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Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

This is a tenants' second appeal under Section 39 of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 against the Rent Control Tribunal's judgment dated 26 April 1979, which accepted the landlady's (respondent's) appeal from an order of the Additional Controller dated 10 February 1975 and directed eviction of the appellants.

The respondent-landlady had filed an eviction petition on clauses (a), (e) and (h) of the proviso to Section 14(1) of the Act (non-payment, bona fide requirement, acquisition of other premises). The Additional Controller dismissed that eviction petition. The Tribunal set aside the Controller's order and granted eviction on ground Clause 14(1)(e) (bona fide requirement).

The tenants (appellants) appealed, raising three principal questions: (1) that the eviction application did not disclose any cause of action; (2) that the premises were not let for residential purposes but used both residentially and commercially; and (3) that the landlady did not bona fide require the premises and had suitable accommodation on the first floor.

Relevant factual matrix (as found in the opinion): the tenancy traces to 1942 when rent notes recited letting for residential purpose; the landlady had been in occupation of the first floor with her husband, who suffered serious heart illness and was medically advised not to climb stairs; the eviction petition was filed on 2 March 1972; one of the original tenants died during proceedings and his heirs were substituted; the Tribunal allowed additional evidence and held the premises were let for residential purposes and that the landlady bona fide required the ground-floor premises for herself and her husband.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the eviction petition discloses a cause of action under Clause (e) of Section 14(1) of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958.
  2. Whether the demised premises were let for residential purposes or for a combination of residential and commercial purposes (i.e., whether they fall within "premises let for residential purposes").
  3. Whether the landlady bona fide required the premises for occupation and had no reasonably suitable residential accommodation (the bona fide requirement and availability of alternative accommodation).

Arguments of the Parties

Appellants' Arguments

  • The eviction application did not disclose any cause of action because it did not specifically plead the ingredients required by Clause (e) of Section 14(1) (premises let for residential purposes; bona fide requirement; landlord's ownership; lack of reasonably suitable accommodation).
  • The premises were used both for residential and commercial purposes — specifically, that Kundan Lal (a predecessor tenant) maintained a lawyer's office in a portion of the premises — so the letting was not purely residential.
  • The landlady did not bona fide require the premises: she had suitable accommodation on the first floor, and the eviction petition was filed belatedly (husband's first heart attack occurred in 1964 but petition filed only in 1972); portions of the ground floor were let to tenants after 1964 and at times vacated and re-let, which, they argued, undermined the claim of bona fide need.
  • The appellants asserted (and sought to rely on) factual material suggesting that a tenant called Epean had vacated and surrendered possession in 1975, and relied on some witness statements and documentary indicia (ration card changes) to argue tenancy changes — challenging the Tribunal's findings on surrender and vacancy.
  • The appellants argued that the Tribunal's finding that the premises were let for residential purposes was perverse.

