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Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

This suit is at the admission stage. The plaintiff filed a suit seeking a permanent decree for partition of a property inherited from her mother, claiming a 1/6th share. The plaintiff also sought the appointment of a Local Commissioner to suggest a mode of partition, a final decree delineating her share, and permanent injunctions restraining defendant No. 1 from preventing her use and possession of the property or from encumbering the property without consent. The plaintiff alleged joint possession of the property with the defendants until July 4, 1990, after which she and some defendants were allegedly ousted by defendant No. 1 and her family. The issue arose regarding whether the proper court fee was paid for the reliefs claimed, particularly concerning the partition and possession of the plaintiff's share.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the plaintiff has paid the proper court fee for the relief of partition of the property.
  2. Whether the plaintiff was in joint possession of the property at the time of filing the suit, affecting the court fee payable.
  3. Whether the court can require additional court fee if it transpires that the initial court fee was paid based on incorrect allegations regarding possession.

Arguments of the Parties

Plaintiff's Arguments

  • The plaintiff claimed to be in joint possession of the property along with the defendants until July 4, 1990.
  • Counsel for the plaintiff relied on Jagdish Pershad v. Joti Pershad, asserting that if joint possession is claimed, only a fixed court fee under Article 17(vi) in Schedule II is payable.
  • Reliance was also placed on Neelavathi & Others v. N. Natarajan & Others, where the Supreme Court held that possession of one co-owner is possession of all unless ouster is proved, and that court fee must be considered based on plaint allegations alone.

Court's Observations on Plaintiff's Position

  • The court noted that the plaint reveals the plaintiff was ousted from possession since July 4, 1990, and is not even permitted to visit the property.
  • Thus, the plaintiff cannot be considered in joint possession for the purpose of court fee calculation.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
In re Nanda Lal Mukherjee, AIR 1932 Calcutta 227 If a co-owner is out of possession of his share, court fee must be paid on the value of his share for relief of possession by partition. Supported the conclusion that the plaintiff, being ousted, must pay court fee on her share's value.
Mir Hassan Khan v. Ahmad Khan & Others, AIR 1935 Peshawar 30 Same principle as In re Nanda Lal Mukherjee regarding court fee for partition when possession is absent. Reinforced the requirement to pay court fee based on the value of the share when possession is lacking.
Onkar Mal & Others v. Ram Sarup & Others, AIR 1954 Allahabad 722 General rule that court fee is based on plaint allegations but court can demand additional fee if initial valuation is incorrect. Applied to hold that the court can require additional court fee if possession allegations are found incorrect.
Jagdish Pershad v. Joti Pershad, 1975 Rajdhani Law Reporter 203 Where joint possession is claimed, only fixed court fee under Article 17(vi) is payable. Plaintiff's counsel relied on this for paying fixed court fee; court accepted the proposition but found it inapplicable on facts.
Neelavathi & Others v. N. Natarajan & Others, AIR 1980 SC 691 Possession of one co-owner is possession of all unless ouster is proved; court fee must be based on plaint allegations. Court found that plaintiff alleged ouster, thus must pay court fee on share's value despite this principle.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court examined the plaint in its entirety to determine the nature of possession and the appropriate court fee. It noted that although the plaintiff initially claimed joint possession with defendants, the plaint itself disclosed that since July 4, 1990, the plaintiff was ousted and denied access to the property. Based on settled legal principles and precedents, possession by one co-owner is considered possession by all unless ouster is proved. Here, the plaintiff's own pleadings established ouster. Therefore, the plaintiff was not in joint possession at the time of filing the suit, necessitating payment of court fee on the value of her share rather than a fixed fee applicable to joint possession cases. The court further relied on precedents allowing it to demand additional court fee if the initial fee was based on incorrect facts. Consequently, the court ordered the plaintiff to pay the deficiency in court fee within ten days before the suit proceeds further.

Holding and Implications

The court held that the plaintiff must pay court fee on the value of her share of the property for seeking partition and possession relief, as she was not in joint possession at the time of filing the suit.

