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Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

The appeal arises from defendant No. 7's challenge under Section 10 of the Delhi High Court Act, 1966 to an order of the Single Judge dated 6 May 1994, which dismissed her application under Order 6 Rule 17 CPC seeking amendment of a written statement filed on 15 November 1988 in Suit No. 662/1988.

Relevant background facts set out in the opinion:

  • Original tenancy: The shop (A-3, Kashi House, Connaught Place) was let by R.S. Ram Parshad to Mrs. Lawrence Enid under a lease dated 15 September 1936; after lease expiry she became a statutory tenant under the Ajmer Rent Control Act, 1952.
  • Ownership change: The premises later vested in Rajeshwar Nath Gupta (plaintiff), who in 1971 sought vacation of the shop.
  • Death of tenant: Mrs. Lawrence Enid died on 23 March 1988; plaintiff claimed no next of kin and that the deceased's stock-in-trade vested in the State by escheat.
  • Suit and parties: The plaintiff sued for permanent injunction, impleading the Administrator General (defendant No.1) and other defendants (Nos. 2–6), initially obtaining an ex parte interim stay against defendants 2–6 which was later vacated after a local commissioner’s report favored those defendants.
  • Claims by defendants: Defendants 4 and 5 claimed partnership rights under a partnership deed dated 29 July 1982; defendant No. 2 claimed tenancy under a registered will dated 8 June 1983; defendant No. 7 (appellant, Evelyn J. Disney) was impleaded on 7 September 1988 as allegedly the sister and heir of the deceased tenant and filed a written statement claiming tenancy by inheritance.
  • Issues were framed on 20 September 1989 (nine issues, including whether defendant No.7 was sister of deceased and whether being a foreign national she lost inheritance rights under the Delhi Rent Control Act, and whether jurisdiction was barred under Section 50 of that Act).
  • Trial progress: Plaintiff and defendant No.2 closed their cases in November 1990; defendant No.7 filed affidavits (admitting two visits to India in 1978 and 1979) and, after orders directing cross-examination, defendants 4, 5 and 7 closed their evidence on 2 May 1991.
  • Amendment applications: After conclusion of arguments and written submissions, three applications under Order 6 Rule 17 CPC were filed seeking to amend written statements — by defendant No.2 (IA 9620/93) on 26 October 1993, by defendants 4 & 5 (IA 9360/93) on 26 October 1993, and by defendant No.7 (IA 10108/93) on 12 November 1993 — to raise preliminary objections including res judicata, time-bar, jurisdiction under Section 50 Delhi Rent Control Act, remedy under Section 14, invalidity of eviction notice, and related pleas.
  • Single Judge decision: All three amendment applications were dismissed by a common order dated 6 May 1994; no appeal was filed by defendant No.2 or by defendants 4 & 5. Only defendant No.7 appealed to the Division Bench (this appeal).

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the Single Judge erred in dismissing defendant No.7's application under Order 6 Rule 17 CPC to amend her written statement, particularly where there is no express statutory limitation for seeking such amendment.
  2. Whether mere delay in moving an application for amendment is sufficient ground for rejection, or whether bona fide and vital amendments should be permitted even after delay, subject to compensation or terms.
  3. Whether the proposed amendments were bona fide, necessary to decide the real controversy between the parties, or mala fide and intended merely to delay disposal of the suit.
  4. Whether observations made by the Single Judge (P.K. Bahri, J.) in an earlier order (7 September 1988) could operate as a conclusive or res judicata finding that would support the proposed amendments.
  5. Whether the proposed amendments would be redundant because the issues they sought to raise were already framed and before the Court (i.e., questions on foreign nationality, Section 50 jurisdiction, limitation, pecuniary jurisdiction and validity of notice).

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's (Defendant No. 7) Arguments

  • The dismissal of the amendment application was impermissible because there is no statutory limitation prescribed for filing applications to amend pleadings.
  • The scope of Order 6 Rule 17 CPC is wide and allows amendment at any stage, so the learned Single Judge’s order was contrary to law and made without proper application of mind.
  • The proposed amendments were necessary and justified, and should not have been dismissed as belated.

