Translate
Text Highlighter

Bookmark

PDF

Share

Report a problem
AMICUS AI
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Attorney(S)
Judges
Are you a practicing lawyer?
Enhance your digital presence and reach by creating a Casemine profile.
Upload pleading to use the new AI search
Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Attorney(S)
Judges
Smart Summary

Judgment Summary — P.N. Nag, J.

Factual and Procedural Background

The Municipal Corporation of Delhi (the Management) challenged by writ of certiorari an Award dated 15 May 1990 of Shri G.P. Mittal, Presiding Officer, Labour Court No. VII, Tis Hazari, Delhi. The Labour Court had held that respondent No.1 (the Workman) had not abandoned employment but was instead illegally and unjustifiably terminated by the Management, and directed reinstatement with full back wages and continuity of service.

The dispute originated from a reference dated 17 January 1977 by the Secretary (Labour), Delhi Administration framed as: “Whether termination of service of Shri Khacheru is illegal and/or unjustified and if so, to what relief is he entitled and what directions are necessary in this respect?”

The Workman claimed employment from 1 January 1970 as a daily-rated, monthly-paid muster roll employee and alleged illegal termination in 1974. The Management contended the Workman had abandoned his job (worked only 10 days in 1972 and subsequently absented himself in 1974). The Labour Court framed issues including Issue No.4: “Whether the services of workman were terminated or he abandoned?”

After inquiry the Labour Court found, inter alia: (i) the Workman had not worked 240 days in the relevant year and so was not entitled to retrenchment compensation or protection under Section 25 (of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947); (ii) the Workman had not abandoned employment but fell sick and produced medical and fitness certificates and an application for leave (dated 4.10.1974) which the Management refused to accept; (iii) juniors to the Workman were retained and some made permanent, amounting to a violation of Section 25G.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the termination of service of Shri Khacheru (the Workman) was illegal and/or unjustified, and if so, what relief should follow (as posed in the reference dated 17.1.1977).
  2. Whether the Workman's services were terminated by the Management or whether the Workman had abandoned his employment (Issue No.4 framed by the Labour Court).

Arguments of the Parties

Management's Arguments (Municipal Corporation of Delhi)

  • The Workman had not put in service for a period of one year (specifically had not rendered 240 days within the relevant 12 calendar months) and therefore could not claim protection or retrenchment compensation under Section 25F of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947.
  • The Workman had abandoned the job; his absence in 1974 was voluntary and not a termination by the Management.
  • Reliance was placed on Mohan Lal v. Management Of M/S Bharat Electronics Ltd. (AIR 1981 SC 123) and related authorities to support the contention that Section 25-B(2) and Section 25F principles preclude relief where a workman has not rendered required days of service.

Workman's Arguments

  • The Workman was sick and produced medical and fitness certificates and an application for leave (produced on 4.10.1974); the Management refused to accept these documents and did not permit him to resume duty, so the Management terminated his services.
  • The Management departed from the statutory rule under Section 25G (“last come, first go”) by retaining juniors while terminating the senior Workman; any departure requires valid reasons and the burden of proof is on the Management.
  • Reliance was placed on decisions such as Workmen of Sudder Workshop of Jorehaut Tea Co. Ltd. Co. v. The Management of Jorehaut Tea Co. Ltd. (AIR 1980 SC 145) supporting the last-come-first-go principle and the Management's burden to justify deviations.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Mohan Lal v. Management Of M/S Bharat Electronics Ltd. (AIR 1981 SC 123) Principle relating to Section 25F and Section 25‑B(2): a workman not in employment for 12 months may still be deemed in continuous service for one year if he rendered 240 days within the relevant 12 calendar months. The Court accepted the principle that because the Workman had not rendered 240 days in the relevant period he could not claim protection under Section 25F; this aspect of the Labour Court's finding was held to be correct.
Workmen of Sudder Workshop of Jorehaut Tea Co. Ltd. Co. v. The Management of Jorehaut Tea Co. Ltd. (AIR 1980 SC 145,4) The rule of “last come, first go” (Section 25G): normally the employer should retrench the last-joined employees first; deviations require valid reasons and the burden to justify is on the employer. The Court relied on this authority to support the Labour Court’s finding that retention of juniors while terminating a senior employee without valid reasons violated Section 25G.
Malkhan Singh v. Union of India and others (1981) -II LLJ, 174 Holding that termination may be struck down for violation of Section 25F and also for violation of Section 25G where juniors retained without reasons. Used to reinforce that violation of Section 25G (retaining juniors without justification) is an independent ground to invalidate termination.
Swadeshmitran Limited v. Their Workmen (AIR 1960 SC 762) Affirmation that the “last come first go” rule is statutorily recognised by Section 25G and that employers must record reasons if they depart from it. The Court applied this principle to find that Management had not produced valid reasons for departing from the rule and thus the termination was illegal under Section 25G.
General Manager, Northern Railway v. Central Industrial Tribunal, Jaipur (1991 LLN 224) Authority that a Labour Court's finding of fact (that a workman did not abandon employment but was terminated) is a factual conclusion that generally cannot be agitated in a writ proceeding before a High Court unless perverse or without evidence. The Court agreed with this reasoning and held that the Labour Court’s factual finding—supported by evidence—could not be overturned in the present writ petition unless shown to be perverse or unsupported.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court proceeded in two central strands of analysis that mirror the Labour Court's findings.