Respondent-Landlady's Arguments

  • The tenants never pleaded in their written statement that the eviction petition did not disclose a cause of action, nor was such an objection raised before the Controller or the Tribunal; therefore the point cannot be permitted to be raised in the second appeal.
  • If the objection had been taken earlier, the respondent could have cured any defect (for example, by amendment of pleadings) — hence the tenants are not entitled to raise it belatedly.
  • The evidence on record (including the original rent notes dated 3 June 1942) establishes that the premises were let for residential purpose.
  • Evidence (including medical certificates) proves the landlady's husband's heart condition and medical advice that he should not climb stairs; thus the landlady bona fide requires the ground-floor premises and has no reasonably suitable accommodation.
  • No substantial question of law arises; the matter is one of fact (letting purpose and bona fides) and therefore no second-appeal interference is appropriate.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Mttulal v. Radhe Lal, AIR 1974 S.C. 1996 That bona fide requirement is a question of fact (not merely law). The court relied on it to support the view that whether the landlady's requirement is bona fide is a question of fact and not a substantial question of law for second-appeal interference.
Dhanentar Vaid v. Karbans Lal, 1978(2) R.L.R. 703 Finding as to letting purpose is a finding of fact. Used to reinforce that the Tribunal's finding on letting purpose was factual and not a matter raising substantial question of law.
Kartar Singh v. Chaman Lal & others, 1969 R.C.J. 349 Finding as to the purpose for which premises were let is a finding of fact. Relied upon to treat the Tribunal's conclusion on letting purpose as factual and not amenable to interference in the second appeal.
Abdul Hamid & another v. Nur Mohammad, 1977 R.C.R. 301 General principle concerning pleading and proof of ingredients of eviction grounds (cited by appellants). The court noted the case facts were different and that it did not assist the appellants in the present factual matrix.
Banke Ram v. Smt. Saraswati Devi, 1977 R.C.R. 595 (F.B.) Full Bench observations on whether evidence can be looked into in absence of pleadings (not an absolute bar). The court cited it to show a Full Bench did not establish a rule forbidding consideration of evidence on unpleaded points where parties had led such evidence.
Onkar Nath v. Ved Vyas, 1979 (2) RLR 226 Supreme Court dismissal where essential ingredients under the applicable Rent Restriction Act were neither pleaded nor supported by evidence. The court observed Onkar Nath did not consider the situation where evidence existed despite absence of specific pleading; thus it did not control the present facts.
Nedunuri Kameswaramma v. Sampati Subba Rao, AIR 1763 S.C. 884 Where parties went to trial knowing the rival case and led evidence, absence of a formal issue or pleading is not necessarily fatal; evidence can permit correct conclusion. The court relied on it as directly supporting the proposition that if parties have led and adduced evidence on matters, a defect in framing an issue/pleading does not require dismissal or remittal.
Smt. Kaushalya v. Mangtoo & another, 1969 P.L.R. (Delhi Section) 117 In a regular second appeal, a plea not raised in the written statement may be rejected. Used to support refusal to permit a new objection (failure to disclose cause of action) to be raised first time in second appeal.
Kanwar Singh v. Maman Chand, 1980 (1) R.C.R. 678 If ingredients for bona fide requirement are not pleaded but parties led evidence on them, eviction petition need not be dismissed where no prejudice is shown. Cited to support the court's conclusion that the tenants could not be allowed to raise the plea at second appeal stage when evidence on those ingredients had been led without protest.
Paramjit Singh & others v. Bawa Gurdas Ram & others, 1978 (2) R.C.J. 40 Ingredients of bona fide not pleaded but evidence was considered; tenants were not permitted to raise the objection at revisional stage. Relied upon to reinforce the principle that lack of pleading is not fatal where evidence has been led and no prejudice is shown, and the point was not raised below.
Hans Raj Dwar & another v. Shyam Kishore, 1977 (2) R.L.R. 253 Inadequacy of pleadings is not fatal if no prejudice was caused to either party. Used to support refusal to non-suit the respondent for defects in pleading when evidence had been led and no prejudice shown.
Rattan Lal v. Vardesh Cahnder & others, 1976 R.C.R. 355 The Rent Act anticipates elaborate pleadings but also uses particulars proforma which functions like a plaint. Referred to show the statutory scheme contemplates certain pleadings but does not mandate non-suiting where evidence was led and matters were known to parties.
Gurdial Nagdev v. Smt. Devi Bai, 1979 (1) R.C.R. 119 Failure to plead ingredients does not necessarily result in dismissal if parties knew the points of controversy and were not taken by surprise. Used to buttress the court's conclusion that absence of pleading was not fatal given the evidence and conduct of parties in the case.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court proceeded in a stepwise factual and legal analysis, adhering to the trial and appellate findings contained in the record:

  1. Letting purpose: The rent notes dated 3 June 1942 expressly recited that the premises were let for residential purpose. The Tribunal's finding that the premises were let for residential purpose was supported by these documents and by oral evidence. The appellants' oral testimony that a portion had been used as a lawyer's office was weak: the key predecessor (Kundan Lal) had died, no heir of Kundan Lal gave evidence to support the commercial user, and no documentary proof of a commercial letting was produced. The court therefore found the Tribunal's finding on letting purpose was not perverse and was supported by the record.
  2. Bona fide requirement: The respondent produced medical certificates and evidence that her husband suffered coronary thrombosis and was advised not to climb stairs. The petition was filed on 2 March 1972 contemporaneously with the husband's hospitalisation on 6 March 1972. Although the first attack dated to 1964 and some portions of the ground floor had various tenants subsequently, the court held that delay or occasional re-letting did not negate a bona fide present requirement in 1972. The court accepted the Controller's and Tribunal's findings (after noting issues of alleged surrenders and vacancies) that the respondent had no reasonably suitable accommodation and that her requirement was bona fide.
  3. Alleged surrender and vacancy: The appellants argued a tenant (Epean) had surrendered possession in 1975, but the court observed the alleged surrender post-dated the filing of the eviction petition (filed in 1972) and the evidence did not establish surrender to the landlady. The court found that the occupant may have inducted a cousin, but that did not amount to the landlady having regained possession; thus the asserted surrender did not undermine the landlady's bona fide need established at the time of institution.
  4. Pleading of cause of action: The court identified the four essential ingredients that must be pleaded under Clause (e) of Section 14(1): (1) premises were let for residential purposes; (2) bona fide requirement by the landlord for occupation; (3) landlord's ownership; (4) landlord has no reasonably suitable residential accommodation. It acknowledged these were not expressly pleaded in the eviction petition. However, the tenants never challenged the petition on that ground in their written statement nor before the Controller or Tribunal; indeed, the tenants themselves pleaded that the premises were used for both residential and commercial purposes and that the landlady had sufficient accommodation (i.e., they addressed the factual points in issue).
  5. Evidence led despite absence of pleading: The court reviewed authorities and concluded that where parties themselves led and adduced evidence on matters and no party was taken by surprise or prejudiced, a defect in pleading does not automatically bar consideration of evidence or require dismissal. The court cited decisions (including a Supreme Court ruling) that support this approach where parties have had full opportunity to present and challenge evidence and do not claim they require further material.
  6. Procedural fairness and timing of objection: The court emphasized that an objection that a plaint/eviction petition does not disclose cause of action must be taken promptly — at the earliest — and could have been cured by amendment under Order 6 Rule 17, or the plaint rejected under Order 7 Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure if properly and timely raised. Because the tenants did not raise this objection at the appropriate stage, and evidence on the relevant ingredients was recorded without protest, the court refused to entertain the objection first raised in the second appeal.
  7. Conclusion on appealability and substantial question of law: The court treated the central contested points (letting purpose, bona fide need, lack of alternative accommodation) as findings of fact supported by evidence and precedent, and therefore concluded no substantial question of law arose warranting interference in a second appeal.

Holding and Implications

Holding: APPEAL DISMISSED.

Direct implications for the parties:

  • The Tribunal's judgment dated 26 April 1979 (which set aside the Controller's order and ordered eviction under Section 14(1)(e)) stands upheld by this court.
  • The tenants' second appeal is dismissed with costs; the court awarded counsel fee of Rs. 300.

Broader implications and precedent-setting:

The court noted that its decision did not raise any substantial question of law and therefore did not lay down new legal principles. It applied established principles: (a) findings as to letting purpose and bona fide requirement are primarily factual; (b) absence of specific pleading of ingredients of an eviction ground is not necessarily fatal where the parties have led evidence on those matters and no prejudice resulted; and (c) objections that a pleading does not disclose cause of action must be raised at the earliest opportunity and may be cured by pleading amendment under the Civil Procedure rules. The court relied on existing authorities for these propositions rather than announcing novel legal rules.

Result: Appeal Dismissed. Counsel fee awarded: Rs. 300.

    Mrs. Kundan Lal Mehta Alias Chanchal Mehta v. Smt. Parkash Wati

    Sultan Singh, J.:— This is tenants' appeal under Section 39 of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 (hereinafter called “the Act”) against the judgment and order of the Rent Control Tribunal dated 26th April, 1979 by which it accepted the landlady's appeal from the order of the Additional Controller dated 10th February, 1975 and passed an order of eviction against the appellants. The landlady respondent brought an eviction petition on grounds mentioned in Clause (a), (e) and (h) of the proviso to sub-section (1) of Section 14 of the Act. The Additional Controller dismissed the eviction petition.

    2. The landlady filed an appeal before the Tribunal. The order of the Controller was set aside and an eviction order under Section 14(1) (e) of the Act was passed on 26th April, 1979.

    3. The learned counsel for the appellants raises three questions in this appeal:

    (1) The eviction application does not disclose any cause of action.

    (2) The premises were not let for residential purposes but were let and used both for residential and commercial purposes.

    (3) The landlady does not require bona fide the demised premises and she has suitable accommodation on first floor.

