| Nanabhai Vallabhdas v. Nathabhai Haribhai, 9 Bom. H.C Rep. 89 |
Authority that in a special appeal/review an appellate court ordinarily has no power to determine questions of fact or to use new evidence to alter findings of fact made by the trial court. |
The court distinguished it: the cited case concerned review of judgment (not production of additional evidence in appeal) and its ratio is limited — the word “ordinarily” allows for exceptions; the decision does not preclude taking notice of subsequent events in second appeal. |
| Quilter v. Mapleson, (1882) 9 Q.B.D. 672 |
English authority interpreting an appellate rule to give appeals the character of rehearings and to permit the court to make orders according to the state of things at the time of the appeal. |
Cited to support the proposition that appellate courts may make orders based on the state of things at the time of hearing and so may take notice of subsequent changes in fact or law. |
| Attorney-General (At the relation of Tamworth Corporation and others) v. Birmingham, Tame and Rea Drainage Board, (1911–1913) All E.R. 926 |
Authority that the Court of Appeal could make an order as the judge could have made if the case had been heard by him at the date of the appeal; applicable to changes of fact. |
Used to show that subsequent factual changes (not only changes of law) may be taken into account by an appellate court in the interests of justice. |
| Lachmeshwar Prasad Shukul and others v. Keshwar Lal Chaudhuri and others, AIR 1941 F.C. 5 |
Federal Court view that an appeal is in the nature of a re-hearing and that appellate courts can take into account facts or events which have come into existence after the decree appealed against. |
Cited approvingly to reinforce that appellate courts may consider subsequent events; the opinion relies on Varadachariar J.'s statements discountenancing the “court of error” hypothesis. |
| Surinder Kumar and others v. Gian Chand and others, AIR 1957 SC 875 |
Supreme Court approval of the Federal Court approach that subsequent facts may be taken into account on appeal. |
Cited as an approving Supreme Court authority where a new fact was taken into consideration when deciding an appeal. |
| Pasupuleti Venkateswarlu v. Motor & General Traders, AIR 1975 SC 1409 |
Recent Supreme Court approval of the principle that subsequent facts can be considered on appeal. |
Cited as further Supreme Court approval of the approach allowing consideration of subsequent events on appeal. |
| Rameshwar and others v. Jot Ram and others, AIR 1976 SC 49 |
Another Supreme Court decision approving consideration of subsequent facts. |
Cited as additional Supreme Court authority supporting the practice. |
| P.V. Subha Raja v. S.S. Narayana Raja and others, AIR 1954 Madras 1074 |
Case exemplifying the view that Order 41 rule 27 does not apply to second appeals and that second appeals are confined to questions of law (thus excluding additional evidence). |
Identified by the court as one of the typical cases advancing the contrary view; the court expressly disagreed with this line of reasoning. |
| Balvant Yadneshwar v. Srinivas Appaji Kulkarni, AIR 1959 Mysore 244 |
Another case supporting the exclusion of Order 41 rule 27 in second appeals. |
Cited as part of the line of cases which the court considered to take too restrictive a view; the opinion rejects that position. |
| Sumanlal Bhagwandas Kapadia v. Naginlal Bhagwandas Kapadia, AIR 1967 Gujarat 87 |
Case holding that Order 41 rule 27 does apply to a second appeal. |
Placed among authorities that support the application of rule 27 to second appeals; the court agreed with this view. |
| Venku Reddi v. Pichi Reddi and others, AIR 1956 A.P. 250 |
Authority dissenting from P.V. Subha Raja and holding that rule 27 applies to second appeals. |
Cited as supportive of the court's conclusion that rule 27 can apply to second appeals. |
| Vora Ibrahim Akbarali v. The State of Gujarat & Anr., (1968) IX G.L.R. 939 |
Gujarat decision accepting that Order 41 rule 27 does not apply to a second appeal and holding that evidence of subsequent events cannot be admitted in second appeal. |
The court criticized this decision (and two other Gujarat decisions) as per incuriam for omitting to notice Order 41 rule 33 and for failing to distinguish subsequent events from new evidence existing at trial. |
| Thakkar Anandji Parshottamdas and others v. Dharamshi Kalabhai (deceased) and others, AIR 1972 Gujarat 70 |
Gujarat decision holding the proposition that rule 27 does not apply to second appeals. |
Identified and criticized by the court as following the restrictive approach that the court rejected. |
| Lilaram Jamiatrai and others v. Meghraj Hardasmal Kalwani and others, AIR 1972 Gujarat 65 |
Gujarat decision which, by analogy, excluded admission of evidence of subsequent events in revision exercisable only on matters of law. |
Criticized by the court for omitting consideration of Order 41 rule 33 and treated as per incuriam. |
| Sawan Singh and another v. Haveli Shah Sardari Lal and another, AIR 1935 Lahore 32 |
Example of a second appeal where Order 41 rule 33 was used to take note of change in facts. |
Cited as authority that rule 33 has been used in second appeals to notice subsequent events; supports the court's conclusion. |
| Doman Sahu and another v. Gangu Nayek, AIR 1940 Patna 300 |
Another case where Order 41 rule 33 was applied in a second appeal to notice factual change. |
Cited as additional authority for the application of rule 33 in second appeals. |
| Miss Badhani v. A. Hoogewarfe, 1975 R.C.J. 262 (Raj.) |
Second appeal under a Rent Control statute in which subsequent events were taken into account. |
Cited as an equivalent instance (rent control context) where subsequent events were considered by an appellate court. |
| Harbans Singh v. Sohan Singh and another, 1962 P.L.R. 834 |
Case stating reasons why an appellate court takes notice of subsequent events: to avoid unnecessary litigation and to do complete justice between the parties. |
Cited to justify taking notice of subsequent events in the present second appeal for reasons of justice and finality. |
| Kesar Das v. Bakshi Ram and another, 1965 P.L.R. 1165 |
Observation that the requirements of a landlord are not static and keep changing. |
Cited to show that, where grounds of eviction may vary over time, justice may require that the latest facts be known and considered. |