This second appeal under S. 39 Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 (for short ‘the Act’) is directed against the order of the Rent Control Tribunal dated October 4, 1982.
2. By lease deed dated July 24, 1953 the Delhi Improvement Trust, predecessor-ininterest of the Delhi Development Authority, leased out a plot of land No. 12, Block No. 10B Western Extension Area., New Delhi, to Rattan Lal. He constructed a building thereon and let out a portion, consisting of one room and a covered Verandah in front thereof to Narain Das (respondent tenant) on a monthly rent of Rs. 63/- Rattan Lal later sold this property to Manohar Lal (appellant/landlord) by a sale deed dated November 26, 1961. The respondent attorned to him as a tenant.
3. Under the terms of the lease deed granted by the D.D.A., the lessee was not entitled to use the said land and building that may be erected thereon for any other purpose than for the purpose of a residential house, without the consent in writing of the lessor. The tenant, however, used the tenanted premises for dairy business. This user, being contrary to the terms of the lease, was objected by the D.D.A. The landlord consequently filed an application against the tenant for recovery of the possession of the premises in dispute under cl.(k), Sub-S. (1) of S. 14 of the Act. Parties, however, arrived at a compromise. The tenant agreed to paw 3/4th amount of the penalty or the premium levied by the DDA for the commercial use of the premises since November 27, 1961 up to date. The landlord agreed to withdraw the eviction petition which was consequently dismissed as such.
4. The D.D.A. thereafter refused to regularise the commercial user and served the appellant with a notice dated 27-5-74 to show cause as to why the lease be not cancelled for the breach of the said term. The landlord consequently filed a second application for eviction of the tenant from the said premises under cl. (k) of the proviso to Sub-S.(1) of S. 14 of the Act. This petition was, however, dismissed on the ground that notice dated June 8, 1974, the basis of the eviction petition, was not a valid notice inasmuch as the tenant was not called upon to stop the alleged misuser of the premises and was not allowed any time for this purpose.
5. The appellant thereafter served a fresh notice on the tenant and filed another eviction petition on July 4, 1977 for recovery of the possession of the premises under cl.(k) of the proviso to Sub-S.(1) of S. 14 of the Act. It was alleged that the tenant notwithstanding the previous notice dated May 7, 1977 was using the tenanted premises for commercial purpose which was contrary to the conditions imposed on the landlord by the DDA while granting him the lease of the land on which the premises were situated. The D.D.A. was also made a party to this petition.
6. The tenant admitted that he was carrying on the business of a dairy in the premises in dispute. He also admitted the receipt of the notice dated May 7, 1977 asking him to stop the commercial user. He, however, resisted the eviction on the pleas that it was barred by the principles of res judicata and also under the provisions contained in O. 23, R. 1(4), Civil P.C; that the premises in dispute had been let out for commercial purpose and were being used as such since the inception of the tenancy and that the DDA had been regularising the commercial user and this user could be regularised permanently, and that the notice dated May 7, 1977 was invalid.
7. Sh. J.M Malik, Addl. Controller by his order dated September, 17, 1979, observing that the learned counsel for the respondent had not picked up any conflict with the maintainability of the case, held that the petition was not barred by the provisions contained in S. 11, Civil P.C inasmuch as the previous application had not been decided on merits. He further found that the notice dated May 7, 1977 was valid and the tenant notwithstanding the previous notice had used the premises in his tenancy for commercial purpose which was contrary to the condition imposed on the landlord by the D.D.A. while granting the lease of the land on which the said premises had been constructed. Relying on the Supreme Court decision in Faqir Chand v. Ram Rattan Bhanot (1973) 3 SCR 454 : (AIR 1973 SC 921), he rejected the objection of the tenant that landlord having let out the premises in dispute for commercial purpose could not claim eviction under cl. (k). With these findings he held that the ingredients contained in cl. (k) stand proved. He consequently issued a notice to the DDA under S. 14(11) of the Act calling upon it to explain whether the premises in dispute could be regularised temporarily or permanently and if the answer was in positive on what terms and conditions. The matter was thereafter decided by Sh. H.P Sharma, Additional Controller on December 6, 1980. He directed the landlord to approach the DDA and apply for regularisation of the commercial user, awaiting results thereon by July 2, 1981. The tenant was directed to pay the misuser charges for the past misuser within one month of the order.