Plaintiff's and Contesting Parties' Position (as reflected in record)

  • The plaintiff and other contesting defendants questioned the locus and factual basis of defendant No.7's claim, including alleging that she was a foreign national who had been in the USA for over 30 years and thus could have lost the right to inherit tenancy under the statutory provisions.
  • During trial, the plaintiff sought to have certain witnesses (including the attorney and close relations of defendants) placed in the witness box for cross-examination and argued that an adverse inference should be drawn when they did not testify.
  • The contesting defendants (Nos.2, 4 & 5) sought to raise in their amendment applications preliminary objections (similar in content to those sought by defendant No.7) such as res judicata, limitation, jurisdictional bar under Section 50 of the Delhi Rent Control Act, the remedy under Section 14, and invalidity of the eviction notice; these were argued to be grounds for dismissing the suit.

Table of Precedents Cited

No precedents were cited in the provided opinion.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Division Bench reviewed the legal principles governing amendments to pleadings and then applied those principles to the facts of this case:

  1. Legal principle acknowledged: The court accepted the established rule that mere delay alone is not an absolute bar to amendment. Bonafide amendments that are vital to decide the real controversy should be allowed even if belated, and the court may impose compensatory terms (e.g., costs) to cure prejudice.
  2. Conversely, the court reiterated circumstances in which amendments may be refused: where the amendment is unnecessary to determine the real controversy; is merely technical or of no substance; would wholly displace the plaintiff's suit or take away a legal right accrued by lapse of time; would introduce a new and inconsistent case; or is made in bad faith.
  3. The Bench examined procedural posture and timing: the amendment application by defendant No.7 was filed approximately five years after institution and after conclusion of arguments and filing of written submissions by parties — facts the Single Judge had narrated and which formed the context for dismissal.
  4. Assessment of bona fides: The court agreed with the Single Judge’s characterization that the application appeared to have been filed to delay disposal of the case. The record showed that other defendants (Nos.2, 4 & 5) had earlier attempted similar amendments and later relied on the appellant’s application, suggesting a lack of confidence in their substantive case and an inclination to use amendment applications tactically.
  5. Substance and redundancy of proposed amendments: The court analyzed the specific pleas proposed to be added and found many to be redundant or already encompassed by framed issues — for example:
    • Issue No. 2 already addressed the contention that defendant No.7, as a foreign national residing in the USA for 30 years, had lost inheritance rights under the Delhi Rent Control Act;
    • Issue No. 5 already addressed the jurisdictional bar under Section 50 of the Delhi Rent Control Act;
    • Issue No. 6 related to valuation for court-fee and jurisdiction (the proposed amendment about pecuniary jurisdiction was therefore unnecessary);
    • Issue No. 8 already dealt with alleged termination of tenancy during the deceased's lifetime (so a proposed plea about illegality of termination notice was redundant).
  6. On the contention that observations of P.K. Bahri, J. (order dated 7 September 1988) supported amendment: the Bench held that such observations, made in disposing of an Order 1 Rule 10 application to implead, were not final and could not serve as a conclusive basis to amend pleadings; those observations were only for disposing of that interlocutory application.
  7. Conclusion from facts to exercise of discretion: Considering that the proposed amendments would not add matter of substance necessary to decide the real controversy, that the amendments overlapped with existing issues, and that the timing suggested mala fides and a design to delay, the court found no error in the Single Judge's exercise of discretion to dismiss the amendment application.

Holding and Implications

Holding:

APPEAL DISMISSED. The Division Bench affirmed the Single Judge's order dated 6 May 1994 dismissing defendant No.7's application under Order 6 Rule 17 CPC. The appeal was dismissed with costs of Rs. 5,000/-.

Implications:

  • The direct effect is that the Single Judge's order refusing amendment remains in force; the proposed amendments by defendant No.7 (and the similar applications previously filed by defendants 2, 4 & 5) will not be added to the written statements.
  • The court emphasized that delay alone is not determinative, but where an application is mala fide, unnecessary, redundant because the matters are already before the court, or is aimed at delaying disposal, refusal of amendment is an appropriate exercise of judicial discretion.
  • No new legal precedent was set by this decision; the Bench applied well-known principles about amendment under Order 6 Rule 17 CPC to the facts and upheld the discretionary refusal by the Single Judge.

    Mrs. Evelyn J. Disney. v. Rajeshwar Nath Gupta & Ors.

    D.K Jain, J.— This is defendant No. 7's appeal under Section 10 of the Delhi High Court Act, 1966, against the order of the learned Single Judge dated 6 May 1994, dismissing her application under Order 6 Rule 17 CPC for amendment of written statement filed on her behalf on 15 November 1988 in Suit No. 662/1988.

