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  • Section 10(1) of the Delhi High Court Act
  • S. 10(1) of the Delhi High Court Act
  • S. 5(1) of the Delhi High Court Act
  • S. 5(2) of the Delhi High Court Act,
  • Bombay City Civil Courts Act
  • DELHI HIGH COURT ACT
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citation codes
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Attorney(S)
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  • Section 10(1) of the Delhi High Court Act
  • S. 10(1) of the Delhi High Court Act
  • S. 5(1) of the Delhi High Court Act
  • S. 5(2) of the Delhi High Court Act,
  • Bombay City Civil Courts Act
  • DELHI HIGH COURT ACT
Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

This opinion arises from an appeal against an order of a learned single Judge in Suit No. 117 of 1974 filed by Mrs. Sushila Sabharwal against Mrs. Shanta Sabharwal and others for partition and separate possession of a house. The defendants sought to amend their written statement to plead the existence of a joint Hindu family business, but the learned single Judge disallowed the amendment application as not made in good faith. The appellant challenged this order by filing the present appeal.

The broader procedural context involves the question of the maintainability of such an appeal under Section 10(1) of the Delhi High Court Act, specifically whether appeals against orders of single Judges exercising ordinary original civil jurisdiction lie under the Code of Civil Procedure or under the Letters Patent jurisdiction of the High Court. A previous five-Judge Full Bench decision in University of Delhi v. Hafiz Mohd. Said had held that the appeal is governed by the Code of Civil Procedure and not by the Letters Patent. The appellant sought reconsideration of this position by a larger Bench.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether an appeal lies under Section 10(1) of the Delhi High Court Act against an order of a learned single Judge exercising ordinary original civil jurisdiction in the High Court.
  2. Whether the word "Judgement" in Section 10(1) of the Delhi High Court Act should be interpreted in the same broad sense as under clause (10) of the Letters Patent originally granted to the High Court of Lahore and subsequently applied to the Delhi High Court.
  3. Whether the earlier Full Bench decision in University of Delhi v. Hafiz Mohd. Said should be reconsidered in light of subsequent Supreme Court decisions, particularly Shanti Kumar R. Canji v. Home Insurance Co. of New York.
  4. Whether it is expedient to refer the question of interpretation of Section 10(1) of the Delhi High Court Act to a larger Bench of seven Judges.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

  • The appeal is maintainable under Section 10(1) of the Delhi High Court Act because the term "Judgement" therein should have the same meaning as in clause (10) of the Letters Patent, which includes orders allowing or disallowing amendments affecting rights and liabilities.
  • The Supreme Court decision in Shanti Kumar R. Canji supports a broader interpretation of "Judgement" to include such orders, potentially undermining the Full Bench decision in University of Delhi.
  • The Full Bench decision should be reconsidered by a larger Bench as the Supreme Court ruling might have changed the legal landscape.