The direct effect of this decision is that the plaintiff was required to remedy the deficiency in court fee payment before the suit could proceed. No new precedent was established; rather, the court applied existing principles to the facts of this case, emphasizing the importance of correct court fee valuation based on actual possession status as pleaded.

    Prakasha Wati v. Dayawanti

    P.K Bahri, J.:— This suit is at the admission stage. Counsel for the plaintiff was called upon to satisfy this Court whether proper court fee has been paid on the various reliefs claimed in this suit. The plaintiff has claimed the following reliefs in this suit.

    (a) pass a permanent decree for partition of the suit property mentioned in Para 1 and mom specifically detailed in the plan attached alongwith the plaint declaring the shares of the plaintiff which is 1/6th;

    (b) a Local Commissioner be appointed to suggest a mode of partition of the suit property by metes and bounds;

    (c) after submitting the report of the Local Commissioner, a final decree for partition be passed delineating and separating the share of the plaintiff in the suit property;

    (d) pass a decree of permanent injunction restraining defendant No. 1 from preventing the use, occupation and possession of the suit property by the plaintiff;

    (e) grant permanent injunction restraining defendant No. 1 from selling, mortgaging, transferring and/encumbering the suit property in any manner without the consent of the plaintiff and defendants 2 to 5;

    (f) costs of these proceedings be awarded to the plaintiff;

    (g) such other relief as this Hon'ble Court may deem fit and just be granted to the plaintiff.

    2. In para 20 of the suit the plaintiff has mentioned that approximate value of the property in question is Rs. 9,00,000/- (nine lakhs) and the value of the plaintiff's share Would be about Rs. 1.05 lakhs. It was pleaded that the parties in the suit ate in joint possession of the property and thus, a court fee of Rs. 20/- is being affixed on the plaint for the relief regarding partition and for separating the plaintiff's share. So, the question which arises for decision is whether proper court fee has been paid by the plaintiff with regard to relief of partition of the property? The plaintiff, as mentioned above, has sought the partition by metes and bounds and then has sought an injunction restraining defendant No. 1 from preventing the use, occupation and possession of the suit property. It is settled law that in order to decide as to what relief has been claimed by the plaintiff, in fact, the whole of the plaint has to be read. It is clear that in case from the perusal of the plaint it is to be inferred that the plaintiff and defendants are in joint possession of the property in question, then the court fee paid initially on the relief regarding partition is correct but if the court is to come to the conclusion that the plaintiff is not in possession of any portion of the property in question then the plaintiff has to pay the court fee on the value of her share. Plaintiff claims to be the co-owner of the property No. D-74A, Mod Nagar, New Delhi. The property was owned by her mother and after the death of her mother on January 6, 1972, the plaintiff and the defendants being the only heirs have inherited the said property in equal shares. It is mentioned in the plaint that Smt. Vishnu Wanti, mother of the plaintiff was suffering from cancer since 1970 and defendant No. 2 was looking after her mother who was living with her and the remaining defendants had all been married and were living separately and used to come and live in the suit premises off and on to look after their mother and it was defendant No. 2 who was the only earning member of the family was supporting the mother. In December 1971 defendant No. 1 was asked by the mother to come and live in the suit premises and defendant No. 2 also continued to live in room marked ‘A’ in the plan attached with the plaint in blue colour and that plaintiff and defendants 3 to 5 also used to come frequently and live in the property in question. Then, it is mentioned that after the death of the mother defendant No. 2 continued to remain in exclusive possession of the room marked ‘A’ and in joint possession of the remaining portion and continued to support defendant No. 1 who was in very stringent financial circumstances. Then, it is pleaded in para 9 that the plaintiff and defendants 2 to 5 continued to exercise all rights of co-ownership and possession over the suit property without any hindrance and objection till July 4, 1990. It was also averred that the plaintiff's daughter's marriage was also solemnised and performed in the property in suit and the room marked ‘A’ remained in continuous possession of defendant No. 2 wherein also belongings of mother were being kept and the plaintiff continued to be in joint use and occupation of the said room.