    2. The learned Single Judge, in the impugned order, in brief, narrated the progress in the suit proceedings from the beginning till the filing of the application for amendment and observed that it was manifest therefrom that the application was moved after five years of the institution of the suit and after the conclusion of arguments by counsel for the contesting parties and after filing of written arguments by the plaintiff and defendant No. 7. The Court thus, felt that the application for amendment was highly belated and had been moved with a view to delaying the disposal of the case. The application for amendment was thus dismissed in limine.

    The dismissal of the application has been assailed in the grounds of appeal on the ground that there was no limitation provided for filing application; for amendment of the pleadings; the scope of Order 6 Rule 17 CPC was very wide, the application could be moved at any time, the order of the learned Single Judge is contrary to law and he has failed to apply his mind while dismissing the application.

    To appreciate the controversy involved, it would be necessary and appropriate to notice in brief the relevant facts and circumstances leading to the filing of the application dismissed by the impugned order.

    It appears that R.S Ram Parshad was the owner of building “Kashi House” at Connaught Place, New Delhi, which had shop No. A-3 on the ground floor. The said owner let out the said shop to one Mrs. F. Lawrence Enid vide lease deed dated 15 September 1936 for running a dress maker's shop and she did that business. The rent continued to be increased from time to time. After the expiry of the period of lease, the lessee became a statutory tenant under The Delhi and Ajmer Rent Control Act, 1952. There was a partition in the family of the owner and the premises in question fell to the share of Rajeshwar Nath Gupta, the plaintiff in the suit, who, in 1971, served notice on the tenant Mrs. Lawrence Enid, asking her to vacate. Mrs. Enid died on 23 March 1988, according to the plaintiff, leaving no next of kin and her assets going to the State by escheat. The plaintiff/landlord filed a suit for permanent injunction, impleading the Administrator General, appointed under the Administrator Generals Act, 1963, as defendant No. 1 (averring that deceased's stock-in-trade lying in the, shop had vested in him) and defendants No. 2 to 6, on the plea that they were trying to trespass on the premises. An application for interim stay was filed on which an ex parte interim stay was issued restraining defendants No. 2 to 6 from entering the premises in question. After service of stay order, defendants No. 2 to 6 applied for vacation of the stay on the plea that defendants No. 4 and 5 were in lawful possession of the premises since 1982 as partners of the deceased tenant Mrs. Enid and so was defendant No. 2, who had now entered into a partnership with defendants No. 4 and 5. The Local Commissioner appointed to visit and report about possession and stocks reported in favour of the said defendants, on which the interim stay was vacated. Defendants No. 3 and 6 were given up by the plaintiff. Defendants No. 4 and 5 claimed to be the partners of the deceased tenant under partnership deed dated 29 July 1982, in occupation as such and defendant No. 2 claimed tenancy rights in the premises on the basis of a registered will dated 8 June 1983 executed by Mrs. Lawrence Enid, the deceased tenant bequeathing tenancy rights in his favour. On 20 April 1988 counsel for the parties made statements; for the plaintiff it was stated that for the purpose of the suit, the plaintiff did not dispute the execution of the will by Mrs. Enid in favour of defendant No. 2 nor did he dispute the execution of the partnership deed dated 29 July 1982 by which, defendants No. 4 and 5 had been taken as partners by the deceased tenant; and for the contesting defendants it was stated that they did not dispute the ownership of the plaintiff. Meanwhile, an application under Order 1 Rule 10 CPC (IA 4878/88) was filed by Mrs. Evelyn J. Disney, the appellant herein, wherein she claimed that she being the real sister of the deceased tenant, inherited the tenancy which vested in her, she was a necessary party and be impleaded. By order dated 7 September 1988, P.K Bahri, J. allowed the application and the appellant was impleaded as defendant No. 7. She filed a written statement claiming tenancy by inheritance and also supported the aforesaid claims of defendants No. 2, 4 and 5 and the pleas raised by them, in their written statement. The claims and pleas of the now contesting defendants 2, 4, 5 and 7 were countered on diverse grounds by the plaintiff, in his replications, as reflected in the issues. On the pleadings of the parties, the following issues were framed on 20 September 1989:

    “1. Whether Mrs. Evelyn J. Disney (defendant No. 7) was the sister of Mrs. Lawrence Enid? OPD -7.