Respondent's Arguments

The opinion does not contain a detailed account of the respondent's legal arguments.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
University of Delhi v. Hafiz Mohd. Said, ILR (1972) 2 Delhi 1 (FB) Appeals against orders of single Judges exercising ordinary original civil jurisdiction governed by the Code of Civil Procedure, not Letters Patent. Affirmed as the settled law; the Full Bench decision conclusively governs the maintainability question.
Shanti Kumar R. Canji v. Home Insurance Co. of New York, AIR 1974 SC 1719 The word “Judgement” in Letters Patent can include orders allowing/disallowing amendments if they affect rights and liabilities. Found not to alter the legal position existing at the time of the Full Bench decision; does not change the meaning of “Judgement” under Section 10(1) of the Delhi High Court Act.
Central Bank of India v. Gokal Chand, AIR 1967 SC 799 Only orders affecting rights and liabilities can be called “Judgement.” Reaffirmed this principle; uncertainty remains in distinguishing procedural orders from those affecting rights.
The Public Trustee v. Rajeshwar Tyagi & Others, ILR (1973) 1 Delhi 29 (DB) Distinction between appeals under Letters Patent and appeals under Section 10(1) of the Delhi High Court Act based on the nature of jurisdiction exercised by single Judges. Supported the view that appeals against ordinary original civil jurisdiction orders lie under the Code of Civil Procedure.
Aswini Kumar Ghosh v. Arabinda Bose, AIR 1952 SC 369 Historical distinction between ordinary original civil jurisdiction of Chartered and non-Chartered High Courts. Used to explain why the meaning of “Judgement” differs in Letters Patent of different High Courts.
State of Bombay v. Narottamdas Jethabhai, AIR 1951 SC 69 Validity of City Civil Courts Act and transfer of jurisdiction from High Courts to City Civil Courts. Contextualized the evolution of original civil jurisdiction in Presidency Towns.
Raja Soap Factory v. S.P Shantharaj, AIR 1965 SC 1449 Extraordinary original civil jurisdiction limited to suits transferred by special legislation; appellate jurisdiction alone insufficient for transfer. Supported the distinction between ordinary and extraordinary original civil jurisdiction and the limited scope of appeals under Letters Patent.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court reaffirmed the Full Bench decision in University of Delhi v. Hafiz Mohd. Said that appeals against orders of single Judges exercising ordinary original civil jurisdiction in the Delhi High Court are governed by the Code of Civil Procedure and not by the Letters Patent. The Court carefully analyzed the historical and jurisdictional distinctions between the ordinary original civil jurisdiction of Chartered High Courts (like Bombay, Calcutta, Madras) and the extraordinary original civil jurisdiction exercised by non-Chartered High Courts (such as Delhi).

The Court noted that the Supreme Court decision in Shanti Kumar R. Canji did not alter the legal position because it did not redefine the meaning of “Judgement” under the relevant Letters Patent clauses but only reaffirmed that only orders affecting rights and liabilities qualify as judgements. The difficulty in distinguishing procedural orders from those affecting rights remains unresolved.

Additional reasons supporting the Full Bench decision were considered, including the legislative intent behind Section 10(1) of the Delhi High Court Act and the practical need to limit the number of appeals to expedite case disposal. The Court emphasized the undesirable consequences of treating all orders of single Judges as appealable, which had led to delays and excessive litigation.

The Court also highlighted the different origins and scope of jurisdiction inherited by the Delhi High Court compared to Chartered High Courts, justifying the narrower interpretation of “Judgement” in the context of Section 10(1) of the Delhi High Court Act.

Finally, the Court found no expediency in referring the issue to a larger Bench of seven Judges, given the settled nature of the law and the absence of conflicting judicial decisions on this local statutory provision.

Holding and Implications

The appeal is not maintainable and is dismissed with no order as to costs.

The Court denied the application for a certificate of fitness for appeal to the Supreme Court, reasoning that there is no conflict of judicial decisions on the issue, and the possibility of two equally plausible views is remote. The decision upholds the finality of the Full Bench ruling, ensuring that appeals against orders of single Judges exercising ordinary original civil jurisdiction in the Delhi High Court continue to be governed by the Code of Civil Procedure.

This ruling directly affects the parties by dismissing the appeal and prevents proliferation of appeals on similar procedural grounds in the Delhi High Court. No new precedent beyond affirming the existing Full Bench decision was set.

    Smt. Shanta Sabharwal v. Smt. Sushila Sabharwal And Others

    V.S DESHPANDE, C.J:— After a five-Judge Bench in University of Delhi v. Hafiz Mohd. Said, ILR (1972) 2 Delhi 1 : (AIR 1972 Delhi 102 (FB)) to which one of us (Deshpande, J. as he then was) was a party, held that the maintainability of an appeal against an order of a learned single Judge exercising ordinary original civil jurisdiction in this Court is governed by the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure and not by those of Letters Patent, the question is concluded for this Court. Nevertheless, attempts are being made from time to time to persuade different Benches to take a different view, and if necessary, to refer the question to a larger Bench of seven Judges. It would, therefore, be necessary to consider the expediency of reference also in deciding upon the maintainability of this appeal.

