Translate
Text Highlighter

Bookmark

PDF

Share

Report a problem
AMICUS AI
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Judges
Acts
  • sub-section (2) of Section 36 of the Central Excises and Salt Act, 1944
Are you a practicing lawyer?
Enhance your digital presence and reach by creating a Casemine profile.
Upload pleading to use the new AI search
Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Judges
Acts
  • sub-section (2) of Section 36 of the Central Excises and Salt Act, 1944
Smart Summary

Structured Summary of the Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

The principal legal question in the writ petition concerned the proper construction of the third proviso to sub-section (2) of Section 36 of the Central Excises and Salt Act, 1944, as amended on 1-7-1978. The petitioner is a manufacturer of portland cement and pozzolana cement. Cement of all varieties is charged to excise duty under Item 23 of the Central Excise Tariff read with Section 3 of the Act. By Notification No. 89/76-C.E. of 16th March, 1976 certain exemptions for some types of cement had been granted.

The Superintendent of Central Excise, M. O. R. Peddapalli, by demand orders (O.C. No. 859 dated 23-10-1976 and No. 96/77 dated 27-8-1977) called upon the petitioner to pay duty at Rs. 91/- per metric tonne on pozzolana cement under Tariff Item 23 read with Item No.2 of the exemption notification. On appeal to the Appellate Collector, the demands were ordered withdrawn and the Superintendent was directed that such cement should be assessed under Item No.3 at Rs. 82/- per metric tonne.

Subsequently, the Central Government issued two notices dated 12th November 1979 and 17th November 1979 under Section 36(2) calling upon the petitioner to show cause why the Appellate Collector's orders should not be reviewed and the original demands restored. Those notices were issued after the expiry of six months but within one year from the dates of the Appellate Collector's orders. The petitioner challenged these notices by the present writ petition, contending they were ultra vires the third proviso to Section 36(2) and barred by limitation.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. How should the third proviso to sub-section (2) of Section 36 of the Central Excises and Salt Act, 1944 (as amended on 1-7-1978) be properly construed?
  2. Whether the impugned show-cause notices issued by the Central Government after the expiry of six months but within one year from the Appellate Collector's orders were barred by limitation under the third proviso to Section 36(2), or whether they fell under the second proviso and were therefore valid within one year?

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner's (Appellant's) Arguments

  • The writ petition challenged the impugned notices as being ultra vires the third proviso to Section 36(2) and barred by limitation under that proviso (i.e., that the notices were issued after the six-month period applicable under the third proviso).

Respondents' Arguments

  • The respondents argued that the language of the impugned notices invoked the general language of Section 36(2) (i.e., that the Central Government wished to review the legality, correctness or propriety of the appellate orders) and therefore the notices were issued under the second proviso, which permits commencement within one year; accordingly the notices were not barred by limitation.

Table of Precedents Cited

No precedents were cited in the provided opinion.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court analyzed the language, scope and interplay of the substantive part of Section 36(2) and its three provisos as follows:

  1. Scope of substantive provision: The substantive part of Section 36(2) confers a broad power on the Central Government to call for and examine records of proceedings under Section 35 or Section 35A "for the purpose of satisfying itself as to the correctness, legality or propriety" of such decisions and to pass such orders as it thinks fit. This broad language enables suo motu revision on any ground touching correctness, legality or propriety.
  2. Second proviso (one-year limitation): The second proviso prescribes a longer period — one year — within which no proceedings shall be commenced in respect of "any decision or order." It is general in scope and aligns with the broad language of the substantive part.
  3. Third proviso (shorter six-month limitation): The third proviso is narrower and applies only where the Central Government "is of opinion that any duty of excise has not been levied or has been short-levied or erroneously refunded." In such cases the third proviso states no order levying or enhancing duty shall be made under this section unless the person affected is given notice to show cause against it within the "time limit specified in Section 11A." The court read this to mean a six-month period measured from the date of the appellate order.
  4. Relation between provisos: The court emphasized that while orders attracting the third proviso may also be generally covered by the second proviso's language, the converse is not true. The third proviso carves out a specific category (short-levy, non-levy, or erroneous refund) from the broader category covered by the second proviso. Thus the third proviso functions as a special law with a shorter limitation period.
  5. Application to the notices: Although the impugned notices used general language similar to the substantive part of Section 36(2) (mentioning review of "legality, correctness or propriety"), the court held that the notices must be read along with the appellate orders which were sought to be revised. When read together, it was clear the Central Government's tentative view was that the appellate orders resulted in a short-levy of excise duty. Therefore the notices sought revision on the ground of short-levy, bringing them within the scope of the third proviso despite the absence in the notices of the specific words "short-levy" or "non-levy."
  6. Consequence of classification: Because the notices fell within the special category of the third proviso, they could not avail themselves of the longer limitation of the second proviso. The special (shorter) limitation period prevailed.
  7. Interpretation of "time limit specified in Section 11-A": The court expressly interpreted "time limit specified in Section 11-A" as a period of six months from the date of the appellate order passed under Section 35 or 35A. The court rejected incorporation of the "relevant date" concept from Section 11-A into the third proviso, because revision under Section 36(2) is of appellate orders (section 35/35A orders), not orders of original assessing authorities.
  8. Additional note: The court observed that the legislative policy of providing a shorter limitation for matters of non-levy/short-levy or erroneous refund is reflected elsewhere (noting Rule 9), supporting the interpretation that a shorter period is intended for such cases.

The court emphasized that the decisive inquiry is substantive: whether the revision sought is essentially for short-levy/non-levy/erroneous refund (third proviso) — determined by reading the notices together with the appellate orders — rather than relying solely on the superficial wording of the notices.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The writ petition is allowed and the impugned show-cause notices (Exhibit I and Exhibit K) are quashed. The court held that the notices were covered by the third proviso to Section 36(2), which prescribes a shorter limitation period, and were therefore barred by limitation because they were issued after the expiry of six months from the dates of the appellate orders.

Direct implications for the parties:

  • The two impugned show-cause notices issued by the Central Government on 12th November 1979 and 17th November 1979 are quashed as illegal and barred by limitation.
  • No order as to costs was made.

Broader implications:

The opinion explains and applies a construction of Section 36(2) and its provisos (including the meaning of the "time limit specified in Section 11A" for the third proviso). The text of the opinion does not expressly state that it sets a new precedent beyond the decision in this case; accordingly, the summary above limits itself to the direct effect and the court's interpretative ruling as applied to these notices.

    Associated Cement Companies Ltd. v. Union Of India

    1. The main question of law in this writ petition relates to the proper construction of the third proviso to sub-section (2) of Section 36 of the Central Excises and Salt Act, 1944 as amended on 1-7-1978. The petitioner manufactures 'portland cement' and also 'pozzolana cement'.

    2. The cement of all varieties is charged to excise duty under Item 23 of the Central Excise Tariff read with Section 3 of the Act. By Notification No. 89/76-C.E. of 16th March, 1976 certain exemptions from payment of duty in respect of certain types of cement were granted as follows :-

    ------------------------------------------------------------------------

    3. The Superintendent of Central Excise M. O. R. Peddapalli by demand orders O.C. No. 859 dated 23-10-1976 and No. 96/77 dated 27-8-1977 called upon the petitioner to pay duty at Rs. 91/- per metric tonne on 'pozzolana cement' manufactured by the petitioner under Tariff Item 23 read with Item No. 2 of the exemption notification. In the appeals preferred by the petitioner to the Appellate Collector, Central Excise the said demands were ordered to be withdrawn and the Superintendent of Central Excise was directed that even though the specific surface may be not less then 3500 Cm 2 all such cement should be assessed under Item No. 3 of the exemption notification at the rate of Rs. 82/- per metric tonne only. Thereupon the two impugned notices were issued by the Central Government on 12th November, 1979 and 17th November, 1979 under Section 36(2) of the Act calling upon the petitioner to show cause why the orders of the Appellate Collector should not be reviewed and set aside and the demands made by the Superintendent should not be restored. These notices were issued after the expiry of six months but within the period of one year after the orders of the Appellate Collectors were passed. These notices have been challenged by the present writ petition as being ultra vires of the third proviso to Section 36(2) being barred by limitation there under.

