standing on the land. In this connection, reference may also be made to the decision of this Court in Chiranjilal & Anr. v. Bhagwan Dass & Ors. reported in 1991(3), Delhi Lawyers 350, wherein it has been held that superstructure standing on a land could be divided. Therefore, this objection also has not merit and is accordingly rejected.

    The further objection of the learned counsel for the plaintiffs is that the property as suggested by the Local Commissioner cannot be divided since the same would lead to violation of the statutory rules of the Municipal Corporation of Delhi. The division of the property, if done, as suggested by the Local Commissioner, it is argued, would reduce the area of the rooms below the minimum provided for under the Municipal Bye-laws.

    9. I have been taken through the provisions of the Municipal Bye-laws and on perusal thereof, I find that there is no merit in the objection raised by the plaintiffs on this count also. In my considered opinion which is agreed to by the counsel for the plaintiffs during the course of arguments, if the property is divided vertically and a partition wall erected, the same also would not, in any case, reduce the area below the standard provided under the building bye-laws of the Municipal Corporation of Delhi. Accordingly, this objection is also over-ruled.

    10. The next submission of the learned counsel for the plaintiffs was that there could be no division as the said division does not contemplate any division of water meter and electricity meter. I do not find any reason to uphold the said objection as separate water meter and electricity meter could be applied for and obtained, if the necessity for the same arises.

    11. The further submission is that the proposed division will necessitate construction of dividing wall which will not be permissible without sanction from the L.& D.O and Municipal Corporation of Delhi as per clause 4 and 5 of the lease agreement and if such a dividing wall is allowed to be erected, the same would damage the roof of the property substantially entailing substantial repairs. In this connection, reference may be made to bye-laws 6.4.1(j) of the Municipal Bye-laws which states that partition walls could be erected for dividing rooms and for that purpose, no permission from the Municipal Corporation of Delhi is necessary. In the light of the provisions of bye-laws 6.4.1.0, this objection has no merit and accordingly, rejected. The allegation that the dividing wall would damage the roof of the property is also without any merit as instead of damaging the roof, it would lend an extra support to the roof.

    12. All the objections raised by the plaintiffs are therefore, found to be without any merit and the same are rejected. The defendant No. 6 who has obtained a decree as against the defendant No. 1, and execution proceeding in respect of the said decree is pending in the Court. During the course of arguments before me and also before the Executing Court, the defendant No.6 has opted for ‘A’ portion of the suit property. The two portions namely ‘A’ and' B' portions of the suit property is marked in the map, which is on record. I find that both the portions namely, ‘A’ and ‘B’ as shown in the map have separate entry points and, therefore, I do no see any difficulty in dividing the suit property vertically and thereby creating two portions as ‘A’ and ‘B’ as shown in the map.

    13. In the result, a final decree in the suit is passed between the plaintiffs and the defendant No. 1 on the one hand and the defendant No. 5 on the other hand. The defendant No. 5 is declared to be the owner of ‘B’ portion of the suit property and he shall be entitled to receive vacant physical possession of the said part of the suit property. The suit stands decreed to that extent confirming the preliminary decree passed by this Court on agreement reached between the plaintiff, the defendant No. 1 and defendant No. 5. Map showing the aforesaid division of the property into ‘A’ and ‘B’ portions shall also form part of the decree. It is, however, made clear that this order in any manner does not decide the dispute/suit/execution case pending between the plaintiff, defendant No.1 and defendant No.6 Any observation made herein would not be interpreted as any observation in respect of the dispute amongst the plaintiff, the defendant No.1 and the defendant No.6 Let a decree be drawn up in terms of the present judgement and order.

    Use AI to get other relevant cases.

    Comments

    Mohinder Singhpetitioner v. Kartar Lal.S
    (Mar 17, 1997)