    2. In Suit No. 117 of 1974 filed by Mrs. Sushila Sabharwal against Mrs. Shanta Sabharwal and others, for the partition and separate possession of the house in which both the parties proceeded on the footing of an absence of joint Hindu family business the defendants had applied for taking up the plea of the existence of a joint Hindu family business by amending their written statement. The amendment was disallowed by the learned single Judge as not being sought in good faith. This appeal is against the order disallowing the application for amendment.

    3. In urging that the appeal is maintainable under S. 10(1) of the Delhi High Court Act wherein the word “Judgement” has the same meaning as it had under cl.(10) of the Letters Patent originally granted to the High Court of Lahore and which has thereafter applied to the High Court of Punjab and Haryana and the Delhi High Court, the learned counsel argues that the reason given in the University of Delhi case (ILR 1972-2 Delhi 1 at p. 9) : (AIR 1972 Delhi 102 at p. 106) (FB) of the report for holding that such an appeal, as the present one, cannot be entertained under S. 10(1) of the Act is that before the enactment of the Delhi High Court Act no consistent and uniform interpretation was placed on the word “Judgement” as used in the said clause by different High Courts. The legislature in enacting Section 10(1) of the Delhi High Court Act could not have, therefore, intended to use the word “Judgement” in the wider sense which had been given to it by cl.(10) of the Letters Patent.

    4. The learned counsel for the appellant points out that since then the Supreme Court has held in Shanti Kumar R. Canji v. Home Insurance Co. of New York, AIR 1974 SC 1719, that the word “Judgement” in cl.(15) of the Letters Patent of the Bombay High Court corresponding to cl.(10) of the Letters Patent of this High Court can apply to an order allowing or disallowing an amendment of pleading if such an order has the effect of affecting the rights and liabilities of a party to the suit. The learned counsel argues that if this decision had been given before the decision in the University of Delhi case this reason would not have been available for the conclusion reached by the Full Bench and that the decision of the Full Bench could then have been different. He, therefore, submits that the question decided by the Full Bench deserves to be reconsidered by a larger Bench.

    5. After having given earnest consideration to the submission, we find that (1) the decision of the Supreme Court does not change the legal position existing at the time the Full Bench decision was given, (2) additional reasons are found to support those on which the Full Bench decision rested, and (3) even otherwise reference to a larger Bench would not be expedient.

    (1) The decision of the Supreme Court in Shanti Kumar's case (AIR 1974 SC 1719) does not define the meaning of the word “Judgement” as used in cl.(15) of the Bombay and cl.(10) of the Delhi Letters Patent. It only reaffirms the proposition already established in Central Bank of India v. Gokal Chand, AIR 1967 SC 799, that it is only an order which affects the rights and liabilities of parties which can be called a judgement. The uncertainty exists because of the difficulty in drawing the line between an order which is merely procedural and an order which affects any rights and liabilities of the parties. This has been the situation from before the Full Bench judgement as also thereafter and is likely to continue even after the Supreme Court decision.

    (2) The view that the maintainability of an appeal against an order of a single Judge of this Court acting in ordinary original jurisdiction is governed by the Code of Civil Procedure and not by the Letters Patent is supported by additional reasons which were not mentioned in the Full Bench decision.

    (A) In the The Public Trustee… v. Rajeshwar Tyagi & Others…S, ILR (1973) 1 Delhi 29. (AIR 1972 Delhi 362), a Division Bench of this Court to which one of us (V.S Deshpande, J. as he then was) was a party, pointed out the following distinction, namely (i) when a judgement is delivered by a single Judge exercising the jurisdiction inherited from the Punjab High Court under S. 5(1) of the Delhi High Court Act then the appeal against it lies under cl.(10) of the Letters Patent; and (ii) on the other hand, when a single Judge delivers a judgement in exercise of the ordinary original civil jurisdiction obtained by this Court from the Subordinate Court under S. 5(2) of the Delhi High Court Act, then the appeal lies under S. 10(1) of the Act. This position is undisputed. The question that arises is whether the meaning of the word “Judgement” in Section 10(1) of the Delhi High Court Act is the same as that in cl.(10) of the Letters Patent.