    4. Section 36(2) reads as follows :-

    "The Central Government may, of its own motion or otherwise, call for and examine the record of any proceeding in which any decision or order has been passed under section 35 or section 36a of this act for the purpose of satisfying itself as to the correctness, legality or propriety of such decision or order and may pass such order thereon as it thinks fit :

    Provided that no decision or order shall be varied so as to prejudicially affect any person unless such person is given a reasonable opportunity of making a representation and, if he so desires of being heard in his defense :

    Provided further that no proceedings shall be commenced under this sub-section in respect of any decision or order (whether such decision or order has been passed before or after the coming into force of this sub-section) after the expiration of a period of one year from the date of such decision or order :

    Provided also that where the Central Government "is of opinion that any duty of excise has not been levied or has been short-levied or erroneously refunded", no order levying or enhancing the duty, or no order requiring payment of the duty so refunded, shall be made under this section unless the person affected by the proposed order is given notice to show cause against it within the time limit specified in Section 11A."

    5. The power of the Central Government to review an order in appeal passed under Section 35 or passed in revision under Section 35A is expressed in very broad terms, namely, "for the purpose of satisfying itself as to the correctness, legality or propriety of such decision". A longer and a shorter periods of limitation for review are provided in the second and the third provisos respectively. The scheme of these provisos is this. Notice of intention to review "any" decision under section 35 or section 35a can be issued within one year from the decision under the second proviso.

    6. On the contrary the third proviso is limited in its scope. It applies only when the Central Government

    "is of opinion that any duty of excise has not been levied or has been short-levied or erroneously refunded"
    . Notice to show cause, has to be issued within the shorter period of six months from the date of decision. Reading the second proviso, it would appear that while every order in respect of which the opinion of the Central Government can be formed under the third proviso would also be generally covered by the all embracing language of second proviso, the converse is not true. That is to say, all orders which fall within the ambit of the second proviso will not fall in the ambit of the third proviso. The reason is that while the second proviso is a provision as general as the substantive part of Section 36(2), the third proviso is a provision which carves out a particular area only from Section 36(2) but leaves out the rest to be covered by the second one. The only opinion to which the third, proviso refers is the opinion of the Central Government that any duty of excise has not been levied or has been short levied or erroneously refunded by the appellate order which is sought to be revised by the Central Government under Section 36(2). By way of contrast it is to be noted that under the second proviso there is no such limitation in respect of the order sought to be revised by the Central Government. Once the Central Government wishes to examine the legality, propriety or correctness of an order passed under section 35 or 35a, then it automatically is covered by the second proviso.

    7. The difficulty which has arisen in the present case is that while the orders of the Appellate Collector are such that according to the tentative view formed by the Central Government, they resulted in short-levy of excise duty, the language of the impugned notices does not use these words which are found in the third proviso. No reference to short-levy or non-levy is made in the notices. On the contrary the notices say that the Central Government wishes to review the legality, correctness or propriety of the appellate orders. On the strength of the language used in the impugned notices, it is argued for the respondents that the impugned notices are given under the second proviso and they are, therefore, not barred by limitation inasmuch as they are issued within a period of one year from the dates of the orders of the Appellate Collector.