    4. The learned counsel for the landlady in reply submits that the tenant, neither raised any plea in the written statement that the eviction petition did not disclose any cause of action, nor such an objection was ever argued either before the Controller or the Rent Control Tribunal. He further submits that such an objection cannot be allowed to be urged in second appeal because the respondent has had no notice previously and if an objection had been taken in the first instance, the respondent could have removed the objection, by amendment of pleadings or otherwise. He further says that the appellants never raised any objection at the time of recording of evidence, that evidence on all the ingredients of Section 14(1)(e) of the Act has been recorded at instance of both the parties and the appellants have always been aware of the case set up by the landlady under clause 14(1)(e) of the Act. He further submits that no appeal lies as no substantial question of law in involved. On merits, he submits that the premises were let out for residential purpose alone in accordance with the rent notes executed by the predecessors of the appellants, that the landlady bona fide requires the suit premises and that she has no other reasonably suitable accommodation.

    5. For deciding the questions involved in this appeal the relevant facts are:

    Thakur Dass, predecessor of the appellants was the owner of the suit property. He was father of Kundan Lal and Roshan Lal. Kundan Lal was the predecessor of appellants No. 1 to 5. Thakur Dass on 3rd June, 1942 sold the suit property to one Pyare Lal by means of the sale deed Ex. AX/4. He and his son Kundan Lal attorned to Pyare Lal and executed two rent notes Ex. AX/1 and Ex. AX/2 on 3rd June, 1942. By these rent notes the premises now in dispute were taken on rent by Thakur Dass and Kundan Lal for their own residence. Pyare Lal sold this property to Jawainda Mal by means of a registered sale deed dated 24th October, 1943. Jawaindal Mal executed a release deed dated 28th January, 1947 with respect to the suit property and his other properties in favour of his daughter-respondent-landlady who thus became owner of the property. The respondent's husband is B.N Chadha. It appears that the respondent's husband suffered an attack of Coronary Thrombosis with acute mycardial infraction on 23rd November, 1964 and he was hospitalised for about three weeks at Sir Ganga Ram Hospital. He was advised by the doctors that it was inadvisable for him to climb stairs. It may be mentioned that the respondent landlady with her husband has been in occupation of the first floor of the suit premises. She accordingly filed a petition under Section 19 of the Slums Areas (Improvement & Clearance) Act, 1956 and the Competent Authority by order dated 5th April, 1966 granted the permission. In pursuance of this permission the present eviction proceedings out of which the second appeal has arisen, were initiated by the respondent-landlady on 2nd March, 1972 on ground of bona fide need, non-payment and acquisition of other premises i.e under Clauses (e), (a) & (h) of the proviso to Section 14(1) of the Act. This eviction petition was filed against Kundan Lal and Roshan Lal, sons of Thakur Dass. It appears that after the death of Thakur Dass, his two sons became tenants. The monthly rent mentioned in the two rent notes was Rs 20 each. The respondent treated the two tenancies as one. She claims rent at Rs 40 per month and there is no dispute that the appellants used to pay the same to her. There is no plea that the terms of tenancy were ever changed since the inception of tenancy in June, 1942. Kundan Lal died in May, 1972 during the pendency of the eviction proceedings and therefore appellant Nos. 1 to 5 being the widow, sons and daughter of the deceased were substituted. The respondent-landlady in her eviction petition claimed possession of the property on ground of bona fide requirement, which is now the only surviving ground of eviction. She pleads that her husband is not keeping well as disclosed in the medical certificates attached to the petition, that she is the owner and she requires the suit premises which are on the ground floor, bona fide for herself and for her husband. Appellant Nos. 1, 2 and 6 in their written statement deny the claim of the respondent-landlady the plead that the tenancy premises have always been used for residence and commercial purposes since the inception of the tenancy, that Kundan Lal was a lawyer and he had been running an office in a portion of the suit premises, that the landlady does not require the premises and that she has been in occupation of sufficient accommodation. The Additional Controller dismissed the eviction petition holding that the premises are not proved to have been let out for residential purposes. He further held that the landlady required the premises inasmuch as she was living with her husband on the first floor and her husband was suffering from heart disease and it was in the interest of the health of the husband that the landlady should live in the ground floor premises. The ground under Clause (h) of Section 14(1) of the Act was negatived on the ground that Roshan Lal admittedly had not acquired any other residence. The ground of non-payment was not pressed before the controller. The respondent-landlady filed an appeal under Section 38 of the Act before the Tribunal. The Tribunal permitted the respondent-landlady to lead additional evidence to prove the said original rent notes executed by Kundan Lal and Thakur Dass Ex. AX/1 and Ex./2. These have been duly proved in accordance with law. The tribunal after considering the evidence on record held that the premises were let for residential purposes, that the landlady bona fide needed the demised premises and that she was not in possession of reasonably suitable residential accommodation for her on account of health reasons. Hence this second appeal by the tenants appellants.