    (B) As pointed out in Aswini Kumar Ghosh v. Arabinda Bose, (1953) SCR 1 : AIR 1952 SC 369), by Sastri, C.J from page 6 onwards, there is a historical distinction between original jurisdiction exercised by two groups of High Courts in India. This corresponds to the jurisdiction exercised by the Courts preceding these two groups of High Courts. The then Supreme Courts exercised jurisdiction in the Presidency Towns and the then Sudder Courts exercise jurisdiction the Mofussil. When the Supreme Courts and Sudder Courts were abolished on the one hand their two different kinds of original jurisdiction were transferred to what may be called the non-Chartered High Courts by different Letters Patent which were substantially different from the Letters Patent of the Chartered High Courts. The former Supreme Courts themselves exercised ordinary civil jurisdiction in the Presidency Towns. In the Mofussil, however, the principal Courts of original jurisdiction were the District Courts. The Chartered High Courts succeeding the Supreme Courts in the Presidency Towns obtained an ordinary original civil jurisdiction till then exercised by the Supreme Courts. This continued till city Civil Courts were established in the Presidency Towns taking away the lower pecuniary jurisdiction from the ordinary civil jurisdiction of these Chartered High Courts in the Presidency Towns. A challenge to the validity of the Bombay City Civil Courts Act was negatived by the Supreme Court in the State of Bombay v. Narottamdas Jethabhai, AIR 1951 SC 69. It is significant to note that the ordinary civil jurisdiction was possessed by the Supreme Courts and the Chartered High Courts from the very beginning. Later, a part of it was transferred to the City Civil Courts which corresponded to the District Courts in the Mofussil.

    6-10. The reverse process was in operation in the Mofussil. The Sudder Courts did not have the ordinary original jurisdiction in the Mofussil similar to the one enjoyed by the Supreme Courts in the Presidency Towns. The High Courts established outside the Presidency Towns, therefore, inherited only the appellate jurisdiction of the Sudder Courts, while the principal Courts of original jurisdiction continued to be the District Courts.

    11. Following this distinction the Letters Patent issued to the Chartered High Courts and those issued to the non-Chartered High Courts contained different provisions regarding the exercise of original civil jurisdiction by these two groups of High Courts. The Charters of the Bombay, Calcutta and Madras High Courts contain cls. (11) and (12) which had no corresponding provisions in the Letters Patent issued to the other High Courts. Clause (11) prescribed the local limits of the ordinary original civil jurisdiction of the Chartered High Courts. Clause (12) conferred the said ordinary original civil jurisdiction on these Chartered High Courts. Clause (13) referred to the extraordinary original civil jurisdiction of the High Courts. Such extraordinary jurisdiction was exercised when a suit was transferred from a District Court to the High Court. Clause (15) conferred powers of appeal on these High Courts over the decision of a Judge of the said High Court. Appeals under cl.(15) come from two different jurisdictions. One is the ordinary original civil jurisdiction which has always existed from the inception of the Chartered High Courts inherited from the then Supreme Courts. The other is the extraordinary original civil jurisdiction which is not really original. It is only when a suit is transferred to the High Court from Subordinate Court that it has to be tried as a suit by the High Court. Hence it is called the extraordinary jurisdiction. It is really the jurisdiction to try a transferred suit.

    12-13. The Letters Patent of the other High Courts did not give any ordinary original civil jurisdiction to these Courts because none was inherited by them from the Sudder Courts. The extraordinary civil jurisdiction was possessed by these non-Chartered High Courts simply because every High Court had the power to transfer to itself a suit from a Subordinate Court within its territorial jurisdiction. Under cl.(10) appeals can come to Division Benches of the High Courts from only those decisions of single Judges, which were given in suits transferred from Subordinate Court. Question of any appeal under cl.(10) from the ordinary original civil jurisdiction does not arise at all as the non-Chartered High Courts do not possess it. Its scope and context are, therefore, quite different from those of cl.(15) of the Letters Patent of the Chartered High Courts. Nevertheless, cl.(10) of the Letters Patent of the non-Chartered High Courts including the High Court of Lahore was phrased in the same language as cl.(15) of the Letters Patent of the Chartered High Courts was phrased. It is this deceptive similarity of language between cl.(15) of the Letters Patent of the Chartered High Court and cl.(10) of the Letters Patent of the non-Chartered High Courts which has given rise to the argument that construction of the word “Judgement” in the former should be the same as the construction of the word “Judgement” in the latter. The correctness of this argument was not considered by the five-Judge Full Bench.

