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  • Section 2(f) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, hereinafter referred to as the Act.
  • sub-section(5) of Section 2. Sub-section (2) of Section 1
  • Section 61 to Section 81. Supplementary provisions
  • FOREIGN EXCHANGE REGULATION ACT
  • sub-sections (4), (5), (6), (7), (8) and (10) of Section 11
  • SECTION 8 ARBITRATION ACT 1940
  • provisions of sub-section (5) of Section 2
  • ARBITRATION AND CONCILIATION ACT 1996
  • Sub-section (12)(a) of Section 11
  • provisions of sub section (4),
  • sub-section (5) of Section 2
  • sub-section (2) of Section 1,
  • Section 44 to Section 60,
  • Section 82 to Section 86.
  • Section 8 and Section 11
  • Section 8 and Section 20
  • Section 2 to Section 43,
  • Section 2 to Section 11,
  • sub-sections (4), (5), (6), (7), (8)
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Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Attorney(S)
Judges
Acts
  • Section 2(f) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, hereinafter referred to as the Act.
  • sub-section(5) of Section 2. Sub-section (2) of Section 1
  • Section 61 to Section 81. Supplementary provisions
  • FOREIGN EXCHANGE REGULATION ACT
  • sub-sections (4), (5), (6), (7), (8) and (10) of Section 11
  • SECTION 8 ARBITRATION ACT 1940
  • provisions of sub-section (5) of Section 2
  • ARBITRATION AND CONCILIATION ACT 1996
  • Sub-section (12)(a) of Section 11
  • provisions of sub section (4),
  • sub-section (5) of Section 2
  • sub-section (2) of Section 1,
  • Section 44 to Section 60,
  • Section 82 to Section 86.
  • Section 8 and Section 11
  • Section 8 and Section 20
  • Section 2 to Section 43,
  • Section 2 to Section 11,
  • sub-sections (4), (5), (6), (7), (8)
Smart Summary

Structured Summary of the Opinion — Dr. M. K. Sharma, J.

Factual and Procedural Background

The petitioner entered an initial agreement with Zavody Vseobecneho-Strojirenstvi (ZVS) on 12 July 1982, under which ZVS developed, tested and manufactured the Adast Dominant 714 press and agreed to supply technical documentation, knowhow and grant usage rights to the petitioner for manufacture, assembly, use and sale. The petitioner subsequently entered into two further agreements with ZVS dated 18 July 1986 and 25 July 1986 concerning Adast Dominant 514 and Adast Dominant 725.

Disputes arose between the parties in relation to the two 1986 agreements. The petitioner filed the present petition seeking a reference to arbitration under the arbitration clause in the agreements. The respondent appeared and filed a reply challenging maintainability on grounds of territorial jurisdiction, subject-matter jurisdiction, non-party status to the 1986 agreements, and that the agreements had lapsed by efflux of time. The Court framed three issues for decision:

  1. Whether there was any agreement valid and subsisting between the parties.
  2. Whether this Court has jurisdiction to try and decide the present petition.
  3. Whether the disputes raised in the petition could be referred for arbitration in terms of the arbitration clause?

The parties were heard at length and the Court delivered detailed reasons and conclusions on these issues.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether there was any agreement valid and subsisting between the parties (i.e., whether the 18.7.1986 and 25.7.1986 agreements remained in force).
  2. Whether this High Court has jurisdiction (both subject-matter and territorial) to try and decide the present petition seeking arbitration-related reliefs.
  3. Whether the disputes raised could be referred to arbitration in terms of the arbitration clause contained in the agreements.

Arguments of the Parties

Respondent's Arguments

  • The petition is not maintainable for want of territorial jurisdiction and for want of subject-matter jurisdiction.
  • The respondent was not a party to the 18.7.1986 and 25.7.1986 agreements and therefore cannot be bound by them.
  • The agreements had lapsed by efflux of time and were not subsisting, so no reference could be made under the arbitration clause.
  • Because the respondent is a body corporate incorporated outside India, the dispute is an "international commercial arbitration" under Section 2(f) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (the “Act”), and section 11(12)(a) makes references to “Chief Justice” mean the Chief Justice of India for such arbitrations; thus the Chief Justice of India alone has jurisdiction to appoint arbitrators — not the Chief Justice of the Delhi High Court.
  • Part I of the Act (which contains Sections 2–43, including Sections 8 and 11) applies only where the place of arbitration is in India; here the place of arbitration is London and the tribunal is the International Chambers of Commerce in Paris, so Part I does not apply and Part II applies instead.
  • The arbitrator is named in the agreement (ICC Paris) and the petitioner did not serve any notice asking the respondent to concur in reference to that named tribunal; therefore the petition under Section 11 is not maintainable.
  • No part of the cause of action arose within the territorial jurisdiction of this Court: the arbitration agreement was executed in Czechoslovakia, drawings/designs and technology were to be supplied in that country and payment of consideration was to be made there.