  1. On the question of statutory protection and retrenchment compensation under Section 25F (and related provisions such as Section 25-B(2) and Chapter V-A), the Court accepted the Labour Court's factual finding that the Workman had not worked 240 days in the relevant 12‑month period. Applying the principle in Mohan Lal (and the statutory recognition in Section 25F/25‑B(2)), the Court held that the Workman could not claim retrenchment compensation or the protections that attach only to those deemed in continuous service for one year.
  2. Independently, however, the Court examined whether the termination itself was illegal under Section 25G because juniors were retained while the senior Workman was retrenched. The Labour Court found the Workman had not abandoned his service but was ill, produced medical/fitness certificates and an application for leave (dated 4.10.1974), and that the Management refused to accept these and refused to permit resumption of duty. The Labour Court also found juniors were retained, some made permanent, without any valid reason recorded for departing from the “last come, first go” rule.

The High Court emphasized established authority that deviation from the Section 25G rule requires valid reasons and the burden lies on the employer to justify such departures (citing Workmen of Sudder Workshop, Swadeshmitran, and Malkhan Singh). Further, the Court agreed with the Rajasthan High Court's approach (General Manager, Northern Railway v. Central Industrial Tribunal) that findings of fact by the Labour Court—here that the Workman did not abandon his employment—are not to be re‑decided in writ jurisdiction unless the finding is perverse or without evidence. Finding no perversity or absence of evidence, the High Court upheld the Labour Court's conclusion that the termination was illegal.

Holding and Implications

Petition dismissed with costs.

Implications:

  • The High Court declined to quash the Labour Court Award dated 15 May 1990; accordingly the Labour Court's reliefs (including the finding that the Workman was entitled to reinstatement with full back wages and continuity of service) stand as the decision records those outcomes.
  • On the statutory point, the Court accepted that the Workman was not entitled to protection under Section 25F because he had not rendered 240 days in the relevant period; however, that did not cure the independently established illegality under Section 25G arising from retention of juniors without valid justification.
  • No new legal principle was announced; the Court applied existing authority and affirmed the Labour Court's factual findings and legal application. The decision's effect is limited to the parties (i.e., the Labour Court award remains operative) and does not purport to create a novel precedent.

This summary is confined strictly to the materials and holdings recited in the provided opinion and does not add or infer facts beyond that text.

    Municipal Corporation Of Delhi. v. Shri Khacheru

    P.N Nag, J.:— In this writ petition, the petitioner, Municipal Corporation of Delhi, (hereinafter referred to as the Management) has sought for a writ of certiorari seeking quashing of the impugned Award dated 15th may, 1990 passed by Shri G.P Mittal, Presiding Officer, Labour Court No. VII, Tis hazari, Delhi holding that the respondent No. 1 (herinafter called the Workman) had not himself abandoned the employment but his services were terminated by the Management which was illegal as well as unjustified and consequently the Workman was held to be entitled to be reinstated with full back wages and continuity in service.

    The facts leading to the filing of this writ petition are that vide notification No. F.24(1405)/76-Lab. dated 17.1.1977, the Secretary (Labour), Delhi Administration made a reference to the Labour Court to settle the dispute between the Management and the Workman about the termination of services of the Workman. Reference was couched in the following language:—

    “Whether termination of service of Shri Khacheru is illegal and/or unjustified and if so, to what relief is he entitled and what directions are necessary in this respect?”

    In his statement Of claim, the Workman has alleged that he was in employment of the Management since 1.1.1970 as a daily rated monthly paid muster roll employee and his services have been illegally terminated in 1974. However, in defence, the Management has stated that the petitioner has himself abandoned the job without any information or prior permission. He worked as a muster roll employee in the year 1972 for a period of 10 days only. In the year 1974 he absented himself and did not return for duty. On the basis of the pleadings of the parties, various issues were framed by the Labour Court and one of the issues namely, Issue No. 4 was in the following terms:

    “4. Whether the services of workman were terminated or he abandoned?”

    After holding enquiry into the matter, the Labour Court came to the following findings which are relevant for determining the point in controversy between the parties;

    (i) That the Workman has not worked with the Management for 240 days in a year at the time of his alleged termination and, therefore, he would not be entitled to any relief for payment of any retrenchment compensation and for protection under Section 25 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as the Act).