    (C) The argument looks only to the similarity of the language of the provisions for appeals in the Letters Patent of the two groups of High Courts in cl.(15) and cl.(10) respectively, but it does not take note of the fact that by far the largest number of appeals under cl.(15) of the Letters Patent of the Chartered High Courts are from the decisions of the single Judge of the High Court exercising ordinary original civil jurisdiction, though a negligible number may be from Judges exercising extraordinary civil jurisdiction, while the appeals under cl.(10) of the Letters Patent of the non-Chartered High Courts are only from the judgements of Judges exercising extraordinary civil jurisdiction, namely, in respect of suits transferred from Subordinate Courts to the High Courts. The question immediately arises whether the meaning of “Judgement” in cl.(15) and cl.(10) of the Letters Patent respectively of these two groups of High Courts would still be the same in spite of the difference between the two different original civil jurisdictions against the exercise of which these two kinds of appeals are preferred to these two kinds of High Courts. In Raja Soap Factory v. S.P Shantharaj, (1965) 2 SCR 800 : (AIR 1965 SC 1449), the proposition was settled that the extraordinary original civil jurisdiction of the High Court was confined to the transfer of only those matters to the High Court in respect of which by special legislation the High Court was specifically invested with jurisdiction. Unless such jurisdiction existed the matter cannot be transferred from Subordinate Court to the High Court. The mere appellate jurisdiction of the High Courts over the decisions of the Subordinate Courts was not sufficient for transferring a matter from the Subordinate Courts to the High Court if the jurisdiction to try such a matter had not been independently conferred on the High Court. It is also well settled that the transfer of a suit from a Subordinate Court to the High Court under S. 24 of the Code of Civil Procedure does not in any way change the nature of the suit. The procedure governing the suit remains the same whether it is tried by a Subordinate Court or by High Court except in so far as the High Court in exercise of its rule making power has made different rules, in respect of suits tried by it. Rules framed by this Court for the trial of suits on its original side do not make any orders passed by Single Judges exercising original civil jurisdiction which is really extraordinary original civil jurisdiction appealable except under S. 104 and O. 43, Civil P.C

    14. On the other hand, the word “Judgement” in cl.(15) of the Letters Patent of the Chartered High Courts has been given a meaning which would include orders even though they are not appealable under S. 104 and O. 43, Civil P.C This is mainly due to the historical reasons that originally and before setting up of the city Civil Courts in Presidency Towns these Chartered High Courts were the principal Courts of original jurisdiction in the Presidency Towns as succeeding the former Supreme Courts in the Presidency Towns. On the other hand, the historical background being different and the Sudder Courts not having enjoyed ordinary original civil jurisdiction the above reason did not exist to justify the same meaning of the word “Judgement” being given in cl.(10) of the Letters Patent of the non-Chartered High Court. It would, therefore, appear that when a suit is transferred from a Subordinate Court to a High Court for trial in its extraordinary original civil jurisdiction it would be governed by the Code of Civil Procedure including the order passed by single Judges during the trial of those suits.