    2. If issue No. 1 is proved whether defendant No. 7 was not entitled to inherit the tenancy rights of the shop in dispute from her sister on the ground that defendant No. 7 was a foreign national staying in USA for more than 30 years and had, therefore, lost her right to inherit the tenancy rights under the provisions of Section 2 (1)(iii) of the Delhi Rent Control Act? OPP

    3. Whether the tenancy rights could not be subject matter of bequeath by Mrs. Lawrence Enid in favour of defendant No. 2 a stranger? OPP.

    4. Whether the defendant No. 2, a legatee (stranger) under the will dated 8.7.86 executed by Mrs. Enid could not seek protection under the Delhi Rent Control Act and, therefore, jurisdiction of the Civil Court to try this suit was not barred? OPP

    5. Whether the jurisdiction of civil court to try this suit for recovery of possession was not barred under Section 50 of the Delhi Rent Control Act on the ground that defendant No. 7 being a foreign national and staying outside India could not claim protection under the Delhi Rent Control Act? OPP.

    6. Whether the suit is properly valued for the purposes of court fee and jurisdiction? OPP

    7. Whether defendant No. 1 was a necessary/proper party? If not, its effect? OPP.

    8. Whether the tenancy of Mrs. Enid had been terminated during her life time with respect to the said premises? If so, its effect? OPP.

    9. Relief.”

    During trial, the plaintiff's son appeared as PW1 and the plaintiff closed his case on 12 November 1990. Execution of the will by the deceased tenant in his favour having been admitted by the plaintiff, without examining any witness, defendant No. 2 also closed his case on that date. On 12 December 1990 the plaintiff, for the purposes of the suit, to cut short the evidence, admitted defendant No. 7 as the full blood sister of deceased Mrs. Enid. Two affidavits were filed from the side of defendant No. 7, a citizen of U.S.A, being exhibited as D/A of the said defendant and D/B of her son, both affirming two visits to India by defendant No. 7, one in 1978 and the other in the company of her son in 1979. These affidavits were taken on record. From the side of the plaintiff it was submitted that defendant No. 2, his wife, defendant No. 4 and his brother defendant No. 5 and their close relation Prashant Aggarwal, attorney of defendant No. 7 and the present appellant be directed to tender themselves for cross-examination. The Court in its order dated 21 March 1991 observed that there must be somebody in the witness box on oath, to whom the case of the plaintiff could be put and failing that, an adverse inference be ordered to be drawn. None of them appeared in the witness box and on 2 May 1991, defendants No. 4, 5 and 7 closed their evidence.

    The three sets of contesting defendants, viz., defendant No. 2, who claims tenancy rights on the basis of a will; defendants No. 4 and 5, who claim such rights on the basis of a partnership with the deceased tenant and defendant No. 7, who claims tenancy rights on the basis of inheritance, being the real sister of the deceased tenant Mrs. Lawrence Enid, after arguments in the main case and after filing of the written submissions, filed three applications under Order 6 Rule 17 CPC for amendment of their respective written statements, being IA Nos. 9620/93 by defendant No. 2, IA No. 9360/93 by defendants 4 and 5 and IA 10108/93 by defendant No. 7. The first two applications were filed on 26 October 1993 and the last one on 12 November 1993. They all sought amendment of their written statements, seeking to raise, it seems in unison, virtually similar pleas by way of additional preliminary objections, viz., that the order dated 7 September 1988 of P.K Bahri, J, directing defendant No. 7 to be made a party for the reasons stated, having not been appealed against, had become final and was res judicata; the suit was barred by time; the civil Court's jurisdiction was barred under Section 50 of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958; the plaintiff's remedy lay in moving an application under Section 14 of the said Act; the eviction notice allegedly served on the deceased tenant was illegal, lacked details and was invalid; defendant No. 2 had become tenant on the basis of will made by the deceased in his favour, and as if by way of corollary, and to serve as motive for the will, defendant No. 2 also claimed of his being treated by the deceased as her son, adopted as such in a function and thus an heir also of the deceased. They all claimed that the suit was liable to be dismissed. All these applications were dismissed by the learned Single Judge by a common order dated 6 May 1994. No appeal has been filed by defendant No. 2 against the said order. As aforenoted, only the appeal filed by defendant No. 7 is before us.

