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AMICUS AI
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citation codes
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  • Sections 132 and 135 (i) (a) of the Customs Act and Section 5 of the Imports and Export (Control) Act,
  • provisions of Section 397(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure,
  • SECTION 482 CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE
  • Section 397 (2) of the Code
  • Section 482 Cr. P.C
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Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Attorney(S)
Judges
Acts
  • Sections 132 and 135 (i) (a) of the Customs Act and Section 5 of the Imports and Export (Control) Act,
  • provisions of Section 397(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure,
  • SECTION 482 CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE
  • Section 397 (2) of the Code
  • Section 482 Cr. P.C
Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

The petitioner was arrested on 3 January 1989 upon arrival at Indira Gandhi International Airport and was charged under Sections 132 and 135(i)(a) of the Customs Act and Section 5 of the Imports and Export (Control) Act, on the allegation of smuggling 349,500 grams of foreign-made gold concealed and undeclared, valued at Rs. 1,09,393/-. The Addl. Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, New Delhi, by a short order dated 17 April 1989, allowed the petitioner's bail application and ordered his release on furnishing a personal bond of Rs. 50,000 with two sureties (one local) and a condition that he would not leave the country without prior leave of the court.

The customs department challenged that bail order by filing a revision petition under Section 397(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure before an Additional Sessions Judge, New Delhi. On 8 May 1989 the Additional Sessions Judge allowed the revision petition and set aside the magistrate's bail order. The petitioner then filed the present petition under Section 482 Cr.P.C. seeking quashing of the revisional order of the Additional Sessions Judge.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether a revision petition under Section 397(2) Cr.P.C. is maintainable against an order granting bail — in other words, whether an order granting bail can be treated as an interlocutory order barred from revisional jurisdiction or as a final order subject to revision.
  2. Whether, on the facts of this case (including the petitioner being a foreign national and the alleged large-scale smuggling), the magistrate erred in granting bail because there was a reasonable apprehension that the accused might abscond and thus the accused's presence could not be secured for trial.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant (Petitioner's) Arguments — as advanced by Mr. Mehmood Parcha

  • The revision petition was not maintainable because the bail order was an interlocutory order and therefore barred from revisional interference by virtue of Section 397(2) Cr.P.C.
  • Primary reliance on the Supreme Court's observations in Amar Nath and others v. State of Haryana (AIR 1977 S.C. 2185), where orders of bail were mentioned among examples of interlocutory orders.
  • Further reliance on an Orissa High Court decision (Nitu and others v. The State, 1983 Crl. L.J. 1590) reaffirming that orders granting, refusing or cancelling bail are interlocutory and not subject to revision.
  • The petitioner did not press the merits of whether bail was appropriate on the facts, but generally contended it was not correct to hold that every foreign national's request for bail should be denied.