Petitioner's Arguments

  • The petitioner relied on provisions of the Act, including sub-section (2) of Section 1 and sub-section (5) of Section 2, to contend Part I can apply and to support the exercise of powers under the Act by Indian courts.
  • The petitioner maintained that although the respondent now exists as Adamovske Strojirny (formed in 1992), ZVS was split and the respondent became the successor/assignee of the business/rights of ZVS; clause 5.03 of the agreements binds successors and assignees.
  • Documentary evidence (a Government of Czech Republic decision dated 4.3.1992, a protocol Ex. P-8 between Adast/KOVO and the petitioner, vouchers, and a letter dated 11.4.1995 in which the respondent referred to itself as the successor) support the claim that the respondent is the successor in interest to ZVS and thus bound by the agreements.
  • As to effective date/expiration, the petitioner argued that although an approval letter of 22.5.1987 existed, that was an initial approval valid for six months and subsequent Reserve Bank of India approval obtained on 8.4.1992 was the last approval required under Indian law for the agreements to be valid; if the 1992 RBI approval is taken as the effective date, the agreements would remain valid until 2000.
  • The petitioner acknowledged an admission in a separate plaint (suit No. 1448/94) that the agreements expired in July 1994, but asserted this was an inadvertent bona fide mistake and sought to amend that pleading (the amendment application was dismissed by the Court in that suit).

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Union Of India v. Chaman Lal Loona, AIR 1957 SC 652 Relied upon by respondent's counsel in support of the contention that a successor or assignee should not automatically be treated as a "party" to an arbitration agreement (i.e., limits on extending 'party' to successors/assignees). The opinion records that the respondent relied on this decision, but the Court did not adopt the respondent's position; instead the Court examined the contractual clause on successors and factual evidence and concluded the respondent was a successor in interest. The Court therefore did not treat this precedent as dispositive in favour of the respondent on the facts.
Anakapalle Cooperative Agricultural and Industrial Society Ltd. v. Workned & Others, AIR 1963 SC 1489 Set out relevant factors to be considered in determining whether one entity is the successor of another. The Court applied the factors from this decision to the factual matrix, weighed contemporaneous documentary evidence (government decision, protocol, vouchers, letters) and concluded that the respondent is the successor in interest of ZVS.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court proceeded in a stepwise statutory and factual analysis:

  1. Scope and classification of the dispute: The Court considered Section 2(f) of the Act (definition of "international commercial arbitration") and observed that the respondent is a body corporate incorporated outside India; accordingly the dispute prima facie falls within the definition of an international commercial arbitration.
  2. Applicability of Part I and the power to appoint or refer to arbitrators: The respondent argued that for international commercial arbitration the reference to "Chief Justice" in Section 11 must be read as Chief Justice of India (per Section 11(12)(a)), so only the Chief Justice of India can exercise appointment powers. The Court examined the structure of the Act (Parts I–IV), sub-section (2) of Section 1 (territorial extent), the proviso to Section 1(2), and sub-section (5) of Section 2, and concluded that Part I is not wholly excluded from application to international commercial arbitrations. The Court emphasized a distinction between:
    • Section 8 — power of a judicial authority to refer parties to arbitration (i.e., to direct reference to an arbitrator where a suit raises a dispute covered by an arbitration agreement); and
    • Section 11 — machinery for appointment of arbitrators when parties have not agreed on an appointment procedure or procedure fails.
    The Court found that these provisions operate in different fields and that Section 8 is the applicable provision when a named arbitrator exists and a party seeks a judicial reference to arbitration.
  3. Application of the Sections to the facts: Because the agreements named the International Chambers of Commerce (ICC) in Paris as the arbitrator and the petitioner had not given notice to the respondent invoking the named tribunal, the Court held Section 8 (reference by a judicial authority) — not Section 11 (appointment machinery) — applied. Under Section 8 a judicial authority before whom an action is brought shall refer parties to arbitration. The Court also noted that using an incorrect statutory provision does not necessarily render a petition non-maintainable where another provision would support the relief.
  4. Territorial jurisdiction: The Court rejected the respondent's territorial jurisdiction objection. It relied on facts that drawings, technical knowhow and components were to be supplied within the jurisdiction of the Court; that the respondent had entered into a separate contract with a Delhi firm; and that approval from the Central Government (located in Delhi) was required for certain approvals. On these bases the Court concluded the Delhi High Court had territorial jurisdiction.
  5. Successor status of the respondent: The petitioner relied on clause 5.03 (agreements bind successors) and produced documentation — a Czech Government decision of 4.3.1992 approving privatization (translated decision dated 24.3.1992 on record), a protocol (Ex. P-8) showing Adast/KOVO agreement to supply documentation, vouchers, and a letter dated 11.4.1995 in which the respondent referred to itself as "state enterprise Adamov and its legal successors, Adamovske Strojirny a.s." The Court referred to the Anakapalle factors and, considering the documentary record and admissions, concluded the respondent is a successor in interest to ZVS and therefore bound by the agreements under clause 5.03.
  6. Whether the agreements had lapsed by efflux of time: The Court examined definitions in the agreements (effective date = date of last required approval by law of the respective countries; expiration date = eighth anniversary of effective date). The petitioner had an admission in a separate plaint (suit No. 1448/94) that the agreements expired in July 1994, and the petitioner’s attempt to amend that pleading was dismissed in that suit.
  7. Evidence concerning effective date: The Court considered a Government of India approval letter dated 22.5.1987 (approval valid for six months) and subsequent documentary material. The petitioner argued the RBI approval dated 8.4.1992 was the last required approval and hence the effective date; the respondent argued the 22.5.1987 approval made the agreements effective from that date and the drawing deliveries in 1988 were within the 12 months delivery time from the effective date.
  8. Conclusion on lapse: Taking the evidence together (including Ex. R-3, a hand note showing the collaborations approved in 1987 which included these agreements, and the fact that drawings were supplied in 1988), the Court held the effective date could be computed from 22.5.1987 and hence the agreements had eight-year terms running to May 1995. The Court rejected the petitioner’s argument that the 1992 RBI approval should be taken as the effective date. Consequently, the agreements lapsed by efflux of time latest by May 1995.
  9. Consequence for arbitration reference: The appointment by the respondent of M/s Amit International as sole selling agent in India (advertised May 1996) occurred after the agreements had expired; therefore, the disputes alleged by the petitioner in paragraph 20 of the petition did not give rise to referable issues under the arbitration clause.