    (ii) That the Workman has not abandoned the employment himself but his services were in fact terminated by the Management, which was illegal and unjustified. As a matter of fact, the Workman could not attend his duty as he had fallen sick for certain period for which he has produced the medical certificate on 4.10.1974 along with fitness certificate and an application for leave. But the Management refused duty as well as medical certificate and fitness certificate were not accepted by the Management.

    (iii) That the persons who were juniors to the Workman are still working with the Management and some of them have already been declared to be permanent and, therefore, the termination of the Workman is in violation of Section 25 G of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947.

    Mr. Luthra, learned counsel for the Management, vehemently contends that the findings of the Labour Court are bad as the Workman has not put in services for a period of one year and the Workman, therefore, cannot complain for retrenchment compensation not being in consonance with Section 25 F of the Act. In support of his submission he has relied upon Mohan Lal v. Management Of M/S Bharat Electronics Ltd. (AIR 1981 SC 123). He has also cited certain other authorities as well to substantiate his point. The principle laid down in Mohan Lal's case (supra) has been statutorily recognised under Section 25F of the Act. It has been further laid down that both on principle and on precedent it must be held that Section 25-B(2) comprehends a situation where a workman is not in employment for a period of 12 calendar months, but has rendered service for a period of 240 days within the period of 12 calendar months commencing and counting backwards from the relevant date, i.e, the date of retrenchment. If he has, he would be deemed to be in continuous service for a period of one year for the purpose of Section 25-B and Chapter V-A. No doubt on the basis of this finding of the Labour Court, the Workman cannot complain of the retrenchment compensation not being in consonance with Section 25 F as he has not rendered service for 240 days within a period of 12 calendar months and cannot have protection of the aforementioned provision.

    However, the matter does not rest here. The finding of the Labour Court is that the Workman has not abandoned his service-rather he was sick and was not allowed to resume duty after he was declared fit. The principle as incorporated in Section 25 G of the Act was not followed inasmuch as persons jonior to the Workman have been retained in service and he has been illegally and unjustifiable retrenched from service.

    Learned counsel for the Workmen, in this context, has relied upon Workmen of Sudder Workshop of Jorehaut Tea Co. Ltd. Co. v. The Management of Jorehaut Tea Co. Ltd. (AIR 1980 SC 145,4). The Supreme Court in that case has held that the rule is that the employer shall retrench the Workman who came last, first, popularly known as ‘last come first go’. Of course, it is not inflexible rule and extraordinary situationsmay justify variations. For instance, a junior recruit who has a special qualification needed by the employer may be retained even though another who is one up is retrenched. There must be a valid reason for this deviation, and, obviously, the burden is on the Management to substantiate the special ground for departure from the rule.

    Reference may also be made to Malkhan Singh v. Union of India and others (1981) -II LLJ, 174) wherein the Division Bench of the High Court has struck down the termination of services of an employee not only on the ground of violation of Section 25 F but also for violation of Section 25 G of the Act. It has been laid down:

    “Where many persons engaged much after the petitioners are retained and no reasons were disclosed for departing from the principle of “last came, first go” contained in S.25 G, then the section stands violated and that is another reason for holding the termination invalid in the instant case.”

    Reference may also be made to Swadeshmitran Limited v. Their Workmen (AIR 1960 SC 762). In that case, the Supreme Court has held that the rule of ‘last come first go’ has been statutorily recognised by Section 25 G. By this section a statutory obligation is imposed on the employer to follow the rule, and if he wants to depart from it, to record his reason for the said departure.

    In the present case, no valid and justifiable ground has been provided by the Management to demonstrate that the services of the Workmen have been correctly retrenched although he was senior. In view of Section 25 G of the Act, there is no doubt the finding of the Labour Court that the juniors have been retained in service and the Workmen being senior has been retrenched unjustifiably, is correct. The termination, therefore, is illegal.

    It was next contended that the Workman himself abandoned his service and the finding of the Labour Court is bad and, therefore, no protection can be given to him under Section 25 F and 25 G.

    Similar question arose before the Rajasthan High Court in General Manager, Northern Railway v. Central Industrial Tribunal, Jaipur (1991 LLN 224). In that case also the stand taken by the Management before the Labour Court was that the Workman has abandoned the work and his services have not been terminated, but the Labour Court came to a finding that Workman did not abandon work but his services have been terminated. The Rajasthan High Court has held that such question of fact cannot be agitated before High Court. I am in entire agreement with the views expressed by the Rajasthan High Court. The finding of fact arrived by the Labour Court after holding enquiry into the matter cannot be challenged in a writ of certiorari before a High Court unless it is perverse or without any evidence.

    In the light of what is discussed above, the petition is dismissed with costs.

    Use AI to get other relevant cases.

    Comments

    Municipal Corporation Of Delhi. v. Shri Khacheru
    (Oct 15, 1992)