    8. In our view this contention of the respondents is contrary to the Scheme of section 36(2) including the provisos.

    9. The substantive part of Section 36(2) deliberately uses wide language so that a suo motu revision by the Central Government can be made on any ground which touches the correctness, legality and propriety of the decision under section 35 or section 35-a. A sufficiently long period of limitation for the issue of notice required by the first proviso is provided in the second proviso, probably because the opinion of the Central Government that the appellate order is either not correct or legal or proper is not so prejudicial to the person to be affected by the proposed order as should be the order which would be proposed by the Central Government under the third proviso. This is the reason why the shorter limitation is provided for under the third proviso for reviewing the appellate order because the Central Government is of the opinion that appellate order has resulted in a non-levy or short-levy of duty. Short-levy or non-levy of duty results in great prejudice to the Revenue and revision of that order on that ground would also result in great prejudice to the assessed. Since a finding of short-levy and non-levy and the order passed on such a finding is of comparatively greater importance both to the revenue and the assessed, it is expected that the revenue would be prompt to initiate action by way of revision under the third proviso and the assessed should also be relieved of the risk of such revision after a comparative short period of six months. The third proviso has been inserted by the amendment of 1-7-1978 to distinguish revision relating to order of short-levy or non-levy from the review of other orders. For instance an appellate order for confiscation or penalty may not be an order of short-levy or non-levy and would fall only under the second proviso while the third proviso would not be attracted. On the contrary an order of short-levy or non-levy under section 35 or section 35-a would fall only under the third proviso and not the second one.

    10. The stand taken in the impugned show-cause notices apparently is that the jurisdiction of the Central Government to revise the orders of the Appellate Collector is based on Section 36(2) because these orders are either incorrect or illegal or improper, While any order which is sought to be revised under Section 36(2) must be shown to be incorrect, illegal or improper, it cannot be said that every order sought to be revised there under is of short-levy or non-levy. The later category is carved out of the former and is confined to the third proviso. While it is for the Central Government to choose its language in giving show-cause notices under the first proviso to Section 36(2), the view of the Central Government has to be gathered not only from the language used in the show-cause notices but also by reading the said language with the orders passed under section 35 or 35-a which are sought to be reviewed by the orders proposed in the show-cause notices. Once the notices are read with the orders passed under section 35 or 35-a, it would be clear whether the notices are issued under the third proviso. The language of the impugned show-cause notices in the present case purports to be under the substantive part of Section 36(2). It cannot, however, attract the application of the limitation prescribed under the second proviso because if the notices are read as a whole and particularly if they are read with orders passed by the Appellate Collector, it becomes quite clear that the revision sought by these notices is of appellate orders of short-levy. It may be that along with short-levy the appellate order would also be incorrect or illegal in the opinion of the Central Government. This does not mean, however, that third proviso can be ignored and the notices can fall under the second proviso.

    11. To conclude, the notices having been covered by the third proviso which is a special law, they cannot seek the benefit of the longer period of limitation prescribed in the second proviso which is general law. As the special law prevails over the general law, the impugned notices were barred by limitation and were, therefore, illegal inasmuch as they were, issued after the expiry of a period of six months from the dates of the appellate orders.

    12. In passing we may make it clear that we understand the words "Time limit specified in Section 11-A" used at the end of the third proviso to section 36(2), to mean a period of six months from the date of the order passed under section 35 or 35-a. We emphasise that the expression "relevant date" is not used in the third proviso. The reason, according to us, is that the limitation which is specified in section 11-A has to be read into the third proviso in section 36(2) in relation to the orders passed under section 35 or 35-a. The relevant date in section 11-A is of action taken by assessing authorities and, therefore, it is not applicable and cannot be incorporated in the third proviso to Section 36(2) for the simple reason that the revision under section 36(2) is not of the orders of the original assessing authorities but only of the orders passed in appeal/revision under section 35 or 35-a. We have, therefore, calculated the period of six months for the purposes of the application of the third proviso to Section 36(2) from the date of the appellate orders. It may also be mentioned that the same policy of providing a shorter period of limitation, namely, of six months with reference to duties not levied or not paid or short levied or not paid in full or erroneously refunded is to be found in Rule 9.

    13. In view of this finding we think it is unnecessary to consider the other contentions raised by the petitioner against the impugned show-cause notices.

    14. For the above reasons, the writ petition is allowed and the impugned show-cause notices Exhibit I and Exhibit K in the writ petition are quashed with no order as to costs.

    Use AI to get other relevant cases.

    Comments

    Associated Cement Companies Ltd. v. Union Of India
    (Apr 17, 1980)