Holding and Implications

Holding:

  • DISMISSED — The petition is dismissed as having no merit, but without any cost to the parties.

Court's specific conclusions on the framed issues:

  • Issue No. 1: Although valid agreements existed, they expired by efflux of time (at least by May 1995); consequently after that date there was no valid and subsisting agreement between the parties. (Decision against the petitioner.)
  • Issue No. 2: The Court held that it has jurisdiction to try and decide the present petition. (Decision in favour of the petitioner.)
  • Issue No. 3: The disputes raised in the petition cannot be referred for arbitration. (Decision against the petitioner.)

Implications:

  • Direct effect: The petition seeking reference to arbitration is dismissed; the respondent is treated as the successor in interest to ZVS for purposes of the agreements on the facts found; and the Court found the agreements had expired by efflux of time and thus no referable disputes arose under them after expiry.
  • Broader precedent: The Court did not state that it was laying down any new legal precedent; it applied statutory interpretation and established case-law factors (Anakapalle) to the facts. The opinion therefore confines itself to resolving the parties' disputes on the particular statutory and factual record before it.

This summary is strictly confined to and drafted from the contents of the provided opinion. No additional facts, outcomes or legal developments beyond the text of the opinion have been added.

    Dominant Offset Pvt. Ltd v. Adamovske Strojirny A. S.

    Dr. M. K. Sharma, J.— The petitioner entered into an agreement with Zavody Vseobecneho-Strojirenstvi, hereinafter referred to as ZVS on 12th of July, 1982. In the said agreement, it was stipulated that ZVS had developed, tested and was manufacturing automatic offset press Adast Dominant 714 and that the petitioner was desirous of acquiring the technical documentation and knowhow for the said product and that ZVS was able and willing to supply the petitioner with the technical documentation, knowhow and to grant to the petitioner the right to use said documentation and knowhow for the manufacture, assembly, use and sale of the product. Subsequently, the petitioner entered into the agreements dated 18.7.1986 and 25.7.1986 with ZVS for Adast Dominant 514 and Adast Dominant 725 respectively. Subsequent thereto, it is stated in the petition that disputes arose between the parties in respect of the aforesaid two agreements and accordingly the present petition has been filed by the petitioner praying for reference to arbitration in terms of the arbitration clause in the agreements concerning enforcement of the terms of the aforesaid agreements.

    2. The respondent, on service of notice, appeared in the case and submitted its reply, contending inter alia, that the petition is not maintainable both on the ground of want of territorial jurisdiction and relating to the subject matter. It was further contended that the respondent was not party to the agreements dated 18.7.1986 and 25.7.1986 forming subject matter of the present arbitration petition and also that the said agreements having lapsed by efflux of time were not subsisting and, therefore, no reference could be made in terms of the arbitration clause of the said agreements. On the basis of the pleadings of the parties, this Court framed three issues in the following manner:—

    (i) Whether there was any agreement valid and subsisting between the parties.

    (ii) Whether this Court has jurisdiction to try and decide the present petition.

    (iii) Whether the disputes raised in the petition could be referred for arbitration in terms of the arbitration clause?

    3. I have heard Mr. Arun Jaitley appearing for the petitioner as also Mr. L. R. Gupta appearing for the respondent at considerable length. In the light of the submissions advanced by the learned counsel appearing for the parties, let me first take up for consideration the issue raised by the respondent with regard to the maintainability of the petition on the ground that this Court has no jurisdiction to try and decide the present petition. Mr. Gupta appearing for the respondent submitted that this Court has no jurisdiction to entertain the present petition in view of the fact that the present is a case of international commercial arbitration as defined in Section 2(f) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, hereinafter referred to as “the Act”. The learned counsel drew my attention to the definition of Section 2(f) of the Act which defines the expression “international commercial arbitration”. The said definition is as follows:—

    “2(f). “International commercial arbitration” means an arbitration relating to disputes arising out of legal relationships, whether contractual or not, considered as commercial under the law in froce in India and where at least one of the parties is:—

    (i) an individual who is a national of, or habitually resident in, any country other than India; or

    (ii) a body corporate which is incorporated in any country other than India; or

    (iii) a company or an association or a body of individuals whose central management and control is exercised in any country other than India; or

    (iv) the Government of a foreign country.