    15-17. An appeal against an order in the extraordinary civil jurisdiction would, therefore, be governed in respect of suit by the Civil P.C Hence the word “Judgement” in cl.(10) of the Letters Patent of the non-Chartered High Courts would not mean anything beyond the decrees and the appealable orders which alone are appealable under the Civil P.C

    (D) It is for this reason that the jurisdiction transferred to this High Court from the Subordinate Courts by the Delhi High Court Act would be more akin in its origin to the extraordinary original civil jurisdiction rather than the ordinary original civil jurisdiction. This is an important consideration why the appeal would be continued to be governed by the Code of Civil Procedure in the suits transferred from the Subordinate Courts to the High Court as also in the suits which are instituted in this High Court only because the pecuniary jurisdiction to some extent has been transferred from the Subordinate Courts to this court. There is no difference in principle in a suit being transferred from a subordinate Court to the High Court and in a suit being instituted in the High Court instead of the Subordinate Court because the higher pecuniary jurisdiction of the Subordinate Courts is itself transferred to the High Court. Both these cases differ essentially from the ordinary original civil jurisdiction of the Chartered High Courts. For, while a Chartered High Court was a principal Court with original civil jurisdiction in a Presidency Town the non-Chartered High Court was not so in the Mofussil.

    (3) If at all any arguments can be mustered in support of two different meanings to be given to the word “Judgement” in S. 10(1) of the Delhi High Court Act it is that meaning which should be accepted which would lead to substantial justice. In these days when number of cases pending in High Courts as well as Subordinate Courts have created a crisis and the legislature, the Government and the Court are concerned as to how to expedite the disposal of cases, a view which leads to the reduction in the number off appeals would be preferable to the view which leads to an increase in their number. In India we have a sophisticated legal system. But, the time has come when the number of appeals available under our procedure may be reduced with a view to terminate litigation finally sooner than later. Recently, the Supreme Court had to consider the question whether it would be constitutional if a criminal case were to be tried in the first instance by the High Court itself with an appeal on facts and law to the Supreme Court rather than being tried first by the Magistrate or by the Sessions Judge and then being subjected to appeals at various stages. The principal change in the procedure was the reduction in the number of appeals. The proposed change was upheld by the Supreme Court as being constitutional.

    18. The Full Bench of five Judges in the University of Delhi case has pointed out how undesirable it would be to treat orders passed by single Judges of the High Court as being appealable under S. 10(1) of the Delhi High Court Act, even though they would not have been appealable under the Code of Civil Procedure. Experience has shown us that trial of suits by single Judges of this Court was exasperatingly delayed, thwarted and stultified by appeals being preferred against them to Division Benches at each stage. The scope of such appeals being larger than the scope of revision under S. 115 of the Civil P.C against orders of Subordinate Courts the evil became worse than the evil effect of too many revisions being filed against orders of the Subordinate Courts. On the recommendation of the Law Commission S. 115 of the Civil P.C has been amended to reduce the number of revisions that can be filed under it. The view adopted by the five-Judge Bench has the same merit of reducing the number of appeals from orders of a single Judge to a Division Bench of this Court. The expediency of this result has been greatly appreciated by all concerned. The Delhi High Court Act being an Act of local operation only in the Union Territory of Delhi the decision of such a large Bench of this Court is likely to be left undisturbed by the Supreme Court. No other High Court would be concerned in construing this Act and the constructions put upon it by this Court has substantially done justice to the litigants. It is certainly, therefore, not expedient particularly when the decision is also justified in law to refer the same question over again to a still larger Bench of seven Judges. After all, it is better to have the final decision quickly rather than chase the will-o'-the-wisp of abstract truth by going from one appeal to another. It is recognised that a final Court of appeal is right only because it is final and not vice versa.

    19. For all these reasons we hold that the appeal is not maintainable and is dismissed with no order as to costs.

    20. An oral application for a certificate of fitness under Art. 133 of the Constitution for appeal to the Supreme Court was made by Mr. F.C Bedi, learned counsel for the appellant. Such a certificate is issued either when there is conflict of judicial decisions on the question of law sought to be raised before the Supreme Court by way of an appeal or two equally plausible views on the question of law can be held. There is no likelihood of any conflict of decisions because this is the only High Court which is concerned with the construction of the Delhi High Court Act. As for holding two equally plausible views, such a possibility is remote. On the contrary, several decisions of this Court have consistently followed the Full Bench decision of five Judges. The oral application is, therefore, dismissed.

    Order accordingly.
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    Comments

    Smt. Shanta Sabharwal v. Smt. Sushila Sabharwal And Others
    (Feb 23, 1979)