8. Feeling aggrieved the landlord filed a petition in the High Court under Art. 227 of the Constitution. This Court by order dated October 32, 1981 held that the order of the Addl. Controller directing the landlord to approach the D.D.A. for regularisation of the future non-conforming user was without jurisdiction and liable to be quashed. The said order was consequently quashed and the matter was sent to the Addl. Controller for determining the two alternatives mentioned in S. 14(11) of the Act.
9. After the remand, Sh. V.B Gupta, Addl. Controller by order dated May 1, 1982 held that the DDA was not willing to regularise the misuser permanently and directed the tenant to stop the misuser within one month from the date of the order failing which the eviction order shall be deemed to have been passed against the tenant.
10. Dissatisfied the tenant filed an appeal before the Rent Control Tribunal. The appeal was allowed, the order of the Addl. Controller was set aside and the case was remanded back to the Addl. Controller to decide it after finding the tentative date by which the temporary regularisation or permanent regularisation could be permitted.
11. Feeling aggrieved the landlord has filed this second appeal.
12. To claim eviction under cl. (k) the landlord was required to prove : (i) that the land on which the tenanted premises are situate had been taken by him on lease from the Government the DDA or the Municipal Corporation of Delhi; (ii) the tenant was using the premises contrary to any condition imposed on the landlord by the said authority (lessor); and (iii) that the tenant had not stopped the breach of the said conditions even after the service of a notice to that effect on him by the landlord.
13. It has not been disputed and cannot be disputed that all these ingredients stand proved in this case. Clause (4)(C) of the lease deed dated July 24, 1953, whereby the Delhi Improvement Trust, predecessor-in-interest of Delhi Development Authority, granted the lease of the land on which the premises in dispute are situated in favour of Mr. Rattan Lal, predecessor of the present landlord, imposed a condition on the lessee that it shall not use the said land and the buildings that may be erected thereon, during the lease period for any other purpose than for the purpose of a residential house without the consent in writing of the lessor. The tenant has admitted in the written statement itself that he was using the tenanted premises for commercial purpose. It has also not been disputed that he had been served with the notice dated May 7, 1977 asking him to stop the user and he has not yet stopped the commercial user. All the ingredients required under cl. (K) thus stand proved.
14. Sub-Section (11) of S. 14 of the Act reads :—
“No order for the recovery of possession of any premises shall be made on the ground specified in cl. (k) of proviso to Sub-S.(1), if the tenant within such time as may be specified in this behalf by the Controller, complies with the condition imposed on landlord by any of the authorities referred to in that clause or pays to that authority such amount by way of compensation as the Controller may direct.”
15. These provisions prohibit the making of an order for the recovery of possession under cl.(k) if the tenant complies with the order which the Controller is obliged to make under Sub-S.(1). This Sub-Section requires the Controller to make either of the two orders namely, (i) directing the tenant to stop the misuser within a specified period; or (ii) to pay to the authority concerned such amount by way of compensation as the Controller may direct. No doubt, it gives discretion to the Controller to pass either of these two orders, this discretion, however, cannot be exercised arbitrarily and has to be exercised judicially. The order has to be made keeping in view the facts and circumstances of the case and the object for the enactment of these provisions. It is also a settled law that the order under Sub-S.(1) has to be made after notice to the authority concerned. (lessor).
16. The object of enacting cl. (k) of the proviso to Sub-S.(1) of S. 14 and Sub-S.(11) of S. 14 of the Act, in my view, is two fold. “The legislature had clearly taken note of the fact that enormous extents of lands have been leased by the three authorities mentioned in that clause, and has expressed its anxiety to see that these lands are used for the purpose for which they were leased.” (See Faqir Chand, (AIR 1973 SC 921) (supra). The other object was to protect the landlords, whose right to claim eviction under the ordinary law had been curtailed by the Act, from the cancellation of their leasehold rights of such lands on account of the breach, by the tenants, of any of the conditions imposed on them by these authorities. At the same time by enacting Sub-S.(11) the legislature sought to protect the tenants from eviction by giving a further opportunity to stop the breach or to pay such compensation as the Controller may fix. The question of payment of compensation, in my opinion, would arise only when the authority concerned is prepared to condone the breach otherwise neither of above mentioned two purposes for enacting these provisions would be achieved.