    4. In terms of the aforesaid definition of the expression “international commercial arbitration” where at least one of the parties is an individual having nationality of another country other than India or a body corporate which is incorporated in any country other than India or an association or a body of individuals whose central management and control is exercised in any country other than India or the Government of a foreign country, the same would be a case of international commercial arbitration. The respondent herein is a body corporate which is incorporated in a country other than India and, therefore, in terms of the aforesaid definition, the present admittedly is a case of international commercial arbitration. Relying on the provisions of section 11(9) of the Act, the learned counsel submitted before me that the Chief Justice of India alone has jurisdiction to appoint arbitrators in view of sub-section 12(a) of section 11. Reference to Chief Justice in sub-sections (4), (5), (6), (7), (8) and (10) of Section 11 is to be construed as a reference to the Chief Justice of India under the said Act. On the basis of the said provisions, the learned counsel submitted that the present petition seeking a reference from the Chief Justice of Delhi High Court is wholly incompetent. According to him, the jurisdiction to entertain a petition under Sections 9 and 11 of the Act in the case of international commercial arbitration is only with Chief Justice of India and not with Chief Justice of Delhi High Court. His further contention was that the present petition having been filed under Sections 9 and 11 of the Act, which occur in Part I of the Act is not maintainable as Part I applies only to such arbitration where the place of arbitration stipulated in the agreement is in India and shall not apply to any arbitration agreement wherein the place of arbitration is not in India but is outside India. He further submitted that as per the arbitration clause 5.07 of the agreement, the place of arbitration is London (UK) while the arbitration tribunal is the International Chambers of Commerce in Paris (France). According to him, since part 1 of the Act does not apply to the present international commercial arbitration, it is only part II which applies to such an arbitration. He further submitted that the present petition filed by the petitioner under Section 11 of the Act is not maintainable since Section 11 is the machinery section for the appointment of arbitrators. According to him, the arbitrator under the agreement is named, namely, International Chambers of Commerce in Paris (France). He submitted that since no notice was served by the petitioner to the respondent calling upon the respondent to concur in the reference of the alleged disputes to the named arbitration tribunal, the present petition is not maintainable. The counsel further submitted that this Court also has no territorial jurisdiction to entertain the present petition as no part of cause of action has arisen within the jurisdiction of this Court as the arbitration agreement was admittedly executed in Czech Republic and drawings and designs, technology and technical know-how were required to be supplied by the respondent to the petitioner in Czech Republic. He further submitted that payment of consideration of Rs. 6.70 lakhs for the supply of technology/technical know-how is to be paid to the respondent in that country and thus no part of cause of action has arisen within the territorial jurisdiction of this Court.

    5. In view of the aforesaid objections raised to the maintainability of the petition and upon hearing the counsel appearing for the parties, I proceed to record my decision on the aforesaid submissions.

    6. Mr. Jaitley, appearing for the petitioner, drew my attention to sub-section (2) of Section 1 and also to sub-section(5) of Section 2. sub-section (2) of Section 1 provides that the Act extends to the whole of India. The said sub-section has a proviso which provides that Parts I, III and IV would extend to the State of Jammu and Kashmir only in so far as they relate to international commercial arbitration or, as the case may be, international commercial conciliation.

    Sub-section (2) and sub-section (5) of Section 2 which are relevant for deciding the case are also quoted hereunder:—

    (2) This Part shall apply where the place of arbitration is in India.

    (3) Subject to the provisions of sub section (4), and save in so far as is otherwise provided by any law for the time being in force or in any agreement in force between India and any other country or countries, this Part shall apply to all arbitrations and to all proceedings relating thereto.

    Since provisions of section 9 will also have some relevance, the relevant portion thereof is extracted below:—

    Section 9

    “A party may, before or during arbitral proceedings or at any time after the making of the arbitral award but before it is enforced in accordance with Section 36, apply to a court:—

    (i) …………………

    (ii) for an interim measure of protection in respect of any of the following matters, namely:—

    (a) the preservation, interim custody or sale of any goods which are the subject matter of the arbitration agreement;

    (b) ………….

    (c)………….

    (d) interim injunction or the appointment of a receiver;

    (e) ………….

    and the Court shall have the same power for making orders as it has for the purpose of, and in relation to, any proceedings before it.”

    7. My attention was also drawn by the counsel appearing for the parties to the provisions of section 11 which relates to provisions of appointment of arbitrators including that of the power of the Court in respect of the same:—

    (1) A person of any nationality may be an arbitrator, unless otherwise agreed by the parties.

    (2) Subject to sub-section (6), the parties are free to agree on a procedure for appointing the arbitrator or arbitrators.

    (3) Failing any agreement referred to in sub-section (2), in an arbitration with three arbitrators, each party shall appoint one arbitrator, and the two appointed arbitrators shall appoint the third arbitrator who shall act as the presiding arbitrator.

    (4) If the appointment procedure in sub-section (3) applies and-

    (a) a party fails to appoint an arbitrator within three days from the receipt of a request to do so from the other party; or

    (b) the two appointed arbitrators fail to agree on the third arbitrator within thirty days from the date of their appointment,

    the appointment shall be made, upon request of a party, by the Chief Justice or any person or institution designated by him.