Respondent (Department's) Arguments — as advanced by Mr. Satish Aggarwal

  • The order granting bail cannot be considered to be invariably interlocutory; whether an order is interlocutory or final depends upon the nature of the order, the stage at which it is passed, and the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case.
  • Reliance on the Bombay High Court decision in Miss Shakuntala v. Roshanlal Aggarwal and others (1985 Crl. L.J. 68), which holds that not every order of bail is interlocutory and that in many cases a bail order may be treated as final.
  • Reliance on a Single Judge decision of the Delhi High Court in Nalla Thamby Sritharan v. Shri Uma Shankar, Air Customs Officer, New Delhi (Criminal Misc. (Main) 746/89, decided 23 May 1989) which, on similar facts, held a revision against an order granting bail to be competent.
  • On merits, it was contended that the petitioner was a Pakistani national allegedly involved in smuggling a large quantity of gold and there was a real likelihood he would abscond if released on bail; hence bail should be declined to secure the accused's presence at trial.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Amar Nath and others v. State of Haryana and another, AIR 1977 S.C. 2185 Illustrative mention that an order of bail can be treated as an interlocutory order (used by petitioner to argue inadmissibility of revision). The Court held reliance on Amar Nath to be misconceived: the issue whether a bail order was final or interlocutory was not the point before the Supreme Court in Amar Nath, which concerned summoning; Amar Nath was treated as illustrative only and not determinative.
Nitu and others v. The State, 1983 Crl. L.J. 1590 (Orissa High Court) Held that orders granting, refusing or cancelling bail are interlocutory and not revisable by a superior court under the statutory bar. The Court noted the petitioner's reliance but did not accept this as a universal rule; instead, it preferred a contextual approach where some bail orders may be final.
Miss Shakuntala v. Roshanlal Aggarwal and others, 1985 Crl. L.J. 68 (Bombay High Court) Held that not every order of bail is interlocutory; depending on nature and facts, an order of bail may be treated as a final order. The Court expressly agreed with and endorsed this view, citing it as persuasive authority supporting the maintainability of revision in appropriate cases.
Nalla Thamby Sritharan v. Shri Uma Shankar, Air Customs Officer, New Delhi, Criminal Misc. (Main) 746/89 (23 May 1989) A Single Judge of this Court reviewed case law and held that on facts similar to the present case a revision petition against an order granting bail was competent. The Court observed that the facts of that case were almost identical and accepted that the Addl. Sessions Judge had not erred in admitting the revision petition; it treated that decision as supporting its conclusion.
Madhu Limaye v. State of Maharashtra, 1978 Crl. L.J. 165 (Supreme Court, larger Bench) Principle that "A judgment or order may be final for one purpose and interlocutory for another" and that whether an order is final or interlocutory depends on whether it finally determines the parties' rights at that stage. The Court relied on Madhu Limaye to explain that Amar Nath's proposition required qualification: each order must be examined contextually to determine whether it finally disposes of rights such that revision is permissible.
Halsbury's Laws of England (as quoted in Madhu Limaye) Expresses the general principle relating to finality versus interlocutory nature of orders ("A judgment or order may be final for one purpose and interlocutory for another"). Used as an authoritative statement in Madhu Limaye and adopted in the Court's reasoning to support a contextual test for finality of bail orders.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court took a twofold approach: first, reviewing the legal question of the maintainability of revision against a bail order; and second, examining whether, on the facts, the magistrate erred in granting bail.

On maintainability, the Court analysed the competing lines of authority. It held that the petitioner's reliance on Amar Nath was misplaced because Amar Nath did not decide the specific question whether an order granting bail is always interlocutory; the decision in Amar Nath concerned summoning orders and the statement regarding bail orders was illustrative. The Court relied principally on Madhu Limaye, where a larger Bench of the Supreme Court stated the controlling principle that an order may be final for one purpose and interlocutory for another, and that the final/interlocutory character must be determined by examining the specific context and effect of the order on the parties' rights at that stage.

Applying that principle, the Court adopted the view expressed by the Bombay High Court in Miss Shakuntala (and endorsed by a Single Judge of this Court in Nalla Thamby Sritharan) that not every order granting bail is interlocutory. The Court reasoned that an order granting bail can finally dispose of the bail application and substantially affect the department's right to secure the accused's presence at trial; therefore, in appropriate circumstances such an order must be treated as final so as not to bar revision.

Turning to facts, the Court accepted the departmental contention that the petitioner's status as a foreign national created a reasonable apprehension of flight and that the Addl. Chief Metropolitan Magistrate had failed to give due weight to the requirement of securing the accused's presence at trial. The Court also rejected the magistrate's justification that bail was necessary because the trial was likely to be protracted, observing that expeditious trial management was within the trial court's control and did not justify release where presence could not be secured.

On these bases the Court concluded that the Additional Sessions Judge did not commit jurisdictional error in admitting and allowing the revision petition, and that the order setting aside bail was legally sustainable.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The petition under Section 482 Cr.P.C. is dismissed.

Implications:

  • Direct effect: The revisional order of the Additional Sessions Judge dated 8 May 1989, which allowed the customs department's revision petition and set aside the magistrate's bail order, stands; the petitioner's challenge to that revisional order is rejected and the bail order remains set aside.
  • Doctrinal clarification (as discussed by the Court): The opinion endorses the principle that whether an order granting bail is interlocutory or final depends on its factual context and effect on the parties' rights. An order granting bail may, in appropriate circumstances, be treated as a final order and thus be susceptible to revisional jurisdiction. The Court also emphasised that securing the accused's presence for trial is a predominant consideration, and that the category of foreign nationals may present a particular risk of absconding relevant to the denial of bail.

The Court found no jurisdictional error or illegality in the revisional order and did not grant the petition under Section 482 Cr.P.C.

    Qamaruddin v. R.P Sharma & Anr.

