Judgment Summary — Mahinder Narain, J.
Factual and Procedural Background
The petitioner, Satya Narain Prakash Punj, and respondents 4 to 20 purchased property No. 10, Prithvi Raj Road, New Delhi from Dr. Karni Singhji. The property is described as about 2.60 acres (12,584 sq. yards). The sale deed was dated 5-2-1973 and registered on 6-2-1973 (registered as No. 798 in Additional Book No.1, Vol. No. 3068, pages 1–97).
The petitioner challenged notice No. IAC/ACQ-2.C-6/73-74/3199 dated 10-8-1973 (Annexure D) by way of writ petition (No. 1174/73 filed on 4-9-1973), seeking quashing of that notice. The petition alleged that the impugned notice was not in accordance with the provisions of section 269-D of the Income Tax Act, 1961, as amended by the Taxation Laws (Amendment) Act, 1972.
On 6-9-1973 the Court passed an interim order (recorded in the opinion) directing a show-cause notice to respondents No.1 and 2, stay application notice to be listed, proceedings before the competent authority to be stayed meanwhile, and no fresh publication to be made in the meanwhile.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the initiation of acquisition proceedings under section 269-D of the Income Tax Act, 1961 can validly be effected by a notice that has not been published in the Official Gazette as required by subsection (1) of section 269-D.
- Whether the impugned notice dated 10-8-1973, which was not published in the Official Gazette prior to its communication to the petitioner and other affected persons, can serve as a valid basis for initiation of acquisition proceedings under section 269-D.
Arguments of the Parties
Petitioner's Arguments
- The impugned notice dated 10-8-1973 was not issued in accordance with section 269-D of the Income Tax Act, 1961, as amended (specifically, it was not published in the Official Gazette as required), and therefore cannot be the basis for initiating acquisition proceedings.
- The petitioner received the notice on 4-9-1973 and filed the writ petition on the same date.
Respondents' / Other Counsel Arguments
- It was not disputed by the respondents that the impugned notice had not been published in the Official Gazette prior to communication to the petitioner and respondents 4–20.
- Mr. Wazir Singh referred to the decision in Girnar Builders P. Ltd. v. I.A.C. (156 (1985) I.T.R. 403 (2))—in which a notice of acquisition had been published in the Gazette on 6-3-1982 and the petitioner there was intimated on 5-4-1982—to support a proposition regarding initiation by Gazette publication. (The court explains why that decision does not assist in the present case.)
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent |
Rule or Principle Cited For |
Application by the Court |
| Nazir Ahmed v. King Emperor, 1936 PC 253 at 257 (1) |
When a statute requires a thing to be done in a particular manner, it must be done in that manner or not at all (the rule that where power is given to do a certain thing in a certain way, it must be done in that way). |
The court applied this principle to conclude that the statutory requirement in section 269‑D (initiation by notice published in the Official Gazette) must be complied with; failure to publish the notice in the Gazette renders initiation invalid. |
| Girnar Builders P. Ltd. v. I.A.C 156 (1985) I.T.R 403 (2) |
Example where initiation of proceedings was by publication in the Official Gazette and the petitioner was intimated afterwards (demonstrating correct statutory compliance). |
The court observed that in Girnar Builders the notice had been published in the Gazette before intimation; therefore that decision does not help the respondents in the present case because the impugned notice here was not published in the Gazette at any time prior to communication. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The court examined section 269‑D (as amended) which expressly provides that "The competent authority shall initiate proceedings for the acquisition... by notice to that effect published in the Official Gazette." The statute also contemplates service of copies on transferor/transferee and other persons, but the court emphasized that the initiation of the proceedings is effected only by the Gazette publication required by subsection (1).
The court noted the second proviso to section 269‑D and reasoned that a copy of the notice served on the transferor/transferee is a notice under subsection (1), reinforcing that publication in the Official Gazette is the essential mode of initiation.
It was undisputed that the notice dated 10‑8‑1973 (the impugned notice) was not published in the Official Gazette at any time prior to its communication to the petitioner and other affected parties. Applying the settled principle from Nazir Ahmed v. King Emperor that where a statute prescribes a mode for doing an act it must be followed, the court held that initiation of acquisition proceedings could not be validly effected by a notice that had not been published in the Official Gazette.
The court considered the cited case Girnar Builders P. Ltd. v. I.A.C. and observed that in that case the notice had indeed been published in the Gazette (on 6‑3‑1982) and the petitioner was intimated thereafter (on 5‑4‑1982). Because the statutory requirement had been complied with in Girnar Builders, that judgment did not assist the respondents where, in the instant matter, there was no Gazette publication prior to intimation.
On this statutory and precedential basis, the court concluded the impugned notice did not comply with section 269‑D and thus could not validly initiate proceedings for acquisition.
Holding and Implications
Holding: The impugned notice dated 10-8-1973 is quashed. The petition is allowed. There shall be no order as to costs.
Implications: The direct consequence is that no acquisition proceedings can be initiated on the basis of the impugned notice because it was not published in the Official Gazette as required by section 269‑D. The opinion does not purport to lay down any broader new legal principle beyond the application of the statutory requirement and established authority (Nazir Ahmed). The decision therefore resolves the dispute between the parties by invalidating the particular notice; the opinion does not announce any broader change in law.
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