    6. LETTING PURPOSE: To determine whether the premises were let for residential purpose, there are two rent notes executed by the tenants on 3rd June, 1942. The rent notes recite that the premises were taken on rent for residential purpose. The case of the appellants is that a portion of the suit premises have always been used as an office of a lawyer. Admittedly, Kundan Lal was a lawyer. He died before the recording of the evidence. His son is also a lawyer. No heir of Kundan Lal appeared as a witness to support their case that any portion of the suit premises was used as a lawyer's office. No documentary evidence to show that any part of premises was ever used as a lawyer's office was placed on record by the appellants. Oral evidence was produced on behalf of the appellants and they depose that some portion of the premises was used as a lawyer's office by Kundan Lal before he shifted his officer to the Supreme Court Chambers. This oral evidence is of no value. What is to be determined is for what purpose the premises were let initially i.e in 1942. No evidence has been led on behalf of the appellants that the premises were let for residential-cum-non-residential purposes. On the contrary there is documentary evidence. It conclusively proves that the premises were let for residential purpose. It was argued by the learned counsel for the appellants that the finding to the effect that the premises were let for residential purposes is perverse. I do not agree. There is documentary evidence and oral evidence to show that the premises were let for residential purposes. The only evidence led by the appellants is about the using of the premises as a lawyer's office, that evidence is of no value because the documentary evidence which was available with the heirs of Kundan Lal was never produced and no witness amongst the heirs of Kundal Lal ever entere into the witness box. In any case the oral evidence produced by the appellants about user of the premises does not inspire any confidence into the face of the two rent notes. I, therefore, hold that the finding returned by the Tribunal that the premises were let for residential purpose is supported by documentary and oral evidence on record and that it is not perverse.

    BONA FIDE REQUIREMENT:

    7. Learned counsel for the appellants contends that the landlady's husband had heart trouble in November, 1964 she took proceedings to obtain permission under the Slum Areas (Improvement & Clearance) Act with a view to institute the eviction proceedings but she filed the present eviction case in March, 1972. This late filing according to him shows that she never required the premises. He further, says that there have been various tenants on the ground floor premises. One portion was vacated a number of times since November, 1964 when the landlady's husband had a first heart attack but she had been letting out the same in 1965, 1969 and 1975. From the evidence on record and finding returned by the tribunal it is apparent that the landlady's husband suffered heart trouble in November, 1964 and the he suffered two attacks in 1972. The respondent's husband was admitted in the hospital on 6th March, 1972 and the present petition was filed on 2nd March, 1972. It shows that from 1964 to 1972 although he was advised not to climb upstairs and to occupy ground floor premises the proceedings for eviction were not filed but it does not mean that she cannot obtain possession on the ground of bona fide requirement. The respondent's husband has been a heart patient. This is not denied and in any case it is abundantly proved on record. The Controller and the Tribunal after considering the evidence on record have also returned the finding that the respondent's husband has been a heart patient and he is required to occupy ground floor under the medical advice. I do not agree with the submission of the appellant's counsel that the late filing of the eviction petition in 1972, although the respondent's husband suffered heart attack in 1964, shows that the landlady does not require the premises for her residence. It is true that in March, 1964 A.W 3 Epean became a tenant in a portion of the ground floor. He deposes that a tenant by the name of Sarkar and another tenant also by the name of Sarkar were already in occupation of two portions of the ground floor as tenants. One of these Sarkars vacated the premises in 1969 and this portion then was let out to a tenant by the names of Chaliapa. These facts are not denied by the landlady. It is however denied that any portion of the ground floor fell vacant in 1965 or 1975. The Tribunal has observed that the portion had fallen vacant in 1965 but it is not correct if reference is made to the statement of the tenant, A.W 3. The next question as contended by the learned counsel for the appellants is that Epean, A.W 3 surrendered his tenancy, vacated the premises and delivered possession to the landlady. The Tribunal after considering the evidence held that there was no evidence about the surrender of tenancy possessed by him. The learned counsel submits that the finding is perverse and contrary to evidence on record. He refers to the statement of R.W 1 a postman. He deposes that Epean was residing. In his statement dated 17th September, 1976 it is deposed by him that Epean vacated about one year ago i.e 1975 and Chaku is now residing in the same premises. R.W.2 is residing opposite to the suit premises. He deposes that Epean was not residing and Chaku is residing R.W 4 is an official of the rationing department. It is deposed by him that ration card of Epean was cancelled on 20th September, 1975 and that a new ration card was issued to M.C Chaku. Epean appeared as R.W 5. He deposes that he never surrendered the tenancy of the portion of the ground floor, that he never vacated the premises and that he never surrendered possession to the landlady, he admits that his cousin is in occupation of the premises under his tenancy. The respondent's husband was examined and he deposes that Epean continues to be a tenant, that he never surrendered the tenancy and never delivered vacant possession of the premises. Examining the evidence referred to by the learned counsel for the appellant it cannot be said at all that the respondent landlady was ever delivered possession of any premises which are under the tenancy of Epean R.W 5. It may be noted that he may have inducted his cousin Chaku in the premises. The respondent landlady is not in possession, she may have to take action under Section 14 of the Act to evict him but it is not necessary that on this ground she can be non-suited. The alleged surrender of tenancy is of September, 1975 while eviction petition was filed in March, 1972. Thus there is no force in the submission of the learned counsel for the appellant that any portion of the ground floor was surrendered or vacated in September, 1975. Taking the totality of the circumstances, I am of the opinion that vacation of a ground floor portion by a tenant namely Sarkar and letting out the same to Chaliapa in 1969 does not show that the respondent's need is not bona fide. It may be termed as negligence on her part but it does not mean that if she had not initiated the proceedings prior to March, 1972. She can be non suited even now when the heart trouble of her husband still continues. He has been advised not to climb upstairs and to reside on the ground floor. No premises on the ground floor have fallen vacant after the institution of the eviction proceedings. I am thus of the opinion that the respondent landlady has no reasonable suitable accommodation with her and that that her husband is a heart patient and that she requires the suit premises which are on the ground floor for the residence of herself and for her husband. The requirement is also bona fide. Learned counsel for the respondent further contends that the findings regarding letting purpose, bona fide requirement and that the landlady has no other reasonably suitable accommodation are findings of fact and no substantial question of law is involved. The question whether the requirement of the landlady is bona fide is a question of fact and not a mild question of law and fact as has been held in Mttulal v. Radhe Lal AIR 1974 S.C 1996(1). The conclusion of the tribunal that the premises were let for residential purpose is supported by documents and there is ample evidence and therefore no substantial question of law is involved in the appeal. [See: Dhanentar Vaid v. Karbans Lal, 1978(2) R.L.R 703 (2)]. The Supreme Court in Kartar Singh v. Chaman Lal & others, 1969 R.C.J 349(3) also observed that the finding as to purpose for which the premises were let is a finding of fact.

    The last question requiring decision is whether the eviction petition does not disclose cause of action and if not, to what effect?

    The respondent-landlady in the eviction petition pleads:

    “The petitioner is the owner of House No. 2458, Gali No. 9/10, Beadonpura, New Delhi and in which the demised premises are part thereof. The premises are bona fide required for the residence of the petitioner and her dependant family members. The premises are also needed for the petitioner & the husband of the petitioner, who are not keeping well. Medical certificates are annexed and marked Annexures A/2 and A/3”

    The appellants in the written statement plead that the premises have been used both for residence and for commercial purposes since the inception of the tenancy, that Kundan Lal was a practising lawyer and has a regular office in the said premises, and that the landlady and her husband have already in their possession sufficient accommodation.# From reading of the eviction petition it appears that the respondent-land-lady did not plead that the premises were let for residence. She also did not plead that she had no other reasonably suitable residential accommodation.

    “S. 14 (1)(e) that the premises let for residential purposes are required bona fide by the landlord for occupation as a residence for himself or for any member of his family dependent on him, if he is the owner thereof, or for any person for whose benefit the premises are held and that the landlord or such person for whose benefit the premises are held and that the landlord or such person has no other reasonably suitable residential accommodation:

    Explanation:—For the purposes of this clause, “premises let for residential purposes” include any premises which having been let for use as residence are, without the consent of the landlord, used incidentally for commercial or other purposes;”

    9. To constitute cause of action a landlord has to plead the following facts:

    1. The premises were let for residential purposes.

    2. The premises are required bona fide by the landlord for occupation as a residence for himself or for any member of his family dependent on him.