    Santosh Duggal, J.:— In this petition filed under Section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code, the petitioner seeks quashing of the order passed in revision by the Addl. Sessions Judge, New Delhi, on 8th May, 1989 where by he allowed the revision petition filed by the customs authorities through the Air Custom Officer and set aside the order passed by the Addl. Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, New Delhi on 17th April, 1989, ordering release of the petitioner, on bail.

    2. The facts giving rise to this petition are that the petitioner was arrested on 3rd January, 1989 for offence punishable under Sections 132 and 135 (i) (a) of the Customs Act and Section 5 of the Imports and Export (Control) Act, on his arrival at Indira Gandhi International Airport, on the allegation that he smuggled gold weighing 349,500 grams of foreign making into India, having concealed it and without declaration, value of which gold was at Rs. 1,09,393/-. On bail application being filed, the Addl. Chief Metropolitan Magistrate by short order allowed the petition by observing that no useful purpose was going to be served by detaining the accused in custody because the trial was likely to take some time and directed that he be released on his furnishing personal bond in the sum of Rs. 50,000/- with two sureties in the like amount; one of whom must be local, subject further to the condition that he shall not leave the country without prior permission of the Court.

    3. The department challenged this order by means of a revision petition, which was heard by an Additional Sessions Judge, New Delhi. The learned judge repelled both the arguments addressed before him, firstly as to the maintainability of the revision petition, and secondly as to the correctness of the order of bail on merits, on the view that on the facts and circumstances of this case, the order of bail could not be treated as interlocutory order so as to bar the revisional jurisdiction under Section 397 (2) of the Code and as such the order was reviseable and that in view of the fact that the petitioner was a foreign national with no permanent abode or property in India, there was every likelihood of his absconding during trial and as such the Addl. Chief Metropolitan Magistrate erred in ordering his release on bail, overlooking the requirement of securing the presence of the accused during trial.

    4. Mr. Mehmood Parcha, Advocate appearing for the petitioner, confined his arguments primarily to the question of maintainability of the revision petition, on the contention that the order of bail was an interlocutory order, and as such there was a clear bar to the maintainability of the revision petition in view of the provisions of Section 397(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, and thus the order passed by the Addl. Sessions Judge, was liable to be quashed. His main reliance is on the observations of the Supreme Court in the case of Amar Nath and others v. State of Haryana and another, AIR 1977 S.C 2185, where while enumerating instances of orders which could be deemed to be interlocutory, their Lordships had mentioned an order of bail to be one of such orders.

    5. The learned counsel pressed his point vehemently relying further on a judgment of Orissa High Court in the case of Nitu and others v. The State, 1983 Crl L.J 1590, where the view was reiterated that the orders granting, refusing or cancelling bail were introductory orders which could not be revised by the superior court in view of the statutory bar. Because of his insistence on this point of law, he has has not touched upon the-question of merits of the case as to whether it was on facts a fit case for bail or not but generally a added that it was not a correct view to take that request of every foreign national for bail should be declined.

    6. Mr. Satish Aggarwal, appearing for the respondent, without filling any reply for the reason that only points of law were agitated, contended that the order allowing bail could not be considered to be an interlocutory order and further that it depended upon the nature of the order and the stage at which it is passed and the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case as to whether to treat an order to be a final order or an interlocutory order.

    7. His emphatical reliance is on a judgment of the Bombay High Court in the case of Miss Shakuntala v. Roshanlal Aggarwal and others, 1985 Crl. L.J 68, wherein it was held that every order of bail could not be considered to be interlocutory and that in a large variety of cases depending upon the nature of the proceedings and the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case, the order of bail may be treated as final order. He further submitted that in fact this question has already been examined by learned Single Judge of this Court in Criminal Misc. (Main) 746/89, Nalla Thamby Sritharan v. Shri Uma Shankar, Air Customs Officer, New Delhi, decided on May 23, 1989, wherein on a review of the case law it was held that on facts of the given case, which were almost identical to the present case, revision petition against order of granting bail, was competent before the Addl. Sessions Judge had not erred in admitting the same. Mr. Aggarwal therefore argued that the question is therefore no longer open, and it was a fit case where the petitioner ought not to have been considered for bail in as much as he was a Pakistani national involved in an offence of smuggling large quantity of gold into India and there was every possibility of his not being remaining available for trial after his release on bail and thus the interest of justice required that in order to see that he remained available to face trial, that bail be declined.