    We have heard learned counsel for the parties and have gone through the record.

    We agree with learned counsel for the appellant that mere delay in filing an application for amendment of the pleadings is per se no ground to dismiss it. It is a trite proposition of law, culled out from various pronouncements, that bonafide amendments vital for adjudication of the real question in controversy between the parties should be allowed, howsoever negligent the first omission and howsoever delayed the proposed amendment, if the opposite party can be compensated with costs or other terms to be imposed in the order. Conversely, amendment should be refused where it is not necessary for the purpose of determining the real question in controversy between the parties; is merely technical or useless or of no substance or where the plaintiff's suit will be wholly displaced or it would take away the legal right which has accrued to the defendant by lapse of time or it would introduce a totally new and inconsistent case; and the application is made at a late stage of the proceedings or the application for amendment is not made in good faith. We are sure that the learned Single Judge was alive to this elementary proposition of law. The real ground for dismissal of the application is epitomized in his following sentence that the application has been filed “to delay the disposal of the case”, indicating that the learned Judge considered the application to be mala fide and the proposed amendments unnecessary, though not saying in so many words.

    After examining the record of the case, we feel that there was basis for the learned Single Judge to feel so while dismissing the application. The facts and circumstances narrated above sufficiently indicate that defendants No. 2; 4 and 5 were not confident of the merits of their case and applied for amendment of their written statements, earlier in point of time but relied more heavily on the application for amendment to be filed by defendant No. 7.

    Appellant/defendant No. 7, claiming tenancy by way of inheritance as sister of the deceased tenant is a foreign national and the plea against her in the replication, subject matter of issue No. 2, is that being a foreign national staying in U.S.A for more than 30 years she had lost her right to inherit the tenancy rights under the provisions of Section 2(1)(iii) of the Delhi Rent Control Act. Probably to get over this difficulty reliance is sought to be placed on some observations made by Bahri, J in his order dated 7 September 1988 (disposing of her application u/O 1 Rule 10 CPC), directing the plaintiff to implead her as a party. We feel that any observations made in the order dated 7 September 1988 cannot be said to be final and these were obviously made for the purpose of disposal of the said application only. The proposed amendment in this behalf is useless and of no substance. On the proposed plea of the jurisdiction of civil Court to hear the matter (taken in para 6(12) of the application) being barred under Section 50 of the Delhi Rent Control Act, despite defendant No. 7 being a foreigner, issue No. 5 is already there. The complimentary plea in para 6(9) of the application that despite this situation she could not be deprived inheritance on this score is a legal one which could be urged in defence. Plaintiff's right to file the suit was not disputed by defendants No. 2, 4 & 5 in the pleadings but mildly by defendant No. 7 in her written statement. The plea being already there on her behalf, the amendment, now proposed, assailing the locus standi of the plaintiff, we feel, is unnecessary. The other objection proposed to be entertained as preliminary objection is that the plaintiff's claim is barred by time. This is a legal issue on which arguments, if deemed necessary, could and might have been addressed. Another proposed plea is that this Court being a Civil Court has no pecuniary jurisdiction as value is less than Rs. 6,000/- on a yearly rent for possession and the separate jurisdiction value for relief of injunction has to be much lesser than the yearly rent; the plaint has to be returned or rejected under Order 7 Rule 11 CPC. The value of the suit for the purpose of Court Fee and jurisdiction having been already challenged, on which issue No. 6 having been framed, the proposed amendment is again unnecessary. Further objection now proposed to be added as additional preliminary objection is regarding the illegality of the notice terminating the tenancy of the deceased tenant. Issue No. 8 already exists on this aspect.

    Defendant No. 2 in his application for amendment dated 26 October 1993 referred to all these objections and sought permission to add these pleas as preliminary objections. Subsequently by application dated 12 November 1993 filed on behalf of defendant No. 7, the present appellant, amendments on these very lines have been sought for. As already observed, all these amendments and the application seeking amendment not being bona fide, we feel that the learned Single Judge was right in holding that the application has been filed only to delay the disposal of the case and thus dismissed it. Having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case, we do not find any ground to interfere with the impugned order. There is no merit in the appeal and the same is accordingly dismissed with costs, which we quantify at Rs. 5,000/-.

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    Mrs. Evelyn J. Disney. v. Rajeshwar Nath Gupta & Ors.
    (Mar 23, 1995)