    3. The landlord in the owner of the premises.

    4. The landlord has no other reasonably suitable residential accommodation.

    It is correct that ingredient 1 to 4 required to be pleaded are not pleaded in the eviction application. No objection was taken by the appellants-tenants in their written statement that the eviction petition does not disclose any cause of action. It was also never argued before the Controller and the Rent Control Tribunal. The Tribunal in its order observe as follows:

    “Only points which have been agitated before me are with regard to the letting purpose of the demised premises and the bona fide requirement of the appellants for having the demised premises for occupation as a residence for herself and for her family members dependent upon her”.

    It is therefore clear that neither the objection was pleaded nor argued either before the Controller or the Tribunal. The learned counsel for the appellants contends that pleading and proving the four ingredients of clause (e) of Section 14(1) of the Act are necessary before an order of eviction can be granted. This is correct. If all the ingredients constituting the cause of action within the meaning of clause (e) of Section 14(1) of the Act are not pleaded and proved the landlord is not entitled to an order of eviction. It is also well-known that no evidence can be looked into on a plea which was never raised in the pleadings. What has happened in this case is that the appellants-tenants of their own accord, as stated above, have pleaded in the written statement that the premises were let not only for residence but both for residence and commercial purposes. It is also pleaded by them that the landlady has sufficient accommodation meaning thereby that she has reasonably suitable residential accommodation. When evidence was being led before the Controller it appears that no objection was raised against the recording of the evidence on these two facts. The Controller gave his finding on these two facts, one in favour of the appellants and the other against the respondent. The Tribunal however on considering the evidence reversed the finding of the Controller on question of letting purpose as discussed above. Not only this the appellants-tenants filed an application before the Tribunal that the respondent has reasonably suitable accommodation and sought permission to lead evidence. This was on the point whether Epean, a tenant in a portion of the ground floor, vacated the premises and surrendered the tenancy in September, 1975. So at the instance of the appellants themselves the Tribunal determined that the respondent-landlady has no other reasonably suitable residential accommodation. The question for decision therefore is whether is these circumstances the respondent-landlady is to be non-suited for not pleading the two material ingredients of Clause (e) of Section 14(1) of the Act. This is second appeal. No specific objection was taken in the written statement. It was neither argued before the Controller nor before the Tribunal This is a new point in the appeal which may or may not be allowed to be aruged by the appellants.

    10. The learned counsel for the appellants in support of his contention that if all ingredients under Clause (e) of Section 14(1) of the Act are not pleaded the petition is liable to be rejected, relies upon the following authorities:

    1. Abdul Hamid and another v. Nur Mohammad, 1977 R.C.R 301(4)

    2. Banke Ram v. Smt. Saraswati Devi, 1977 R.C.R 595 F.B.5

    3. Onkar Nath v. Ved Vyas , 1979 (2) RLR 226(6).

    In Abdul Hamid and another (Supra) it does not appear that there was any evidence on record with respect to the various ingredients of Clause (e) of Section 14(1) of the Act. The facts of that case are entirely different and as such it does not help the appellants. In Banke Ram (Supra) (FB) the Court observed, “In the present case we are concerned only with the question as a principle of law as to whether it is essential to plead in an eviction application the ingredients of sub-clause (b) & (c) and not the question that if in a particular case these ingredients are not pleaded, but the parties have led evidence with regard to them, what will be the effect?” Further the Full Bench observed, “it should not be understood that under no circumstances in the absence of pleadings, the evidence regarding the ingredients envisaged in sub-clauses (b) & (c) can be looked into”. The matter before the Full Bench was under Section 13(3)(a)(i)(b) and (c) of the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949. These observations of the Full Bench do not help the appellants. It was not decided by the Full Bench that the evidence regarding the ingredients cannot be looked into in the absence of the pleadings. The Supreme Court in Onkar Nath (Supra) dismissed the eviction application on ground of bona fide personal necessity as the three ingredients under the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949 were not pleaded and proved. It was observed, “There is not a scintilla of evidence nor indeed there is any averment in compliance with there latter conditions”. The Supreme Court in its judgment does not refer to a case where there is no pleading but there is evidence on record in support of the various ingredients of bona fide personal necessity. As already observed, the parties led evidence on the ingredients of Clause (e) of Section 4(1) of the Act. In Nedunuri Kameswaramma v. Sampati Subba Rao AIR 1763 S.C 884 (7) the Supreme# Court has observed:

    “Since the parties went to trial fully knowing the rival case and led all the evidence not only in support of their contentions but in refutation of those of the other side, it cannot be said that the absence of an issue was fatal to the case, or that there was that mis-trial which vitiates proceedings. We are, therefore, of opinion that the suit could not be dismissed on this narrow ground, and also that there is no need for a remit, as the evidence which has been led in the case is sufficient to reach the right conclusion ...... .Neither party claimed before us that it had any further evidence to offer.”

    In the case before me it is not claimed by the appellants that they had to lead any other evidence. This Supreme Court judgment concludes the mater.

    11. The learned counsel for the respondent further argues that this objection is liable to be rejected at this stage in the second appeal. This court in Smt. Kaushalya v. Mangtoo and another, 1969 P.L.R (Delhi Section) 117(8) which is a regular second appeal observed that such a plea is not raised in the written statement the same was liable to be rejected in second appeal. In Kanwar Singh v. Maman Chand. 1980(1)R.C.R 678(9), it was held that in cases of bona fide requirement if ingredients required by the Act are not pleaded but parties lead evidence keeping the ingredients in view, the petition for eviction cannot be dismissed for not pleading the ingredients as no prejudice was caused to the tenant. In Paramjit Singh and others v. Bawa Gurdas Ram & others, 1978(2)R.C.J 40(10) ingredients of bona fide were not pleaded in the eviction application and the evidence thereon was taken into consideration. The tenants were not allowed to raise such an objection at the revisional stage. This court is Hans Raj Dwar & another v. Shyam Kishore, 1977(2) R.L.R 253(11) observed that the inadequacy of the pleadings, if any, is not fatal to the case if no prejudice was caused to either of the parties. The Supreme Court in Rattan Lal v. Vardesh Cahnder and others, 1976 R.C.R 355(12) in a case under this Act has observed that the Rent Act contemplates in elaborate pleadings but filling out of particulars in a proforma which takes the place of a plaint. Again in Gurdial Nagdev v. Smt. Devi Bai, 1979(1) R.C.R 119(13) this court observed that failure to plead ingredients does not necessarily result in dismissal of petition for ejectment if parties knew the points of controversy and no one was taken by surprise.

    12. If the appellants-tenants had taken the objection in the eviction petition that it does not disclose any cause of action, in their written statement, the respondent landlady would have cured the defect. She is now taken by surprise in the second appeal. The objection, not raised in the courts below to which the respondent has had no notice that it is going to be urged, cannot be allowed to be urged in the second appeal. Further if such an objection has not been taken in the first instance and evidence has been recorded, without any protest, on facts which were not pleaded, the objection cannot be allowed to be raised in the second appeal. The objection that a plaint does not disclose cause of action must be taken at the earliest. If the court on examination finds the objection valid it may reject the plaint under Order 7 Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The court however before rejecting the plaint may allow the same to be amended, if applied for by the party in accordance with Order 6 Rule 17 of the Code. If such an objection has not been taken in the written statement and evidence has been recorded on facts not pleaded, without any protest by the party, and where the parties were aware of the case and pleas of the opposite party at the time of recording of evidence it is not desirable to non-suit a party for his failure to plead facts property specially at the stage of second appeal, or even first appeal if no prejudice was caused to the parties.

    13. In the present case, all the ingredients of Clause (e) of Section 14(1) of the Act were not pleaded and no objection was taken before the Controller and the Tribunal, that the petition did not disclose any cause of action, the tenants themselves pleaded that the premises were not let for residential purposes alone and the landlady has reasonably suitable residential accommodation, and evidence has been recorded on all the ingredients without any# protest, are not prejudiced by absence of pleading. The appellants-tenants therefore cannot be allowed to raise the plea in second appeal that the eviction petition does not disclose any cause of action.

    14. This appeal does not raise any substantial question of law and has no merit. It is, therefore, dismissed with costs, Counsel fee Rs. 300.

    R.SAppeal Dismissed
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