    8. I have examined the issue raisd by the learned counsel for the petitioner with earnest care. I am in respectful agreement with the view expressed by the Bombay High Court, in the case of Miss R. Shakuntla (supra) and which has been endorsed by a learned Single Judge of this Court in the case of Nalla Thamby Sritharan (supra).

    9. I would like further to add that reliance by the counsel for the petitioner on the observations of Amar Nath's case (supra) are wholly misconceived because the question as to whether an order granting bail was to be treated as a final order or interlocutory order, was not at issue in the said case and their Lordships only by way of illustration mentioned order of bail as one of the cases which could be deemed as interlocutory. The case before Court actually involved an order of summoning of the accused persons and on the view that it closed one stage of the proceedings and vitally affected rights of the person summoned as an accused, it could not be treated as an interlocutory order so as of bar right of revision.

    10. The position has been elucidated further in the case of Madhu Limaye v. State Of Maharashtra., 1978 Crl. L.J 165, where it was observed quoting from Halsbury's laws of England that:

    “A judgment of order may be final for one purpose and intelrocutory for another.”

    11. It was observed further in Madhu Lirnaye's case (supra) that only that order which does not deal with the final rights of the parties, can be termed as interlocutory and further that even certain orders which would be clearly treated as interlocutory orders, took in their embrace a final adjudication so far as certain rights of the parties were concerned and to that extent, such orders cannot be treated as interlocutory orders. The court also cautioned:

    It is neither advisable, nor possible, to make a catalogue of orders to demonstrate which kinds of orders would be merely, purely or simply interlocutory and which kinds of orders would be final, and then to prepare an exhaustive list of those types of orders which will fall in between the two.”

    12. On a cumulative reading of the aforesaid two judgments of the Supreme Court, it can certainly be said that the Supreme Court in the latter case of Madhu Limaye (supra), which was also by a larger Bench, indicated that the proposition of law indicated in the Amar Nath's case (supra), required certain modifications and that each order needed to be examined in its context and then a view taken as to whether the said order was a final order or an interlocutory order depending upon the situation whether the said order finally determined the rights of the parties in respect to given stage or was simply a step in and in the course of proceedings like summoning of witnesses, issuing of commission or order of production of documents etc.

    13. Judged on this criterion, I am of the considered view that an order rejecting bail may be Interlocutory because subsequent applications are maintainable on fresh grounds being shown, or at different stages of enquiry or trial but as against that, the order of grant of bail finally disposes of the application, and the Department's rights are substantially affected in the sense that in a given case it may be possible to show to the Court that there was reasonable apprehension that the presence of the accused is not possible to be secured and that its rights to have the accused face the trial would by vitally affected, Such an order has to be treated as a final order, in the sense that revision petition against such an order would not be barred. To hold otherwise would be tantamount to making a magistrate the sole repository of the power to refuse or grant bail. Such a proposition can certainly be not countenanced.

    14. I am in full agreement in this respect with the view taken by the Bombay High Court in the case of Miss R. Shakuntla (supra) and the observations made therein to the effect that:

    “An order which itself brings the entire proceedings to an end cannot be considered to be an interlocutory order.”

    15. I therefore do not find that any case is made out for exercise of inherent jurisdiction of this court in the proceedings under Section 482 Cr. P.C The order passed by the Addl. Sessions Judge does not suffer from any jurisdictional error or illegality.

    16. I also find that the order of bail was rightly set aside on the facts of this case because the question is no longer res Integra to the effect that the requirements of securing presence of the accused in a trial is a predominant consideration for refusing bail in case there is a reasonable apprehension that the accused might flee from the justice, and the category of foreign nationals is one such category. The Addl. Chief Metropolitan Magistrate certainly mis-directed himself by not keeping this important requirement of having presence of the accused for trial in view while considering the application for bail. The observation that the trial was likely to take long is also not justified because it was certainly a situation which the trial court could manage effectively by ensuring expeditious trial-a factor which was exclusively within his power, a well as control. There was no justification to order release of the petitioner on bail on this count.

    17. For the foregoing reasons, the petition merits dismissal, and it is dismissed accordingly.

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    Comments

    Qamaruddin v. R.P Sharma & Anr.
    (Sep 25, 1989)