    (5) ………………

    (6) Where, under an appointment procedure agreed upon by the parties,-

    (a) a party fails to act as required under that procedure; or

    (b) the parties, or the two appointed arbitrators, fail to reach an agreement expected of them under that procedure; or

    (c) a person, including an institution, fails to perform any function entrusted to him or it under that procedure,

    a party may request the Chief Justice or any person or institution designated by him to take the necessary measure, unless the agreement on the appointment procedure provides other means for securing the appointment.

    (7)………..

    (8) ………….

    (9) …………..

    (10) …………

    (11) ………..

    (12)(a) Where the matters referred to in sub-sections (4),(5),(6),(7),(8) and (10) arise in an international commercial arbitration, the reference to “Chief Justice” in those sub-section shall be construed as a reference to the “Chief Justice of India”.

    (12)(b) ………….”

    8. The present act, namely, the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, has been divided into three parts. Part I deals with to arbitration and contains Section 2 to Section 43, whereas Part II deals with enforcement of certain foreign awards and includes within its ambit Section 44 to Section 60, whereas Part II deals with conciliation and includes Section 61 to Section 81. Supplementary provisions are contained in Part IV and the sections relating thereto are from Section 82 to Section 86. Apparently, therefore, all the aforesaid sections, extracted hereinabove, from Section 2 to Section 11, admittedly are contained in Part I. Sub-section (2) of Section 2 of the Act provides that this Part, thereby signifying Part I, shall apply where the place of arbitration is in India. Relying on this provision, the learned counsel submitted that since part I applies only to the arbitration where the place of arbitration is in India, the said provision contained in Part I cannot be made application and shall not apply to any arbitration agreement wherein the place of arbitration is not in India but is outside India. The agreements involved in the present case stipulate that the place of arbitration is London (UK) while the arbitration tribunal is the International Chambers of Commerce in Paris (France). The place of arbitration being outside India, the learned counsel submitted that provisions of Part I does not apply.

    9. The aforesaid argument of the learned counsel appears to be attractive atthe first glance of the provisions. However, on a closer look of the provisions of the Act relied upon by the counsel for the parties, the said impression does not appear to be correct. Reasons for the same are not far to seek. On a reference to the proviso to sub-section (2) of Section 1, it is crystal clear that Part I shall apply to a case of international commercial arbitration in the case of State of Jammu & Kashmir. Therefore, the provisions in Part I applies to a case of International Commercial Arbitration relating to the State of Jammu & Kashmir. Again, when one refers to sub-section (5) of Section 2 which states that subject to the provisions of sub-section (4) and save in so far as is otherwise provided by any law for the time being in force, this Part (meaning thereby Part I) shall apply to all arbitrations and to all proceedings relating thereto. Sub-section (12)(a) of Section 11 also provides that when the matter referred in sub-sections (4), (5), (6), (7), (8) and (10) arise in an international commercial arbitration, the reference to ‘Chief Justice’ would be construed as a reference to ‘the Chief Justice of India’. A conjoint reading of all the aforementioned provisions clearly indicate that sub-section(2) of section 2 is an inclusive definition and that it does not exclude the applicability of Part I to those arbitrations which are not being held in India. The aforesaid interpretation gets support from the provisions of sub-section (5) of Section 2 which provides that Part I shall apply to all arbitrations and to all proceedings relating thereto which would also, in my considered opinion, include an international commercial arbitration. So far Section 8 and Section 11 are concerned, in my considered opinion, they operate in two different fields as Section 8 is the power vested on a judicial authority to make a reference of the disputes arising between the parties to an arbitrator whereas Section 11 empowers a Court to appoint an arbitrator when thee is a difference between the parties regarding appointment of an arbitrator.

    10. On a careful study of the aforesaid provisions, I find that the aforesaid distinction between the power of the Court to refer the disputes to an arbitrator and the power to appoint an arbitrator by the Court has been recognised under the present Act. Section 8 of the Arbitration Act, 1940 confers powers upon the Court to appoint an arbitrator where the parties do not concur in his appointment while Section 20 of the said Act entitles a party to apply for the filing of the arbitration agreement in Court and empowers the Court to make an order of reference to the arbitrator appointed by the parties, or in the absence of such appointment, to the arbitrator appointed by it. Section 8 only empowers the Court to appoint an arbitrator where the parties do not concur in the appointment whereas Section 20 Confers power on the Court to order the agreement to be filed and, further, to make an order of reference to the arbitrator appointed by the parties, or, where the parties cannot agree upon an appointment, to an arbitrator appointed by the Court. Similar distinction as was existing under the old Act in the nature of Section 8 and Section 20 appears to have been retained in the present Act in view of enactment of Section 8 and Section 11 of the Act.