17. This Court by order dated October 30, 1981, while remanding the case back to the Addl. Controller, directed him to determine the two alternatives mentioned in Sub-S.(11) of S. 14 of the Act. Learned Addl. Controller held that the DDA was not prepared to regularise the misuser permanently and directed the tenant to stop the commercial user. The learned Tribunal in appeal observed :
“As already pointed out above, Hon'ble Mr. Justice Sultan Singh in the civil writ between the parties has clearly held that it is to be found as to what compensation, if any, can be payable by the tenant for misuse charges and this has to be for the past as well for the future. Delhi Development Authority in its reply does state about past regularisation for the misuser and in the reply filed in this Court, stated that the misuser charges up till 30-9-82 are none but for the future misuser charges they are not ready to make any statement. The Delhi Development Authority has been a party to these proceedings and, therefore, is aware of the directions given by the High Court. It must file a detailed reply before the matter can be agitated. If necessary, it is a fit case where the evidence should be recorded by calling an officer of the Delhi Development Authority to spell out as to up to which date they are willing to condone the breaches temporarily or permanently for the future and on what compensation and further what is their general policy with respect to the shop in question.”
With the above observations the case was remanded with directions to the Addl. Controller to decide, if any tentative date was known up till which temporary regularisation charges could be fixed or permanent regularisation could be permitted.
18. Mr. B.R Malik, learned counsel appearing for the landlord, strenuously assailed this order of the learned Tribunal. He contended that the Delhi Development Authority was a party to the eviction petition since beginning and had taken the stand that it was not prepared to regularise the breach. In these circumstances, argued the learned counsel, the Tribunal was in error in remanding the case.
19. Undoubtedly the Delhi Development Authority was a party respondent to the eviction petition filed by the landlord in the year 1977. It filed a written statement. The relevant portions of para 3 of the preliminary objection and para 21 (additional pleas) read as under :—
“3......... The portion of the premises on this plot is being used for commercial purpose and, as such, the same is in contravention of the terms and conditions and, therefore, the lease is liable to be cancelled. It is further submitted that the answering respondent is not prepared to regularise the misuser of the premises and to accept the consideration money and is interested in the vacation of the misuser...”
ADDITIONAL PLEAS :
21. That the answering respondent reserves the right to take action against the petitioner for contravention of the terms and conditions of the lease deed under the provisions of Delhi Development Act, 1957 and the Master Plan and Zonal Plan of Delhi.”
20. As noticed above Mr. J.M Marik Addl. Controller after holding that the ingredients of cl. (k) had been proved, directed that notice be issued to the DDA under Sub-S.(11) of S. 14 of the Act. The authority filed a reply to this notice. The relevant portion of the para 3 of the reply reads as under :—
“Question for permanent commercialisation of the premises under reference does not arise till the Zonal Plan of this area is approved by the Central Government. However, the application for the change of the user may be considered afresh under the rules and regulations, if the same is submitted by the lessee.”
21. After the remand by the High Court the Delhi Development Authority filed another reply dated April 7, 1982. The relevant portion of para 3 reads as under :
“question for permanent commercialisation of the premises under reference does not arise till the Zonal plan of this area is approved by the Central Govt. However, the application for the change of the user may be considered afresh under the rules and regulations if the same is submitted by the lessee.”
22. In this second appeal Deputy Director (OSB) Delhi Development Authority was examined. He deposed :—
“As per the existing policy the DDA is not at all going to regularise the misuse in respect of the said property permanently or temporarily but is keenly interested to get the misuse removed/vacated. However, DDA can regularise only the past misuse subject to payment of misuse charges for the past period provided the lessee removes the existing misuse in the premises”.
23. From various replies filed by the DDA and the statement of the Deputy Director (OSB) recorded by this Court on 27-1-86 it is clear that DDA was not prepared to regularise the misuse permanently or temporarily. On the other hand it was insisted to get the misuse vacated and in default threatening cancellation of lease. In these circumstances, there was no alternative but to direct the tenant to stop the misuse and in default to face eviction.
24. Mr. P.K Jaitley, learned counsel for the tenant contended that the DDA had issued a public notice dated April 6, 1985 which had been published in the Gazette of India Extraordinary, Part II dated April 6, 1985. It shows that the DDA was proposing to make changes in the Master Plan. According to these changes the user of the premises in dispute would be converted as commercial. Admittedly, no change has yet been made in the Master Plan or the Zonal Plan regarding the user of the property in dispute. Mere proposal is not of much help.