    3. In para 12 of the plaint, it was pleaded that the plaintiff and defendant No. 3 came to the suit property as usual but they were threatened and were physically attacked causing serious injuries to defendant No. 3 and defendant No. 1 and her family members had threatened the plaintiff and the remaining defendants and warned them that they should not come to the property in suit. It is pleaded in para 213 that till July 4, 1990, the suit property was being used jointly amicably by ail the co-owners who were in joint possession. Now the question which arises for consideration is whether from these pleadings could it be said that on the date the suit was filed the plaintiff was in joint possession of the property in question? It is clear from the pleadings that the plaintiff was never in physical possession of any portion of the property in question and since July 4, 1990, they are being not allowed to even visit the property by defendant No. 1 and her family members. In view of these pleadings it cannot be inferred that the plaintiff is in joint possession of any portion of the properly in question. Hence, the plaintiff has to, in my opinion, pay the court fee on the value of her share for seeking the relief of partition and for possession of her separated share. In re Nanda Lal Mukherjee, AIR 1932 Calcutta 227. it has been held that if a person who is entitled to claim partition of the property is out of possession of his share he has to pay the court fee on the value of his share for seeking relief of possession of his share by partition. Same ratio was laid down in (Mir) Hassan Khan v. Ahmad Khan & Others, AIR 1935 Peshawar 30 In a Full Bench judgment of Allahabad High Court in Onkar Mal & Others v. Ram Sarup & Others, AIR 1954 Allahabad 722, it was laid down that the general rule that the court must base its decision as to the court-fee payable on the allegations and prayers in the plaint is correct only to the extent that the general rule is invoked primarily for the purposes of classification of suit; in other words, in order to find out the nature of the suit and the category it belongs to, the Court must examine the allegations and reliefs claimed in the suit for the simple reason that it is allegation made in the plaint which determine the nature of the suit. It was further observed that even in the matter of classifying the suit the general rule is ignored where it appears, on the construction of the plaint that the real relief sought is something different than what is asked for in the disguised form. The Court must then intervene and ignore the ostensible form and language adopted in the plaint. It was held that in the matter of computation of court fee the aforesaid general principle cannot have so wide a scope as it has in determining the nature of the suit. It was further observed that this process also involves the examination of the plaint allegations and if there is nothing to indicate otherwise, the plaintiff's valuation prima facie is accepted as correct and ordinarily the court would accept court-fee paid in the first instance as correct but if it transpires subsequently that an allegation of fact on the basis of which the court-fee was computed is not correct, then it within the power of the Court to demand additional court fee before the judgment is pronounced. In the present case, taking the avertments made in the plaint on their face themselves it is quite clear that the plaintiff has alleged that she has been ousted from the house as she is not being permitted to even visit the house by defendant No. 1. In other words, the plaintiff cannot be treated to be even in joint possession of the property in question.

    4. Counsel for the plaintiff has made reference to Jagdish Pershad v. Joti Pershad, 1975 Rajdhani law Reporter 203, wherein it has been laid down that keeping in view the peculiar facts of the case that where the plaintiff claims to be in joint possession of the property of which partition is sought, the plaintiff is to pay only fixed court fee as per Article 17(vi) in Schedule II. There is no dispute about this proposition of law Counsel for the plaintiff has then placed reliance on Neelavathi & Others v. N. Natarajan & Others, AIR 1980 SC 691, wherein the Supreme Court has laid down that it is settled law that the question of court fee must be considered in the light of the allegations made in the plaint and its decision cannot be influenced either by the pleas in the written statement or by the final decision of the suit on merits It was held that the general principle of law is that in the case of co-owners the possession of one is in law the possession of all unless ouster or exclusion is proved. I think these observations of the Supreme Court go against the case of the plaintiff because in the present case reading of the whole of the plaint makes it clear that the plaintiff is alleging ouster from possession and thus, the plaintiff has to pay ad valorem court fee on the value of her share. I order accordingly. The deficiency in the court fee be made up within ten days and the suit be listed for further proceedings on August 21, 1990, in ‘Short Matters’.

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    Prakasha Wati v. Dayawanti
    (Aug 8, 1990)