    11. In the present agreement, the arbitrator is named, namely. International Chambers of Commerce in Paris. Admittedly, no notice was given by the petitioner to the respondent seeking for a reference of the disputes stated to have arisen between the parties to the said arbitrator. Therefore, the present is a case where the provisions of Section 8-will apply and not the provisions of section 11 of the Act, in as much as, no notice having been given to the respondent, it cannot be said that there is any failure either on the part of the party or on the part of the appointed arbitrators to appoint the arbitrator or the third arbitrator as the case may be. Under such circumstances, the provision that would apply to the facts and circumstances of the present case is Section 8 of the Act under which a judicial authority, before whom an action is brought in a matter which is the subject matter of an arbitration agreement, shall refer the parties to arbitration. Although in the present case, no notice was given by the petitioner to the respondent seeking to invoke the arbitration clause, yet when the matter is brought before this Court, this Court has the power and jurisdiction to refer the parties to arbitration, exercising the powers under Section 8 of the Act, provided the other objections raised by the respondent herein in the present case are found to be without merit.

    12. It is a recognised legal principle that even if it is held that a petition is not maintainable under the specific provision under which it is preferred but maintainable under any other provision of the Act, mere mention of a wrong provision does not render the petition non-maintainable.

    13. Therefore I have no hesitation in my mind to construe and hold that the present petition has been preferred by the petitioner is this Court under Section 8 of the Act which, in my opinion, is applicable in full force to the facts and circumstances of the present case, and not under Section 11 of the Act which is mentioned in the petition. The provisions of section 11, as I have held above, are not applicable to the facts of the present case, and therefore, it is not necessary for me to examine and decide the question raised by the respondent as to whether this High Court or the Supreme Court has jurisdiction to entertain the present petition. The said question would have arisen for my consideration if the parties would not have agreed upon the appointment of the arbitrator. But since in the present case the arbitrator is a named arbitrator under the agreement, the provisions of section 11 are not attracted and, therefore, in my considered opinion, this Court shall have jurisdiction to try and decide the present petition. The preliminary objection with regard to the maintainability of the petition on the ground of want of jurisdiction in respect of the subject matter, therefore, is without merit.

    14. So far as the question raised by the respondents with regard to the maintainability of the petition on the ground of territorial jurisdiction, in my considered opinion, the said objection also has no force. The drawings and the technical knowhow and components of parts were to be supplied by the respondents to the petitioner within the jurisdiction of this Court. The respondent have entered into a separate contract with another firm which is also a subject matter of dispute in the present petition. The said firm also hails from Delhi. The approval for obtaining the drawings and the knowhow from ZVS was to be obtained by the petitioner from the Central Government whose office is located at Delhi and, therefore, this Court shall have territorial jurisdiction to try and decide the present case and the objection on the ground of territorial jurisdiction is also rejected.

    15. Having decided the aforesaid preliminary issue raised by the respondents, let me now proceed to decide the other issues arising for my consideration. The learned counsel appearing for the petitioner submitted before me that the respondent was not a party to the said agreements dated 18th and 25th July, 1986 forming subject matter of the arbitration petition. The counsel submitted that the said agreements were entered into between the petitioner and ZVS, a department of the erstwhile communist state of Czechoslovakia and not with the respondents. The counsel referred to the provisions of the definition of a ‘party’, as appearing in Section 2 (h) of the Act, meaning a party to an arbitration agreement and also to the provisions of section 7 as “an agreement by the parties to submit to arbitration all or certain disputes which have arisen or which may arise between”, the learned counsel submitted that the only arbitration agreement contemplated in the present Act is of the parties to the agreement exclusively and therefore, the expression ‘party’ does not include a successor or assignee and cannot be extended to such successor or assignee of a party. The learned counsel submitted that the respondent derives its name from the town Adamov and was formed in 1992 and is an independently registered company. He submitted that since the erstwhile Communist State of Czechoslovakia was dismantled in 1990 and split into three independent states, one of them being the Czech Republic, the successor of the erstwhile state of Czechoslovakia was, if at all, the Czech Republic. According to him, the respondent is an independent company incorporated in 1992 and has taken over only some part of the assets of the erstwhile communist State of Czechoslovakia and is best an assignee of the erstwhile communist Government of Czechoslovakia with respect of the said assets and can, under no circumstances, be held responsible for contractual obligations of the said communist Government merely by being an assignee of some of its assets. In support of his statement, the learned counsel relied soon the decisions of the Supreme Court in Union Of India v. Chaman Lal Loona & Co repotted in AIR 1957 SC 652.

    16. The learned counsel also drew my attention to the various averments made in the petition in support of his submissions that the petitioner has nowhere said in the petition that the respondent is successor in interest of the erstwhile Czech Republic or even of ZVS. Countering the aforesaid submissions of the learned counsel for the respondents, Mr. Jaitley submitted that after the split which took place in the erstwhile Czechoslovakia, ZVS was split up into three corporate entities and that Adamovske Strojirny, the respondent, became the successor in interest/assignee of ZVS. He drew my attention to the provisions of clause 5.03 of the two agreements which stipulate that the agreement would bind successors and assignees of the respective parties. He submitted that the successor/assignee of ZVS, that is, erstwhile state entity of the Czechoslovakia Republic has to be determined in relation to the successor and assign of the business/machines covered by the two agreements and in that process it would be found that the machines in question being models Adast Dominant 514 and Adast Dominant 725, the rights in relation to the said machines as also the improvements in the said machines vested in Adamovske Strojirny, the present respondents. He further submitted that the fact that the respondent is an assignee/successor of ZVS also proved by further evidence on record and in this connection, he drew my attention to the evidence adduced by the parties in the form of affidavit, particularly, the affidavit filed by the petitioner. Clause 5.03 of the agreement is extracted below for ready reference:—

    “This agreement and each every covenant, term and condition herein is binding upon and enures to the benefit of the parties hereto and their respective successors but neither this Agreement nor any rights hereunder may be assigned or sublicensed, directly or indirectly, voluntarily or by operation of law except with the prior written approval of Licensor and Licensee on terms which are acceptable to both parties and the Governments of India and Czechoslovakia.”