25. Learned counsel for the tenant also argued that the authority had regularised the commercial user in respect of adjacent premises and its action in not regularising the commercial user of the premises in dispute was discriminatory. I am afraid, this question cannot be gone into in these proceedings.
26. Mr. Jaitley, learned counsel for the respondent also assailed the finding of the learned Addl. Controller regarding the maintainability of the eviction petition. It was argued that the landlord had earlier filed an application claiming eviction under cl. (k) of the proviso to Sub-S.(1) of S. 14 of the Act, i.e on the same ground on which eviction was claimed in the present eviction petition. The application filed earlier was withdrawn by him without the permission from the Court and, therefore, the present application was barred by the principles of res judicata as well as by virtue of the provisions contained in O. 23, R. 1(4), Civil P.C
27. Mr. Malik, learned counsel appearing for the landlord, on the other hand, contended that the tenant had specifically raised this plea in the written statement but had given up the same as was apparent from the order of the learned Addl. Controller. Even in the appeal filed by the tenant against the said order this finding was not assailed. He, therefore, could not raise this plea now in the second appeal. It was also pointed out that there is no bar of res judicata as the matter had been compromised. Provisions of O. 23, R. 1(4), CPC were not attracted as the present petition has been filed on a new cause of action which arose after the decision of the earlier case. He also pointed out that according to the law which was prevalent in 1966, i.e, at the time of the decision of the earlier petition, the landlord who had himself let out the premises for use for a purpose which was contrary to the terms imposed on him by the authority concerned while granting the lease of the land on which the premises were situate was estopped from claiming eviction under cl.(k). There was a change in this view by the decision of the Supreme Court in Faqir Chand v. Ram Rattan Bhanot, (AIR 1973 SC 921)(supra) which was decided in the year 1973.
28. I have carefully examined the contentions of the parties. The previous petition filed under cl. (k), as noticed earlier, had been withdrawn as a result of the compromise between the parties. To create the bar of res judicata the matter in the earlier case, inter alia, must have been heard and finally decided by the Court. The petition having been dismissed as withdrawn on the basis of a compromise, the matter had not been heard and decided on merits. There being no decision of the court the previous order based on compromise does not bar the present application. That order did not operate as res judicata See P.V Subha Rao v. V. Jagannadha Rao, AIR 1967 SC 591.
29. Sub-rule (4) of R. 1 of O. 23, CPC provides that where the plaintiff withdraws from a suit without the permission of the Court under sub-rule (3) he would be barred from bringing a fresh suit in respect of same subject matter. The term ‘subject matter’ means plaintiffs cause of action for a suit. As observed by the Supreme Court in Vallabh Das v. Dr. Madanlal, AIR 1970 SC 987, the term ‘subject matter’ in O. 23, R. 1 means the bundle of facts which have to be proved in order to entitle the plaintiff to the relief claimed by him. Where the cause of action and the relief claimed in the second suit are not the same as the cause of action and the relief claimed in the first suit, the second suit cannot be considered to have been brought in respect of the same subject-matter as the first suit.
30. To claim eviction under cl. (k), as observed earlier, the landlord, inter alia, was required to prove that the tenant had not stopped the breach of the condition even after the service of the notice on him by the landlord. In other words, one of the essential facts required to be proved in such a case is the service of the notice on the tenant requiring him to stop the breach of the condition imposed on the landlord by the authority concerned. Each such notice furnished a new cause of action. The present petition was based on the notice dated May 7, 1977 which was issued long after the decision of the first case. Therefore, it cannot be said that the subject-matter in the present I application was the same. This view finds support from a decision of this Court in Rajeshwar Dayal Saxena v. Nanak Chand SAO No. 165 of 1981 decided on October 20, 1981.**
31. In the view I have taken above I need not go into the question whether the landlord had given up this plea and, therefore, could not raise this plea in this appeal.
32. For the reasons recorded above I allow the appeal, set aside the impugned order and instead direct the tenant to stop the misuser within three months from today. In default, the order for recovery of possession under cl.(K) of the proviso to Sub-S.(1) of S. 14 of the Act would be deemed to have been passed against him and the landlord would be entitled to recover the possession of the premises in dispute. Parties are left to bear their own costs.
Appeal allowed.