    The aforesaid stipulation entered into between the parties clearly provides that the agreement as also each of the terms and the conditions is binding upon and enures to the benefit of the parties and their respective successors. Therefore, each and every terms and conditions of the aforesaid agreement was intended to be binding not only on the parites but also on their successors as well. Therefore, the issue that arisen to my consideration its whether the respondents could be considered as the successor of the ZVS.

    17. My attention was drawn to the decision dated 24.3.1992 which is a translated copy of the order from the file of the Government of the Czech Republic. The said docu ment incoporates the decision of the Government of Czech Republic of 4.3.1992 and lays down that the Government approves privatisation projects including privatisation of the state enterprise Adast Adamov. In this connection, reference may also be made to the protocol which is also on record as Ex. P-8 filed by the petitioner. The said protocol was signed between Adast Joint Stock Company and the petitioner. The said protocol records the agreement between Adast/KOVO to deliver quantities of components in 1992 with regard to the various machines including the one relating to 516 which is stated to be an improved variety of 514 as also Adast Dominant 725. The said protocol further records the agreement that Adast would positively supply to the petitioner the complete documentation of technology and knowhow for the models Adast 716, Adast 516, Adast 726 which are stated to be improved varieties. The said protocol indicating the agreement between the respondent and the petitioner to positively supply to the petitioner the complete documentation of technology and knowhow records specifically that the said documentation forming part of the agreement relates to part of existing collaboration agreement. The said existing collaboration referred thereto cannot be anything else but the two agreements dated 18.7.1986 and 25.7.1986 There are other corroboration evidence on record to show that the respondent is the successor in interest of ZVS and in this connection reference may be made to the vouchers annexed by the petitioner to the affidavit dated 10.8.1996 I may also appropriately refer here to the letter dated 11.4.1995 written by the respondent to J. Mahabeer Company wherein it has been recorded “the company Adamovske Strojirny state enterprise Adamov and its legal successors, Adamovske Strojirny a.s (respondent in the present case).” The respondent, therefore, has admitted therein that it is the successor in interest of ZVS.

    18. My attention was also drawn to the decision of Anakapalle Cooperative Agricultural and Industrial Society Ltd. v. Workned & Others reported in AIR 1963 SC 1489. In the said decision, the Supreme Court has laid down the relevant factors to be taken into consideration in deciding whether an entity in successor of another entity or not. I have carefully gone through the factors mentioned therein and considered the same weighing the facts of the present case and having done so and having regard to all the relevant facts, I cannot but arrive at the conclusive opinion that the respondent is a successor in interest of ZVS. Since the respondent is held to be the successor of ZVS, the entity which entered into the two agreements with the petitioner consequently in terms of clause 5.03 of the agreements, all the terms and conditions and obligations thereof are assigned to the respondents and they are held to be bound by the same. Therefore, this issue is also answered in favour of the petitinner and against the respondent holding that the respondent is the successor in interest and assignee of ZVS.

    19. This leaves me with the task of considering the last objection raised by the respondents, contending inter alia, that the two agreements are not subsisting and have lapsed by efflux of time. For adjudicating the aforesaid issue, it would be necessary to icier to definitions incorporated in the agreement, particularly, the definition of ‘effective date’ and ‘expiration date’. The expression ‘effective date’ has been defined in the agreement as meaning the date of the last approval required by law of the respective country of the parties for the agreement to become valid after signing the agreement by the parties concerned and having been taken on record by Indian authorities whereas ‘expiration date’ has been defined as to mean the 8th anniversary of the effective date. Therefore, the agreements were intended by the parties to become effective from the date on which the last approval required by law of the respective countries is received to make the agreement valid.

    20. My attention was drawn to an admission made by the petitioner in the plaint filed by suit No. 1448/94. In paragraph 13 of the said plaint, the petitioner stated that the aforesaid two agreements, namely, agreements dated 18.7.1986 and 25.7.1986 with the respondents expired in July, 1994. The counsel appearing for the petitioner, however, submitted before me that they have inadvertently made the aforesaid admission through bona fide mistake and in order to rectify the said mistake they have filed an application praying for amendment of the plaint. The said amendment application has been dismissed by me by a separate order passed today in the said suit. Considering the facts and circumstances of the case and having regard to the submissions of the learned counsel for the parties and taking note of the decisions of the Supreme Court on the issue, I have dismissed the said application.

    21. Be that as it may, apart from the aforesaid admission in the pleadings, let me independently consider the submission of the learned counsel of the parties on this issue and thereafter come to a definite finding on the said issue. As disclosed by the agreements itself, the tenure and duration of both the agreements was eight years from the date of obtaining the last approval/permission of the respective Governments necessary to make the agreements valid. My attention has been drawn to a document filed by the petitioner which is a letter dated 22.5.1987 containing the approval of the Government of India. The said letter conveyed the approval of the Government of India to the import of designs and drawings by the petitioner further indicating that th'e said approval is valid for a period of six months from the date of issue of the said letter. The learned counsel appearing for the petitioner submitted that although the said letter dated 22.5.1987 could be said to be the letter granting approval, but the same is only the first approval in that regard obtained from the Indian authorities. According to the learned counsel, the said approval was valid only for a specified period and subsequently the said approval lapsed with efflux of time and the petitioner had to obtain subsequent approvals. The further submission is that since the first set of drawings which were sent by the ZVS in August, 1988 were not the latest drawings and were only a part of the drawings, the petitioner was forced to obtain approval from the Reserve Bank of India which approval, if was not obtained, the agreement would not have been valid under the Indian law as they would be contrary to the provisions of the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act. According to the petitioner since the Reserve Bank of India's approval was obtained on 8.4.1992, that was the last approval required by the law of India for the agreements to be considered valid and, therefore, the effective date would depend only on this approval as per clause 1(a) of the agreement and computing therefrom, the agreement should be interpreted to be valid till the year 2000.

    22. On the other hand, the learned counsel appearing for the respondents drew my attention to the subsequent approvals granted by the Government of India which invariably referred to the earlier approval letter dated 22.5.1987 According to the learned counsel, the subsequent letters relied upon by the counsel for the petitioner are letters indicating extension of the earlier and final approval granted by the Government of India on 22.5.1987 and that the said subsequent letters relate to operational matters under the said agreements after they have become valid. The counsel for the respondent also drew my attention to the letters dated 9.9.1989 and 6.10.1990 indicating that the petitioner had received the drawings under the agreements in 1988 and submitted that as per the definition of the “delivery time”, drawings were to be supplied within 12 months after the effective dated. The said drawings having been supplied to the petitioner in 1988, necessarily therefore, the drawings were supplied within 12 months from the effective date which is admittedly the year 1987. I find considerable force in the submissions of the learned counsel for the respondents.

    23. My attention has also been drawn to Exb. R-3 annexed with the affidavit filed by the respondent which is a hand note on foreign collaborations. The said hand note contains the list of approved collaborations for the year 1987 by the Government of India which includes the present two agreements with the petitioner. Considering the aforesaid evidence on record and having regard to the submissions of the learned counsel for the parties, I hold that apart from the admission of the petitioner in paragraph 13 of the plaint in suit No. 1448/94, contending inter alia that the two agreements with the respondent expired in July, 1994, there are other evidence on record to prove and show that the two agreements became effective and operational from 1987. Under the terms and conditions of the agreement, the tenure and term of the agreements was to be 8 years from the date of obtaining permission of the Government of India necessary to make the agreements valid. The petitioner having obtained the approval from the Government of India under the letter dated 22.5.1987 in pursuance whereof the drawings were also supplied to the petitioner in 1988 which is within 12 months period from the effective date as envisaged under the delivery time, the said approval was the first approval and, therefore, the effective date could be held to be computed from the date 22.5.1987, The said agreement therefore were valid for eight years from the said date and therefore valid till May, 1995, after which the said agreements are held to have lapsed by efflux of time. The approval stated to have been given by the Reserve Bank of India in 1992 is a consequential permission and is not relevant for. the purpose of determining the commencement of the effective date. The disputes that are stated to have been arisen in the present petition are set out by the petitioner in paragraph 20 of the petition. All the disputes mentioned therein revolve around the action of the respondents in appointing M/s. Amit International as their agents which is stated to be in gross violation of the terms of the agreements. It is stated in paragraph 14 of the petition that the respondent recently appointed the said M/s. Amit International as its sole selling agent in India and the petitioner came to know through an advertisement in the magazine ‘Student Technologist’ published in May, 1996. Therefore the said appointment was subsequent to the date of expiry of the agreements and consequently the contention of the petitioner that the agreements are valid till the year 2000 is not sustainable and is accordingly rejected. The agreements have, at any rate, expired with efflux of time latest at least by May 1995 and the appointment of M/s. Amit International by the respondent as their sole selling agents being subsequent thereto, in my considered opinion, no referable question as set out in paragraph 20 is made out by the petitioner.

    24. Accordingly, the issues as framed on 18.10.1996 are answered in the following manner:—

    Issue No. 1

    It is held that although there were agreements valid and subsisting between the parties, the same expired by efflux of time at least in the month of May, 1995 and subsequent thereto there was no valid and subsisting agreement between the parties. This issue is decided against the petitioner and in favour of the respondents.

    Issue No. 2

    Issue No. 2 is decided in favour of the petitioner and against the respondent holding that this Court has jurisdiction to try and decide the present petition.

    Issue No. 3

    Issue No. 3 is decided against the petitioner and in favour of the respondents holding that the disputes raised in the petition cannot be referred for arbitration.

    In view of my findings against issues No. 1 and 3, the petition stands dismissed as having no merit, but without any cost.

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